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Scotus Academicus Dogmatica

Volume 3 – On the Most Holy Trinity

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SCOTUS ACADEMICUS

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SCOTUS ACADEMICUS
DOGMATICA

VOLUME THREE

THE ENTIRE THEOLOGICAL DOGMAS OF THE SUBTLE DOCTOR, ADAPTED TO THE CLEAR METHOD OF TEACHING OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS

ON THE MYSTERY
OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY

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TO THE READER

This volume presents an English translation of the venerable *Scotus Academicus*, the comprehensive exposition of the theological dogmas of the Subtle Doctor, Blessed John Duns Scotus, as systematically arranged and masterfully elucidated by the Most Reverend Father Claudius Frassen, O.F.M. (1620–1711), Distinguished Doctor of the Sacred Faculty of Paris. The Reverend Father Frassen's profound synthesis illuminates the most sacred mysteries of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity with the remarkable precision and dialectical rigor characteristic of the illustrious Scotist school, rendering the sublime thought of the Blessed Subtle Doctor accessible through the clear and solid pedagogical method of the University of Paris. His work stands as a luminous testimony to the Franciscan intellectual tradition at its height, wherein rigorous dialectic serves the contemplation of divine truth.

The present translation endeavors to make accessible the depths of the Reverend Father Frassen's exposition to contemporary readers unfamiliar with Latin. However, any deficiencies, infelicities, or obscurities in this rendering are solely attributable to the limitations of the translator—one who labors in full awareness of human fallibility and the perpetual need for divine

grace. Such errors must never be imputed to the most venerable author, whose original text remains unblemished in its theological excellence and philosophical rigor.

This translation is based upon the 1900 Roman edition published by the Sallustian Press (Mater Amabilis), working from a digitized text of unfortunately compromised legibility. The Latin text, printed in small typeface across two columns per page, has necessitated not only translation but also reformatting according to contemporary academic standards. Readers should exercise appropriate caution regarding numerical references, patristic citations, and scriptural passages, as these may contain inaccuracies introduced during the digitization process or arising from difficulties in deciphering unclear letterforms.

This translation serves as a humble aid for those not trained in the Latin language. It cannot and does not replace the original work. For all scholarly purposes—including citation, critical analysis, and verification of theological arguments—the Latin edition remains the sole authoritative text, and all citations must refer to the original as the definitive source.

This translation was completed using GPT 5.2 (OpenAI, 2026).

In servitium scientiae et ad
maiorem Dei gloriam.

TREATISE THREE

A BRIEF PREFACE ON ADORING THE MYSTERY OF THE DIVINE TRINITY

"Deep truly calls to deep," and "night to night declares knowledge" (Psalm 42:7; Psalm 19:2), when the theological method summons and leads us from the arduous investigation of the Godhead, essentially subsisting and acting in itself, to contemplate and illuminate the ineffable secret of the Trinity.

For indeed St. Cyril not without reason called the Trinity "to be adored," the mystery of the Divinity at its summit; because —so the mystical Dionysius speaks aptly and wisely—nowhere can the Godhead be more sublime, nowhere more profound, than when it is uniquely distributed, singularly divided, and made manifold, yet without departing from the one.

Hence, in chapter 13 of the book *De Divinis Nominibus*, he gathers that this great mystery is altogether beyond mortal sight: for no monad or triad, he says, nor number, nor Trinity, nor fecundity, nor anything else among those things which either are or are known, proclaims that secret of the supreme Godhead which surpasses all things and overcomes every reason and intellect. Nor does it have a name or an account; rather, it is hidden in those secrets to which no access lies open.

For this reason St. Augustine, in book 1 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 3, declares excellently: Where the unity of the Trinity is sought—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—nowhere is there more dangerous error, nowhere is anything sought with more labor, and nowhere is anything found more fruitfully.

Thus, while we are still mortal, it would be safer for us to imitate on earth those heavenly Seraphim who indeed cry out the divine Trinity with the eternal thrice-holy hymn of sanctity, yet do not disclose even a word about what it is, or with what excellences it shines.

The word of God would suffice for believers, says St. Hilary in book 2 of *De Trinitate*, which has been poured into our ears by the testimony of the Evangelist through the very power of its truth, when the Lord says: GOING FORTH NOW, TEACH ALL NATIONS, BAPTIZING THEM IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER, and so forth. Yet we are compelled by the vices of heretics who blaspheme to do what is illicit: to climb lofty things, to speak what is ineffable, to presume what is unshaken; and whereas we ought to be fulfilled by faith alone in what has been commanded—namely, to adore—we are forced to stretch the lowliness of our speech to what cannot be narrated, and by another's vice we are constrained into a vice.

Hence, after certain matters inserted, not less devoutly than elegantly he adds: Perfect knowledge is to know God (Triune in unity) in such a way that, although you know him not to be unknowable, you nevertheless know him to be inexpressible. He must be believed, he must be understood, he must be adored, and by these offices he must be honored.

Therefore, even in explaining the secret of the divine Trinity, our intention is not that we attempt to attain a clear knowledge of it and weigh it alongside other things. Such

presumption would be vain and such labor futile. Rather, with the torch of faith going before, let us open what Holy Scripture discloses about it, what ecumenical councils teach, what the holy Fathers say—then the Latins, especially St. Hilary in book 12, St. Augustine in book 15, St. Fulgentius in *Adversus objectiones Arianorum*, St. Anselm in the book *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, Richard of St. Victor in six books; then the Greeks, above all St. Athanasius everywhere, St. Basil in the book against Eunomius, St. Gregory Nazianzen in four Orations on Theology, St. Gregory of Nyssa in four Orations on the Trinity, St. Cyril in book 7 of the Dialogues, St. John Chrysostom in five Homilies on the vision of Isaiah, and Damascene in the book *De Fide Orthodoxa*.

Finally, we shall set forth what the Scholastic Doctors—especially the lights of the Franciscan family, namely the Irrefragable Doctor of Hales, the Seraphic St. Bonaventure, and the Subtle Bl. Scotus—have with one consent approved and taught.

But in order to accomplish this in summary form, or by a clear method, we shall complete the present treatise in four disputations. The first will treat the existence, origin, and principles of the divine Persons. The second will explain their constitutive, distinctive, and manifestive principles. The third will disclose the proper character of each divine Person. The fourth, finally, will explain their common properties.

Yet that we may deserve to obtain from God, the giver of all good things, a happy success in the work we have begun, he must first be invoked and called to our aid in those very words in which St. Dionysius invoked him in *De Mystica Theologia*, saying: Trinity, superior in essence, divinity, and goodness, and more excellent guide of the Christians' theology, direct us to the most unknown, most splendid, and highest summit of the divine

mystical writings, where the simple, absolute, and unchangeable mysteries of mystical theology lie hidden, with the darkness of silence that teaches shining forth.

St. Hilary adds near the end of the first book of *De Trinitate*: It is yours to grant what is prayed for, to be present for what is sought, and to open to what is knocked. For we grow numb in a certain sluggish stupor of our nature, and we are held back, by the weakness of our intellect, within the necessity of ignorance, in understanding your things. But the pursuit of your teaching forms us toward the sense of divine cognition and carries us beyond natural opinion by obedience of faith. We therefore await that you may stir up these trembling beginnings of our undertaking; and, as progress increases, confirm us and admit us to fellowship with the voice either of the Prophets or of the Apostles, so that we may grasp their sayings in no other sense than that in which they themselves spoke. Grant us, therefore, the meaning of words, the light of understanding, the honor of their utterances, the faith of truth; and grant that what we believe, we may also speak, and so forth.

But so that it may be evident who were the most hostile assailants of this adorable mystery and who its most vigorous defenders, it has pleased me to set down here the following list of heretics waging war against the most holy Trinity, and likewise an appendix of councils—both general and provincial—asserting and explaining this divine mystery, selected already by certain theologians of no common name, and most recently by our Baronius (a man truly well deserving, both in letters and in the Seraphic Order, by reason of his vast learning and outstanding piety). This is done so that the investigator of this adorable mystery may at the outset perceive what rocks he must avoid and by what path he ought to run in safety.

APPENDIX OF COUNCILS
ASSERTING AND EXPLAINING THE MOST HOLY MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY

THE COUNCIL OF ALEXANDRIA

When the Easterners were suffering not only from dissension in faith but also from dissension of minds to such an extent that in the see of Antioch alone three bishops were sitting, Eusebius of Vercelli came to Alexandria and convened a council of bishops. In it, among other matters, there was discussion about οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, because Hosius, bishop of Córdoba, in order to refute Arius, while he strove to reject the doctrine of Sabellius, disputed about essence and about hypostasis, that is, about person; from which matter was supplied for another contention.

And indeed (as St. Basil noted with precision), the Nicene Synod itself provided fuel for this dispute in them: If anyone should say that the Son of God is from another essence, or hypostasis—that is, substance—the Catholic and Apostolic Church rejects him with anathema. Here you see a distinction placed by the Council between essence and hypostasis, that is,

substance; for if it had held them as synonyms, it would not have placed each separately.

And indeed the acts of this council have almost perished; nevertheless we shall set down what serves our purpose from its synodal letter. For to those who were accusing certain persons as affirmers of "three hypostases," since words of this sort were not found in Scripture and thus could appear suspect, we were authors that they should no longer inquire into the Nicene confession. Yet, because of the obstinate perversity of quarreling, a question was held about these matters.

They were asked whether, in the Arian sense, they wished the substances of persons to be alien, foreign, and diverse from one another, and whether they thought each hypostasis to exist per se and separately, after the fashion of other creatures and of those who are born from men; or whether they understood diverse things, such as gold, silver, and bronze; or whether, like other heretics, under these words they were establishing three principles and three highest gods. But they affirmed that they neither said nor thought this.

When we asked by what reason they said these things, or why they used such terms at all, they answered that they believed in the Trinity, not as to a name only, but as truly Trinity existing and subsisting; and that they acknowledged the Father as truly existing and subsisting, and the Son as existing and subsisting, and the Holy Spirit as subsisting and existing. Yet they did not say three gods or three principles; rather, they would not tolerate it if anyone should say or think such a thing. But they knew the Holy Trinity to exist, such that the Godhead is one and the principle one; and they acknowledged the Son to be coessential with his Father, as the Fathers said, and the Holy Spirit not a creature nor

alien, but proper and inseparable from the essence of the Father and of the Son.

Therefore, when this kind of interpretation and excuse was approved, we in turn examined those who were being accused by the others, as though they said there is one hypostasis, asking them whether, in the Sabellian sense, they spoke so that they wished the Son and the Holy Spirit to be removed in the Trinity, as though the Son lacked essence or the Holy Spirit did not subsist. They too affirmed that they neither spoke nor ever thought so, but that they understood hypostasis to be the same as essence; and that they therefore understood one hypostasis partly because the Son is from the essence of the Father, partly because in the three there is an identity of nature—since they believed one Godhead and one nature, and no different nature of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Indeed, even those who had been accused of introducing three hypostases came to the same sense with these; and in turn those who asserted one hypostasis acquiesced in the interpretation of the others. Both factions alike execrated Arius as an enemy of Christ; and Sabellius and Paul of Samosata as impious; Valentinus also and Basilides as strangers to the truth; Manichaeus likewise as a contriver of evils. Finally, by the grace of God, after such an interpretation of words—most excellent and most exact, as the Nicene Fathers had established—they approved that the faith is one, and they decreed that the words of the same faith suffice, and above all are to be brought into use.

THE NICENE COUNCIL

Since scarcely any of the heretics doubted the person of the Father or his Godhead—because that would be manifest

atheism—no councils were assembled about this; hence the first council was about the Godhead of the Son. I shall weave its history partly from the words of the Council of Chalcedon and partly from the history of Nicaea itself.

Therefore, when the most blessed Sylvester was bishop of the Apostolic See in the city of Rome, and Constantine Augustus and Licinius Caesar were emperors, in the consulship of Paulinus and Julian, most illustrious men, in the year of Alexander 1030 (or, as another edition has it, 1306), on the 13th day before the Kalends of July, on the 19th day of the month according to the Greeks, which is the 13th day before the Kalends of July, a Synod sat at Nicaea, the metropolis of Bithynia, of 318 Fathers—although some say fewer gathered there: Eusebius only 250. Yet the lists and names of the individual Fathers rightly exhibit the commonly received number 318, which some saints also note to be mystical and prefigured in the army of Abraham, which consisted of 318 soldiers.

Although this was not only a general synod but the first of the general synods, I have placed it after the Council of Alexandria because it was later in time, since it is clear from the letter of Pope Julius to Athanasius that the acts of the Alexandrian council were brought forward at Nicaea.

In this solemn assembly, the impiety of Arius and of the Eusebians, who held that the Son of God is less than the Father—indeed, that he is the Father's creature—was struck down and condemned by this eternal creed, so often afterwards ratified and confirmed.

THE NICENE CREED

We believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only-begotten born from the Father, that is, from the substance of the Father: God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, ὁμοούσιον with the Father, that is, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things were made, both those in heaven and those on earth. Who for us men and for our salvation came down, and was incarnate, and was made man; suffered, and rose again on the third day, and ascended into the heavens, and from there will come to judge the living and the dead. And in the Holy Spirit.

But those who say: "There was when he was not," or "He was not before he was made," because he was made from things that do not exist; and those who say that he is from another substance, or that the Son of God is created, or changeable—such persons the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes.

Now, to pursue the history of the Council: the cause of this definition and tenor was that, when (as Athanasius says) the Synod was intent on removing the impious terms of the Arians and wished to employ words that are without controversy from Sacred Scripture—namely, that the Son is and by no means is from non-being, but is from God; and that he is Word and Wisdom; and by no means a creature or a product, but the proper offspring of his Father—the Eusebians, according to their inveterate and depraved custom, wished "from God" to be common also to men, and to pertain to them too, and that Christ differed from us by nothing on that account.

Therefore the Fathers, having noticed their fraud and impiety, were compelled to explain in clearer words what "from God" is, and to write that the Son is from the substance of God,

lest "from God" be thought common and equally to pertain both to the Son and to creatures.

Further, when the bishops again insisted that it also must be written that he is the true power and image of the Father, and like the Father, and immutable in all things and unchangeable, and eternal, and that he subsists undivided in the Father—for he never was not, but always was and subsisted perpetually with the Father, as the radiance of light—the Eusebians indeed endured these things thus far, not daring to contradict, because of the reproach they had suffered when their sayings were refuted; yet they were discovered whispering among themselves, exchanging nods, and applauding one another with their eyes, as though "to be like," "to be in God," and "to be his power" were common to the Son with us, and as though nothing stood in the way of applying these things also to us, because it is written about our likeness to God that man is an image and glory.

But the bishops, having considered their hypocrisy and craftiness (as Scripture says, "deceit is in the hearts of those who devise evil"), were again compelled by necessity to gather the meaning of these matters from Scripture, and to repeat in clearer words what they had said before, and to write that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, so that they might signify not only that he is like by likeness, but that he is the same—by that word by which he is said to be from the Father. Athanasius says much about these things there.

Concerning that word, Marius Victorinus, treating it at length, says: By this one word—ὁμοούσιος—the whole poison of the Arian dogma is destroyed. Learned bishops, O holy ones, O you who confirm the faith by the Spirit, O Word truly Word of God, by which God and λόγος is shown to be eternal and always, and of the same substance. Therefore it is spoken in Latin as

consubstantial; hence it must also necessarily be set down in Greek and treated. Thus he.

THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE

It was convened under Pope Damasus and the Emperor Theodosius the Elder, partly because of a similar cause already treated—about assigning a bishop to the see of Constantinople—but also, and chiefly, to establish the Catholic truth against the Macedonians, namely the adversaries of the Holy Spirit, as the same Council speaks. For, as is clear from the sixth synod, Macedonius denied to the Spirit the Godhead and lordship, and proclaimed him a fellow-servant; but the greatest Emperor Theodosius and Damasus, the adamant of faith, resisted.

It must be known that this Council was and is ecumenical, among those four to which the Greeks—and also St. Gregory the Great—give reverence as to the four Gospels, although it yielded in number of bishops even to other councils that were not general: for there were 150. Yet they were so few because another council was held meanwhile in the West and in the city of Rome under Damasus the Pope, with the same sense and judgment about the same matter, so that those are judged not as two councils but as two parts of the same.

This Council held the faith of the Nicene Synod as ratified and certain in these words: Let not the faith of the three hundred and eighteen Fathers who met at Nicaea in Bithynia be rejected or reproved, but let it remain firm and ratified. And with the utmost execration and detestation it condemns every heresy and perverse and impious opinion, especially of the Eunomians, or Anomoeans; likewise of the Arians, or Eudoxians; likewise of

the Semi-Arians, or those who fight against the Spirit; and of the Sabellians, Marcellians, Photinians, and Apollinarians.

Then it adds its own creed, which differs from the Nicene chiefly in this: that with greater clarity and description it adds what concerns the person of the Holy Spirit.

THE CREED OF CONSTANTINOPLE

We believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, creator of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, born of the Father, before all ages, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, that is, of the same substance with the Father, through whom all things were made, which are in heaven and on earth. Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven. And was incarnate by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary: was made man, suffered under Pontius Pilate, and was buried and on the third day rose again: ascended into heaven, sits at the right hand of the Father; thence he will come with glory to judge the living and the dead, whose kingdom will have no end. We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver; proceeding from the Father, to be adored and glorified with the Father and the Son, who spoke through the prophets. And one Catholic and Apostolic Church. I confess one baptism for the remission of sins; we await the resurrection of the dead and the life of the age to come. Amen

We believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, born of the Father before all ages, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial

with the Father, through whom all things were made. Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven: was incarnate by the Holy Spirit, of the Virgin Mary and was made human. And was crucified for us, under Pontius Pilate. And was buried. And rose again on the third day. Ascended into heaven, sits at the right hand of the Father. He will come again with glory to judge the living and the dead: whose kingdom will have no end. And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, proceeding from the Father, to be adored and glorified with the Father and the Son: who spoke through the holy prophets. And one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. We confess one baptism for the remission of sins: we await the resurrection of the dead and the life of the age to come. Amen.

THE COUNCIL OF EPHESUS

I judge that it does not contribute much to my present purpose, since it is clear that the heresy of Nestorius—against which the Council was assembled—was not so much about the Trinity as about the Incarnation, and more properly about Christ as man than about God the Word. For he nowhere destroyed the substance of the Word of God, as Cassiodorus says in book 12, chapter 4.

Yet because certain authors mingle these heresies, which are indeed neighboring, and because Nestorius himself supplied some kind of foundation—at least in words that raised suspicion—for he says (as cited by Cassiodorus): Do not boast, Jew: you did not crucify God. And in Socrates you will also read, in chapter 2, that very many confess Jesus to be God. I do not confess, says Nestorius, a two-membered or three-membered God. Hence those around Cyril, repeatedly rereading the

homilies of Nestorius which he had produced on this question and judging from them, condemned him as though blaspheming the Son of God.

Be that as it may, the Council was assembled at Ephesus by the authority of Pope Celestine, at the request and with the support of Theodosius the Younger. More than two hundred bishops gathered from the East, in the year of Christ 430. The aforesaid heresy of Nestorius was condemned there, with St. Cyril of Alexandria presiding in the place and name of Pope Celestine.

And because Cyril had composed twelve chapters against as many blasphemies of Nestorius—among which he said that the Holy Spirit is of the Father and of the Son, and proceeds from the Father and the Son—Theodoret, contradicting, wrote that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son, nor from the Father through the Son. From Theodoret's words an occasion was taken that, long afterward, the Greeks denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, although against Theodoret they always held that he proceeds from the Father through the Son.

In any case, the doctrine of faith, or the definitions of this Council, are none other than those contained in its letter to Nestorius. We add, it says, to our writing what you ought to think and teach, and what you ought to abstain from.

Then it sets forth the Nicene Creed as follows: We believe in one God, the Father almighty, creator of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, born from the Father, the only-begotten; that is, from the substance of the Father: God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, ὁμοούσιον with the Father, that is, of one substance with the Father, through whom all things were made in heaven and on earth. Who for us men and for our

salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate and made man, suffered, and rose again on the third day, and ascended into heaven, and from there will come to judge the living and the dead. And in the Holy Spirit.

But those who say: "There was a time when he was not," and "Before he was born he was not," and "He was made from things that do not exist," or who say that he is from another substance, or that the Son of God is changeable or mutable—the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes.

Then it adds twelve chapters or canons, of which these bear on our matter to some extent. If anyone does not confess that Emmanuel is truly God, and therefore that the holy Virgin is Mother of God, let him be anathema. If anyone says that the one Lord Jesus Christ was glorified by the Holy Spirit as though he had used a power alien to himself through the Spirit and had received from him efficacy against unclean spirits and the ability to perform divine signs before men, and does not rather confess that the Spirit by whom he worked divine signs is his own proper Spirit, let him be anathema.

THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON
THE FOURTH ECUMENICAL COUNCIL

It comes closer to our matter, since the heresy it condemned would destroy the Godhead itself in consequence of the Incarnation of the Word. For if in the Incarnation one nature were made from two, then at least in the Word the nature would no longer be pure.

The Synod was assembled under Pope Leo I and the Emperor Marcian; in the consulship of Marcian himself, as the Council testifies in Act 1. It was convened against the error of

Eutyches, a priest or archimandrite, who said that after the Incarnation there was only one nature in Christ—not that one remained from two with the other removed, but that from two one third, or mixed, nature was made.

On this occasion I have thought it necessary to warn readers that after the Fifth Ecumenical Council a dissension arose among Catholics. For very many did not wish to receive the Council of Chalcedon because of the "three chapters" treated in the Fifth Ecumenical Council: the first concerning Theodore of Mopsuestia, whose impious writings are condemned there, though Theodore was not condemned in the Council of Chalcedon; the second concerning Theodoret, whose writings against the twelve chapters of Cyril are there rejected, though the Council of Chalcedon in Act 8 restored Theodoret to his see; the third concerning the letter of Ibas, bishop of Edessa, written to Mari the Persian, which calls St. Cyril of Alexandria a heretic and praises Nestorius, though Ibas was received in the Council of Chalcedon.

Yet all of this can move no one except one who suffers from ignorance of history. For the Council of Chalcedon did not receive their doctrine but their persons, since those men afterward repented and embraced Catholic doctrine; and the Fifth Council condemned not the persons but the doctrine.

In any case, the definition of faith issued by this Council, in its own specific form, is scarcely anything other than an explanation of the creeds of Nicaea and Constantinople, which the Fathers renew with common judgment as they drive out the dogmas of error. We have renewed, they say, the ineffable faith of the Fathers, proclaiming to all the Creed of the 318, and we also enroll as our own Fathers those who afterward gathered at great Constantinople, the 150, who likewise confirmed the same faith.

Therefore we define, keeping the order and all the formulas that have been established concerning the faith; and we decree that the definition of the holy Synod held formerly at Ephesus—whose presidents were of blessed memory Celestine, bishop of the Romans, and Cyril, bishop of Alexandria—should shine forth; that the upright and unblemished exposition of the faith of the 318 holy Fathers who gathered at Nicaea in the times of pious memory Constantine should be preserved; and that what was decreed at Constantinople by the most holy 150 Fathers should also be preserved, both for expelling all heresies that sprout up and for confirming the symbol of the same Catholic and Apostolic faith: the Nicene Creed of the 318 Fathers, "We believe in one God," and so forth; likewise that of the 150 holy Fathers gathered at Constantinople, "We believe in one God," and so forth.

But since in this same Council the doctrine of Pope St. Leo is received, with wondrous praises celebrated by the Council itself, it has seemed good to insert here certain chapters of his, which are as it were canons concerning the definition of faith, from his letter to Turbius of Astorga. The pontiff, as he writes in the preface to the chapters, comprehends opinions long condemned in sixteen chapters, and adds: Let us also briefly review everything, lest any of these blasphemies seem either tolerable or doubtful.

First, then, in the first chapter it is shown how impiously those think about the divine Trinity who assert that the person of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one and the same, as though the same God is now called Father, now Son, now Holy Spirit; and as though there is not one who begets, another who is begotten, another who proceeds from both, but a solitary unity is to be understood in three names, and not in three persons. This

kind of blasphemy they have taken from the opinion of Sabellius; and his disciples are deservedly called Patripassians, because if he who is the Son is the same as he who is the Father, then the cross of the Son is the passion of the Father, and whatever the Son in the form of a servant endured by obeying the Father, the Father himself took upon himself. This is without ambiguity contrary to the Catholic faith, which so confesses the Trinity of unity as ὁμοούσιος that it believes Father, Son, and Holy Spirit without confusion undivided, and without time everlasting, without difference equal—whose unity in Trinity is not fulfilled by the same person, but by the same essence.

In the second chapter there is shown the inept and empty invention concerning the processions of certain powers from God, which he began to have and which he, by his essence, preceded—as though he first lacked them. In this they also support the error of the Arians, who say that the Father is prior to the Son because there was some time when he was without the Son, and then began to be Father when he begot the Son. But just as the Catholic Church detests those, so it detests these who think that something which belongs to God's very essence was ever lacking to him; for it is impious to call him mutable and likewise progressing. For what is diminished is changed, and what is increased is also changed.

THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND SEVENTH COUNCILS

These were Greek councils: the two earlier celebrated at Constantinople, the third at Nicaea in Bithynia, as above. I do not pursue them here, because they treated more of persons than of causes. Nor is there lacking someone who says that the Fifth Synod was not only not ecumenical but not even ever ratified—

something one might wonder entered the mind of Baronius, since it is expressly received in the seventh synod, the second of Nicaea.

Yet some things from these pertain here because each confirms the earlier synods; on this one may see Mark of Ephesus discuss at length in Act 6 of the Council of Ferrara. And since the principal controversy in the matter of the Trinity with the Greeks is about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, I shall produce from the seventh synod the Creed, in which it was expressly proclaimed by 350 Fathers, and delivered as a dogma of faith, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

THE CREED OF THE SEVENTH SYNOD
THE SECOND COUNCIL OF NICAEA

We believe in one God, the Father almighty, creator of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, before all ages, through whom all things were made; who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Spirit from the Virgin Mary, and was made man. He was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate, suffered and was buried, and rose again on the third day according to the Scriptures, and ascended into heaven, sitting at the right hand of the Father, and will come again with glory to judge the living and the dead, whose kingdom will have no end.

And we believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, who together with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified, who spoke through the prophets; and in one holy Catholic and Apostolic

Church. We confess one baptism for the remission of sins. And we await the resurrection of the dead and the life of the age to come. Amen.

It is true that the Greeks at the Council of Florence denied to the Latins that the Creed had this wording, and they produced their codices in which the phrase "and the Son" was not read. But, as the acts of that Council in session 5 relate, the Latins brought forward a very ancient book in which that same definition was written, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and so forth. From this it followed that the book at once agreed with the books of the Greeks in all the other things. Moreover, Cardinal Julian, who acted on the side of the Latins, produced a similar author, that is, an ancient historian, who among other things testified that the Creed in the seventh synod was read in this tenor.

From these things anyone can see and marvel at the Church, complaining with Solomon: Who is she who rises up like the dawn, beautiful as the moon? For indeed the Church, like the moon, was gradually filled out and brought to roundness, that is, to perfection; and indeed like the dawn, with time she received increments of light, in this matter most arduous and most holy.

For in the first and principal synod, the first of Nicaea, only the Godhead of the Holy Spirit was defined, and not very clearly, in the words: I believe in the Holy Spirit. In the first Council of Constantinople procession was added: who proceeds from the Father. But in the second Council of Nicaea, which is seventh in order, the procession from the other person also, and thus from both, was defined in the words: who proceeds from the Father and the Son.

GENERAL COUNCILS OF THE WEST

THE COUNCIL OF BARI

I pass over the eighth synod, which was celebrated about the rights of persons in the case of Photius, by whose counsel and work the Greeks began to think against the primacy of the Roman Pontiff and to avoid the Latins as though bound by anathema because of the addition to the Creed of the words "and the Son." Hence no more councils were celebrated in the East, nor in the West commonly by both Churches together, except those in which the Eastern Greeks were again joined to the Roman Church, or at least the union was treated.

Of these the first encountered is the Council of Bari, celebrated by Pope Urban II in the year 1097, in which, among Greeks summoned there and Latins, the controversies long and previously agitated about the procession of the Holy Spirit were discussed. And although the acts of this illustrious council have perished through the neglect of historians, it nevertheless stands from Eadmer that the question of the aforesaid procession was treated with the Greeks and that they were refuted.

William of Malmesbury described the whole matter more freely: he reports not only the controversy treated but also

defined for the Latins by Pope Urban, in these terms. When they came, then, to the Council, the Apostolic Pontiff, reclining before the body of St. Nicholas upon carpets and cloths, clothed with his chasuble and pallium, ascended a tribunal; the others sat in their cloaks. While all claimed their place by ancient custom, Anselm, greatest in humility, sat as he was able. The Supreme Pontiff, amid the tumult, had forgotten to assign him a place; but he was reminded of this error by the necessity of the question, the Greeks proposing that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father and wishing to prove it. As the Pontiff, attempting to resolve the question, became more entangled while the Greeks opposed him not implausibly, he remembered Anselm and cried out: By a living voice the vastness of the hall and the multitude of the crowd resound like thunder. Father and Master Anselm, archbishop of the English, where are you? He, when he heard himself called, stood up. The Apostolic Pontiff addressed him: Now, Master, there is need of knowledge, and need of eloquence by your effort. Come, ascend here, and defend your mother the Church, which the Greeks are striving to shake. Come to her aid, then, as one sent here by God.

Immediately all present, both standing and seated, turned eyes and faces upon him and asked who he was. With those nearest striving to help, he was raised to the seat of the Apostolic Pontiff, and was commanded to sit beside the Roman archdeacon, who by custom sits before the Pope. Let us enclose this man in our orbit, he said, as though he were a pope of another world. Yet he did not set forth publicly to all mortals his lineage, whence his home, what learning, what eloquence, how religious, and how zealous in fidelity to the Roman See he was.

The discussion of the question was deferred to the next day, although Anselm did not hesitate to respond at once. But on

the following day, when the assembly was convened earlier than usual, he was brought forward to a higher place and so treated the sides of the question, so penetrated and clarified the depths, that the Latins with a shout testified their joy, while the Greeks showed a ridiculous pain in themselves; and none departed poor and unlearned. In the course of time he arranged the substance of that discourse more clearly in the book he composed *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*. When he concluded, all turned eyes and faces upon him: one praised the faith, another the learning, all the eloquence.

When the roar which his praise had stirred up was quieted, the supreme Pontiff fixed his gaze on him and said: Blessed be your heart and your spirit; blessed be your mouth and the word of your mouth. Without delay, strengthened by the consent of all, he hurled the thunderbolt of excommunication upon those who thought otherwise.

THE LATERAN COUNCIL UNDER POPE INNOCENT III

It was held in the year 1215, the eighteenth of that pontiff: most celebrated and most attended of all those assembled in Europe. Pope Innocent himself presided; two Eastern patriarchs were present, of Constantinople and Jerusalem. The patriarch of Antioch, hindered by illness, sent his legates; the patriarch of Alexandria did likewise, hindered by the Egyptians. Archbishops, both Greek and Latin, were present, seventy; bishops, four hundred; abbots, one hundred twenty; conventual priors, eight hundred. Altogether the Fathers were 1285. Legates of the Roman and Greek emperors were present, and envoys of the kings of France, Spain, England, Jerusalem, and Cyprus.

In it matters were treated about recovering Jerusalem; and, to our point, the following was defined about divine unity and Trinity. We firmly believe and simply confess that there is one alone true God, eternal and immense, almighty, immutable, incomprehensible, and ineffable: Father and Son and Holy Spirit. The Father from no one; the Son from the Father alone; and the Holy Spirit equally from both, always without beginning and without end. The Father begetting, the Son being begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeding: consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal: one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal, who by his omnipotent power from the beginning of time created both creatures from nothing, spiritual and corporeal: namely the angelic and the earthly; and thereafter the human, as it were common, constituted of spirit and body. The devil also and the other demons were indeed created good by God according to nature, but through themselves they were made evil. Man, however, sinned at the suggestion of the devil.

Likewise in chapter 2: We condemn and reject the little book or treatise which Abbot Joachim published against Master Peter Lombard concerning the unity, or essence, of the Trinity, calling him heretical and insane, because in his *Sentences* he said that some highest thing is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and that there is there neither one who begets, nor one begotten, nor one proceeding. Hence Joachim asserts that Peter did not so much establish a Trinity as a quaternity in God: namely, three persons and that common essence as a fourth—openly protesting that there is no thing which is Father and Son and Holy Spirit. They are one essence, one substance, and one nature. He confesses that the unity of this kind is not real and proper but, as it were, collective and by likeness, as they say that

many men are one people, and many faithful are one Church, according to the saying: The multitude of believers was of one heart and one soul.

But we, with the sacred and universal Council approving, believe and confess with Peter that there is one certain thing, incomprehensible and inestimable, which truly is Father and Son and Holy Spirit: three persons together and each of them singly. Therefore in God there is only Trinity, not quaternity, because each of the three persons is that thing, namely the divine substance, essence, or nature, which alone is the principle of all things, besides which no other can be found. And that thing is not begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, but the Father is he who begets, the Son he who is begotten, and the Spirit he who proceeds, so that the distinction is in persons and unity in nature.

Although, therefore, the Father is other than the Son or the Holy Spirit, nevertheless it is not another thing: rather, what the Father is, the Son is; and what the Father is, the Holy Spirit is, that is, entirely so, that according to the orthodox and Catholic faith they are believed consubstantial. For the Father, by eternally begetting the Son, gave him his substance, according to what the Son himself testifies: What my Father has given me is greater than all. Nor can it be said that he gave him a part of his substance and retained a part for himself, since the Father's substance is indivisible, as being altogether simple. Nor can it be said that the Father transferred his substance into the Son by begetting, as though he gave it to the Son in such a way that he did not retain it for himself, otherwise he would have ceased to be substance. It is clear, therefore, that without any diminution the Son, by being born, receives the Father's substance, and thus Father and Son have the same substance; and thus the same thing is Father and Son and the Holy Spirit who proceeds from both.

THE COUNCIL OF LYONS

In the year of Christ 1271, Michael Palaiologos, emperor of the Greeks, fearing for himself an attack from Charles, king of Sicily and Naples—to whom Baldwin II, the Latin emperor of the East, had betrothed his daughter with the dowry of the empire of Constantinople if by Charles's help he could obtain it—among other measures of preserving his realm, employed religion. He sent legates to Pope Gregory X, recently elected, concerning reuniting the Easterners with the Western Romans, provided that the pope would avert Charles's expedition.

Gregory eagerly embraced the offer and in turn sent his own legates to Constantinople to the emperor Palaiologos: Fr. Jerome of Ascoli (who afterward became cardinal of the Roman Church and finally its supreme pontiff), Fr. Raymond of Berengar, Fr. Bonagratia the Dalmatian, and Fr. Bonaventure of Mugello, all four professed members of the Seraphic Order of our holy father St. Francis. When they had accomplished the business as desired, persuading the Greeks to union and leading with them certain Greek nobles to the feet of the pontiff, Gregory celebrated a General Council at Lyons in the year 1274. In it, according to his own intention and the Council's definition, the Greeks issued a profession of the Catholic faith in this form:

I, Gregory Akropolites and great logothete, envoy of our lord, the great emperor of the Greeks Michael Angelos, Doukas, Komnenos, Palaiologos, having from him sufficient mandate for what is written below, wholly renounce every schism, and I acknowledge the truth of the faith written below, as it has been plainly read and faithfully expounded, to be the true, holy, Catholic, and orthodox faith in the name of our said lord; I

accept it and with heart and mouth profess it. And I promise that I shall observe it inviolably, as the most holy Roman Church, mother and teacher of all the faithful, truly holds, faithfully teaches, and proclaims it; and that I shall never depart from it at any time, nor in any way deviate or dissent.

Likewise, I confess, acknowledge, accept, and of my own will receive the primacy of that same most holy Roman Church, as it is contained in the foregoing series, coming freely to the obedience of that Church in the name both of him and of myself. And I promise and confirm with an oath bodily given upon the soul of him and of myself that I will do and keep all the aforesaid promises—both concerning the truth of the faith and concerning the primacy of that same Church, and the recognition, acceptance, reception, observance, and perseverance therein—so may God help him and me, and these holy Gospels. In like manner Gregory swore for Michael. From the same formula another envoy professed for Andronikos and the rest of the Greeks, especially for the metropolitans. For twenty-six metropolitical sees (if one may trust the letters of Andronikos himself) promised that they would obey the sacred sanctions of the Catholic faith and acknowledge the primacy of the Roman Church.

As to the profession of faith, the Fathers, and above all the pontiff, prescribed it in this manner against the errors of the Greeks: With faithful and devout profession we confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles but as from one principle, not by two spirations but by one spiration. The most holy Roman Church, mother and teacher of all the faithful, has hitherto professed this; she has preached and taught it; she firmly holds, preaches, professes, and teaches it. This is the immutable and true

judgment of the orthodox Fathers and Doctors, both Latin and Greek.

But because some, through ignorance of the aforesaid irrefragable truth, have fallen into various errors, we, desiring to preclude such errors, with this sacred Council approving, condemn and reject all who presume to deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, and likewise those who with rash daring assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles and not as from one.

When those matters were settled which pertained to the confession of faith and the unity of the Church, the Easterners, standing by in the Church with the pontiff at work, sang the Creed with the addition of the words "and the Son," in confirmation of all that they had said and subscribed before the assembly of the Fathers, to the great exultation of the whole Church; and they received Holy Communion from the hands of the supreme pontiff. This same matter is contained much more fully in the letters of Palaiologos himself, which he sent to the pontiff through the aforesaid Franciscans, envoys of the Apostolic See.

THE COUNCIL OF FLORENCE

Thus I speak, says our Baronius, more by another's phrasing than by my own sense; for in fact it is the Council of Ferrara: in auspices and convocation and in the multitude of sessions. In all there were twenty-six sessions; of these fifteen were held at Ferrara, where the synod was also convoked and begun; only ten were held at Florence, where it was merely concluded.

John Palaiologos, emperor of the East, was present. Pope Eugenius IV presided in the year 1438. And although many matters, and indeed very grave ones, were treated there—about the supreme power of the pope, purgatory, and consecration with and without leaven—yet the principal article, on which the Council's greatest examination, delay, and dissension turned, was that concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. The Greeks denied it—such was their levity, not to say their stubbornness—even after agreement had already been reached about it between them and the Latins in the Councils of Lyons and Bari, and so forth.

I shall present the doctrine of faith of this Council somewhat differently from certain other theologians, even those not of bad repute. For I hold first that it is not to be referred too much to faith that the Council established an agreement between both Churches such that the Greeks, in their manner, would say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son; for the Council's definition was received by both parties, and in it it is expressly asserted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

Moreover, so that it may appear with what fidelity this Council is cited in the present matter—especially by adversaries of Subtle Theology, who sell flowers as fruits and boast skirmishes of soldiers as victory and triumph—I shall set forth the entire doctrine of this Council separately: first by parts, then together, since each part was of one speech and of the same words.

THE CONFESSION OF THE LATINS

After long examination and sharp dissension of the parties, in session 25, the last at Florence, the Latins—while the

Greeks resisted—committed their view to writing in this way: Since the Greeks calumniate us and object to us that we set down two principles or two causes in the holy and consubstantial Trinity, we therefore commit our profession to writing as follows. We believe in one God the Father and in one only-begotten Son, born from the Father, and in one Holy Spirit who indeed has his essence from the Father, as the Son also does, but also proceeds from the Son, since we profess the Father to be the sole cause of the Son and of the Holy Spirit—the cause of the Son by generation, and the cause of the Spirit by procession.

Furthermore, lest we seem to distribute the identity and conjunction of the divine substance and to believe that the same substance differs from the hypostases and persons in reality and not in reason alone, and lest anyone, believing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, conceive in his mind that the one divine substance is divided into three parts, we have judged it necessary that the words "and the Son" be included in the Creed, professing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle.

THE CONFESSION OF THE GREEKS

When the Greeks received the aforesaid letter, they examined it most attentively for two whole days. Since they were unwilling by any means to concede that the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit, they too sent their view committed to writing to the Latins in this tenor: Since the Latins profess that the Father is the sole cause of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and contend with us that we declare our view in writing about what we think in this matter, therefore we profess the Father to be the fountain and root of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and we profess the Son and

the Holy Spirit, according to the first ecumenical synod and St. Basil and St. Cyril, to be divine offspring; moreover we say that the Spirit gushes forth from the Son, is drawn, comes forth, is sent out, and is poured forth.

From these words, says Baronius, it is plain that certain persons strive in vain and almost rashly to twist these statements as if they were definitions of the Council: as when they contend that the divine essence is not distinguished from the persons formally, or from the nature of the thing, but by reason alone; or when with equal impetuosity they demand that it be conceded to them that the Holy Spirit would not be distinguished from the Son unless he proceeded from him. For even if we grant that all those things are here, they do not establish the faith, because they are not definitions of the Council, but statements of the parties explaining themselves on either side.

It is therefore clear how little certain persons look to the source, content with the mere air and name of the Council, not attending where the alleged words are found: in disputation, not in the definition, which is of this kind.

THE DEFINITIVE BULL OF EUGENIUS IN THE COUNCIL OF FLORENCE

Eugenius, bishop, servant of the servants of God, for a perpetual memorial of the matter. Let the heavens rejoice and the earth exult, for the wall that divided the Western and Eastern Church has been taken away, and peace and concord have returned—Christ that cornerstone, who made both one, joining both walls by the strongest bond of charity and peace, and uniting them by the covenant of perpetual unity, and holding them together. After a long, dark, and hateful gloom of grief and

long-standing dissension, the serene radiance of the long-desired union has shone upon all.

Let mother Church rejoice, who now sees her sons, hitherto at odds with one another, returned to unity and peace; and let her, who previously wept most bitterly at their separation, now with ineffable joy give thanks to almighty God for their concord. Let all the faithful throughout the world rejoice, and let those who are called by the Christian name cling to their mother, the Catholic Church.

For behold: the Western and Eastern Fathers, after a very long time of dissension and discord, exposing themselves to the dangers of sea and land and overcoming all labors, have come gladly and eagerly to the sacred ecumenical council, out of desire for the most holy union and for renewing ancient charity; and they have not been frustrated in their intention. For after a long and laborious investigation, through the clemency of the Holy Spirit, they have at last attained that most desired and most holy union.

Therefore, in the name of the most holy Trinity, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, with this sacred universal Council of Florence approving, we define that this truth of faith is to be believed and received by all Christians, and that all should so profess: that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, and has his essence and his subsisting being from the Father together with the Son, and proceeds eternally from both as from one principle and one spiration.

We declare that what the holy Doctors and Fathers say, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, tends to this understanding: that by this it is signified that the Son also is—according to the Greeks indeed a cause, but

according to the Latins a principle—of the substance of the Holy Spirit, just as the Father is.

And since all that belongs to the Father the Father himself gave to his only-begotten Son by begetting him, except being Father, the very fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son the Son has eternally from the Father, from whom he too was eternally begotten.

We further define that the addition of the words "and the Son," for the sake of declaring the truth and because of the necessity then impending, was lawfully and reasonably appended to the Creed. This celebrated confession of the Council was written in Greek and Latin on one and the same sheet, so that on the right side it was read in Latin with the subscriptions of the Western Fathers and the seal of the supreme pontiff; on the other side in Greek with the subscriptions of the Greeks and the seal of the emperor.

PROVINCIAL COUNCILS

THE FIRST COUNCIL OF TOLEDO

In the year of Christ 405, the fourth year of Pope Innocent, under the emperors Honorius and Arcadius, in the second consulship of Stilicho, a council was celebrated at Toledo in Spain of the province of Tarraconensis, with nineteen bishops, who established many things pertaining to ecclesiastical discipline, comprised in twenty chapters. In the twenty-first they set down a canon of the Catholic faith, by the title of which you may understand that what I have placed here about the time and rulers, both ecclesiastical and secular, under whom it was held, is uncertain; on this one may consult Ambrosius Morales and John Mariana, and after both Cardinal Baronius in tome 5.

But whatever the case about these matters, this tenor is set down there.

THE TOLEDAN CREED

We believe in one true God, the Father almighty, and the Son and the Holy Spirit, maker of visible and invisible things, through whom all things were made in heaven and on earth: one

God and one Trinity of the divine substance. The Father is not the Son himself, but has a Son who is not the Father. The Son is not the Father, but is the Son of God from the nature of the Father. The Spirit also is the Paraclete, who is neither the Father himself nor the Son, but proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten, the Paraclete not begotten but proceeding from the Father and the Son. The Father is he whose voice was heard from heaven: This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear him. The Son is he who says: I came forth from the Father and I came from God into this world. The Paraclete is the Spirit of whom the Son says: Unless I go to the Father, the Paraclete will not come. This Trinity, distinct in persons, one in substance, indivisible in virtue and power and majesty, without difference: besides this we believe no divine nature—whether of angel or spirit or any power—which is to be believed God.

THE THIRD COUNCIL OF TOLEDO
A NATIONAL COUNCIL

For it was gathered not from the bishops of one province but from all Spain, and even from Gaul of Narbonne, as is clear from the subscriptions of the bishops. It fell in the year of the Lord 589, the thirty-second year of Pope Pelagius, the fourth of the emperor Maurice, and the fourth also of King Reccared. Under him, after the martyrdom of St. Hermenegild his elder brother, the nation of the Goths was converted from Arianism to the Catholic faith. This the bishops themselves also confess, who there testified their faith clearly enough in this tenor.

Therefore, whoever still desires to hold the faith and communion coming from Arius and retained even to us, and

does not condemn it with the whole intention of his heart, let him be anathema. Whoever denies that the Son of God, the Lord Jesus, is begotten without beginning from the paternal substance and is equal to the Father, or consubstantial, let him be anathema. Whoever does not believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and does not say that he is coeternal with the Father and the Son and coessential, let him be anathema. Whoever in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit does not distinguish persons and does not acknowledge the substance of one divinity, let him be anathema. Whoever asserts that the Son of God and the Holy Spirit are, according to divinity, less than the Father, and separates them by ranks, and says that either is a creature, let him be anathema. Whoever does not believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one substance, omnipotence, and eternity, let him be anathema. Whoever says that the Son of God does not know what God the Father knows, let him be anathema. Whoever assigns a beginning to the Son of God and the Holy Spirit, let him be anathema. Whoever dares to declare that the Son of God, according to his divinity, is visible or passible, let him be anathema. Whoever does not believe that the Holy Spirit, like the Father and the Son, is true God and omnipotent, let him be anathema. Whoever holds faith and Catholic communion elsewhere than in the universal Church, which holds and honors equally the decrees of the councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, the first of Ephesus, and Chalcedon, let him be anathema. Whoever separates or disjoins the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit in honor and glory and divinity, let him be anathema. Whoever does not believe that the Son of God and the Holy Spirit are to be glorified and honored with the Father, let him be anathema.

THE FOURTH COUNCIL OF TOLEDO

Likewise it was celebrated at Toledo by all the bishops of Spain and others of Gaul of Narbonne (therefore it is called general by the Fathers gathered in it) in the year of Christ 633, the eighth of Pope Honorius, the twenty-fourth of the emperor Heraclius, the fourth of King Sisenand, with seventy bishops, St. Isidore, bishop of Seville, presiding.

In it, among other things, these were established about the Catholic faith. According to the divine Scriptures and the doctrine which we have received from the holy Fathers, we confess the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit to be of one Godhead and one substance. Believing the Trinity in the diversity of persons, we proclaim unity in divinity; we neither confuse the persons nor separate the substance. We say the Father is made by none and begotten by none; we assert that the Son is not made by the Father but begotten; we profess that the Holy Spirit is neither created nor begotten, but proceeds from the Father and the Son.

We also confess that the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God and Creator of all, begotten from the substance of the Father before the ages, came down in the last time for the redemption of the world from the Father, with whom he never ceases to be. For he was incarnate by the Holy Spirit and the glorious holy Virgin Mary, Mother of God, and born from her: the same Lord Jesus Christ, one in the holy Trinity, perfect in soul and flesh, taking man without sin, remaining what he was and assuming what he was not; equal to the Father according to divinity, less than the Father according to humanity, having in one person the property of two natures. For in him there are two natures, God and man,

not two sons and two gods, but one and the same person in each nature.

THE EIGHTH COUNCIL OF TOLEDO

It was celebrated in the same city in the year of Christ 653, the fifth of Pope Martin, the twelfth of the emperor Constans, the fifth of King Recceswinth of Spain. Fifty-two bishops were present, twenty-two abbots, and ten vicars of absent bishops. Other things belong elsewhere; what pertains here is the following confession of faith.

THE CREED OF THE COUNCIL

We believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, creator of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, born from the Father before all ages: God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, ὁμοούσιον with the Father, that is, of the same substance with the Father, through whom all things were made, those in heaven and those on earth. Who for our salvation came down from heaven and was incarnate by the Holy Spirit from the Virgin Mary, and was made man; suffered under Pontius Pilate and was buried; rose again on the third day; ascended into heaven; sits at the right hand of the Father; from there will come in glory to judge the living and the dead, whose kingdom will have no end.

We also believe in the Holy Spirit, the giver of life, proceeding from the Father and the Son, to be adored and glorified with the Father and the Son, who spoke through the prophets. And in one Catholic and Apostolic Church. We confess

one baptism for the remission of sins. We await the resurrection of the dead and the life of the age to come. Amen.

THE ELEVENTH COUNCIL OF TOLEDO

It is fitting that this catalogue of synods should end here, because of the excellent confession of faith which follows and which Scholastic Doctors have even to this day in veneration and use. It was held in the year of salvation 675, the seventh of Pope Adeodatus, the eighth of the emperor Constantine Pogonatus.

It established some things, but taught more by this celebrated Creed, which contains not only the faith of the Trinity but, as it were, a commentary upon it.

THE CREED OF THE COUNCIL

We confess and believe that the holy and ineffable Trinity —Father and Son and Holy Spirit—is naturally one God, of one substance, one nature, and likewise one majesty and power. We profess the Father to be not begotten, not created, but unbegotten; for he derives origin from no one, from whom the Son received nativity and the Holy Spirit received procession. Therefore he himself is the fountain and origin of the whole Godhead.

He himself also, the Father, ineffable in essence, ineffably begot the Son of his substance; yet he begot nothing other than what he is: God begot God, light begot light. From him, therefore, is all fatherhood in heaven and on earth.

We also confess that the Son is born from the substance of the Father without beginning, before the ages, and yet is not made: because neither did the Father ever exist without the Son,

nor the Son without the Father. Yet the Father is not from the Son as the Son is from the Father, because the Father received nothing from the Son, but the Son received generation from the Father. Therefore the Son is God from the Father; the Father is God, but not from the Son. Yet the Son is in all things equal to God the Father, because he neither began to be born at some time nor ceased. He is also believed to be of one substance with the Father, for which reason he is called ὁμοούσιος with the Father, that is, of one substance with the Father; for in Greek ὅλος signifies "one," and οὐσία signifies "substance," which joined together sound "one substance."

Nor is he to be believed begotten from nothing or from some other substance, but from the Father's womb, that is, from his substance. And the Son of God is eternal, because if the Father always was, he always had the Son of whom he is Father; and therefore we confess that the Son is born from the Father without beginning.

Nor do we call the same Son of God, because he is begotten from the Father, a portion of a divided nature; rather, we assert that the perfect Father begot the perfect Son without diminution, without defect, because it belongs to the Godhead alone not to have an unequal Son.

Hence also the Son of God is Son by nature, not by adoption. Nor is God the Father to be believed to have begotten him either by will or by necessity, because no necessity falls in God, and will does not precede wisdom.

We also believe that the Holy Spirit, who is the third person in the Trinity, is one and equal God with God the Father and the Son, of one substance and one nature; yet not begotten or created, but proceeding from both, the Spirit of both. Nor is the Holy Spirit believed unbegotten, lest if we say unbegotten we say

two fathers; nor begotten, lest we seem to proclaim two sons. Yet he is called neither the Spirit of the Father alone nor the Spirit of the Son alone, but at once the Spirit of the Father and of the Son.

For he does not proceed from the Father into the Son, nor does he proceed from the Son to sanctify the creature; rather, he is shown to proceed at once from both, because the charity or sanctity of both is acknowledged. Therefore this Holy Spirit is believed to be sent by both, yet is not held less than the Father and the Son, just as the Son, because of the flesh he assumed, testifies that he is less than the Father and the Holy Spirit.

This is the account handed down of the holy Trinity, which is not threefold but can be called and believed Trinity. Nor can it be rightly said that in one God there is Trinity; rather, one God is Trinity. In the relative names of persons, the Father is referred to the Son, the Son to the Father, the Holy Spirit to both. Although they are called three persons relatively, yet one natural substance is believed. Nor do we proclaim three substances as we proclaim three persons, but one substance and three persons.

For what the Father is is not said with respect to himself but with respect to the Son; and what the Son is is not said with respect to himself but with respect to the Father. Likewise the Holy Spirit is referred not to himself but relatively to the Father and the Son, insofar as he is called the Spirit of the Father and of the Son.

Likewise when we say "God," it is not said with respect to something else, as "Father" is with respect to the Son and "Son" with respect to the Father and "Holy Spirit" with respect to both, but it is said specifically with respect to himself. For if we are asked of each person individually, we must confess him to be God. Therefore the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, said individually; and yet not three gods, but one God.

Likewise the Father is almighty and the Son almighty and the Holy Spirit almighty, said individually; and yet not three almighties but one almighty, just as one light and one principle are proclaimed. Therefore each person individually is confessed and believed to be one God, and there is one indivisible and equal Godhead, majesty, and power in them.

Nor is anything diminished in each, nor increased in the three, because neither does anything have less when each person is said individually to be God, nor more when all three persons are proclaimed one God. Therefore this holy Trinity, which is one true God, does not depart from number, nor is it contained by number: for number is seen in the relation of persons, but in the substance of divinity what is numbered is not comprehended. Therefore they insinuate number only in that they are toward one another; and they lack number in that they are in themselves. For so one natural name belongs to this holy Trinity that it cannot be plural for three persons.

THE ENGLISH COUNCIL

Four years after the preceding eleventh and last Council of Toledo, that is, in the year 679, another council was held in England by the venerable man Theodore, archbishop of Britain (as Bede relates in his history of the English), with the other bishops of the island of Britain sitting together with him, with the holy Gospels placed before them, and so forth. Their confession is this. We firmly believe and confess, according to the holy Fathers, properly and truly, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit to be Trinity, and a consubstantial unity, and unity in Trinity: that is, one God in three subsistences or consubstantial persons, of equal glory and honor. And after many things of this

kind pertaining to the confession of right faith, the holy synod also adds in its letter: We receive the holy and universal synods of the blessed and God-pleasing Fathers: namely those who gathered at Nicaea, 318, against the most impious Arius and his dogmas; and those at Constantinople, 150, against the madness of Macedonius and Eudoxius and their dogmas; and those at the first Council of Ephesus, 200, against the most wicked Nestorius and his dogmas; and those at Chalcedon, 630, against Eutyches and Nestorius and their dogmas; and again those who were gathered at Constantinople in the fifth council in the time of Justinian the Younger against Theodore and Theodoret and their dogmas against Cyril. And a little later: and the synod which was held in the city of Rome in the time of the most blessed Pope Martin, in the eighth indiction, the most pious Constantine reigning, in the ninth year, we receive; and we glorify our Lord Jesus Christ as they glorified him, adding nothing or subtracting nothing.

And we anathematize with heart and mouth those whom they anathematized; and those whom they received we receive; glorifying God the Father without beginning, and his only-begotten Son begotten from the Father before the ages, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son inexpressibly.

In these words it is noteworthy that this archbishop and president of the council, who so firmly pronounced that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that according to the mind and faith of the holy Fathers and synods, was a Greek —unto greater shame for those who afterward dared to deny it and proclaim the opposite as handed down to them by the Fathers, when he, closer to the ancients, both Greek and Latin, produced both sides as witnesses for this.

THE COUNCIL OF GENTILLY

So that I may omit nothing in this kind, I have determined also to add this synod, such as it was. For it treated in part of the procession of the Holy Spirit, as Ado and the abbot of Vespers relate. It seems to have been gathered primarily to decide the question about veneration of sacred images; yet the two are related errors and familiar to the Greeks, especially at the time of that Council, which fell in the year of the Lord 767.

It was occasioned by a certain legation of Constantine Copronymus, emperor of the Greeks, to Pepin, king of the Franks. Since Constantine was a fierce iconoclast and had already issued an edict against sacred images, for which he was ill spoken of among the orthodox, he seems to have wished by this legation to recover his reputation with Pepin, using also this argument: that if he had erred in attacking images, then the Latins also had sinned by adding the words "and the Son."

Therefore the council was convened also to decide this article: the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Nor is there doubt that it answered in the affirmative, even though the acts of the Council do not exist; for it was also decided against Constantine concerning images, as may be gathered from the Roman synod under Pope Stephen.

I could recount other synods in which the right and holy faith concerning the divine Trinity was not only expressly handed down but also set forth plainly and clearly, if it were permitted by other labors undertaken; but since time and leisure do not allow, reader, let these things suffice for you, excerpted from our Baronius and inserted here for your benefit.

DISPUTATION I

ON THE EXISTENCE, ORIGIN, AND PRINCIPLES OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

In various ways the Devil has envied the truth. At times, as Tertullian says at the beginning of *Adversus Praxean*, he has sought to shake it by defending it. And indeed this is so. For this fact alone, even if everything else were silent, would more than sufficiently prove that the mystery of the Trinity is to be adored: that most crafty rival of the Godhead attacked it with every weapon he could, so that he might darken and extinguish its faith and light by the gloom of error.

For this reason it is worth our effort to begin the explanation of so great a mystery from the very existence, origin, and productive principles of the divine Persons. This I undertake to set forth in the following three articles.

ARTICLE I

ON THE EXISTENCE OF THREE DIVINE PERSONS IN THE UNITY OF ESSENCE

A fourfold class of men stumbles and falters with respect to the existence of the divine Trinity, namely Jews, Gentiles,

heretics, and uneducated and ignorant Catholics. The Jews reject that mystery altogether, because they do not notice it written in Sacred Scripture. The Gentiles disparage it, because they judge it to be contrary to natural reason. Very many heretics attack it precisely because they want to grasp it and cannot. Finally, some Catholics shrink back, because they scarcely know what is to be believed and said about so great a mystery.

Therefore I have judged that the following four questions must be discussed from the threshold, so that the light of divine truth may shine upon all those very "dwellers in darkness."

QUESTION I
WHETHER AND HOW THE TRINITY AND EQUALITY OF THE PERSONS IN THE UNITY OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE CAN BE PROVED AGAINST THE JEWS

Note 1. The Catholic truth concerning the mystery of the Trinity is chiefly contained under three heads: the unity of the essence, the distinction of the Persons, and their complete equality. The Gentile philosophers attacked the unity of the essence, because it seems to oppose all the principles of natural reasoning and the dictates of reason itself. The Jews rejected the diversity and real distinction of the Persons, because it seemed to introduce a multiplication of the Godhead and to infer a plurality of gods. Finally, various heretics attacked the equality of the Persons, because they could not reconcile it with the procession of one from another. We shall refute the philosophers and the heretics in what follows; now we must contend with the Jews.

Note 2. There are usually three lights by which some truth can be discovered and confirmed: demonstration, authority,

and persuasion. Demonstration produces scientific knowledge; authority produces faith; persuasion produces opinion and also credulity. Demonstration rests on principles evidently known; authority rests on the dignity and trustworthiness of the speaker; persuasion rests and is strengthened by conjectures, reasons, and likenesses. Demonstration is wholly natural; authority is supernatural, especially for making preternatural truths known; persuasion can be produced partly by a natural means and partly by a supernatural one.

Demonstration is needed to convict philosophers; persuasion to attract and lead the unlearned and ignorant; authority, finally, to persuade Jews and heretics of the truths of faith. Whether this threefold light shines in proving the mystery of the divine Trinity must be determined in what follows. In this question, however, we must chiefly fight against Jews and heretics by the divine authority of the Scriptures.

Note 3. Divine truths are chiefly to be drawn from a twofold source, namely from Sacred Scripture and from constant and firm tradition. For Scripture is the armory and treasury in which divine truths are not only contained but also defended. Hence St. Paul says in 2 Timothy 3: All Scripture, inspired by God, is useful for teaching, for refuting, for correcting, for training in justice, so that the man of God may be perfect, equipped for every good work. Scripture is divided into the two Testaments, the Old and the New.

From this twofold storehouse of divine truth, and from the constant tradition of the doctors of the Synagogue and of the Church, the faith concerning the Trinity of Persons in the unity of essence must be established.

CONCLUSION I
THE MYSTERY OF THE DIVINE TRINITY IS GATHERED AND PROVED, NOT OBSCURELY, FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT AGAINST THE JEWS

This is common among Catholic doctors. First, it is supported from that famous oracle of Genesis 1, where God, the maker of all things, speaks thus: Let us make man in our image and likeness; and shortly afterward: Therefore the Lord God formed man; and again: God created man to his image and likeness. Moreover: Let us make for him a helper like unto him. Here the verb "let us make" and the pronoun "our" introduce a multitude of Persons; the words "Lord" and "God" designate the unity of the essence.

They reply 1. Modern Jewish teachers say that God spoke in the plural according to the manner of princes and kings, to display his authority and power. But this is clearly shown to be false from Scripture itself, which almost always, as Theodoret rightly notes in his Questions on Genesis, question 19, uses the singular number, and scarcely ever speaks in the plural. Hence it very often doubles and repeats the singular to express the plural. Therefore there must be some mystery in this unusual difference. And surely it is nothing other than the signification of the three divine Persons, into whose invocation through baptism man was later to be regenerated, as he was being formed then.

They reply 2. They say that by these words God addressed the angels, that they might lend their assistance in creating man, forming his body, while he himself would create the soul and infuse the spirit of life. Against this: Sacred Scripture, in the earlier chapters of Genesis in which the formation of man is

contained and explained, attributes that work to God alone, constantly affirming that he himself formed, created, and made man. Therefore that speech is not directed to the angels. Moreover, that plural speech "let us make" is directed to those whose likeness man bears; but man was not made to the image and likeness of angels, but to the image and likeness of God alone, as is clear both from Genesis 1, God created man to his image and likeness, to the image of God he created him, and from Genesis 5, On the day when God created man, he made him to the likeness of God. Therefore that speech is not directed to angels, but only to the three divine Persons, whose likeness the soul of man expresses and reflects, as will be shown below.

Finally, they reply that God, speaking to himself and stirring himself to act, said "let us make." But this is an altogether foolish retort. For who, says St. Basil in Homily 9 on the *Hexaemeron*, whether a smith, a wax-worker, a carpenter, or certainly a leather-worker and shoemaker, being alone by himself, with no other helper at his side, and sitting among the instruments of his craft—who, I say, mutters to himself saying, "Let us make a sword," or "Let us complete a plow," or "Let us make a shoe"? Does he not rather in silence carry out his work, when he wishes, as fits his craft? For it would indeed be a remarkable absurdity for someone to be found who commands himself.

Second, the plurality of the divine Persons is gathered from Genesis 11: Come, let us go down and confuse their language there. From this the holy Fathers, Gregory of Nyssa in *De Trinitate* and St. Basil in book 5 of *Contra Eunomium*, infer the Trinity of Persons. Above all, St. John Chrysostom in his Sermon on the Trinity weighs these words thus: By saying "come," he calls them as equals in honor, inviting them. For if he

had commanded the angels, he ought to have said "go," not "come." But see, I ask you, how the voice of the Father calls the Son and the Holy Spirit. For if this had been said to one alone, he ought to have said "come" and "let us go down." But because he said "come," there is one voice to two equals.

Third, the holy Fathers support the same point from Genesis 18, where it is said that the Lord appeared to Abraham. Then it adds: And three men appeared, standing nearby. When he saw them, he ran to meet them from the door of the tent, and he bowed to the ground and said: Lord, if I have found favor in your eyes, do not pass by your servant, and so forth. From these words it is clear that Abraham understood that God had appeared to him in those three; therefore he addressed prayers in the singular number to one alone, as to God. Hence St. Augustine says in book 2 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 12: Since three men were seen, and yet none of them is said to be greater than the others in form, or age, or power, why should we not understand here that, through a visible creature, the equality of the Trinity was visibly suggested?

St. Cyril of Alexandria likewise says in book 1 of *Contra Julianum*, around the middle, that three did indeed appear, and stood as distinct individuals, yet each was comprehended into one by the account of consubstantiality, and thus they deliberately intermingled their conversation.

Fourth, it is proved from Deuteronomy 6: Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one God. In Hebrew, however, in place of the word "Lord" there is the name of the Tetragrammaton, by which the unity of the divine essence is designated; but its threefold repetition designates the Trinity of Persons. The same is confirmed by Psalm 67: May God bless us. By "God" the Father is signified; by "our God" the Son is signified, who through the

incarnation has been given to us and has become ours; by "May God bless us" the Holy Spirit is suggested. For the threefold repetition would seem pointless if it did not contain some mystery, and surely no other than the adorable Trinity of Persons in the unity of essence.

Fifth, it is proved from Psalm 32: By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their host. For by the name "Lord" the Father is designated, who works through the Word; the second Person, namely the Son, is signified by the name "Word," through whom all things were made; finally the third Person is called the Spirit of the mouth of God, that is, the Holy Spirit, to whom power and the perfection of divine works are especially appropriated. But since the same operation of the whole universe is assigned to the divine Persons themselves, the identity of power and of the divine nature is made manifest, as almost all the holy Fathers interpret it, whom Ruiz reports at length in Disputation 36, session 5, and even the more learned among the rabbis, as our Galatinus proves in book 2 of *De Arcanis*, chapter 4.

Sixth, the Trinity of divine Persons is proved from the thrice-holy acclamation of the Seraphim, who, as Isaiah relates in chapter 6, cried one to another: Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of hosts. For, as St. Ambrose elegantly weighs it in book 2 of *De Fide ad Gratianum*, chapter 4: What does the threefold repetition of the one name of holiness mean? If the repetition is threefold, why is the praise one? If the praise is one, why is the repetition threefold? Why threefold repetition, unless because the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one in holiness? He did not say it once, lest he exclude the Son; nor twice, lest he pass over the Holy Spirit; nor four times, lest he join creatures. And to

show that the Godhead is one in the Trinity, when he had said "Holy, Holy, Holy," he added in the singular: "Lord God of hosts."

The Jewish teachers likewise interpreted this same text in the same way, and especially Rabbi Simeon, saying: "Holy" here is the Father, "Holy" here is the Son, "Holy" here is the Holy Spirit, as our Galatinus reports in the same place. He adds that for this reason the ancient teachers of the Talmud established that each Jew should say that thrice-holy acclamation, so explained, at least twice a day, namely morning and evening. Hence it also happened that both Churches, Greek and Latin, used it among their solemn prayers, as Anthemius, Bishop of Assisi, testifies in his letter to Peter of Antioch, which is placed in the Council of Constantinople under Felix III in the case of Peter the Fuller. There he refutes Peter's heresy because Peter appended to that thrice-holy acclamation the name "Crucified," saying: Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, Crucified, by which he signified that the Crucified was the Holy Spirit, or some other fourth divine Person.

Finally, this same truth is drawn from Isaiah 48: From the time before it came to be, I was there; and now the Lord has sent me, and his Spirit. St. Jerome explains this thus: When all things were being made, he himself, namely the Son, was with him in whom he rejoiced; and he who even now speaks says, according to the frailty of the flesh assumed, that the Lord God has sent him and his Spirit. And in this brief verse the sacrament of the Trinity is shown to us.

From this it is evident how truly Christ the Lord, addressing the Jews in John 5, said: Search the Scriptures; for they bear witness about me. By these words he not only shows that he is the true Messiah, but also demonstrates that he is the true Son of God.

All these things could also be confirmed from the ineffable name of the Tetragrammaton, which Scripture uses everywhere. For, as our Galatinus observes in book 2, chapter 10, Rabbi Haccados, writing the mysteries of this name to Antonius, consul of the city of Rome, affirms that it signifies God begetting; and because there cannot be one who begets without one begotten, nor can either be without love proceeding, therefore the divine Trinity is contained in this name. Hence it is commonly said among the Hebrews that the name, when expounded, is explained by twelve Hebrew letters which, joined together, signify and produce in Latin: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Or it is called the name of forty-two letters, which the same Rabbi Haccados interprets thus: The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; the Trinity in unity and unity in Trinity. From these things it is clear what the opinion of the ancient rabbis was concerning the divine Trinity, and how far the more recent Jewish teachers have wandered from their fathers, when they so strongly oppose this most constant truth.

CONCLUSION II
THE SAME TRINITY AND DISTINCTION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS, SUBSISTING WITH THE UNITY OF NATURE, IS GATHERED FROM THE NEW TESTAMENT

First, from Matthew at the end, where Christ, sending out his apostles, says: Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. This oracle so manifestly indicates the Trinity of Persons in the unity of essence that the Arians could scarcely find anything to reply. For not only are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit

named as distinct Persons, but also to them is attributed one name of Godhead, and one power and authority are assigned, since baptism is commanded to be conferred in their name. Hence the followers of Arius, pressed by this oracle, kept silent during baptism at the words "in the name," and only said: I baptize you in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as St. Athanasius reports in book 7, *Ad Theophilum*, so that they might signify three natures.

The second testimony is that of 1 John 5, where it is said: There are three who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one. By these words also the distinction of the Persons together with the unity of the essence is manifestly expressed. We shall discuss this text more fully in question 5.

The third is that which is related concerning the baptism of Christ the Lord in Matthew 3, Luke 3, and Mark 1: The heavens were opened and I saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove, and behold a voice from heaven saying: This is my beloved Son. Here the Fathers of the Church commonly acknowledge three Persons of the same authority: the Father speaking, the Son whom he addresses, and the Holy Spirit descending upon Christ; for he would not descend upon him unless he were of the same authority with the Father and the Son.

The fourth is taken from John 10, where Christ, speaking of himself, says: I and the Father are one. By these words the distinction of Persons is expressed by saying "I and the Father"; the unity of essence by adding "are one." That this is to be understood not merely of unity of affection but of consubstantial unity of essence is proved by the holy Fathers against the Arians, especially by St. Augustine in Sermon 5 on the words of the Lord: Let the Arians hear what he says, "one"; let the Sabellians hear

what he says, "are." And let neither be vain by denying: the one, equality; the other, otherness. Hence in Tractate 36 on John he reasons beautifully: He does not say, "The Father is I," or "I and the Father is one," but when he says, "I and the Father are one," hear both: "one" and "are." In those two words you will be freed from Charybdis and from Scylla. In what he said "one," he frees you from Arius; in what he said "are," he frees you from Sabellius. If "one," then not different; if "are," then Father and Son. For he would not say "are" of one; nor would he say "one" of those who are different.

The fifth is that of John 14, where likewise three divine Persons are noted when it is said: I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, that he may remain with you forever; and later in verse 26: But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name; and in John 15 near the end: When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father. For it is necessary that Persons be really distinct who ask and who are asked, who send and who are sent, who proceed and from whom they proceed. But the equal authority, and consequently the same substance, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is indicated when each is called the Paraclete, and when the Holy Spirit is said to take the place of the Son, teaching all truth and remaining with the disciples forever. Likewise the same authority of the Son with the Father is shown when each is said to send the Holy Spirit, and when the Father sends the Spirit in the name of the Son.

Finally, one can cite 1 John 4: He has given us of his Spirit, and we have seen and testify that the Father has sent his Son, the Savior of the world; and also Titus 3: The kindness and love of God our Savior appeared, not from works of justice which we did, but according to his mercy he saved us through the

washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, whom he poured out upon us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Savior. From these it is clear and indicated that there is a Trinity of divine Persons: one who pours out the Holy Spirit, one through whom he pours him out, and one who is the Holy Spirit poured out.

Here I do not relate the objections that heretics used to raise against this truth. In a more fitting order we shall satisfy them when, unfolding this same truth again, we prove one by one the Trinity of those Persons, and also their divinity and equality. But these things at the outset suffice to suggest and to establish by divine oracles the august mystery of the Trinity. Whether natural reason can also establish it against the Gentile philosophers will be made clear by the next question.

COROLLARY

From these things it is clear how truly St. Augustine wrote in Sermon 38 on Time: All Scripture, of the Old and New Testaments, if understood in a Catholic manner, suggests this: that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, of the same substance and one essence, and an inseparable unity in the Godhead. Yet there is this difference between the two Testaments: the Old proposed the Trinity of Persons in the unity of Godhead more obscurely, wrapped in certain shadows; but the New, with the Sun of justice shining and the light of the Gospel beaming forth, drove away all these shadows and brought this great mystery into open light. Hence Christ, addressing the disciples in John 16, said: The hour is coming when I will no longer speak to you in proverbs, but will announce plainly to you about my Father.

From this St. Cyprian, in the prologue of *De Cardinalibus Operibus Christi* on the mystery of the Trinity, says: For such a profound investigation of realities, unless the teaching of the incarnate Word had come, human minds would have failed, and I do not know whether any would have dared to rise to attempts of such a kind.

St. Gregory agrees in book 2 of *In Ezechielem*, homily 16: The people of the Hebrews, he says, tried to keep the commandments of the Decalogue, but they were not instructed in the knowledge of the Holy Trinity. And although the spiritual fathers had perfectly known it, nevertheless the multitude of the Synagogue could neither discover the mystery of the Trinity nor knew to seek it. But when grace came, the whole faithful people knew that the one God is a Trinity.

Theodoret gives the reason for this difference in book 2 of *Ad Graecos*, where he says of the Hebrews: Since they had remained in Egypt for a long time and had learned the worship of many gods according to Egyptian custom, the most wise God did not hand down to them the mysteries of the Trinity manifestly and with a fully explicit account, lest, thinking that a multitude of gods was being proposed to them, they would have this occasion for turning to Egyptian impiety. Yet he did not even then completely conceal the dogmas of the Trinity from those who would come later; for in the ancient Scriptures he scattered the matter of more perfect theology like certain seeds.

QUESTION II

WHETHER THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY CAN BE DISCOVERED AND PROVED BY NATURAL REASON BY PHILOSOPHERS

Note 1. The present difficulty is not raised concerning the inclination and native capacity of the intellect to know this mystery, so that its knowledge would be offered from every side, whether by revelation or by demonstration. For it is certain, as the Doctor says in question 1 of the prologue, that since the possible intellect is naturally perfected by whatever knowledge, it is also naturally inclined to whatever knowledge. For every passive power is carried by a natural weight toward that which is its perfection; therefore the created intellect naturally tends toward the knowledge of every truth, and especially toward the knowledge of the most excellent truth, such as the unity of the divine essence and the Trinity and equality of the Persons.

Nor is the present question concerned with an incomplex and imperfect knowledge of these terms, God and Triune, by an active cognition. For it is clear, as the Doctor says in question 14 of the *Quodlibetica*, article 1, that any created intellect can, by its native light alone, know God as the first cause, and thus can discover the unity of the essence. Moreover, attending to the ternary number and to the meaning of the name "person," it can also grasp what the Trinity of Persons signifies, once it has heard it proposed by someone. But the whole difficulty is whether through the innate power of understanding and reasoning some philosopher can discover the Trinity of Persons in God, as he can know by natural reasoning that there is one God.

Note 2. In fact, many philosophers attained some knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity, as St. Justin Martyr in his Address to the Gentiles, St. Clement of Alexandria in book 5 of the *Stromatum*, St. Cyril in books 1 and 2 of *Contra Julianum*, and especially Eugubinus in books 1 and 2 of *De Perenni Philosophia* prove at length. For the divine Plato in various places posited the highest God; then he asserted that from him a mind

was begotten, through which he fashioned other things; finally he posited a third, which he calls the soul of the world. Hence Claudianus Mamertinus, cited by Eusebius in book 11 of the *Praeparatio Evangelica*, says of Plato: So many ages before the childbirth of the Virgin, before the ineffable unity of the supreme Trinity was proclaimed among the nations, with praiseworthy daring, wondrous genius, and inimitable eloquence, he sought, found, and handed down one Godhead in three Persons.

Likewise he reports that Hermes Trismegistus, that is, "thrice-great," aimed more closely at Christian truth. For in the book titled *Pymander* he says: I, the mind, am that light, God of this, before the moist nature which shone forth from darkness. But that word of God which came from the mind into the moist nature is the Son. And later: But the mind, God, being both male and female, as the author of life and light, brought forth by the word another mind, a craftsman, who is God, fire, and Spirit. One may add Zoroaster the Chaldean, who wrote: The Monad begot the Dyad, and the Triad shines in the whole world. To this corresponds that common saying attributed to Trismegistus: The Monad begot the Monad and reflected its love into itself. Hence St. Augustine says in book 7 of the *Confessionum*, chapter 9, about the books of the Platonists: I read there, not indeed in these words, but the very same thing wholly, urged by many and varied reasons: that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

But from what source these philosophers drew this knowledge is no slight controversy among theologians, and it must be settled in this question.

Note 3. Concerning the resolution of the present difficulty, there are three opinions among theologians. Some affirm that the mystery of the Trinity so exceeds the grasp of the

human mind that it cannot be discovered by any natural power. Indeed, they say that in seeking to attain knowledge of it, reasoning so clashes with all principles that, if someone were led by reason alone, he would judge the mystery altogether impossible.

Others, among whom Bl. Raymond Lull set the course, pursued the extreme opposite path. They affirm not only that this mystery does not conflict with natural reason, but that it can be evidently demonstrated by it. For Bl. Raymond Lull, in the book he calls *Apostrophe* and in his books on the Sentences, contends that three points pertaining to this mystery can be demonstrated by the natural light. First, that there are several Persons in God. Second, that there are neither more nor fewer than three. Third, that these three Persons are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Yet he notes that these demonstrations are neither a priori nor a posteriori, but "of equivalence." He calls demonstrations "of equivalence" those that proceed neither through a cause nor through an effect, but from equals.

Finally, the rest, embracing a middle opinion as safer, teach that the mystery of the Trinity neither conflicts with natural reason nor can be demonstrated by it, nor even discovered without divine revelation, as will be set forth below.

CONCLUSION I
NO CREATED INTELLECT, WITHOUT DIVINE REVELATION, CAN ACQUIRE A CERTAIN AND EVIDENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY

This seems to be of faith, and Sacred Scripture urges it. For in Matthew 11: No one knows the Son except the Father, nor

does anyone know the Father except the Son and the one to whom the Son wills to reveal him. More expressly it is read in Luke 10: No one knows who the Son is except the Father, and who the Father is except the Son and the one to whom the Son wills to reveal him. The Council of Nicaea adduces these texts in book 2 to prove that the mystery of the divine generation is impossible to penetrate. Hence also the first Synod of Antioch, held in the time of Pope Dionysius, says in its profession of faith: If we have any notion of God, however moderate, we must be content with what we have through the revelation of his Son, as he says: No one knows the Father except the Son and the one to whom the Son will reveal him.

St. Epiphanius agrees in *Haeresis* 76, saying: All things fly past and surpass and leave behind every syllogistic cause, those doctrinal sentences drawn from divine Scripture, namely: No one knows the Son except the Father, nor the Father except the Son and the one to whom he will reveal. He reveals, however, through the Holy Spirit, not to those who reason about him through syllogisms, but to those who rightly and perfectly believe in him.

This is confirmed from Matthew 16: Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father. By the name "flesh and blood" not only is all knowledge begged from the senses comprehended and expressed, but also knowledge attainable by the powers of nature, as St. Cyril of Alexandria understands it in his Oration on the Incarnation of the Word, which he delivered in the Council of Ephesus, saying: Do not inquire more curiously into the matter itself; for it is not perceived through the wisdom of the Greeks or worldly sense, but is alien to both. Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jonah, says the Lord, because flesh and blood, and so forth. For the knowledge of the Son of God is a heavenly and divine gift of inspiration.

This can also be confirmed from all those places of Scripture in which we are forbidden to search into the deeper mysteries of the Godhead, such as Job 28: From where will you find the wisdom of God? For it is hidden from the eyes of men and is concealed from the birds of the sky.

Second, it is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, and especially of St. Dionysius in chapter 13 of *De Divinis Nominibus*, where he says: The Godhead, which surpasses all things, celebrated under the name of Unity and Trinity, is not a Unity and Trinity known by us or by any other of the things that are. St. Gregory Nazianzen alludes to this in his Oration on Theology, number 67, where, speaking of the Triune God, he says: Let us follow faith as a guide rather than reason, if indeed you have learned the weakness of your mind even in things nearer to you, and have recognized that it belongs to reason to know what things exceed the grasp of human reason, lest otherwise you be altogether earthly, even ignorant of your own ignorance.

Hence St. Jerome rightly said in the preface to his book 18 on Isaiah: The right confession of the Trinity is ignorance of knowledge. For, as St. Hilary says in book 1 of *De Trinitate*, steadfast faith rejects the captious and useless questions of philosophers, and truth does not offer itself as prey to falsehood, succumbing to the fallacies of human absurdities.

Thus, wisely and most learnedly weighing those words of John 6, There are some of you who do not believe, St. Augustine says that the Evangelist did not say: there are some of you who do not understand, but he stated the cause why they do not understand: there are some of you who do not believe, and therefore they do not understand. For the prophet says: Unless you believe, you will not understand.

Third, the same truth is proved by reason. Every certain and evident knowledge of something is produced through demonstration. But there is no demonstration which, without revelation, can convey a certain and evident knowledge of the divine Trinity. For every middle term of demonstration is either a cause, or an effect, or something equivalent. Every demonstration is either a priori, or a posteriori, or "of equivalence." But in natural things no middle term shines for the intellect by whose guidance it can ascend to an evident knowledge of the Trinity.

For such a middle term cannot be a cause, since the Trinity of Persons lacks every cause and is wholly independent of any extrinsic maker. Nor can it be an effect. For if any effect could lead to a knowledge of the Triune God, this would especially be creatures, which are known as established by God himself. But the knowledge of creatures cannot lead us by the hand to the knowledge of the divine Trinity, because creatures do not flow from God as he is Trinity in Persons, but as he is one in essence. Therefore from the knowledge of creatures we cannot know the Trinity of Persons, but only the unity of the Godhead.

The minor is proved because creatures flow from God's omnipotence, and omnipotence is an essential attribute common to the Trinity. Moreover, as the Doctor says in question 14 of the *Quodlibetica*, article 1, that cannot be known of a cause through an effect, such that, if it were removed, what is necessary in the cause for causing would remain. But if, per impossibile, the Trinity were removed, there would still remain in God whatever is necessary for causing a creature. For if, per impossibile, there were only one divine Person, he would have an infinite power of producing whatever he wished. Therefore the Trinity of Persons cannot be known from the knowledge of a creature proceeding from God.

Finally, any intellect, whether angelic or human, even endowed with all native quickness and subtlety of understanding, from an evident knowledge it might have of created personality could only gather that there is in God a single absolute personality. For it could not conceive the divine personality except after the manner of its own personality, or after the manner of the personality of some other more excellent angel. But so far as the native power of understanding can grasp, the whole account of subsisting seems to be something "toward itself" and something absolute, not something relative and ordering itself to another. Therefore every account of subsisting that an angel could conceive would be wholly absolute, not in any way relative. Hence it is so far from the case that knowledge of created personality would lead to knowledge of several divine Persons that it would rather draw the mind away from it.

Consequently, the certain and evident Trinity of divine Persons can be gathered neither by demonstration a priori nor by demonstration a posteriori. Nor can it be introduced by that kind of demonstration which Bl. Raymond Lull calls "of equivalence," which I prove as follows. The divine Trinity of Persons is not evidently proved by something that either presupposes it or directly militates against it. But all the reasons that Lull adduces either presuppose the divine Trinity of Persons or oppose it and then attempt to solve the opposition.

For Lull aims to demonstrate, first, that there are several Persons in God; second, that there are only three; third, that these three Persons are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

First, he tries to prove that there are several Persons thus: Wherever there is concord and equality, there is plurality. But in God there is concord and equality of agent and acted-upon in the act itself, or, as he speaks, of the one who "makes good" and the

one "made good" in the act of "making good." Therefore there is plurality of Persons in God. He proves the minor thus: Where there is act, there is concord of the agent. But in God there is an act of "making good." Therefore there is concord and equality of the one "making good" and the one "made good," and thus there are several Persons in God.

But this reason is neither demonstrative nor of any weight. It is not demonstrative because it presupposes what is in no way evident and is perceived only by divine faith, namely that there is in God an act that is productive ad intra. For although natural reason would show that God is operative through intellect and will, it would not disclose that such operation is productive of another Person. Indeed, unless faith suggested the contrary, someone would say that the act of understanding and willing in God is nothing other than his infinite substance itself, which we conceive by way of operation and act. Nor is the reason of any weight, since it presupposes that every divine production is a "making good," and thus occurs only through the will, which is in fact contrary to the faith. For the divine Son is produced through the intellect, and only the Holy Spirit proceeds through the will.

Second, Lull tries to prove that this plurality of Persons is threefold, because that essence which is in the greatest perfection of action, that is, which acts most perfectly, requires only one "making good" action, one "being made good" passion, and one act of "making good." That is, that essence is most perfect in acting in which there is only one agent or producer, one produced, and one act. For if there were more, one would limit another. But God is in the greatest perfection of action. Therefore in God there is one producer, one produced, and one act.

He proves the same point from a "distinctive" account: that essence is in the greatest perfection of distinction in which there is one distinguisher, generator, or producer, and also one distinguishable and generable, or producible, and one act of distinguishing by breathing forth and loving. But goodness is in the greatest perfection of distinction. Hence he concludes that there is one distinguisher and generator with respect to the Son, and this is the Father; and one distinguishable, generable, and producible with respect to the Father, and this is the Son; and one act of distinguishing by breathing forth and loving, and this is the Holy Spirit.

But these "proofs" stray far from the intended goal. First, because this author presupposes what ought to be proved, namely that that essence is in the greatest perfection of action in which there is only one producer, one produced, and one act. Indeed natural reason suggests that the cause is more perfect which has multiple power and produces more effects. Second, because it would follow that in God there is only one act, namely breathing forth, and thus the act of the divine intellect, namely understanding, would be excluded. But this is heretical and alien to reason. Finally, because many absurdities against the mystery of the Trinity follow from these reasons.

The first is that one Person would be distinguished by another, which is false. For the divine Persons are distinguished from one another by their own proper characters. Next, since the three Persons are really distinct from one another, there is not only one distinguishable and one distinguisher, but three distinguishables, namely the three Persons, and three distinguishers, namely the three personal properties. Finally, it follows from this doctrine that there are more divine Persons than three. For it is of faith that there are two acts of production

in God, namely to generate and to breathe forth. Consequently, in God there would be "generative," "generable," and "generating," and thus these would be three Persons; then there would be "breathing-forth," "breathable," and "breathing forth," and thus there would be another three Persons, and so there would be six.

Third, Lull tries to show by an "evident" reason that the Trinity of Persons, which he thinks he has demonstrated, is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He reasons thus: Everything must be granted in divine goodness by which the one "making good" is in the greatest perfection of action and the one "made good" is in the greatest perfection of passion, that is, God must be attributed what has the more perfect mode of producer and produced. But this happens through paternity and filiation. Therefore in God, in the account of producer and produced, there are Father and Son.

He proves the minor because the most perfect mode of producing is that of the Father with respect to the Son, since he generates the Son from his whole substance. That there must also be the Holy Spirit he tries to prove thus: Everything must be granted in divine goodness by which "making good" is in the greatest perfection of act, that is, by which there is most perfectly the act of the one "making good" and the one "made good." But this is through loving. Therefore in divine goodness loving must be admitted, which we call the Holy Spirit. He proves the minor because otherwise "making good," that is, loving, would not be infinite, and thus would not be most perfect nor in the greatest perfection of act.

But how weak this proof is, no one fails to see. For even if we granted that in God there is a production most perfect and in the greatest perfection of passion and action, it would not follow that it is between the Father and the Son, even if it were from the whole substance of the producer. For in human beings the

generation of a son is true generation, and yet it is not from the whole substance but from part of the substance of the generator. How then can Lull infer that a production from the whole substance, which is found only in divine things, must be called the generation of the Son—especially since the Holy Spirit is also from the whole substance and yet is not the Son? Therefore, without divine revelation, the mystery of the Trinity cannot be demonstrated.

You will say 1. Evident knowledge of an effect produces evident knowledge of its cause. But creatures, which we know evidently, are effects of the divine Trinity, since the three divine Persons, who have the same omnipotence and power of creating, concur per se in all created effects. Therefore from the knowledge of creatures man can discover the divine Trinity. I distinguish the major: if the necessary connection and dependence of the effect upon the cause is known, I grant it; otherwise I deny it. Likewise, I distinguish the minor and deny the consequence. For man can indeed know a creature as an effect of God, and from this knowledge infer that the productive divine power must necessarily be in some suppositum, since all actions are judged to belong to a suppositum. Thus he can naturally know that there is some divine Person who is the producer of creatures. But from this knowledge he cannot naturally gather a plurality of Persons in the divine. For creatures have a necessary connection with God as he is one, not as he is triune. For if, per impossibile, there were only one Person in God, there would be no less infinite productive power in that Person, and thus creatures would be no less dependent upon him.

You will say 2. Once an image is known, its prototype can be known. But man is truly an image of the most holy Trinity. Therefore from the knowledge of himself he can ascend to

knowledge of the divine Trinity. I distinguish the major: if the formal account of the image and that relation which it has to the prototype is known, I grant it; otherwise I deny it. For a relation cannot be known unless both extremes are known. To the minor I say that man cannot know himself under the account of an image by the native light of reason, as St. Augustine very well explains in book 15 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 24. Expounding 1 Corinthians 13, We see now through a mirror and in an enigma, he says that the Apostle did not say "we see now a mirror," but "through a mirror." Hence he concludes: Those therefore who see their own mind and how it can be seen, and see in it this Trinity, and yet do not believe or understand it to be an image of God—these indeed see the mirror, but they do not see through the mirror him who must now be seen through a mirror, to such an extent that they do not even know the very thing they see through as a mirror, that is, as an image.

You will say 3. Many philosophers obtained a fairly clear knowledge of the divine Trinity, as we observed in note 2. But they did not acquire it from any other source than from the storehouse of philosophy itself and the innate power of reasoning. Therefore knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity can be acquired. I deny the minor. For first, they could have received that knowledge from tradition itself, which was transmitted by hereditary right from Adam to Noah, and from Noah to Abraham. Abraham and Moses then disseminated that same knowledge among Egyptian philosophers, from whom all the wise Greeks, and especially Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, were taught, as the holy Fathers St. Justin and St. Cyril, already cited, affirm. St. Clement of Alexandria adds in book 5 of the *Stromatum* that Plato and other philosophers learned many things from the Hebrews and Chaldeans, among whom the

knowledge of the most holy Trinity, divinely revealed to the earliest patriarchs, had been derived and propagated.

Moreover, philosophers may also have received such knowledge from the Sibyls, whose outstanding mark was virginity and whose reward for virginity is prophecy, as St. Jerome says in book 1 of *Contra Jovinianum*. Hence it is the concordant opinion of Christians, as is clear from Lactantius in book 1, chapter 6, that the Sibyls by divine instruction prophesied many things about Christ, and especially about the Son of God and the humanity he would assume. Therefore the philosophers' knowledge of the Trinity presupposes revelation.

Finally, philosophers could have attained some knowledge of the divine Persons through the oracles of demons, to whom this mystery had been revealed before their fall. For, as Eugubinus reports in book 2 of *De Perenni Philosophia*, in the last chapter, Apollo of Delphi, asked by a priest about the true religion, replied among other things:

Do not ask me about the holy and divine Begetter
And the beloved Offspring of the great Almighty,
And the Breath that holds the whole world bound together.

Something similar is reported by Vives in book 10 of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 23, concerning Serapis, who, when consulted by Tullus, king of Egypt, about who was happiest, is said to have replied:

First is God, then the Word, and the Spirit with him;
And these three are equal and tend toward One.

Nor should it seem strange that demons were heralds of so great a mystery. For they could be driven to it either by good angels or by God himself, who sometimes commands the light of truth to shine from the darkness of falsehood. Add that demons themselves could be stirred to it, so that they might undermine

faith in the Godhead. For by introducing the knowledge of three divine Persons, they more easily persuaded men that there are three gods. Hence every knowledge that philosophers had about the Trinity was mixed with almost innumerable errors. Therefore Plato himself is not without reason said to be a forerunner of the Arians. For he posited three gods, namely the highest God, the Demiurge, and the World-Soul. But he asserted the latter two to be created and far inferior to the highest God, which was almost the invention of Arius. Hence Tertullian most aptly called philosophers, and especially Platonists, the patriarchs of heretics.

You will object: St. Athanasius in many places, but especially in the disputation against Arius that is read in the Council of Nicaea, and in his second oration against the Arians, affirms that pagan philosophers were inexcusable because they did not acknowledge the divinity of the Word from creatures. For he says in that second oration: Paul rightly accuses the Greeks because, contemplating the harmony among the parts and the order of nature, they thought nothing about the account of nature, that is, the Word. For the things that are known show their maker, so that through them they may understand the true God. And he adds "his eternal power and divinity," so as to signify the Son. And in the third oration he says: In works the likeness of wisdom is placed, so that the world through it may acknowledge its maker, namely reason, that is, the Word, and through the Word the Father, and so forth. Therefore philosophers could truly, by the native light of reason, discover the Trinity of Persons.

I respond that St. Athanasius in these and similar words understood a supernatural help of stirring grace. Illuminated by this, philosophers contemplating created things could attain at least an obscure knowledge of the divine Trinity. For the same St.

Athanasius in the first oration against the Arians says: Great without doubt are those gifts given to us by his grace, and they are above man and surpass in excellence all the charisms of the Father, and the knowledge of the Word himself, and the gift of the Holy Spirit. By this he plainly confesses that the knowledge of the Word and the Holy Spirit is above man, and thus transcends the natural powers of the human intellect.

You will ask 1. Whether Bl. Raymond Lull truly thought that an evident knowledge of the Trinity could be acquired without any supernatural illumination, or whether he presupposed revelation. I respond that it is more likely that he thought the Trinity of divine Persons can be evidently demonstrated independently of any supernatural illumination. First, because he very often affirms that all the articles of faith can be proved by necessary, demonstrative, and evident reasons; therefore he did not think that faith and revelation are required beforehand for those demonstrations. Second, because Eymericus reports in the second part of the *Directorium Inquisitorum*, question 9, that Lull professed that faith is not necessary for such demonstrations. For he said: Faith is necessary for unlearned men, rustics, laborers, and those who do not have a lofty intellect, who cannot know through reason and prefer to know through faith. Men of small ability, illiterate and unlearned, prefer to know the articles through faith and not through reason, and are more easily drawn to Christian truth through faith than through reason. But a subtle man is more easily drawn through reason than through faith.

You will ask 2. Whether at least by the light of nature the mystery of the Trinity can come under suspicion. I respond that it is more probable that no inquiry and suspicion of so great a mystery can ever be stirred up in a created intellect without

divine revelation. First, because there is no natural object that can introduce such doubt or inquiry. Second, because if perhaps someone did apprehend that three Persons are three gods, he could not draw his thought back from that apprehension, as we now draw it back when it insinuates itself into our minds, because of a firmer reason, namely because of the supreme authority of God revealing and declaring that there are three Persons in the unity of the Godhead.

CONCLUSION II
JUST AS THE EXISTENCE OF THE DIVINE TRINITY CANNOT BE PROVED BY NATURAL REASON, SO ITS IMPOSSIBILITY CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED

This is proved as follows. If some natural reason could persuade one of the impossibility of the divine Trinity, it would be chiefly because it seems to conflict with the most universal and best-known metaphysical principles, or because it strikes at the most received principles of reasoning and syllogistic art, or finally because the Trinity of Persons in the unity of essence clashes with the very intimate predicates of God. But none of these can be said. Therefore the impossibility of the divine Trinity cannot be shown.

The minor is proved in its first part. The metaphysical principles on which all truth rests are chiefly these: it is impossible that something be and not be at the same time, that is, affirmation and negation of one and the same thing cannot be predicated at once and together. Yet the mystery of the Trinity seems to attack this principle. For the divine essence, which is really the same as personality, is communicated, while

personality is not communicated. Therefore the same entity is really communicated and really not communicated. Likewise, the Father and the Godhead are one thing, and yet the Father really generates, while the Godhead does not really generate. Therefore the same indivisible thing generates and does not generate. Finally, the same singular thing is both singular and common. For the Godhead is essentially "this," and yet it is common to several. Therefore it is at once common and not common. Thus the mystery of the Trinity seems to militate against the most received principles of metaphysics and to involve open contradictions.

But on the contrary: for there to be a true and manifest contradiction it does not suffice that affirmation and negation be made about the same thing according to its real entity; it is also required that it be made according to one and the same formal account. It is true that man reasons insofar as he is rational, and does not reason insofar as he is sensitive, and no contradiction follows from this, because "to reason" and "not to reason" are not predicated of man according to the same principle and power; for the sensitive power is formally distinct from the rational power. Thus likewise in God no contradiction follows from the fact that the essence is communicated but personality is not; likewise that the Father generates but not the essence. For although paternity and personality are really the same as the essence, they nonetheless differ from it formally, and that suffices to preserve and resolve the appearance of contradiction, as we proved when treating the formal distinction of the attributes both among themselves and from the divine essence.

The minor is also proved in its second part, namely that the mystery of the Trinity does not clash with syllogistic principles, which are chiefly three: the first is that things which

are the same as a third are the same as one another; the second, "to be said of all"; the third, "to be said of none," that is, whatever is affirmed or denied of a superior is also affirmed or denied of everything contained under it. Hence a difficulty can be formed thus: paternity and filiation are really the same as the divine essence; therefore they ought also to be really the same as one another, if it is true that things that are the same as a third are the same among themselves, and thus there will be no real distinction of Persons. Again: the essence is really the same thing as paternity, and is really the same thing as filiation; but paternity and filiation are two things; therefore the essence is also two things, otherwise the principle "to be said of all" will be false.

But these difficulties are easily dissolved. Omitting various other answers, the Doctor gives two replies in book 1, distinction 2, question 7, number 47. First, from this principle one may only infer that the extremes have no other identity with each other than the identity they have with the third. Hence, since the personal properties do not have formal identity with the divine essence, they cannot have formal identity with each other. Because someone could object that, since the personal properties have real identity with the essence, they ought also to be the same really with each other—because things that are the same as a third are the same as each other by that very identity by which they are the same in the third—he answers, second, that this principle holds universally only when the extremes that agree in the third have, from their own principles and their own formal account, that they also agree in that way with one another. But when the things that are identified with a third cannot, from their own formal account, be so identified with one another, then it does not follow necessarily from their identity with the third that they are also really identified with one another. Now the divine

personal properties have from their own formal account that they cannot be identified with one another, because they constitute distinct Persons.

Finally, the third part of the minor is proved: if the plurality of Persons were repugnant to God from his own predicates, it would be chiefly because it seems to offend his unity, aseity, and infinity. It would offend unity because, since God is the first being, he should be no less alone in the account of Person than in the account of essence. It would offend aseity because God is being from himself; therefore since the Son is produced by the Father and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, they cannot have the account of Godhead. It would offend infinity because if there are several Persons, there will be several infinites, which is repugnant.

But these are easily answered. First, the primacy of being denies a plurality of gods, but this is not asserted by the Trinity, since the three Persons are only one God. Second, aseity, as we said in the disputation on the attributes, denies only dependence, not production. Although the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced, their production is in every respect independent. Third, the Trinity of Persons does not imply a plurality of infinites, because, as will be proved below, personal properties imply neither perfection nor imperfection. And consequently the impossibility of the divine Trinity cannot be established on any of these grounds.

QUESTION III

WHETHER AND HOW, GIVEN DIVINE REVELATION, THE MYSTERY OF THE DIVINE TRINITY CAN BE PROVED AGAINST PHILOSOPHERS WHO DENY IT

NOTE 1. Revelation is the proposing of an object by the testimony of some person who speaks, whether it be made in the intellect by God, or in the imaginative faculty by an Angel, or only outwardly by the teaching of men, or by voices and visions formed by Angels. Hence there is a twofold revelation: one created and natural, which takes place through the ministry of Angels or men; the other supernatural and divine, which is commonly called an interior light supernaturally infused, effectively inclining the will and the intellect to give assent to what is revealed. Of this, Matthew 16 says: Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father. It is about this revelation that we ask at present, whether through it the human intellect can be so enlightened and strengthened that it is able to find pressing natural arguments by which it would evidently demonstrate the Trinity, or at least persuade it with probability.

NOTE 2. It is certain that, even with supernatural faith presupposed, the human intellect, by its innate power of discursive reasoning, cannot effectively prove the impossibility of the mystery of the Trinity: first, because all natural principles that might seem to suggest such an impossibility are taken from finite and limited things; since there is no proportion between them and divine and infinite things, neither should there be a comparison. And so natural reason itself teaches that there is something in God that a created intellect cannot reach by its own powers. Second, because all arguments that can be brought against the Trinity are, when reason is illumined by faith, probably answered and dissolved, as will be evident in the course of this Treatise. Finally, because natural reason also seeks out and supplies certain likenesses and congruities by which the intellect is led by the hand to assent to this mystery, and it so dissolves the reasons that seemed to suggest its impossibility that they scarcely

retain any force. There therefore remains only a difficulty concerning the possibility and the existence of this mystery: namely, whether by natural arguments a Christian philosopher can effectively persuade a pagan and unbeliever.

NOTE 3. Concerning the resolution of the present Question, there are two maximally opposed opinions among theologians. The first was especially advanced by Richard of St. Victor, asserting in book 5 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 8, that it is proved by manifest reason, indeed established by multiple demonstration, that just as the perfection of one person is the cause of another, so the perfection of two is the cause of the third in the Trinity. Hence, speaking of the reasons he proposed for proving the Trinity of the divine Persons, he adds in chapter 11: as we evidently showed above, a multiple reason establishes a plurality of persons; and in chapter 13: behold what is clearer than light: we find three in three distinctions of properties. By these he contends that the mystery of the divine Trinity can be effectively and evidently proved once knowledge of it has shone forth through revelation. For he speaks of reasons that presuppose faith; thus in book 1, chapter 1, he weighs the saying of Isaiah 7: If you do not believe, you will not understand. And in chapter 4 he says: with respect to what we believe, we can adduce not only probable but even necessary reasons.

A second opinion, wholly opposed, is defended by some theologians, asserting that the mystery of the divine Trinity is so proper to faith that no natural reason can prove it, indeed cannot in any way even persuade it. With these St. Thomas seems to agree in I, dist. 33, art. 1, ad 2, where he says that in no created thing is anything found similar to divine simplicity in such a way that what has is what is had; for all likenesses that could be introduced, whether from things joined together or from

differences existing in a genus, have more of dissimilarity than of similarity, and altogether they draw one away from the truth more than they lead into a true understanding. In order to avoid these extremes, we embrace a middle opinion, and we undertake to resolve two points here. First, that even with faith and revelation presupposed, no convincing reasons can be produced that would evidently persuade the Trinity. Second, that at least some fitting reasons and likenesses can be produced by which the difficulty of the unbeliever's intellect is softened and he is disposed toward faith and assent to this mystery.

CONCLUSION I
A CREATED INTELLECT, HOWEVER ILLUMINED BY DIVINE REVELATION, CANNOT EVIDENTLY AND CERTAINLY DEMONSTRATE THE MYSTERY OF THE DIVINE TRINITY

It is proved, 1. By the authority of the holy Fathers, and especially of Justin in the exposition of faith on the Trinity: Although, he says, a pure mind has been implanted in us, by which we often apprehend higher things by reasoning, nevertheless, weighed down by flesh it grows dull with respect to the evident perception of greater things. Therefore in no way, since we are men, can we penetrate to that first and blessed essence. Why do I say the divine essence? Indeed, not even to its mysteries; for nothing divine is manifest to men. St. Augustine agrees with this in book 1 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 1: We sometimes bring forward a reason, not the one they demand when they seek concerning God (for they cannot take it up, and perhaps we cannot even grasp or produce it), but one that shows them how incapable and how altogether unfit they are for

perceiving what they demand. St. Hilary supports this in book 8 of *De Trinitate*, where, affirming that this mystery transcends natural reason, he says: This the Church understands by faith; this the Synagogue does not believe; this philosophy does not taste: one from one and the whole from the whole, God and Son, neither by nativity taking away from the Father what He wholly is, nor by being born not having the whole itself with Him.

It is also proved by reason. Faith or revelation cannot make purely natural and sensible effects have a necessary connection with the Trinity of persons; therefore it cannot make it so that, through evident knowledge of such effects, the divine Trinity is evidently demonstrated. The consequence is clear, for a cause cannot be evidently known through an effect unless the necessary connection the cause has with that effect also becomes known. Further, faith cannot make natural reason, relying only on its own powers, be carried beyond its own sphere; but the mystery of the Trinity is outside the sphere of natural light; therefore it cannot be attained by natural reason. Finally, even with the light of faith presupposed, all natural discourses remain within the sphere of natural light, which can show nothing divine except by the help of creatures; but creatures of themselves more readily lead to assent to the impossibility of this mystery than to assent to its existence. Therefore, although someone through revelation and faith knows the mystery of the Trinity, he nevertheless cannot devise natural reasons that would evidently persuade another who does not believe it.

It is proved, 2. From the refutation of all reasons that could be brought forward to demonstrate this mystery. If any reasons could evidently prove the divine Trinity, they would chiefly be the following five; but none of them is demonstrative.

The first reason could be formed from Bl. Scotus in I, dist. 2, q. 7, n. 3: Whoever has from himself and without imperfection a productive principle sufficient to produce, can produce. But some divine person has from himself and without imperfection a productive principle sufficient with respect to another divine person. Therefore he can produce another divine person. The minor is proved. First, it is established that there is one person for the same reason it is established that there is God, since the Deity must be personal so that it can act and produce. Second, that divine person has fecund memory, that is, an infinite intellect and an infinite object present and applied under the aspect of intelligible. Further, he has this infinitely fecund memory from himself, because he is unproduced; and he has it without imperfection, since no imperfection is found in God. But that infinitely fecund memory is a productive principle of something infinitely perfect; not indeed of another God, since a plurality of gods is repugnant, therefore of another divine person.

The minor is proved: fecund memory, by its formal reason, is productive of begotten knowledge. Therefore the fecund memory of the unproduced divine person is productive of begotten knowledge proportioned to it, and thus infinite. But that infinite knowledge is not an accident, for that would be unworthy of God. Therefore it is something subsistent, and consequently something spiritual living an intellectual life; otherwise it would not be proportioned to the productive principle. Therefore it is a divine person. Therefore fecund memory in God produces another divine person; and so there are already two divine persons, one producing and the other produced.

That a third can likewise be known is clear. For that unproduced divine person has a will from himself infinitely perfect; but an infinitely perfect will is productive of an infinite

love proportioned to it. But that produced infinite love must be a divine person; otherwise it would not be proportioned to the producing principle. Therefore by natural reason the Trinity of those divine persons can be evidently proved.

Yet although this reason seems to some to be the most compelling of all, a pagan philosopher could easily dissolve it. First, by denying the minor, and asserting that God does not understand except through an intellection really identical with Himself, not distinct from Him; and therefore His intellection is not a real production of a term really distinct, but only an operation. Second, he could reply that the intellect indeed produces something immanent, but inhering, not something subsistent; and therefore one could not infer that the Word produced by God is something subsistent. Third, even if he granted that the divine intellect is productive of a subsistent Word really distinct from the producing principle, he would nevertheless not be bound to admit three persons; indeed he would have an occasion for asserting that there are infinitely many produced divine persons. For since the Word and the Holy Spirit have intellect and will, each of them could produce another Word and Holy Spirit, and these again others, and so on to infinity.

A second reason can be formed as follows. What is supremely and infinitely good is supremely and infinitely communicable. But God is naturally known to be the supreme and infinite good. Therefore He ought to communicate Himself supremely and infinitely. But outside Himself He cannot so communicate Himself infinitely and supremely, because no creature can be produced that is supremely infinite. Therefore it is necessary that within Himself He be communicated infinitely. But that communication cannot be made except through intellect

and will. Therefore God must communicate Himself through the operation of intellect and will to another within Himself; not indeed to another according to essence, since there cannot be many gods, but according to person. Therefore there will be three divine persons: one who communicates Himself, and two others to whom He is communicated, to the one through intellect and to the other through will.

But the philosopher would answer, first, by denying the major, because an actual communication adds no perfection to the communicating cause, but only to the produced effect; for the actual illumination is not a perfection existing in the sun, but in the illuminated bodies. Second, he could reply that an infinite communication is repugnant to God, because it seems it could not be made without division of the essence and production of another God, which implies a contradiction. Third, he could distinguish the major: that the infinite good is infinitely communicable syncategorematically, so that it can always be more communicated, he would grant; but categorematically, so that it can have at once a communication adequate to itself, he would deny.

A third reason: God is naturally known to be most happy. But happiness cannot belong to one who is solitary; it requires companionship. Therefore He must have a companion. But since creatures are dissimilar and were not from eternity, they cannot furnish God with true and perfect society. Therefore it is necessary that God have a companion who is not a creature. But he cannot be another God, because many gods are repugnant. Therefore God must have other divine persons. Hence Tertullian in *Contra Praxeam*: Before all things God was alone, Himself for Himself a world and a place and all things; but He was not even

then alone, for He had within Himself the reason established, namely His Word, His Son, and His Holy Spirit.

But the philosopher would deny that companionship is required for the happiness of an infinitely perfect being; God fully suffices for Himself, since He is the greatest and center of all goods.

A fourth reason can be taken from the supreme charity of God: where there is supreme goodness, there is perfect charity, which necessarily is toward another; and supreme charity is only toward another supremely good. But in God there is supreme goodness. Therefore there is supreme charity toward another supremely good; not indeed toward creatures, which are not supremely good, nor toward another God, because many gods are repugnant. Therefore it must be toward another divine person; and so by natural reason a plurality of divine persons can be proved. But the philosopher would deny the minor, for where there is supreme goodness it does not follow that there must be perfect charity having the aspect of friendship; an infinite love that God has toward Himself is enough.

A fifth reason could be formed thus: We naturally know that no perfection is to be denied to God. But to produce one like oneself in nature is a supreme perfection. Therefore it is known not to be denied to God.

But the philosopher could refute it, first, by distinguishing the minor: to produce one like oneself is a supreme perfection in corruptible beings, so that they can preserve their species; not in beings free from corruption, as is evident in Angels, who do not beget other Angels. Therefore, since God is free from all corruption, it would not be a perfection in Him to produce one like Himself. Second, he would answer that such a production is repugnant to God, because in order

truly to produce one like Himself He would have to produce another God, which implies a contradiction. Third, if it is a supreme perfection to produce one like oneself, then since the divine persons that would be produced would be infinitely perfect, they too would have to produce other divine persons; and so the divine persons would have to be infinite in number.

It is therefore clear that no natural reason can be produced that would so evidently persuade an unbeliever of the mystery of the Trinity that he could not deny his assent. This mystery, then, can only be persuaded with probability by the aforesaid reasons, and also by certain likenesses of natural things in which the trace and image of the adorable Trinity is portrayed, as will be explained.

CONCLUSION II
THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY CAN BE PROBABLY PERSUADED AND EXPLAINED FROM NATURAL THINGS, IN WHICH IN SOME WAY ITS TRACES AND IMAGES APPEAR AND SHINE FORTH

This is the judgment of the holy Fathers. They persuade it by various likenesses.

First, they find in the sun an expressed image of the Trinity, St. Athanasius and St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 45), because it is one heavenly body in which nevertheless three distinct things are found, namely the solar disk, the ray, and the light. For as Athanasius says, just as the sun consists of three subsistences, so the one God consists of three persons. The type of the Father is the solar disk; the type of the Son is the ray; the type of the Holy Spirit is the light of the sun. Therefore, just as in the sun the disk, the ray, and the light are not called three suns

but one sun, so in God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God and not three. Hence the compendious exposition of faith attributed to Cyril of Alexandria says: The sun is the Father, the ray is the Son, and the fiery radiance is the Holy Spirit.

Second, the holy Fathers infer the same image of the Trinity from fire. For as St. Athanasius says, there are three subsistences of one fire: namely what is subject, what burns, and what shines; and yet there is one nature of fire. Thus the Father is fire, the Son is what burns, and the Holy Spirit is the illuminating power. Here he calls "subsistence" individual things, although they are accidents. Isidore likewise says in book 2, *De Differentiis Spiritualibus*, chapter 2: As fire, brightness, and heat are three words but one thing, so in the relation of persons there is a Trinity, but in substance of nature there is one God.

Third, they take it from air, in which God painted the rainbow, so that in the rainbow the Trinity could in some way be discerned. For just as in one rainbow three colors so come together that the sight cannot discern the part where one color ends and is distinguished from another, so in the holy Trinity the divine persons so agree in the Deity that there is one God.

Fourth, they take it from water, for a spring produces a river and a stream, as though there were a threefold water, and yet one. Hence St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 37) calls the eye of the spring the Father, the spring itself the Son, and the river the Holy Spirit. Tertullian in *Contra Praxeam*, chapter 8, likens the Father to the spring, the Son to the river, and the Spirit to the stream.

Fifth, they take it from earth, in that in a tree there are root, trunk, and branches, which all form one tree, as Tertullian explains in the same place, and St. Augustine also in *De Fide et Symbolo*, chapter 9.

Sixth, St. Augustine gathers this trace from all creatures in book 6 of *De Trinitate*, last chapter: It is necessary, he says, that beholding the Creator through the things that have been made, we understand the Trinity, whose trace appears in creation in the way it is fitting. Explaining this trace, he adds: for in that Trinity there is the highest origin of all things, the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed delight. He also gathers this in book 4 on Genesis, from the fact that in Wisdom 11 God is said to have made all things in number, weight, and measure. Measure, he says, sets the limit for each thing; number gives each thing its form; and weight draws to rest and stability.

Bl. Scotus in I, dist. 13, q. 5, n. 6, adds that the trace of the Trinity that shines in creation chiefly consists in the unity, the form, and the order of things, and he gathers this from St. Augustine in book 6 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 10: All these things that have been made by divine art show a certain unity in themselves, and a form, and an order. The unity found in creatures represents the highest unity of the first Principle, which is appropriated to the Father; the form of the creature represents the highest beauty, which is attributed to the Son; and the order of the creature represents the most perfect operation of God, which is His beatitude, and it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

Seventh, the holy Trinity painted its own image in man, and so rightly said: Let us make man to our image and likeness. For as Bl. Scotus teaches in I, dist. 3, q. 9, n. 6, just as in the Trinity there is the same divine nature, and the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three persons really distinct from one another and identified in the same divine nature, so in us, besides the soul, there is fecund memory, which is the intellect with its object or species, and this corresponds to the Father. Next, in us there is the intellect informed by actual knowledge, which

corresponds to the Son. Finally, there is the will informed by volition, which corresponds to the Holy Spirit. Further, just as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are really distinct from one another and yet identified with the divine essence, so fecund memory, and the intellect as affected by intellection, and the will as affected by volition, are really distinct from one another and yet are really the same as the soul, namely insofar as the intellect and the will are considered in first act, as faculties of the soul, only formally distinct from it.

St. Augustine explains all this clearly in book 15 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 20: Whoever, he says, vividly perceives in his mind these three, namely memory, intelligence, and will, naturally instituted by divine gift, and how great that is in it whereby the eternal and immutable nature can be recalled, beheld, and embraced, he indeed finds the image of that supreme Trinity. He recalls by memory, beholds by intelligence, and embraces by love. Toward that supreme Trinity to be recalled, seen, and loved, so that he may remember it, contemplate it, and delight in it, he ought to refer everything he lives.

QUESTION IV
WHETHER IN FACT THERE ARE ONLY THREE DIVINE PERSONS REALLY DISTINCT AND ONE GOD

There is not one error, but many errors of those who deviate from the truth. Hence it is scarcely possible to recount how many and what kinds of heresies have strayed around the greatest of all truths, namely the divine Trinity. Yet it is fitting to distinguish them all into a threefold order. For some asserted more divine persons than three; others imagined one person in the Deity distinguished only by a threefold office or name; others

finally said that the three divine persons are not one God, but three. So that these errors may appear more easily and be refuted:

NOTE 1. There were various heretics who attacked the Trinity of divine persons in many ways. First, the Emperor Anastasius decreed that one should adore, not the Trinity, but a quaternity, and that for this reason he was struck by divine lightning, as Paul the Deacon and Pomponius Laetus report (through Celius, book 1, *De Trinitate*, art. 4). A certain Gallican cleric seems to have subscribed to this error. For as St. Anselm reports in *De Incarnatione Verbi*, chapters 1 and 13, he really distinguished the three divine persons from the divine essence, and said: If in God the three persons are one thing and are not three things, each separated per se, as three Angels or three souls, yet so that in power and will they are altogether the same, then the Father and the Holy Spirit with the Son are incarnate. Nor was Gilbert of Poitiers far from it. For, as Matthew Paris relates in the *Historia Anglicana* at the year 1119, his third assertion was: The properties of the persons are certain eternal relations, which indeed are not what the persons are, but are divided in number and divided in substance, and they have three unities, and thus there are many eternal things of which none is God. But an even more monstrous multiplication of persons is condemned by the First Council of Braga, canon 2, saying: If anyone, outside the holy Trinity, introduces I know not what other names of divinity, saying that in the divinity itself there is a trinity of a trinity, as the Gnostics and Priscillianists said, let him be anathema.

NOTE 2. Some heretics were most opposed to the former, who from the complete unity of the essence inferred also unity of the divine person, so that what Scripture designates as a distinction of persons they referred not to a diversity of the persons themselves but to a difference of offices and actions of

the same person. They said that the same person, insofar as He is unbegotten and productive of creatures, is called Father; insofar as He is incarnate, is called Son; and insofar as He sanctifies the creature, is called Holy Spirit, as though one and the same person were distributed into diverse effects and distinct offices. Praxeas seems to have brought forward the torch of this error, who, as Tertullian says in the book he wrote against him: In order to make a heresy out of unity, he said that the Father Himself descended into the Virgin, that He Himself was born from her, that He Himself suffered. And he adds: Praxeas accomplished two works of the Devil at Rome: he expelled prophecy and he introduced heresy. He drove away the Paraclete and he crucified the Father. Hence Optatus of Milevis in book 5 against Parmenian calls Praxeas a Patripassian, because he asserted that the divine Father was crucified and suffered. Noetus subscribed to him, who, as St. Epiphanius reports in heresy 57, said that the one God is the same Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that He was begotten and suffered in the flesh. The disciples of Montanus also favored it, although St. Epiphanius in heresy 48 says that Montanus thought about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as the holy Catholic Church does; nevertheless St. Jerome in his Epistle to Marcella, question 54, says of the disciples of Montanus: they forced the Trinity into the narrowness of one person. Hence Nicephorus in book 4 of his *Historia*, chapter 22, says: Montanus taught about the divine Trinity and the creation of the world the same as we do; yet some of his followers later thought that the three substances of the Godhead are one. But this error, almost buried, Sabellius, an African from Pentapolis, again raised up. As St. Anastasius reports in his discourse against the followers of Sabellius, Sabellius said that the Father is extended into the Son by assuming flesh and into the Holy Spirit by sanctifying men;

thus he called Father, Son, and Holy Spirit not three persons but the same under three names. Hence his disciples were called Patripassians, because they asserted that the Father was incarnate, suffered, and died. Paul of Samosata later adhered to this error, then Photinus, bishop of Sirmium, and also many more modern heretics, as has already been said.

NOTE 3. Other heretics, opposed to the foregoing at the extreme, did indeed acknowledge a distinction of persons in God, but denied unity of essence. These are further distributed into two streams of error. Some denied the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. Origen is said to have gone before them, but this error is attributed as to an author to Arius, because through him it was so propagated and disseminated that it poured out its poison through the whole world. After Arius died, having spilled out his entrails in a place of seclusion, the sect of Semi-Arians arose, who, tempering the error of Arius, asserted that the Son is similar to the Father and coeternal with Him, but not consubstantial and equal. They changed the term meaning "consubstantial," softening its force, into a term meaning "similar in substance," so that by the likeness and consonance of the words they deceived many, as though they used a Catholic word. The Macedonians are usually counted among them, who denied that the Holy Spirit is truly God; some of them said that the Father is omnipotent, the Son is half-omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit is powerless. But another opposite error grew up, that of the Tritheists, who asserted three natures and substances altogether similar in every respect. Their leader was Philoponus, as Nicephorus reports (book 18, chapter 49). Concerning these, Dionysius of Rome, cited by Athanasius in the Epistle *De Decretis Nicenae Synodi*, says: These in some way constitute three gods, since they divide the holy unity into three alien substances.

Therefore it is worthwhile at present to resolve three things: 1. That there are only three divine persons. 2. That they are really distinct from one another. 3. That they are truly one God. In the following Question we will prove the consubstantiality of the persons.

CONCLUSION I
THERE ARE IN FACT THREE DIVINE PERSONS REALLY DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER

That three there are is more than sufficiently established by the oracles of the Old and New Testaments already cited above. That they are really distinct from one another is proved by those same sacred texts. It is further confirmed from the various places where Sacred Scripture mentions generation, paternity, and filiation in God, which cannot be verified without a real distinction of persons. For, as St. Augustine says in book 1 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 1, there is absolutely nothing that begets itself so as to be. And Tertullian in *Contra Praxeam* says: Everything that proceeds must necessarily be of that from which it proceeds, according to that which it is, from which it proceeds; yet for that reason it is not separated. But where there is a second, there are two; and where there is a third, there are three. For the third is the Holy Spirit from God and the Son, as the third from a root is fruit from a shrub, and the third from a spring is a stream from a river, and the third from the sun is a point from a ray.

Nor may you say with the Sabellians that these words "Father" and "Son" in God denote a distinction of persons not entitatively and really, but only by diverse offices, which a single divine person carries and executes, so that He is called Father by reason of creation, Son by reason of incarnation, and Holy Spirit

by reason of justification. For, as Tertullian rightly replies against Praxeas (chapter 10), it can in no way happen that the Father makes a son for Himself, and the Son makes a father for Himself. What God has established, He Himself keeps: the Father must have the Son in order to be Father, and the Son must have the Father in order to be Son. But to have is one thing and to be is another. For example, in order that I be a husband, I must have a wife; I will not be a wife to myself. So too, in order that I be Father, I have a Son; I will not be a Son to myself. And in order that I be Son, I have a Father; I will not be a Father to myself. For the things that make me such if I have them: I will then be Father if I have a Son; I will be Son if I have a Father. But if I myself will be each of these, then I no longer have what I myself will be: I do not have a Father, because I myself will be Father, nor do I have a Son, because I myself will be Son. And insofar as I must have one of these, the other must in that measure be; if I am both, I will not be the other, since I do not have the other. For if I myself will be the Son who is also Father, then I do not have a son, but I myself am the son. But not having a son while I myself am the son, how will I be Father? I must have one Son in order to be Father, and so forth.

Further, this is evident from those very words of Scripture in John 8, where the Son affirms: I proceeded from God; and in the same place: I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me. And in chapter 14: I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may remain with you forever, the Spirit of truth. For the one who proceeds must be really distinct from the one from whom he proceeds, and the one sent from the one who sends, and the one who asks from the one whom he asks, since the same cannot proceed from himself, nor send himself, nor ask himself, as Tertullian rightly urges there,

and St. Athanasius also in his discourse against the followers of Sabellius.

Finally, Sacred Scripture plainly declares that the Son of God was begotten before the morning star, and that divine Wisdom came forth from the mouth of the Most High before every creature, and that the Word was in the beginning with God, and that through it all things were made. Therefore, within God Himself a real distinction of persons must be admitted, and not merely a distinction from diverse connotation and respect to effects to be produced in creatures. Add that this divine truth is established by the very principles by which the Sabellians attempt to overthrow it.

They object, 1. Various places of Scripture where the unity of God is proclaimed, from which they infer one person. Thus Deuteronomy 6: Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord. And in chapter 4: The Lord Himself is God, and there is no other besides Him. But these words not only do not indicate unity of person; they rather signify the Trinity and denote distinction. For by a marvelous divine prompting it happened that Moses and the other writers of the Old Testament signified the unity of God by a threefold repetition, so that they might designate three persons in the unity of the Godhead, as the holy Fathers gather, especially Athanasius in his books on the Trinity.

They object, 2. John 14: I am in the Father and the Father is in me, from which they infer that the Father and the Son are one person distinct only by two names. They confirm it from Isaiah 43 and 45: Only in you is God, and besides you there is no God; truly you are a hidden God. But from those texts the holy Fathers gather the distinction of persons, especially Athanasius in Dialogue 3 on the Trinity and Hilary in book 4, who weighs that word of Isaiah thus: Isaiah distinguishes the one dwelling from

the one in whom He dwells by distinction of person, not of kind; for God is in Him, and He in whom God is, is God. For God is not in a dwelling of a nature different and alien from Himself.

They object, 3. John: I and the Father are one. But that context is against them. For as St. Augustine notes in Tractate 36 on John: If one, therefore not diverse; if we are, therefore Father and Son. For he would not say "we are" of one, and he would not say "one" of those who are diverse. Hence St. Gregory Nazianzen in book 1 *De Fide*: "One," he says, refers to the unity of the Godhead; but "we are" assigns the persons. Similarly Tertullian in book 1 against Marcion weighs 1 John 5: There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one. He says: "Three are one," not "one," as it was said: I and the Father are one. He replies: it refers to unity of substance, not to numerical singularity.

They object, 4. All things the Father has, the Son likewise has; therefore there is nothing by which the Son can be really distinguished from the Father. They prove the antecedent from Matthew 11: All things have been handed over to me by my Father; and John 16: All things that the Father has are mine; and chapter 17: All mine are yours, and yours are mine. But from those very words the holy Fathers gather the distinction of persons. For between giver and receiver there must be a real distinction. Hence they commonly interpret those contexts to mean that the Father gave all things to the Son, except being Father. Thus the Council of Florence in the Letters of Union says: All things that are the Father's, the Father gave to His only-begotten Son by begetting Him, except being Father. St. Gregory Nazianzen agrees in Oration 44 on Pentecost: All things whatsoever the Father has are the Son's, except that He is not unbegotten; all things whatsoever the Son has are the Holy

Spirit's, if you except generation. That this exception is implicitly contained in Christ's own words is taught by Athanasius in Oration 4 against the Arians: Lest anyone, seeing the Son have all things whatsoever the Father has, be deceived in the manner of Sabellius by an indiscriminate likeness of the things possessed and impiously think that the Son is also the Father, for this reason this word was spoken: It has been given to me, and I have received, and it has been handed over to me, for no other cause than to show that He is not the Father. And a little later he weighs John 5: As the Father has life in Himself, so He gave to the Son to have life in Himself. He says: By the word "gave" he indicates that he is not the Father; but by the fact itself he signifies the Son's likeness and property with the Father.

They object, 5. Sacred Scripture affirms that God is alone, Psalm 85: You alone are God; and 1 Timothy 1: To the King of ages, immortal and invisible, to the only God. Therefore He is also solitary; but solitude does not stand with companionship of three persons; therefore three persons are not to be admitted in God. The holy Fathers answer that Scripture also teaches that the Father is not alone, but the Son is with Him. For Christ Himself in John 8 plainly declares: I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me. And: In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true: I am the one who testifies about myself, and the Father who sent me testifies about me. St. Athanasius weighs these words thus against the followers of Sabellius: Behold for you two persons; and unless you say that there are truly two when He speaks these things, you do not permit the testimony to be true, for the testimony is confirmed only if it is given not by one but by two.

They answer, second, that God is said to be alone by exclusion of other gods, not by exclusion of divine persons. This

exposition is confirmed by Scripture itself. For in John 17 we read: This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God; and it adds: and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. Further, of the Son it is said in Isaiah 45: Besides you there is no God; truly you are a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Savior. And Baruch 3: This is our God, and no other shall be esteemed against Him; but it adds: After this He was seen on earth, so as to signify that the prior words are to be understood of the Son of God. Yet it does not follow that the Father is not truly God and Lord. Therefore the particle "only" does not exclude persons, but excludes vain gods.

I answer, third, with Bl. Scotus in I, dist. 2, q. unica, that the word "only" can be taken in two ways: categorematically or syncategorematically. Taken categorematically it is the same as "solitary," and therefore it has no place in divine things. Hence these propositions are false: God is alone; the Father is alone, that is, solitary. Taken syncategorematically it can be taken in four modes. Either it determines an essential subject with respect to an essential predicate, and then this proposition is true: You are the only God, the true God. Or it determines a personal subject with respect to an essential predicate, and thus the proposition would be false: Only the Father is God. Hence when it is said of the Father in John 17: that they may know you, the only true God, the particle "only" is not on the side of the subject, namely the Father, but on the side of the predicate, namely the true God, so that the sense is: that they may know you, Father, who are the only true God. Third, "only" can be taken insofar as it determines a personal subject with respect to a personal predicate, and thus this proposition is true: only the Father begets; only the Son is begotten. Fourth, "only" can determine a personal subject with respect to a notional predicate common to more than one person.

In that case it is not rightly joined to a subject signifying only one person, but should be joined to a subject signifying both; for you would not rightly say: only the Father spirates, but you should say: only the Father and the Son spirate.

They object, 6. Certain testimonies of the holy Fathers where they seem to affirm that the divine persons are distinct only in names and by consideration of the intellect. Thus St. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 13, after he has distinguished the three divine supposita by their proper marks, adds: each is God if it is considered separately, namely by the mind separating what cannot be separated. And Oration 35: There is one essence and nature and appellation of God, although through certain distinct thoughts the names also are distinguished together. But St. Gregory Nazianzen himself rejects this injury far from himself. For in Oration 49, showing that in his earlier writings he professed a true real distinction of persons, he says that he condemned the Sabellian sect in that same little work, and wrote the distinction of persons according to the word, since no one can for one person search "they are one," and assign unity of kind except to persons. Hence in Oration 35 he says: It is an equal impiety either to connect the persons in the manner of Sabellius, or to distinguish and separate the natures in the manner of Arius. Therefore when he says that one person considered apart is distinguished by intellection, he must be understood to mean that our intellect scarcely can truly conceive and set apart one person from another. For in reality each person has the other two persons dwelling within by mutual indwelling, and as to essence is the same as them, and therefore cannot be really separated from them.

They object, 7. Things that are the same as a third are the same as one another; but the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit

are the same as the divine essence; therefore they are the same as one another. I distinguish the major as I already distinguished: whatever are the same as something by the same identity are the same as one another by that identity, I grant. But since the divine persons are not the same in the third personally and as suppositum, but only essentially, neither should they be the same as one another personally, but only essentially.

They object, 8. It implies a contradiction for something one to be simultaneously multiple; but God is one and the Trinity is divided and multiple; therefore God is not Trinity. I distinguish the major: under the same aspect under which it is one, it cannot be divided and multiple, I grant; under another aspect under which it is not one, I deny. Thus God is one in essence and multiple in persons; therefore He is not one and divided and multiple under the same aspect, but under different aspects.

They object, finally: nothing is to be admitted in God such that, if it were removed, God would remain infinitely perfect; but with the Trinity of persons excluded, God remains infinitely perfect, since to be infinite belongs to the essence of the Godhead; therefore, and so on. Bl. Scotus denies the minor in I, dist. 2, q. 53. For if one person were removed, another would not remain infinitely perfect, not because one person constitutes the perfection of the essence or of another person, but because all the persons are really identified with the essence, and so they are really and essentially identified even with one another. But it implies a contradiction that something really identified with another subsisting reality be taken away; otherwise the same thing would really be both taken away and not taken away, which implies a contradiction. Or I distinguish the minor: with the Trinity of persons excluded, God would remain infinitely perfect

if that condition were possible, I grant; but since it is impossible, as it truly is, I deny.

They press: from the infinity of the divine nature we gather that the Godhead is one and incapable of multiplication; but the divine person, as formally distinct from the essence, is no less infinite; therefore it is no less one and incapable of multiplication. I distinguish the major: from infinity simply and absolutely, I grant; from infinity in a certain respect and in a determinate genus, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the minor: that a divine person is no less infinite simply and absolutely, I deny; infinite according to its own formal reason, let it pass. Or otherwise I deny the minor, for a divine person, formally as person, is neither infinite nor finite, neither imperfect nor perfect, as we will prove below.

CONCLUSION II
IN GOD THERE ARE ONLY THREE DIVINE PERSONS, AND THERE CAN BE NEITHER MORE NOR FEWER

This is of faith, defined in many councils, whose doctrine the Lateran Council gathers and again proves in the chapter *Damnamus* in these words: We believe and confess that there is one supreme reality, which is truly Father and Son and Holy Spirit; three persons together, and each of them singly. Each of the three persons is that reality, namely the divine substance, essence, or nature. And that reality is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding, but is the Father who generates, and the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, so that the distinctions are in the persons and the unity is in the nature. Although the Father is other, the Son other, and the Holy Spirit other, not another thing, but what the Father is, the Son is

and the Holy Spirit is, altogether the same, so that according to the orthodox and Catholic faith they are believed to be consubstantial.

This same is openly handed down by St. Athanasius in the Creed: There is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits. All the contexts of Sacred Scripture also prove it, by which in the prior Question we insinuated the holy Trinity, that is, that there are three divine persons. Moreover Sacred Scripture plainly pronounces that there is one Father, since God the Father is expressed by a singular name. And it also plainly explains that there is one Son and one Holy Spirit. For it calls the Son only-begotten: John 1, The only-begotten who is in the bosom of the Father; and: glory as of the only-begotten from the Father. And chapter 3: God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son. Likewise of the Holy Spirit, 1 Corinthians 12: There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit; and: One and the same Spirit works all these things; and again: In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body. But John speaks it more evidently in 1 John 5: There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. Although this proposition does not express exclusion directly and explicitly, nevertheless it implicitly signifies and includes it, according to the common interpretation of the holy Fathers.

The same truth is proved by reason. First, if there were more than three divine persons, there would likewise be more than one God, and not one God; but it implies a contradiction that there be more than one God; therefore it also implies a contradiction that there be more divine persons than three. The major is proved: the reason why a plurality of persons constitutes one God and does not have a distinct Godhead and essence is

that the Father communicates the same Godhead undividedly to the Son by generation, and the Father and the Son communicate it to the Holy Spirit by spiration. But such a communication of the same Godhead would be impossible if there were many Fathers, many Sons, or many Holy Spirits. Therefore, and so on.

The holy Fathers prove the minor, who confess that from this communication there is one God. First, St. Ignatius in the Epistle to the Philippians concludes: There is one God the Father and not two or three; one, namely, who is and there is none besides Him, for the Lord says, God is one. Likewise there is one Son, God the Word. And shortly after, for the unity of the Holy Spirit he concludes: Again, therefore, there are not three Fathers, nor three Sons, nor three Paracletes; but one Father and one Son and one Paraclete. With these words Ignatius observes that it pertains to the unity of God that there are not many Fathers, nor many Sons, nor many Paracletes. St. Basil agrees in book 3 against Eunomius: Thus, he says, the account of unity will be preserved in the Trinity if we profess one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit. Epiphanius likewise subscribes (heresy 64): The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, a Trinity in truth and a unity; for that reason there is one God, because there are not two Fathers, nor two Sons, nor two Holy Spirits. Hence St. Fulgentius, in his response to the first objection of the Arians, concludes the whole matter: If both, he says, were called Fathers, they would surely be natures unlike, since each would exist from himself and would not have a common substance with the other; and the Godhead would not be one, where one nature is not one. He says the same to objection 5 about the Son: Two unbegottens, he says, cannot have one nature, where neither one finds in the other a true generation from himself, nor one from another truly acknowledges in himself the substance of nativity.

It is proved, 2. There are only as many divine persons, and not more, as there are unproduced and produced persons. But there is only one unproduced person, and there can be only one; and there are two produced persons. Therefore there can be only three divine persons. The major is clear. The minor is proved as to the first part by Bl. Scotus in I, dist. 2, q. 7, n. 37: If there could be more than one unproduced person, they would necessarily be infinite; but it implies a contradiction that there be infinitely many persons in God; therefore it also implies a contradiction that there be more than one unproduced person. The minor is evident: those infinite unproduced persons would either be of the same species and distinct only in number, or diverse. Not the former, because it implies a contradiction that there be many infinites differing only in number, as we proved in demonstrating the unity of God. Not the latter, because then none of them would be infinite, since each would lack the perfections of a person of another species, just as man does not have all the perfections of beasts, nor beasts the perfections of man. Therefore none would be infinitely perfect, since it would not have all possible perfections.

Bl. Scotus further proves the minor: whatever can be in many suppositums and is not determined to a certain number of suppositums by something distinct from itself, by its own account can be in infinitely many; and if it is a necessary being, in fact it is in infinitely many, since, as Aristotle says in Physics 4, text 32, in eternal things "to be able" and "to be" do not differ. But if an unproduced divine person could be in many suppositums, it could not be determined by anything so that it would be in a certain and determinate number of suppositums, because to be determined by another in order to be in a suppositum is contrary to the account of an unproduced person. Therefore of itself it

could be in infinitely many, and thus in fact there would be infinitely many unproduced persons. But this implies a contradiction. Therefore, and so on.

He proves it again: a plurality is never to be posited without necessity; but there is no necessity for admitting more than one unproduced person, for that would neither belong to the production of an unproduced person nor contribute anything to the perfection of the produced persons. Therefore there cannot be more than one. Third, because one essence actually existing cannot of itself have diverse modes of existing without productions. From where, then, would that diversity of existing be taken? Therefore the unproduced person cannot be multiple.

The same minor, as to the second part, namely that there are only two produced persons, is proved by Bl. Scotus in the same place, n. 18: there are only as many produced persons, and not more, as there are adequate and sufficient productive principles of diverse account in the unproduced person. But those principles are only two, namely intellect and will. Therefore there are only two produced persons. This will be made clear in the following Disputation, where we will demonstrate that only two divine processions and productions are to be admitted, and thus only two produced persons.

St. Bonaventure proves this same truth from a sufficient combination, which he presents in I, dist. 1, art. 1, q. 4, in a threefold way. First, he argues thus: The first person, who is unbegotten and not inspirable, begets and spirates. The second person, because He is inspirable but begotten, does not beget, but spirates. The third person, because He is spirated and proceeds from the one begetting, neither begets nor spirates. Therefore it is impossible that there be more than three persons.

Second, with Richard of St. Victor (book 3 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 20), he argues from a threefold love: for love is threefold, namely gratuitous, owed, and mixed from both. Therefore there ought to be only three divine persons: one who only gives, in whom there is gratuitous love; one who only receives, in whom there is owed love; and a middle one who gives and receives, in whom there is love mixed from both.

Third, he gathers it from origin. For, he says, one can understand a person who is the principle of a person and is not principiated, and again a person who is principiated and is not the principle of a person, and in a third way a person who is principiated and is a principle. But a fourth mode, that someone be neither principle nor principiated, is altogether impossible and unintelligible.

You will say, 1: In created things generation proceeds from the fecundity of nature; therefore similarly in God, besides the two processions of which one is through intellect and the other through will, another is to be admitted arising from the fecundity of nature, and consequently another proceeding person distinct from the Word and the Holy Spirit. Bl. Scotus answers in the same place, n. 21, by distinguishing the consequent: that in God a production from the fecundity of nature is to be posited as from an adequate principle, he denies; as from an inadequate and partial principle, he grants. For the adequate and total principle of the production of the Son includes both the intellect and the divine essence, and each of these concurs partially in that production. The same must be said of the divine will with respect to the production of the Holy Spirit. Hence, although the divine essence concurs as the principle by which in the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, it does not thereby have the account of a distinct adequate and per se productive principle of some

divine person, but only insofar as it concurs with the intellect and the will. Therefore, since there are only two adequate productive principles of divine persons, there are also only two produced divine persons.

You will press: From one and the same adequate principle there can be multiple productions and distinct terms; therefore, although in God there are only two productive principles, it does not follow that there are only two produced persons. The antecedent is proved: a created intellect is an adequate principle of a mental word, yet it can produce many total and adequately distinct words. I distinguish the antecedent: if the produced terms are not adequate both intensively and extensively, that is, if they do not exhaust the perfection of the producing principle both in being and in operating, I grant; if they do, I deny. Therefore a created intellect can produce many distinct mental words because none of those words is adequate to the perfection of the intellect in being, since the intellect is a substance and the word is an accident; nor is it adequate in operating, because the intellect that concurs with one impressed species to produce one word can again concur with another dissimilar species representing an object to produce another word. But in divine things it is otherwise: the divine Word exhausts the perfection of its productive principle both in being, since it is consubstantial with the Father, and in operating, since it exhausts and is adequate to the whole fecundity of the divine intellect. Therefore the consequence is to be denied.

You will add: Yet from the same productive principle there can be distinct terms that are adequate both in being and in operating; therefore even if there are only two adequate productive principles in divine things, more than two produced persons can exist. The antecedent is proved: a produced fire is

adequate to the perfection of the producing fire, for it is of the same nature and activity; yet from one fire two other fires can be produced from two distinct materials applied in different ways. I distinguish the antecedent: if it does not otherwise imply a contradiction, namely if the adequate term is not infinite, I grant; if it is, I deny. Therefore from one finite productive principle there can be multiple finite terms, because many finite beings of the same account are not repugnant; a finite power, notwithstanding its limitation, can extend itself to two terms at once which it could produce separately. But it is otherwise when the produced term is infinite, because it is repugnant that two infinites exist of the same account. For either one would include the perfections of the other or not. If it did, they would not be distinct and thus not two. If it did not, neither would be infinitely perfect, since neither would have the perfections the other infinite would include. Therefore the consequence is to be denied.

You will urge: As a finite power relates to a finite effect and term, so an infinite power relates to an infinite. But a finite power can have multiple adequate finite terms. Therefore much more an infinite power can have multiple adequate infinite terms. The antecedent is proved: if there were a difference, it would be because either an infinite effect exhausts the fecundity of the productive power, or because it is incompossible with another infinite effect of the same account. But neither blocks. Not the first, because there appears no reason why an adequate infinite effect would exhaust the fecundity of an infinite power more than a finite effect exhausts the fecundity of a finite power; and the finite effect does not so exhaust it that it cannot produce another adequate term, as is evident from the example of fire. Therefore neither does one infinite term so exhaust the fecundity of an infinite power that it cannot produce a further term. Not the

second, because the effect, as posterior to the cause, does not impede the fecundity of the cause; and because all the divine attributes and the three divine persons are many infinites of the same account in the account of attribute and person, though they otherwise differ. Therefore there could also be many infinite terms of the divine intellect, although they have their own particular marks by which they are distinguished.

I distinguish the major: according to a certain proportion, I grant; according to an exhaustive proportion, I deny. It is true that an infinite power requires an adequate infinite term; but it is false that, as a finite faculty can have successively various adequate finite terms, so an infinite could have various infinite terms. Therefore the consequence is denied. To the proof I say that the variety of infinite terms of one divine power is repugnant on both sides. First, because a single term exhausts and is adequate to the fecundity of its faculty: if that faculty could produce something further, it would not act infinitely in producing the first term, since it would not have bestowed every perfection on that first term if it could produce another equally perfect term endowed with similar excellences. Second, because it implies a contradiction that there be two infinites of the same account, for the very explicit reasons already given.

Nor do the proposed examples establish the contrary. For the divine personalities, formally considered, are neither infinite nor finite, as will be shown below. Likewise the attributes, formally considered, are neither finite nor infinite; for in that respect they are formally distinguished both from formal infinity, which is a mode of the divine essence, and from radical infinity, which is the constitutive and distinctive difference of the divine essence itself. Hence they are not infinite formally, but only really, insofar as they are identified with the divine essence. Therefore

they are not many infinites, but one, because they do not have the account of infinite as they are distinct, but only as they are identified.

You will say, 2: There are as many divine persons as there are constitutive principles of them. But these are four. Therefore so are the persons. The major is clear. The minor is proved: the constitutive principles of the divine persons are opposite relations. But these are four: paternity and filiation, passive spiration and active spiration. Therefore, and so on. I deny the minor; and to its proof I distinguish: a relation belonging to only one person is a constitutive principle of that person, I grant; a relation that belongs to more than one person, I deny. But active spiration belongs to the Father and the Son, who indivisibly spirate the Holy Spirit; therefore it is not constitutive of any divine person, but presupposes the Father constituted by paternity and the Son constituted by filiation.

You will press: As being begotten and being spirated relate, so begetting and spirating relate. But being begotten and being spirated, signified by the relations of filiation and passive spiration, constitute distinct persons. Therefore likewise begetting and spirating, expressed by paternity and active spiration, ought to constitute two distinct persons. I deny the major. For being begotten and being spirated are opposed at least mediately, and so they constitute diverse persons, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit. But begetting and spirating are in no way opposed, and therefore they ought not to constitute diverse persons.

You will say, 3: In a being supremely necessary, to be and to be able are the same. But the divine Son can produce another son. Therefore He in fact produces one. The minor is proved from St. Augustine in book 3 against Maximinus, who, asserting that the Son of God is not equal to the Father, is struck thus by

Augustine in chapter 7: The matter is entirely brought to this point: either God the Father could not beget an equal Son, or He would not. If He could not, He is weak; if He would not, He is envious. But both are false. Therefore the Son is truly equal to God the Father. Finally in chapter 12 he concludes: Far be it that, as you think, the Father is more powerful than the Son because the Father begot a Creator, but the Son did not beget a Creator, for it is not that He could not, but that it was not fitting. Therefore St. Augustine seems to hold that the Son of God could have begotten another son like Himself, but did not, lest there be many divine sons. It is confirmed: Augustine's whole point there is to prove that if the divine Father could not generate an equal Son, He would be impotent; and conversely, if He is omnipotent, He ought to generate an equal Son. Therefore likewise, if the Son cannot generate another son, He would not be omnipotent, and consequently not God. Therefore from St. Augustine's mind it follows that the divine Son could beget another son.

Bl. Scotus answers in I, dist. 20, q. unica, n. 12, denying the minor. As to St. Augustine's consequence, he says it holds only from an extrinsic consideration: namely, that if the Father did not beget an equal Son, He would truly not be omnipotent. It is not that omnipotence is the principle and reason why the Father can produce another Son, for otherwise, since the Son and the Holy Spirit are likewise omnipotent, they too would have to beget sons. Rather, if the Father could not produce an equal Son, that impotence would show some defect in Him, which could be nothing other than a defect of omnipotence, since there would be nothing else in the Father that could prevent the production of an equal Son. But the same account does not hold for the Son, since the negation of producing another son cannot be traced back to a defect of omnipotence, but to another reason, namely because

two adequate and infinite terms of the same faculty are altogether repugnant. Therefore the divine Son did not fail to produce another son because He could not or because He is not omnipotent, but because it was not fitting, that is, because the production of two Sons is repugnant in itself.

I answer, 2. That St. Augustine there argues ad hominem. For since Maximinus granted at once that the Son of God is a natural Son, and yet claimed He was made and a creature, it followed that some Son of God would be able to be made who would be equal to the Father. Therefore the Father would not be omnipotent if He could not make such an equal and makeable Son. That this was St. Augustine's intent is gathered from his following words, where he adds that divine generation would be immoderate if the begotten Son begot a grandson for the Father; because that grandson too, unless he begot a great-grandson for his grandfather, would, according to your marvelous wisdom, be called impotent. Likewise that one too, if he did not beget a grandson for his grandfather and a great-grandson for his grandfather, would not be called omnipotent by you; nor would the series of generation be fulfilled if one always came from another and none completed it, if one omnipotent were not sufficient. Therefore He begot an omnipotent Son, because whatever the Father does, the Son likewise does.

CONCLUSION III
THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS ARE ONE GOD IN NUMBER

This is of faith, determined in the councils: Nicaea (book 2), where the holy Trinity is preached as individual and indivisible; Toledo 6, chapter 1: In the Trinity there is such unity

of substance that it lacks plurality and holds equality, and in each it is no less than in all, nor in all greater than in each; and Toledo 11: God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit is said singularly; and: Therefore each person is affirmed and believed singularly to be one God. The Lateran Council gathers this in the chapter *Firmiter*, saying that there is one only true God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; three persons indeed, but one essence, substance, or nature altogether simple; the Father from no one, the Son from the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit from both; the Father begetting, the Son being born, and the Holy Spirit proceeding.

This the holy Fathers most consistently defend. First, Pope Damasus in the profession of faith anathematizes the one who divides God the Father and God the Son and God the Holy Spirit as gods and not as God, because of the one Godhead and power which we believe to be of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Hence St. Epiphanius in the *Anchoratus* notes that the Seraphim in Isaiah say Holy, Holy, Holy, not Holies, Holies, Holies, by which they both proclaim a celebrated singularity and do not conceal the number of three, but give sanctification three times, and yet uniformly and singularly pronounce the word, lest they name a multitude of gods.

The holy Fathers prove this truth by many reasons. First, from the simplicity of God. Divine simplicity would not be the strictest if there were not one and indivisible essence, as is evident from the example of human nature, which is not properly and truly simple in all men, because it exists in many natures really and numerically distinct. St. Dionysius touches this in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chapter 1: In almost all the sacred books, he says, we observe that the Godhead is proclaimed as singular and one, because of the simplicity and unity of that excellent individual. St.

Gregory of Nyssa agrees, at the end of his book to Ablabius: Although the account of cause distinguishes the hypostases of the holy Trinity, requiring that one be without cause and another be from cause, yet the divine nature is found to be free from variation and division under every consideration. Therefore properly there is one Godhead and one God, and the other names that belong to God are also spoken in the singular. St. Athanasius agrees in the first dialogue on the Trinity against the Anomoean: Essence, he says, admits neither a property not common to the hypostases that are under the essence, nor a multiplication of number, since it is one and singular.

Second, they prove it from the infinity of the divine essence. For an infinite essence admits no companion of the same kind; otherwise it would lack a perfection of the other that would be possible in the same species. Therefore each created numerical essence is circumscribed and finite, and does not admit the perfection of another. But what is not circumscribed, says the same Nyssen, is not numbered; and what is not numbered cannot be considered in a multitude. Therefore since the divine essence is not circumscribed and not finite, it cannot be multiple. Hence the holy Fathers infer that the divine essence has no more or less perfection in three persons than in one. St. Augustine excellently explains this in book 7 of *De Trinitate*, chapters 4, 5, and 6, where, after proposing various reasons why three human persons are three men, whereas three divine persons are not three gods, he concludes in chapter 6: One man is not as much as three men together; and two men are more than one man; and in equal statues there is more gold in three together than in one statue, and less in one than in two. But in God it is not so. For the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit together are not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone. But the three together—those

substances or persons, if they must be called so—are equal to each singly. St. Bernard agrees in Epistle 190 to Innocent: The Father is wholly what the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are; the Son is wholly what He Himself and the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are; the Holy Spirit is wholly what He Himself and the Father and the Son are; and the whole is wholly one, neither overflowing in the three nor diminished in the singles. For the true and supreme good, which they are, is not divided among them as though in parts, since they do not possess it by participation; rather they are it essentially.

Third, the holy Fathers prove it from the supreme unity and uniformity of God. For, as St. Fulgentius says in *De Fide ad Petrum*, chapter 1: The Trinity itself would not be one God if, as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct from one another by property of persons, so they were also distinguished by diversity of natures. Hence he adds: For this reason we rightly believe and say that the three are one God, because there is one eternity, one immensity, and one numerically the same Godhead of the three divine persons. St. Ambrose explains this excellently in book 5 of *De Fide*, chapter 1, where he solves the objection of the Arians saying: If you confess the Father and the Son to be of one substance, you introduce not one God but two gods; because those who are of one substance seem to be not one God but two gods, as two men, and so on. He replies: We approve by the Lord's words that where there are many, there is either a difference of natures, or of wills and operations. Finally, so that they are refuted by their own testimonies: two men are called two because, although they are of one nature, they differ by right of birth, and by time, and by thought, and by work, and by place. Therefore one man cannot be said in the signification and number of two, because there is no unity where there is diversity.

But one God is said, and the glory and fullness of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is signified.

I will not repeat here all the scholastic reasons I have more than sufficiently pressed in proving that a plurality of gods is impossible, and therefore that the unity of the Godhead is numerical and singular. Nevertheless, certain holy Fathers must be explained here who seem to assert that between the divine persons there is only unity of species.

You will say: The holy Fathers affirm that the divine persons agree in unity of the Godhead in the way two men agree in unity of humanity. But two men so agree in a specific unity, and are truly two men numerically distinct from one another. Therefore likewise the three divine persons agree only specifically, and thus will be three gods numerically distinct.

The major is proved. For St. Gregory of Nyssa in the discourse *De Fide ad Simplicium* says: In divine dogmas, being begotten produces no difference of nature; but just as in Adam and Abel there is one humanity, that is, one human nature, so also in the Father and the Son the Godhead, that is, the divine nature, is one. Likewise Justin in the exposition of faith says: Just as Adam, although not begotten in the same manner as his descendants, nevertheless has a common essence with them, so there is no reason why, because of the name "unbegotten," the common essence should be divided between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Similarly Athanasius against the Macedonians, first dialogue: As Paul, Peter, and Timothy are three, so the heretics think that the Son is not consubstantial with the Father, because neither is the Father. And because of the difference of persons they introduce also a difference of substances, as Abel and Adam can be called consubstantial, since neither can Abel be Adam nor Adam Abel. Therefore, if

difference of persons does not destroy identity of nature among men, how is it not impious to think that for that reason the supernatural substance of God is diversified?

From these they conclude that the holy Fathers asserted among the divine persons only unity of species and not numerical unity, and therefore that they can be called three gods. I deny the minor. That was not the judgment of the cited Fathers, as though they intended an equality in all respects between the three divine persons and three men. Rather, since they argued against heretics who said the Son is a substance of a different kind from the Father, and consequently unequal, as a creature of another kind is unequal to its Creator, the Fathers refuted them thus: if the Son is truly and properly a natural Son, He must necessarily be equal and of the same substance with the Father, just as the begetting man and the begotten man are of the same substance and essence. Therefore since you admit that the Word is the Son of God, you must also necessarily confess that the divine persons are of the same substance.

With prudent counsel, the Fathers then pronounced nothing about the numerical and real unity of the divine nature, because mention of it would doubtless have given the adversaries an occasion for many sophisms by which they would blunt the force of the arguments. Therefore the Fathers judged it sufficient to bring the disputation so far that the adversaries could not deny the specific identity and equality of substance among the divine persons. Once this was admitted, it was very easy for the Fathers to prove numerical identity by the reasons already brought forward. That this is in fact the mind of the cited Fathers is gathered more than sufficiently both from what has been said and from what will be said, where it will be clear that they assert that the three divine persons are one God in number.

QUESTION V
WHETHER THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE TRULY GOD AND CONSUBSTANTIAL WITH THE ETERNAL FATHER

From the preceding Question it is clear that various heretics have shamefully erred concerning the equality of the three divine persons. But Arius deviated from the truth most badly of all. He had many precursors and followers of his error, which will be clearer from what follows.

NOTE 1. Tertullian chiefly carried the torch for the Arian error. For he thought that the Word of God was then begotten by the Father and made the Son when He fabricated all created things from nothing, and he used that expression. Thus he testifies in chapter 7 of *Contra Praxeam*: This is the perfect nativity of the Word, when He brought forth the Word itself with its appearance and adornment, when He said: Let there be light. When He proceeds from God, He is first established by Him as thought, under the name of Wisdom: The Lord established me in the beginning of His ways; then begotten unto effect: when He prepared the heavens, I was with Him. From that time, making Him like Himself, from proceeding He became Son, the first-born, as begotten before all things, and only-begotten, as the only one properly begotten from God, from the very womb of His heart.

No less false, indeed even more absurd things against the eternity of the Son and His equality, he asserts in *Contra Hermogenem*, chapter 3, where he says that God indeed was from eternity and always God, but was not always Father. God, he says, is Father and God and Judge; but not therefore Father and Judge

always, because He is God always. For neither could He be Father before a Son, nor Judge before a fault. But there was a time when both fault and the Son were not, which made Him Judge and Lord and Father. These words contain the same error that Arius later disseminated, which Athanasius shows from Arius's book called *Thalia* in *De Synodis*: Arius said that the one without beginning constituted the Son as the beginning of the things made, and brought Him forth and adopted Him as His own Son; He has nothing of God according to the property of hypostasis, for He is not equal nor consubstantial. The Father is alien from the Son according to substance, since He is without beginning. Understand that the unity was first without a beginning, namely the Father; but the duality, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit, was not before it existed. Thus, with the Son not existing, the Father is God; finally, when the Son did not exist, by the will of the Father He came to be, and so on.

NOTE 2. Arius was from Libya, that is, the part bordering Egypt. Since he was a participant in the Meletian schism, he was first barred from communion by Peter of Alexandria, as Baronius proves from the acts of the same Peter the Martyr at the year 301. But later he was reconciled to the Church and made a deacon by Peter himself. Yet, when he again returned to schism, he was again deprived of communion. Moreover, when Peter was seized in the persecution of Maximinus and was in chains, he learned from Christ that Arius was beyond hope; therefore he warned Achillas and Alexander, whom he knew by divine indication to be his successors, that they should never receive Arius into communion.

Nevertheless, after Arius feigned repentance, under Bishop Alexander he was made a priest and put in charge of a certain church or parish in Alexandria called Baucalis. But when

Alexander, in a certain gathering of clergy, disputed about the mystery of the Trinity and more subtly explained how unity is in Trinity, Arius began to contend against him and to charge him with the Sabellian error. From this it happened that around the year 317, as Orosius notes (book 7, chapter 28), he began to disseminate and defend his heresy. At first seven priests adhered to him, twelve deacons, one bishop, namely Secundus of Pentapolis, and also seven hundred virgins, as Epiphanius teaches in heresy 69. Alexander expelled all of them from the Church. Then he wrote circular epistles to seventy bishops; after receiving them, bishops replied variously according to their dispositions and morals. Some approved the action and urged him to persevere. Others openly began to profess themselves supporters of Arius and to urge Alexander to receive the expelled back into favor, especially Eusebius of Nicomedia, to whom Eusebius of Caesarea and Patrophilus of Scythopolis eventually joined themselves. Calling synods, they restored Arius completely, as Sozomen relates (book 1, chapter 15).

From this it happened that, with continuous fuel of disputes and quarrels, the fire stirred up in the East grew daily, and the Christian religion itself and the most sacred mysteries of faith had already come into contempt and mockery among the pagans, and were publicly ridiculed through stages and theaters, as Eusebius relates in book 2 of *De Vita Constantini*. To compose these dissensions, the Emperor Constantine first exhorted Alexander and Arius to concord by letters sent through Hosius, bishop of Cordoba in Spain. When Hosius achieved nothing by this, he held a synod at Alexandria against newly arising heretics, as he had been commanded. But when no hope remained of recovering peace and concord, Constantine summoned the first ecumenical council at Nicaea in Bithynia by letters sent to

bishops everywhere, in the year of Christ 325. There 318 bishops assembled; Arius was condemned, his error proscribed, and a profession of faith issued in which the Son is asserted to be consubstantial with the Father.

NOTE 3. The heresy condemned at Nicaea and recanted by Arius and his disciples gradually recovered strength and was spread far and wide, not only through regions and the number of men, but it was also divided into various sects and factions, especially into three. The first was of the Anomoeans, who openly said that the Son is a creature and in no respect like the Father, much less equal; this was the very heresy of Arius. The second was of the Semi-Arians, who did not at all assert that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, but only similar in substance. The third, between these two, was of certain men who held that the Son is neither consubstantial nor similar in substance, but only similar, and they either denied or did not dare openly to profess that He is a creature of the order of other creatures, as Epiphanius, Athanasius, Hilary, and others report. Or, as Rufinus writes (book 1 of *Historia*, chapter 25), this threefold separation of the Arian sect was marked by three different names: some were Eunomians and Anomoeans, who made the Son in no way similar; others were Arians, who said He is similar by largess of grace, not by property of nature; the rest were Macedonians, who asserted that He is similar in all respects. These Macedonians were also called Pneumatomachians, that is, fighters against the Holy Spirit, because they denied His divinity and asserted that He is a mere creature.

Therefore two things especially must be established in this Question: the divinity of the Son and the divinity of the Holy Spirit, and the consubstantiality of each with the Father. Therefore:

CONCLUSION I
THE SON IS TRULY CONSUBSTANTIAL WITH THE FATHER AND TRUE GOD

This is of faith, determined in various councils and expressed in all Catholic professions of faith. It is proved first by all the testimonies of the Old and New Testament already produced in the preceding Question to prove the plurality of persons in God.

It is further proved by manifest oracles of the New Testament. The first is that famous confession of Peter in Matthew 16: You are the Christ, the Son of the living God. For by asserting Him to be the Son of the living God, he professed Him to be the natural Son of God. Add that elsewhere the Son is called only-begotten (John 3) and proper (Romans 8). But if He were only an adoptive Son, as the Arians replied, He would not be called only-begotten nor proper; for many are adoptive sons. Further, if Peter only pronounced Christ to be an adoptive Son, there would be no reason his confession should be preferred to others and he should be called blessed by Christ because of it. For those who thought Christ was Elijah or one of the prophets also confessed Him as an adoptive son of God. Therefore Peter recognized Him truly as the natural Son. But if Christ is the natural Son of God, He must necessarily be in the same nature, that is, of the same nature, with His principle; in any other nature He could only be adoptive.

It is confirmed from this: Christ Himself testified in many places that He is the true and natural Son of God. Hence in John 19 the Jews accused Him: We have a law, and according to our law He ought to die, because He made Himself the Son of

God. Hence John 5: The Jews sought all the more to kill Him because He not only broke the Sabbath, but also called God His Father, making Himself equal to God. But Christ nowhere excused Himself as though He had said He was God or Son of God. Rather in that same chapter He adds: Amen, I say to you, the Son cannot do anything of Himself except what He sees the Father doing; for whatever the Father does, the Son likewise does. By these words He not only does not reply as though the Jews were calumniators, but rather again asserts Himself to be the Son of God and to have the same operation and power as the Father.

The Arians reply that Christ excused Himself before the Jews who wanted to stone Him for having said He was the Son of God. For when the Jews said in John 10: We do not stone you for a good work, but for blasphemy, and because you, being a man, make yourself God, He excused Himself by that testimony of Scripture: I said, you are gods. From this He inferred: If He called them gods to whom the word of God came, namely the patriarchs and prophets, why is He not called Son of God with stronger right, whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world? Thus, they say, Christ calls Himself Son of God in the way the just and prophets are, and therefore only an adoptive Son.

But this was not Christ's reasoning, as Hilary in book 7 of *De Trinitate* most well noted. Rather He argued from lesser to greater in this way: if the just and prophets can be called sons of God, how much more He whom the Father sanctified in a special way by the assumed humanity in unity of divine person. St. John Chrysostom adds that Christ indeed first answered the Jews this way so as verbally to repel their calumny, saying in effect: you say in vain that I blaspheme by naming myself the Son of God, since the same name is attributed to those to whom the word of God came, whom you nevertheless consider just and holy. But after

rejecting the calumny, He afterward showed from His works that He is not only adoptive but also true God, saying: If I do not do the works of my Father, do not believe me; but if I do them, so that you may know that I am in the Father and the Father is in me. Add that the Jews remained in the same opinion that He made Himself equal to God, for the Evangelist adds: They sought to seize Him, certainly for the same reason for which they earlier wanted to stone Him. They would have laid aside that intention if they had judged Him to assert only adoptive sonship, since Scripture gives this name to any just man.

It is confirmed, 2. A true Son is the same as a natural Son. But Christ is called the true Son of God in 1 John at the end: that we may be in the true Son; this is the true God. Therefore He is a natural Son. Further, Moses, as a just and holy man, was an adoptive son; yet Paul to the Hebrews (chapter 3) calls him a servant in comparison to Christ, whom he names Son: Moses indeed was faithful in all his house as a servant, but Christ as a Son in His own house. Therefore Christ was not Son of God by adoption and justification, but by eternal and natural generation. Finally, Angels are sometimes called sons of God in the Old Testament because of their eminent holiness. But Christ is called Son in another way than an Angel: For to which of the Angels, says Paul in Hebrews 1, did He ever say: You are my Son; today I have begotten you? Yet this was said to Christ. Therefore it follows that He is a true and natural Son, born by a proper generation.

It is proved, 2. From John 10: I and the Father are one. For "one," in the neuter without another substantive, signifies one being. But of one being there is one essence. Since the Father and the Son are not one by accident, because God is incapable of accident and of change; nor are they one by relation, since they

are personally and really distinguished by relations; therefore, as St. Augustine infers in *De Trinitate*, chapter 2, they are one in substance.

The Arians, both ancient and modern, namely the Transylvanians, reply that the Father and the Son are one not in essence or substance, but by consensus of minds and concord of wills. They confirm it from John 17, where Christ prays that all the faithful may be one, as you, Father, are in me and I in you, that they also may be one in us; and again: The glory you have given me I have given them, that they may be one, as we are one. But the faithful among themselves and with Christ are not one in essence, but by consensus of faith and concord of charity. Therefore from that oracle the Father and the Son are not proved to be one in essence, but only in concord of wills.

Against this, all the Fathers who wrote on the divine Trinity reply. First, that in sacred letters, whenever many are said to be one and it is not added what sort of one, it signifies the same nature and essence, because, as St. Augustine notes in the cited place (chapter 3), one and being are convertible. But one being is one essence. He takes the foundation from 1 Corinthians 6: He who clings to a prostitute becomes one body; he did not say simply "one," but "one body." And again: He who clings to the Lord is one spirit; he does not say simply "one," but "one spirit." Nor is there found any place where many are said to be simply one, without explaining in what way, unless they are one in substance and essence. Nor does it matter that in that same place Christ says of the faithful that they may be one, without adding what sort of one; for it is sufficiently understood that this unity is only by consensus and mutual concord, both among themselves and with God, since it is said: that they may be one, and that they may be one in us. For it plainly follows that the faithful cannot be

one with one another by unity of essence, nor can they be one with God; therefore that unity cannot be understood of unity of essence, as Christ's unity with the Father is. Add that in that very context Christ intended to prove that He has the same power as the Father, and therefore no one can snatch the sheep from His hand, because He and the Father are one, and no one can snatch from the Father's hand. Therefore it necessarily follows that they are of one and the same nature and will. Thus St. John Chrysostom (Homily 60), Hilary (book 7 of *De Trinitate*), Ambrose (book 3 of *De Spiritu Sancto*, chapter 18), and Augustine (Tractate 48 on John) reason. They also confirm it from the fact that if Christ had meant "one" not in power but only in concord, He could not thereby prove that no one can snatch His sheep from His hand as from the Father's; for unity of concord does not constitute equality of power.

It is proved, 3. From 1 John 5: There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one; and there are three who give testimony on earth, the Spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three are one. By these words John signifies that in heaven there are three witnesses, not Angels, since there are more than three Angels, but divine witnesses, namely the persons of the Trinity, who are one, namely one Godhead, essence, and substance, as all the holy Fathers interpret.

The Arians reply: first, that the words There are three who give testimony in heaven are read only by St. Jerome. But this is an open falsehood, for Pope Hyginus read it in Epistle 1, and Cyprian in *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, and others.

They reply, second, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are said by John to be one in the same way the Spirit, the water, and the blood are one. But those three are not one in

essence, but only in testimony, because they testify to the same thing, namely that Christ endured torments not by natural and human but by divine power: the Spirit, because after so many crucifixions He expired with a strong cry; and the water and the blood, because they flowed from His side after death. Therefore the centurion, seeing and hearing these things, rightly cried out (Mark 15): Truly this man was the Son of God. Therefore also the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one only by unity of testimony, not by unity of substance and essence.

I answer, first, that those words and these three are one, when it speaks of the Spirit, the water, and the blood, are not read in some copies. Second, that in Greek the reading is not simply "and these three are one," but "and these three are in one," namely in one testimony; but of the three heavenly witnesses it is read simply: these three are one, by which it signifies unity of essence and substance.

It is proved, 4. From all those texts of Scripture in which the divinity of the Son is plainly expressed, for example John 1: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. Hence St. Ambrose in book 1 of *De Fide Trinitatis*: In these four or five words our Fisherman excludes all heresies. For what was in the beginning is not included in time and is not found in a beginning; therefore Arius should be silent, who denies that the Son is coeternal with the Father. And what was with God is not confused by mixture, but by the solid perfection of God remaining with the Father it distinguishes the persons, so that Sabellius and Photinus are struck dumb, who acknowledged no distinction of persons in divine things. But if the Word was God, there is the inseparable unity and consubstantiality of the everlasting Godhead in the Father and the Son, so that Eudoxius and Eunomius may blush. Behold how

within one statement he rightly shut them all in, so as to make them incapable of deceit, though useless at evasion.

It is confirmed from Isaiah 45: They shall adore you and implore you: only in you is God, and besides you there is no God; truly you are a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Savior, by which Christ's divinity is plainly signified. Second, from Baruch 3: This is our God, and no other shall be esteemed against Him; and it adds: After this He was seen on earth, and so forth. Third, from Philippians 2: Who, being in the form of God, did not think it robbery to be equal with God; therefore He was truly equal. Fourth, from Romans 9: From whom is the Christ according to the flesh, who is over all, God blessed forever. Many other contexts insinuating the Son's divinity we will produce throughout the course of this work.

Because the Arians shamelessly boasted that none of the Fathers before the controversy concerning the Son's divinity and consubstantiality arose ever mentioned it, it is worthwhile to bring forward some Fathers of the newborn Church who professed the divinity and consubstantiality of the three divine persons. These are Clement of Rome, book 8 of the Apostolic Constitutions; Ignatius in the Epistles to the Antiochenes, to the Philadelphians, to the Philippians; Dionysius the Areopagite in *De Mystica Theologia*, chapter 2, and in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chapter 1; Justin in *De Fide* and in the Apology to Antoninus and in the Dialogue with Trypho; Irenaeus in book 3, chapters 8, 9, 16, 19, 20, and book 4, chapter 11; Clement of Alexandria in book 1 of the *Paedagogus*, chapter 6, and in his last book, last chapter; Tertullian in *Contra Praxeam*; Cyprian in book 2 *Ad Quirinum*, chapter 6; and other orthodox writers of the first centuries before the Council of Nicaea. After them, so many

Doctors wrote for this truth that it would be long and useless to recount them.

The Arians object, first, various contexts of Sacred Scripture where the divine Son is called created and a creature. Thus in Proverbs 8 in Greek we read of Wisdom: The Lord created me in the beginning of His ways for His works; likewise in Colossians 1 Christ is called the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature, that is, the principal and most excellent of all creatures, as the Arians interpret. Therefore He is not God and not consubstantial with the eternal Father.

I deny the consequence. To the first context I answer, 1. That the Greek version in that place does not seem to agree with the Hebrew text, which in place of "created me" has "possessed me," as our Vulgate expresses. Between possession, says Jerome in Epistle 139, where he treats this same place, and creation there is a great difference. For possession signifies that the Son was always in the Father and the Father in the Son; but creation is the beginning of existence for one who previously was not. Hence Basil of Seleucia says in Oration 1 on Adam translated into Paradise: Man was made possessor of things of which he was not creator.

I answer, 2. That since in Christ there are two natures, human and divine, certain things are attributed to Him according to one nature that do not belong to the other. Therefore according to the divine nature He is truly uncreated Wisdom; but according to the human nature He can be called created Wisdom, as many holy Fathers interpret, especially Athanasius in Oration 3, who, treating the words The Lord created me, says that we should not think the whole Word is by nature a creature, but that He assumed a created body and for our sake was created by God. Or, as Ambrose says in book 3 of *De Fide*, chapter 5, the Arians, like

Jewish tavern-keepers, mix water with wine, because they confuse divine generation and human generation, referring to the divinity what is said of the flesh. Therefore Augustine in book 1 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 11, commends this rule for understanding Scriptures about the Son of God: that we distinguish what in them sounds according to the form of God, in which He is equal to the Father, and what according to the form of a servant, which He received from the Father. In the same way I answer to the second context, that Christ as incarnate Wisdom is called firstborn because He was first destined by God; for all things are for Christ, and the incarnation to be made was for God the motive for making man and the world.

They object, 2. Those texts where the Son is said to be inferior and subject to the Father, such as John 14: The Father is greater than I; and the end of Matthew: All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth; and Philippians 2: He became obedient unto death. Therefore He was not equal to the Father according to divinity, authority, and power.

I answer, 1. That all these are true according to the assumed humanity, not according to divinity; or, as Athanasius says in the Creed: equal to the Father according to divinity. For by taking humanity He also took servitude. Hence after the Apostle said, He did not think it robbery to be equal with God, he adds: He emptied himself, taking the form of a servant. In this way it is true that He was subject to the Father and that authority was given Him in heaven and on earth, which He did not claim by right of human birth.

I answer, 2. That some Fathers say the Son is less than the Father even according to divinity insofar as He has His principle from the Father, who is therefore called greater because He lacks a principle. Thus St. Hilary, although in book 9 of *De Trinitate* he

expounds that place about the assumed human nature, nevertheless he also interprets it about divinity, saying: Therefore the Father is greater than the Son, and truly greater, who gives Him to be what He is, insofar as He is. Or as Sebastian says more briefly in *Contra Arianos*: The Father is greater than I, rightly greater, because He alone is the author without an author. But Augustine explains it most clearly in *De Fide et Symbolo*, saying Christ said this partly because of the administration of the assumed man, and partly because the Son owes to the Father that He is. Therefore He also owes to the Father that He is equal and on a par with the Father. But the Father owes to no one whatever He is.

You will object, 3. True divinity does not admit a defect of knowledge. But in the Son such a defect and ignorance is found, as is clear from Mark, where Christ speaks about the day of judgment: But of that day or hour no one knows, neither the Angels in heaven nor the Son, but only the Father. I answer, 1. That St. Ambrose in book 5 of *De Fide*, chapter 7, thought the Gospel codices were corrupted by the Arians, because in the older copies the words "nor the Son" are absent. Jerome too in his commentary on Matthew 24 says that in some Latin codices "nor the Son" was added, whereas it is not found in the Greek, and especially not in the copies of Origen and Pierius. I answer, 2. That this restriction of knowledge with respect to the Son must be understood of Him according to humanity specifically, not reduplicatively: not as denying that Christ's humanity knew that day, but as denying that it knew it by human knowledge. For He knew it only by knowledge infused divinely, that is, by revelation. Hence Athanasius in Oration 4, where he explains this oracle at length, says that it is manifest that the end of all these things is that as the Word He knows, but as man He is ignorant. For it is

proper to man to be ignorant, especially of such things. But it is proper to the goodness of our Savior: after He became man, He was not ashamed, because of the ignorant flesh, to say "I do not know," so that He might show that although as God He knows, He does not know carnally. Thus also most of the Fathers, especially Hilary and Augustine.

They object, 4. Various sayings of the holy Fathers. First, Ignatius in the Epistle to the Magnesians says of Christ: He announced His Father as the one and only true God; therefore, they say, only the Father is true God, not the Son. Second, in the Epistle to the Tarsians he says of Christ: He is not that one who is God over all, but the Son of Him. Third, in the same Ignatius's Epistle to the Philippians, when he proves that the Father is one God from Deuteronomy 6, The Lord your God is one God, in the middle he introduces Christ speaking with Satan at the time of the temptation: I know Him, namely God; I know the one and only, to whom I do not refuse to serve, from whom you have become an apostate; I am not an antitheist, that is, contrary to God; I confess His eminence. From these they gather that only the Father is God, to whom service is owed.

I answer that by these and other similar words Ignatius does not exclude the other persons from sharing the Godhead with the Father. Indeed he openly affirms the Son's divinity in the cited Epistle to the Tarsians, for he adds about Christ: How then is such a man merely from Mary, having at last a beginning to be, rather than God the Word and the only-begotten Son, of whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word? Therefore in the earlier words he did not say that He is not God over all, but that He is not that one who is God over all, so that the pronoun indicates the person of the Son as distinct from the Father, who is therefore especially called "over all" because He is the font of the whole

Godhead. Other cavils and objections of the Arians we will solve in the course of this Treatise.

CONCLUSION II
THE HOLY SPIRIT IS TRUE GOD AND THEREFORE CONSUBSTANTIAL WITH THE FATHER AND THE SON

This follows from the preceding and is especially proved by those texts of Scripture.

First, those where baptism is commanded to be conferred in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: at the end of Matthew; and Titus 3: He saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit. From these St. Gregory Nazianzen gathers: If the Holy Spirit is not God, how does He make me God through baptism? As though he said: if through baptism I am sanctified and through the invocation of the Holy Spirit I am made God by participation in divine holiness, then He is God to be adored, because no one can remit sins or sanctify except God alone.

Second, in Acts 5 Peter addresses Ananias thus: Why has Satan tempted your heart that you should lie to the Holy Spirit? Immediately he declares to whom he lied: You have not lied to men but to God. Hence Epiphanius in heresy 74 says: He is God from God, and the Holy Spirit is God, to whom they lied who withheld part of the price of the field.

It is proved, 2. To have a temple and to be the beatitude and ultimate end of a rational creature belongs to God alone. But these are attributed to the Holy Spirit in Scripture. For of the first, 1 Corinthians 6 says: Do you not know that your members are a temple of the Holy Spirit? Of the second, 1 Peter 1 says: The Holy Spirit sent from heaven, into whom the Angels desire to look. But

He into whom Angels desire to look is their beatitude and ultimate end. Therefore, and so on.

Third, He is truly God to whom the operations and properties of the Godhead belong. But all these belong to the Holy Spirit. For first, a property of the Godhead is to be everywhere; but Wisdom 1 says: The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world. Second, creation is the work of God alone; yet it is attributed to the Holy Spirit in Psalm 103: Send forth your Spirit and they shall be created; and Judith 16: You sent forth your Spirit and they were created.

Third, to raise and give life to the dead is an operation proper to God, as is clear from John 5: As the Father raises the dead and gives life, so the Son gives life to whom He will. But this power belongs to the Holy Spirit. For as Paul says in Romans 8: He who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies because of His Spirit dwelling in you. Finally, to foretell and announce future things through prophets belongs to God alone; but 2 Peter 1 says: Holy men of God spoke inspired by the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Holy Spirit is true God, since He has operations proper to God, not merely by ministry, as the Macedonians once said, but by authority. For Paul says in 1 Corinthians 12: One and the same Spirit works all these things, distributing to each as He wills.

Hence one must infer with St. Fulgentius in book 3 to Thrasamund, chapter 25: Let it be said, then, if one who is not God could strengthen the power of the heavens; if one who is not God could sanctify in the regeneration of baptism; if one who is not God could bestow charity; if one who is not God could dwell in believers; if one who is not God could give grace; if one who is not God could have the members of Christ as His temple; and then the Holy Spirit will be rightly denied to be God. But if these

were never possible for a creature, and they are found in the Holy Spirit, which nevertheless belong to God alone, we ought not to say He is naturally different from the Father and the Son, since we cannot find Him different in the power of works; and thus from unity of operation one must acknowledge unity of power.

The Macedonians object: first, John says: All things were made through Him, namely through the Word; therefore the Holy Spirit too was made through Him. Second, Romans 8 says: The Spirit intercedes for us; but if He were God, He would not ask, but give. Therefore He is not true God. Third, John 16 says: Whatever He hears, He will speak and announce to you; but one who must hear and be instructed so as to speak to others is not God. Therefore, and so on.

I answer to the first with Nazianzen in Oration 5 on theology: not all things were made through the Word, but whatever things were made. But the Holy Spirit is outside the order of things that were made; otherwise the Father too would have been made through the Word.

To the second I say with St. Augustine in Epistle 121: Paul says the Holy Spirit intercedes for us because He makes us intercede, helping our weakness by His graces and aids so that we may ask. Hence Paul in Galatians 4: God sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father. To the third I say with St. Basil in book 1 against Eunomius: the Holy Spirit hears from the Father and the Son what He speaks and announces, not by instruction and discipline begged from a wiser and more learned one, but by communication of the divine essence and knowledge itself, which He received from the Father and the Son by eternal procession.

APPENDIX
WHETHER THE UNITY OF THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS IS FITTINGLY EXPLAINED BY THE HOLY FATHERS THROUGH THE TERM CONSUBSTANTIALITY

The term "consubstantial" was used by the holy Fathers, and especially in the Council of Nicaea, to express the unity of essence and substance of the three persons. For this term condemns both Sabellius and Arius: Sabellius, because since the same is not consubstantial with itself, if the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were one person they would not be consubstantial; Arius, because if the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were distinct persons, they would not be consubstantial, but at most would be "similar in substance," and according to Sabellius they would be "of one substance." Hence Epiphanius in heresy 69 says: As a serpent avoids the smell of pitch, or a deer's breath, or the smoke of jet, or storax incense, so Arius and Sabellius hate the steadfast confession of consubstantiality. Therefore Marianus Victor says in a little work on this word that it was found by divine prompting, and Athanasius in the work on the Council of Ariminum calls it a column or summit upon which the impiety of those Arians is proscribed, and as a trophy is set up over it. Pope Liberius agrees in Epistle 11 to the Easterners, around the middle, concerning the Nicene faith: This name "consubstantial," comprehended as a firm and impregnable bulwark, blunts and restrains all the assaults and machines of Arius.

Not only Catholics used the term, but heretics older than Nicaea also did. For Athanasius reports in his work on the councils of Ariminum and Seleucia that Paul of Samosata, who

asserted that Christ was not begotten by God from eternity but only arose in time from Mary, used this argument: that unless it were so, it would follow that He is consubstantial with the Father, and therefore that there are three substances: one primary and two derived from it. He interpreted consubstantiality in the way it is in created and bodily things, where from one substance another is propagated distinct and separate. Therefore Athanasius says in the same work that bishops who assembled at Antioch against Paul of Samosata decreed that the Son is not consubstantial with the Father, namely in the sense Paul of Samosata understood. Hence Hilary says in *De Synodis* near the end: Paul of Samosata confessed consubstantiality badly; but did the Arians deny it better? Eighty bishops once rejected it, but now three hundred eighteen have received it. Those earlier condemned it against a heretic; if in condemning and approving they established the same thing for both, what have we done, overturning what was well established?

Athanasius reports the reason for using this term at Nicaea in *De Decretis Synodi Nicenae*: when the Catholic bishops at Nicaea deliberated among themselves what verbal formula they should adopt for a true profession of faith to extinguish Arian perfidy, it first came into their mind to say that the Son is God from God, only-begotten. But when Eusebius of Nicomedia, who defended the Arians, warned his party that they should not fear to assent to that determination because all created things are likewise from God, the Fathers, noting this, added that the Son is from the substance of the Father. But since this addition also pleased the Arians, they then added that the Son is the power and image of the Father, similar to Him in all things and immutable. But seeing that the Arians did not refuse to subscribe even to this, the Fathers at last used the term "consubstantial" to shatter

and crush their heresy, affirming that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, so that He is believed not only similar to Him but altogether of the same nature and substance.

The occasion for using this term was provided by Eusebius of Nicomedia himself, as St. Ambrose affirms in book 3 of *De Fide*, chapter 7, for one of his letters was brought to the Fathers, which he had addressed to his party, where he warned them not to confess the Son as true, because this would be to confess that He is consubstantial with the Father, which he judged utterly contrary to his opinion. Why, says Ambrose, do they not want to call the Son consubstantial with the Father, unless because they do not want to confess the true Son of God, as their author Eusebius of Nicomedia revealed in his letter, saying: If we say that He is the true Son of God and uncreated, we begin to confess consubstantiality with the Father. When the letter was read in the Council of Nicaea, the Fathers placed this term in the treatise of faith, because they saw that the adversaries feared it, so that, as though with a sword drawn by the adversaries themselves, they might cut off the wicked head of heresy.

Hence Nazianzen rightly notes in Oration 49 that the Arians admitted all other terms by which they could pretend to profess the Son's divinity, except "consubstantial." They could, he says, have said "consubstantial" and the rest verbally if they had a way to pervert it into another meaning according to their sense. But since they saw themselves enclosed by this word, they wanted no mention of it, lest either by professing they be believed, or by believing they be seen to have professed. They subtly excused themselves, saying that it was not written, or that God should not be spoken of "in substance," lest He be believed corporeal, and so forth. Or, as Athanasius adds in the work on the Council of

Ariminum, the exact account of this term both refutes all their dissimulation—since it proves that the Son is from God in such a way that their pretense collapses—and excludes their tricks by which they deceive the simple. Indeed, since they can adulterate and twist everything by sophistical calumnies at will, they fear only this term, because it convicts their heresy. Therefore the Fathers wrote it as a fortification and citadel against all their impious inventions.

The Arians applied every assault and device to abolish this term. For they objected, first, that this word is a new invention, unknown to the ancient Fathers and the Apostles, and not found in Scripture; therefore it is to be rejected, since Proverbs 22 warns: Do not pass beyond the ancient boundaries; and Paul in 1 Timothy 6 says: Guard the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words. Therefore, and so on.

The holy Fathers answered, 1. That this argument rebounds against the Arians. For if they think that every word not written must be excluded, Athanasius says, why did Arius heap up such a pile of expressions nowhere occurring in Scripture, such as "from things not existing," "the Son was not before He was begotten," "there was when He was not," "He is mutable," "the Father is ineffable and invisible to His Son," "the Son does not even know His own substance," and the rest which Arius poured out from his opinion in his ridiculous and impious writing? Why did they not contradict him? Or, as Hilary elegantly wrote against Constantius Augustus, who was also an Arian: The Apostle commands that novelties of words be avoided, not simply novelties, but profane ones. Why do you exclude pious terms, especially since he also said: every Scripture divinely inspired is useful? You read "unbegotten" nowhere; will you deny it because it is new? You decide that the Son is similar to the

Father; the Gospels do not proclaim it. Why do you not flee from this word? In one case novelty is chosen, in another it is removed. Where an occasion of impiety lies open, novelty is admitted; where the greatest safeguard of faith and religion is, it is excluded.

They answered, 2. That the term "consubstantial" is not new, since it had been used by ancient Fathers, for example by Tertullian in book 4 against Marcion, by Prochorus in the Life of St. John, by St. Martial in Epistle 1 to the Bordeaux Christians, chapter 10, and others. The Arians themselves acknowledged this. For Athanasius reports in an Epistle to the African bishops that Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea, who earlier supported the Arian sect, later subscribed to the decrees of Nicaea and affirmed this to his own people by letters. His words are: We know that certain of the ancient learned and illustrious bishops and other writers, when they spoke of the Godhead of the Father and the Son, used the word "consubstantial." A copy of this epistle is found in Theodoret, book 1 of *Historia Ecclesiastica*, chapter 12. Add that this term is also contained in Sacred Scripture in meaning, since Scripture plainly affirms that the Father and the Son are one, and that the Son is begotten from the womb of the Father and equal, and so on. Hence Augustine says in book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 14: What is "consubstantial" other than "I and the Father are one"?

They answered, 3. That when new diseases arise, new remedies must be applied, and against new doctrines new formulas of faith must be written. For, as Athanasius rightly replied in the disputation held at Laodicea before Probus: It has always been the custom of ecclesiastical discipline that when a new teaching of heretics arises, against insolent novelties of questions, with the realities themselves remaining immutably, the terms of names are changed and the natures of things are

expressed more significantly, and by these very changes it is shown that the causes are congruent with the powers and that they are more truly of antiquity.

They objected, 2. That the most pious Emperor Constantine had reproved the term "consubstantial" as new and useless in a letter he wrote through Hosius of Cordoba to Alexander and Arius, in which he says that it seemed very slight and not worthy of so great contention; and after a few words: you will inquire about a certain empty particle of a question; and a little later: concerning such things, do not ask at all and do not answer when asked; for such questions, which no law or ecclesiastical canon necessarily prescribes, but which an empty contest of idle leisure proposes.

The holy Fathers answered that an excessive zeal to compose the tumults stirred up in the churches moved the pious emperor to believe deceivers who affirmed that the dissension between Arians and Catholics was about a mere word. But, as we read shortly before the subscriptions in book 2 of the Council of Nicaea, in a fragment, when Constantine was made certain of the Nicene definition, he praised God upon hearing these divine dogmas and rejoiced in the concord of our bishops and exulted in spirit. For he strove that no one, neither great nor small, should dissent from that confession. Therefore he wrote orthodox letters against Arius, which are found in book 4 of the Council of Nicaea.

They object, finally, that the term "consubstantial" was proscribed and condemned by the councils of Ariminum and Sirmium. I answer that although many reject the authority of Ariminum insofar as it favored Arian heresy, nevertheless in the Council of Ariminum, insofar as it had the character of a synod, nothing at all was decreed against the word or the reality of

consubstantiality. Rather, the Catholic truth on this matter was again defined, and Valens and Ursacius, patrons of the Arians, with their fifty or eighty followers who were present at the synod, were condemned by three hundred and more Fathers, and thus the synod was dissolved. But when its definition was sent to Constantius the emperor, devoted to the Arians, he compelled some of those Fathers and forced them to subscribe to a confession fabricated by the Arians. For this reason some condemn the Council of Ariminum, although only that subscription should be condemned which was made after the synod by Fathers remaining at Ariminum and awaiting the emperor's response.

As to the council of Sirmium, it is clear that nothing at all was done freely and rightly there, but only under coercion and by force, since the Arian emperor Constantius was present and pressing it. Nor does it matter that Liberius and Hosius subscribed, for they did so out of weariness of exile, as we will demonstrate more fully in the Treatise on councils.

ARTICLE II
ON THE ORIGIN AND PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

In this Article we undertake to navigate a truly immense ocean of difficulty. For who can grasp how there are processions in God and yet no motion: by a kind of eternal outflow and yet wholly immutable; always ancient, always new; always completed, always beginning; producing a terminus, yet not causing an effect? Who will unfold how the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the beginning, and yet are not later than the very one from whom they proceed? They are not from a subject, and yet they

are not from nothing: they are from another, and yet they do not depend; they are in another, and yet they are not received; they are toward another, and yet they subsist in themselves. How, finally, can there be fecundity without corruption; plurality without division; an emanation of one from another without inferiority? Hence St. Ambrose rightly says in Book I of *De Fide*: If Paul calls ineffable the things he heard when he was caught up into the third heaven, how can we express the mystery of the Father's generation, which we could neither perceive nor hear? For this reason St. Gregory Nazianzen rightly rebukes the curious inquirer into this mystery in Oration 5 of *De Theologia*: What then is this procession, you say? Tell me what the Father's unbegottenness is, and I will set about explaining the Son's generation and the Spirit's procession, so that we may both be driven headlong by madness of mind as we cast our eyes upon the mysteries of God.

Nevertheless, because the method of theological doctrine requires that, having thus far discussed the plurality of the divine persons, we should also disclose the manner in which they are multiplied through production and procession, we therefore propose four following Questions to be examined: 1. Whether there must be admitted in God a true and real procession of one person from another. 2. How many kinds there are. 3. What it is and what sort it is. 4. How the processions of the Word and of the Holy Spirit differ from one another.

QUESTION I
WHETHER THERE ARE REAL PROCESSIONS OF PERSONS IN GOD

NOTE 1. The name of procession in creatures is used chiefly to signify the origin or emanation of one from another as from a principle or cause. Hence a twofold emanation or procession is distinguished, namely immanent and transient. The former is that whose terminus remains within its own principle or cause, such as the production of a mental word that remains in the intellect producing it. The transient is that whose terminus goes out beyond its principle or cause from which it is produced, such as the procession of heat from fire into water. In divine things, however, the term procession signifies a true and real emanation of one person from another, which does not go out from God into creatures, but remains within the entity of the divine substance and, as it were, subsists eternally within the bosom of the producing person, as in John 1: The Only-Begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father.

NOTE 2. Although, in explaining the ineffable mystery of one divine person proceeding from another, theologians indiscriminately use the names production, procession, origin, or emanation, nevertheless the word production properly signifies, as it were, the action of a person producing another; the others more fittingly express the going forth or emanation of one person from another.

Hence they distinguish a twofold procession, just as they distinguish origin itself, namely active and passive. The active procession is the very action of the producing person; the passive is the emanation of the produced person. It must also be noted that although, by the usage of the Church, procession signifies the emanation of the Holy Spirit, who in the Symbol of St. Athanasius is said to be not begotten but proceeding, nevertheless among theologians its signification is broader; for

they customarily use that word to express the origin of either of the divine persons who emanate.

NOTE 3. Productive action in creatures has various imperfections joined to it, but chiefly three, since it brings about in the effect dependence, contingency, and a diversity of entity from the producing principle.

Dependence, because when an effect that is produced passes from not being to being, it is most certain that before its production it was nothing; therefore whatever being it possesses, it owes to the producing cause, and consequently depends upon it with respect to its entity, which it borrows only from the fecundity of the producing cause. Further, it implies contingency; for since before its production it was nothing, it is evident that it does not have necessity of being, and therefore is not a necessary being, but only contingent.

Finally, it has an essence numerically different from its principle at least in number, because a created being, on account of its finitude, cannot be communicated without division of itself. Hence if some productive action be granted in which the produced thing is so simply necessary that it cannot be conceived not to be, and has the same essence in number with the producing principle, it will certainly be free from these imperfections. Whether, then, in God there is some such productive action without any imperfection, producing the divine persons, or whether the divine essence from itself is determined to three persons as it is to the first without any production, as certain heretics maintain, who for that reason were called Autotheans because they asserted that all the divine persons are from themselves and not from others: this must be determined in this Question.

CONCLUSION I
IT IS ESTABLISHED BY FAITH THAT IN DIVINE THINGS THERE IS A REAL PROCESSION AD INTRA, ACCORDING TO WHICH ONE PERSON PROCEEDS AND IS PRODUCED FROM ANOTHER.

This is gathered first from various texts of Scripture in which the divine Word is said to proceed from the Father, and especially from John 8: I proceeded from God; and in chapter 7: I know him, because I am from him. Although Origen, Euthymius, and Theophylact explain these passages of a temporal procession, or the temporal mission of the Son from the Father, so that he might come into the world, nevertheless from these the intended point is also proved, because the mission of one person from another is not made except on account of procession from the one who sends, as will be proved below.

Next, in Ecclesiasticus 24 the divine Word or divine Wisdom is said to have come forth from the mouth of the Most High, that is, from the intellect of the Father, as firstborn before every creature. And in Wisdom 7 it is called a certain pure emanation of the glory of the almighty God. And in Micah 5 it is said: His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity. Finally, this same thing is proved by all those oracles in which the Son is said to have received from the Father: 1. Life, as in John 5: As the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son also to have life in himself. 2. Power, in John 17: As you have given him power over all flesh. 3. Authority, in Matthew 11: All things have been handed over to me by my Father, and so forth. For since the divine essence really contains all these divine perfections and is indistinct from them, it follows that the Father

gave the essence to which he conferred the aforesaid perfections. The same Scripture also testifies this of the Holy Spirit, for in John 15 we read: When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father; and in chapter 16: He will glorify me, because he will receive from what is mine and will announce it to you. Therefore the Holy Spirit receives knowledge from the Son, and consequently the essence and the other attributes. The verb will receive is placed in the future because it indicates the future effect of the Holy Spirit in the faithful; nor does this conflict with procession, which, since it is eternal, embraces all times. Further, in Romans 8 the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of Christ; in Acts 16 the Spirit of Jesus; in Galatians 4 the Spirit of the Son. But one person cannot be called another's unless because he proceeds from him. Therefore it is clear from sacred Scripture that there are from eternity in God two productive processions of the divine persons.

Second, this same truth was defined in various councils, and especially in the Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, Lateran, and Florence, and it is contained in all the symbols of faith approved by the Church, especially the Nicene, where of the Son it is said: God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten not made. Of the Holy Spirit, however: Who proceeds from the Father and the Son. And in the Constantinopolitan these are added: We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, and is to be adored with the Father and the Son. With these agrees St. Athanasius in his Symbol, where it is read: The Son is from the Father alone, not made nor created but begotten; the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made nor created nor begotten but proceeding. The Council of Toledo II, celebrated

in the year 675, also bears witness and teaches all these things in its exposition of faith, where we read: We confess and believe the holy and ineffable Trinity, Father, Son, and Spirit, to be one God by nature. And we profess the Father indeed to be not begotten, not created, but unbegotten; for he takes origin from no one, from whom also the Son has received his birth and the Holy Spirit his procession, and so forth.

Third, the holy Fathers with one voice prove and confirm this same truth, and especially from John 5: As the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son also to have life in himself. St. Ambrose expounds this passage in Book IV of *De Fide*, chapter 5: Who does not notice, he says, that with respect to the unity of life it must be referred to the fact that the life of the Father and of the Son is the same? For as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son to have life in himself. He gave by unity. With him agrees St. Hilary in *De Synodis* on Canon 4 of the Easterners, where explaining the same text he says: That in each there is life, in each the essence is signified. For he has nothing other than what he gave; and as he has life, so he gave life to be had. With them agrees St. Augustine in Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 26, treating the same place:

As generation from the Father bestows essence upon the Son without beginning of time and without any mutability of nature, so procession from both bestows essence upon the Holy Spirit without beginning of time and without any mutability of nature. They prove similarly from the fact that the divine essence is communicated by the Father to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Thus St. Cyril in Book II of *Thesaurus*, chapter 1: The divine substance, he says, established by an ineffable and supreme nature, begot the Son from the hypostasis of the Father; for God cannot be perfect unless he has the Son and brings forth fruit

from himself. Hence St. Athanasius in the third sermon of the Acts of the Council of Nicaea rebukes the Arians because they said that the paternal nature was barren and fruitless. With them agrees St. Hilary in *De Synodis* about the middle: He gave nature to the Son from an impassible, unbegotten substance; a perfect nativity. Many similar things we will bring forward at length in what follows.

Fourth, this same truth is proved by reason, and by multiple arguments among theologians. The first is gathered from the holy Fathers, who therefore conclude that the three persons are not three gods but one God, because the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from a single principle, namely the Father, who communicates his same essence to the Son and the Holy Spirit by origin; if this were removed it would follow that the Son must be of another essence. Thus St. Gregory Nazianzen reasons in Oration 37: For us, he says, there is one God, because there is one Godhead, and the things that are from him are referred to one. Likewise St. Hilary in the same way concludes that there is one unproduced person and the other two are produced: Since, he says in *De Synodis* about the middle, there is one God, there cannot be two unbegottens; because God is one, since the Father is God and the Son of God is God, because unbegottenness belongs to one alone. St. Fulgentius subscribes to this in his response to the fifth objection of the Arians: Two unbegottens cannot have one nature for you, nor does one find in one a true generation from himself, nor does one truly recognize in himself the substance of nativity from one.

The second reason: it is of faith that there are three persons really distinct from one another in the unity of essence; but a real distinction of persons in unity of essence cannot exist without real production and procession of one person from

another. Therefore it must truly be admitted. The minor is proved thus: if procession ceases, opposition ceases; but where there is no opposition, there can be no distinction of persons. Therefore. The minor is evident, since the divine nature, on account of its infinity, identifies to itself all things with which it has no opposition. The major is proved thus: the divine essence cannot have opposition except by opposed relations; for in divine things all are the same where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way. But there is no opposition of relations in God except on account of procession. This I prove thus: every relation is founded either in measure, or in unity, or in production. But in an infinite being the character of measure cannot have a place, for the infinite is immeasurable because it is unbounded. Likewise the relation of unity cannot be found in God, because the supreme unity of the divine nature excludes every distinction of nature altogether. Therefore only the relation of origin can be found in God.

Third, Bl. Scotus proves this same truth in Book I, distinction 2, question 7: Whatever by its formal reason is a sufficient productive principle, wherever it is from itself, in that it is truly a perfectly productive principle. But the intellect, having an object actually intelligible present to it and duly proportioned, by its formal reason is a productive principle of generated knowledge. Therefore wherever it is, it will produce generated knowledge, and this according to the proportion of its perfection. He adds: But in God there is an intellect having an object actually intelligible present to it and proportioned, namely the divine essence. Therefore in God the intellect is also a productive principle of generated knowledge, not of any sort but adequate to it; for every perfect principle can produce a terminus adequate to itself. Consequently, since the divine intellect is infinite, it is

productive of infinite generated knowledge. Further, since no infinite can exist in another, that generated knowledge will necessarily be subsistent per se. Again, since outside God nothing subsistent per se is infinite, it follows that the divine intellect must produce subsistent generated knowledge which is truly God. The same argument can be formed about the divine will: the will, having an object lovable proportioned to it, is productive of love proportioned to it; but the divine will is infinite and has the divine essence adequately proportioned to it; therefore it can produce an infinite love; but an infinite love is a divine person produced; therefore, and so forth. Although this argument does not suffice to prove that the mystery of the Trinity can be demonstrated and known naturally, as we said in Question 3 of the preceding Article, nevertheless it is effective so that, with the light of faith presupposed, it is necessarily shown that real productions in God ad intra must be admitted.

By a similar reason St. Augustine proves the same truth in Book IX of *De Trinitate*, chapter 11: In speaking, one must hold, he says, that every thing whatever we know generates in us a knowledge of itself; for knowledge is born from both, from the knower and from the known.

Therefore when the mind knows itself, it alone is the parent of its own knowledge; for both the known and the knower is itself. From this he concludes: There is a certain image of the Trinity, the mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring, and its word from itself, and a third, love; and these three are one and one substance; nor is the offspring less so long as the mind knows itself as much as it is; nor is the love less so long as it loves itself as much as it knows itself and as much as it is.

In order that the foregoing reason may appear more effective from the solution of its objections, Bl. Scotus thus attacks it.

Objection 1. The intellect is productive of generated knowledge only when it ought to understand through that generated knowledge, or when it ought to be perfected through it. But the divine intellect cannot be perfected, nor can it understand through any knowledge distinct from itself in reality. Therefore even if it has an object proportioned to it, it does not follow that it is productive of generated knowledge.

Confirmation 1. God understands all intelligibles sufficiently through ungenerated knowledge and is perfected through it; therefore generated knowledge would be wholly superfluous for this.

Confirmation 2. Ungenerated knowledge is adequate to the divine intellect; therefore it cannot have another generated knowledge. The consequence is clear: for we therefore say that the divine Word is not productive of another Word, because the divine intellect has an adequate terminus in the production of one Word only.

Confirmation 3. The intellect, since it is an active and not a factive power, cannot produce anything except in itself; but generated knowledge, if there were any, would not be produced in the intellect; therefore it cannot be produced by it; and consequently the intellect is not productive of generated knowledge.

Bl. Scotus denies the major, because the character of the active does not depend per se on the character of the passive or perfectible; rather it is accidental that the created intellect is productive of knowledge by which it understands and is perfected. For since it cannot understand through any

ungenerated knowledge, it is necessary that it produce generated knowledge by which it understands and is perfected; therefore it produces it out of need. Hence in it a twofold character must be distinguished: one insofar as it is receptive of generated knowledge; the other insofar as it is productive of the same. The former denotes imperfection because it involves potentiality and perfectibility; the latter imports no imperfection, rather it expresses the highest perfection, namely fecundity and activity. Therefore the former is not found in the divine intellect, but only the latter. Hence it follows that the divine intellect can produce an intellection, although it cannot receive it, and consequently a fecund memory can produce generated knowledge not only when it can understand and be perfected through it, but also when it neither understands through it nor is perfected through it.

To the first confirmation he denies the consequence: for it is false that every agent acts in order to be perfected by its production. Rather, there are many agents that operate from the fullness of perfection and fecundity; and therefore by Avicenna in Book VI of *Metaphysica*, last chapter, they are called agents from liberality.

To the second confirmation he distinguishes the antecedent: ungenerated knowledge is adequate in the character of ungenerated knowledge and as though unproduced; he concedes. Adequate in the character of knowledge truly generated and produced; he denies, and he denies the consequence. Indeed he turns the argument back: the divine intellect does not have every adequate knowledge corresponding to itself without generated knowledge; therefore it has generated knowledge.

To the third confirmation he denies that active and factive are accidental differences of power, since the same power can be active and factive, as is clear in the angelic intellect. That every created intellect requires a subject in which it acts or makes an intellection arises from the imperfection of created intellection, which, since it is an accident, requires a subject in which it inheres or is received connaturally. Hence, since in divine things the produced knowledge is subsistent per se, it can truly be understood to be produced without being understood to be received in the intellect itself.

Again it can be objected against the aforesaid reason: if this reason concluded anything, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit could also produce generated knowledge and produced love, and thus there would be more divine persons than three. But this is contrary to faith. Therefore the aforesaid proof is nothing. The consequence of the major is proved: for the Son and the Holy Spirit have the divine intellect and will with the divine essence adequately proportioned in the character of intelligible and lovable no less than the Father. Therefore if by this reason the Father can produce generated knowledge and produced love, the Son and the Holy Spirit can do the same.

I deny the consequence and the consequence of the proof, for the same reason does not hold for the Father as for the Son and the Holy Spirit. For Bl. Scotus in his major posited: wherever the sufficient productive principle is from itself, that is, not from another, it can produce. This cannot be applied to the Son and the Holy Spirit; for they do not have a productive principle from themselves, since they have their being from the Father. Add that the reason is not the same for the Father and the other persons, because the Father, since he is from himself, does not presuppose generated knowledge adequate to his fecund

memory; rather it is presupposed to him, and therefore the production of such knowledge does not repugn to him. But the Son, since he is the very generated knowledge adequate to the productive principle, both intensively and extensively, cannot produce another generated knowledge. Likewise the Holy Spirit, since he has being from the Father and the Son, presupposes both, and consequently cannot produce generated knowledge.

Objection 1. Against the truth of the conclusion. A being from itself cannot have origin from another; but every divine person is a being from itself, otherwise it would not be God; therefore it cannot have origin. The major is clear, for to have origin is to be from another.

I distinguish the major. A being from itself cannot have origin from another as from an extrinsic cause and a principle of a diverse nature; I concede. As from a principle of the same nature, excluding all dependence, causality, and contingency; I deny. For a being from itself can be taken in two ways: first, as excluding an alien principle and one of another nature; and in this way all divine persons are truly from themselves. Second, as excluding a real principle of the same nature; and in this way only the divine Father is from himself.

You will press: what proceeds from another must have distinct being and a nature at least numerically distinct from the one from whom it proceeds. But the divine persons subsist in the same numerical nature and are one God, as we proved. Therefore one cannot proceed from another.

I distinguish the major. What proceeds from another by a finite, bodily, and material procession must have a different nature from the one from whom it proceeds; I concede. By an infinite, intellectual, and spiritual procession; I deny. For since infinity identifies to itself all things that have no opposition, and

since there is no opposition between the nature that is in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, therefore although the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father, they need not on that account be numerically distinct divine natures.

Objection 2. What proceeds from another receives something from the one from whom it proceeds, and therefore is of a needy and more imperfect nature: needy, since if it did not need it would not receive; more imperfect, because according to Acts 20 it is more blessed to give than to receive. But among the divine persons, since there is the highest equality, no need and no inferiority can be found. Therefore neither can procession.

I distinguish the major. To be produced from another freely and contingently, and through communication of a diverse nature, is to be of a needy and inferior nature; I concede. To be produced from another in a most necessary way and through communication of the same infinite nature is to need and to be of an inferior nature; I deny. In the former way it is more blessed to give than to receive, but not in the latter, as St. Augustine expressly explains in Book III *Contra Maximinum*, chapter 14 after the middle: It is more blessed to give than to receive, he says, but in this life, where there is poverty, to which abundance is better; for it is better to have than to lack, and better to give than to receive, to distribute than to beg. But where the one who gave, gave by begetting, and the one who received, received by being born, it is not that one in need was helped, but abundance itself was generated. Nor can the one who received be unequal to the one who gave, because he also received this, that he should be equal.

Objection 3. No produced thing is necessary from itself. But every divine person is a necessary being from itself, since it is God. Therefore none is produced.

Bl. Scotus proves the major in Book I, distinction 2, question 7, number 1: what is necessary from itself is necessary with anything else excluded; but what is necessary from another is not necessary when that other is excluded. Therefore it cannot be necessary from itself and be from another. He proves secondly: every produced thing is possible to be produced, or has receptive potency for the being it receives, otherwise it could not be produced, and consequently would not be produced, or it would follow that the impossible is produced. But what is possible to be produced is not a necessary being. Therefore. He proves thirdly: through production the divine essence has a produced thing which it would not have without production; therefore through production it is truly changed, because from not having a produced thing it becomes having one, and consequently it is not a necessary being. He proves fourthly: production through intellect would be true generation; therefore if one of the divine persons were produced through intellect, it would truly be generated. But every generation is essentially change; therefore in divine things there would truly be change if there were production. But every change in God implies a contradiction; therefore every production in God likewise implies a contradiction.

Bl. Scotus responds there, number 9, denying the major. To its first proof he distinguishes the major: nothing can be formally necessary from itself and at the same time be formally necessary from another; he concedes. Nothing can be formally necessary from itself and at the same time be necessary from another efficiently or productively; he denies. For in the opinion of the ancient philosophers who held that creatures are produced by God necessarily, it was necessary for them to assert that those creatures have an entity by which they are formally necessary,

although they receive that entity from a necessarily producing cause. Hence in their opinion something can be at once necessary in itself formally and at once necessary from another productively. Yet in the divine Son the necessity of being is greater both formally and productively than it would be in creatures even if they were produced necessarily, because creatures would receive a diverse essence from the producing cause, but the Son has the very same essence altogether with the principle from which he is produced. Hence Bl. Scotus concludes: If the Father were to produce a creature naturally and necessarily, he would produce it formally necessary, yet it would not then be necessary by as great a necessity as the Son is necessary.

Or more briefly I distinguish the major: what is necessary from itself by excluding both contingency and production would be necessary with anything else excluded; I concede. What is necessary from itself only by excluding contingency and not by excluding a producing principle would be necessary with that producing principle excluded, especially where it has the same entity altogether with the producing principle, as the Son and the Holy Spirit have with the divine Father; I deny.

To the second proof Bl. Scotus distinguishes the major, number 10: every produced thing is possible to be produced either by logical possibility, which signifies only non-repugnance, so that those terms possible and to be produced can be combined without contradiction in the concept of the intellect; or by physical and real possibility, which signifies an aptitude either to receive an accident or to receive an entity diverse from the producing principle. He concedes the latter and denies the former. He similarly distinguishes the minor: what is simply necessary does not have potency to be produced physically and really; he concedes. Logically and intentionally; he denies.

Therefore the divine person cannot have physical potency for being, since it would have to be first in potency before it was in act, which is repugnant to a most necessary being. But it can have logical potency, because since it is in fact produced, it is not repugnant that it can be produced.

Or more briefly and clearly: what is necessary does not have potency to receive being. I distinguish: if that being which it receives through production is not most necessary and not the same essentially with the producing principle; I concede. If it receives being that is most necessary and the same altogether essentially with the producing principle; I deny. But the produced persons in divine things have the same being altogether essentially and most necessarily with the producing principle. Hence although they are from another, they are no less a necessary being.

To the third proof he denies the consequence, because for change it does not suffice that something have being through another such that without it it would truly not be; but further it is required that it could have not had that being, and also that it could have received it from another than the one from whom it receives it. But the divine essence was never without production, nor without the person which through production it has, nor could it be without either of them, and consequently it does not become from not having to having, and therefore it is not changed.

To the fourth proof he denies the minor: for although generation in creatures imports two things, namely production and change, nevertheless it is essentially production and only accidentally involves change. Hence there can be true generation where there is true production in likeness of nature, even if it does not import change, as in divine things.

OBJECTION 4. Every production implies dependence of the produced on the producer. But in divine things there can be no dependence, since all are supremely equal. Therefore no production. The major is proved: if the produced did not depend on the producer, each would equally have the nature, and consequently the produced would not require that the producer first have the nature insofar as it receives it from him. This is contrary to the formal reason of production. Therefore.

Bl. Scotus denies the major there, number 12, and distinguishes the proof: if the produced person did not depend on the producer, each would have the nature equally, that is, without any real dependence of one on another; he concedes. Each would have it from itself and not one from another; he denies. For although one divine person does not depend on another, it nevertheless requires that the producing person first have the divine nature determined to itself by priority of origin before it is determined to the produced. But this pre-requirement is more a presupposition of one person to another than a dependence of one on another, as we will explain more fully when we treat the consubstantiality and equality of the divine persons.

Objection 5. Several changes that do not involve as great an imperfection as generation involves cannot be in divine things; therefore much more generation cannot be in divine things. But if there is no generation in divine things, there can also be no spiration. Therefore in divine things there will be no production.

The antecedent is proved: neither locomotion or local change, nor alteration, that is change to quality, can be in divine things. Yet these changes do not involve as great an imperfection as generation imports, as is clear because many perfect beings, for

example the heavens and angels, can be moved locally, yet they cannot be generated.

Bl. Scotus distinguishes the consequence: generation cannot be in divine things insofar as it signifies imperfection; he concedes. Insofar as it signifies production; he denies. For generation can be considered, as we already said, either according to the character of change, which connotes a transition from not being to being, or according to the character of production, which connotes a produced substance. In the former way it equally repugns to divine things as the other changes do; but not in the latter, because the produced person does not pass from not being to being, but through its production receives the same being altogether with the producing principle.

Finally you object from the holy Fathers. First, St. Epiphanius in Heresy 69, who calls the Son Autotheos, which the Autothean heretics interpret as meaning that he has the essence from himself. Then St. Augustine on Psalm 109 and St. Cyril in Book VI of *De Trinitate* say that the Father and the Son are one principle, from which it seems to follow that the Son lacks a principle and therefore is not from the Father but from himself. Third, the Son is called Jehovah, as the Father is; but this name signifies that he is the source of being. Therefore he has the essence from himself and consequently is not produced.

I deny the consequence. To the first I say that St. Epiphanius means only that the Son of God is truly and properly God, not a substitute or a fictitious god, nor does he have divinity as something alien and undue, but as something proper and due to him, no less than to the Father who communicated it. For auto, whether in composition or outside it, signifies little other than properly and per se, as Genebrard notes from Plato and Aristotle

in Book I *De Trinitate*, as Ruiz observes in Disputation 1, section 2, number 4.

To the second I say that when the holy Fathers call the Son a principle, they must be understood comparatively and with respect either to the Holy Spirit or to creatures: namely, that with the Father he is the one principle of the Holy Spirit ad intra; and with the Father and the Holy Spirit he is the one principle of creatures ad extra. The third instance is solved in the same way: for the Son is called the source of being because by the fecundity of love he communicates the divine being to the Holy Spirit, and by the fecundity of power he bestows created being on all beings ad extra.

QUESTION II
HOW MANY DIVINE PROCESSIONS THERE ARE AND HOW THEY DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER

NOTE 1. The question proceeds about processions both of the same kind and of a diverse kind, namely whether there are in God several processions distinct in number and in species. For although according to Bl. Scotus in Book I, distinction 17, number 3, in divine things there is not properly genus, species, or specific difference, because these savor of part and composition and therefore of imperfection, so that properly speaking there is no specific distinction to be assigned among divine things; nevertheless there are in God some things which, since they are distinguished more than in number and have diverse formal reasons, can be called quasi specifically distinct. For generation and active spiration differ more, for example, than two generations and two active spirations would differ, if that many were granted. It must therefore be resolved whether the divine

processions are several of different quasi species, and whether there are several of the same kind distinct only in number.

NOTE 2. The theologians distinguish each procession into active and passive; hence they can be compared with one another in four ways. First, active processions can be compared among themselves, such as generation with spiration. Second, one passive procession with another, such as being generated with being spirated. Third, an active can be compared with its corresponding passive, such as generating with being generated. Fourth, an active can be compared with a non-corresponding passive, such as generating with being spirated. It is certain that the passive processions are really distinct from one another, for this is necessary to establish the real distinction and constitution of the divine persons, as will be clear in the following Disputation. It is also certain that active spiration is distinct from its corresponding passive; from this the real distinction between the producing person and the produced is gathered; and also distinct from the non-corresponding passive, as will be clear when we prove that even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would nevertheless be really distinct from him. Hence for the present the difficulty remaining is how the active processions differ from one another.

NOTE 3. The distinction of things can be conceived in two ways, namely with respect to us or with respect to themselves. Things are said to differ with respect to us when we conjecture their distinction from certain merely extrinsic reasons, while the intrinsic reason from which their discrepancy could be drawn remains unknown to us. They are said to differ with respect to themselves when they are known to differ from their proper and formal intrinsic reasons. This again can be in two ways, namely adequately or first; and inadequately or not first. In

the first way those differ from one another which differ wholly, as individual differences. In the latter way those are said to differ which agree in some intrinsic principle and disagree by another intrinsic feature, as species and individuals, which agree in a generic or specific reason but disagree by a specific or individual difference.

With these presupposed, a threefold difficulty must be resolved: first, whether there are truly two and no more than two processions formally and quasi specifically distinct. Second, whether several processions of the same kind, distinct only in number, are repugnant. Third, from what principles their diversity and distinction must be drawn. The first resolution will stand against Bl. Raymond Lull, who, if Eymericus is to be trusted, not consistent with himself, at times affirmed one single and at times several and innumerable nearly divine processions. He affirmed one, because he often asserted that within God there is only one act of making good, that is, communicating goodness and the divine essence, because, he says, if there were several acts, each of them would be finite and limited, which is supremely repugnant to a being infinite in every way. Yet he also admitted several divine processions, for in Book I of the Sentences, question 2, he speaks thus: In divine things the essence is not idle, but essence and nature naturify, goodness makes good, infinity infinitizes, eternity eternizes, and so forth. That he did not understand by these words only the formal constitution and denomination of attributes, but also truly willed various operations ad intra, such as understanding and loving, is gathered from the same, for he says: As God naturally has to understand and to love intrinsically, so intrinsically he naturally has to make good, to eternize, to make possible, and to make virtuous, as he speaks in *De Centum Dei Nominibus*. The second

difficulty must be resolved against theologians who do not agree in assigning the principles from which the distinction of the divine processions is to be drawn.

CONCLUSION I
THERE ARE TRULY TWO AND NO MORE THAN TWO DIVINE PROCESSIONS FORMALLY AND QUASI SPECIFICALLY DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER.

The first part remains more than sufficiently proved from what has been said thus far, and will be made clearer from what will be said in the following Article, where it will further be proved that the divine intellect and divine will in God are two distinct principles of the divine persons who proceed. Hence it remains only to prove the second part, which Bl. Scotus proves in Book I, distinction 2, question 7, number 18: There are as many and no more processions in divine things of a diverse kind as there are distinct productive principles. But there are only two of these, namely the fecund memory and the fecund will, of which the one is productive by mode of nature and the other by mode of freedom or will. Therefore there are only two processions of a diverse kind.

The major is clear, because since processions are from productive principles, it follows that their diversity and multiplicity must be drawn from those principles. The minor is proved as to its first part, namely that those two productive principles are distinct: a principle of acting naturally and a principle of acting freely have opposite modes of acting; therefore there cannot be one principle to which this diverse mode of acting belongs as one. For either, Bl. Scotus says, that productive principle would act from itself in a determinate way, and thus by

mode of nature; or it would act not from itself in a determinate way, but freely, and thus by mode of the voluntary. But since these modes of acting directly oppose one another, they cannot be reduced to one principle. Nor can they be reduced to some third, because that third principle would also have to have those diverse modes of acting, namely by mode of nature and by mode of the voluntary. Further, one of them cannot be reduced to the other: both because of the same reason and because, since those principles are equally perfectly productive, there would be no stronger reason why one should be reduced to the other than the other to it; and finally because nothing is reduced to another unless the less perfect is reduced to the more perfect. But in God there is no inequality of perfection. Therefore if in God there are necessarily two productive principles and no more, there are also only two processions.

Bl. Scotus objects 1: a diverse mode of principling can be reduced to one principle. Therefore although principling by mode of will and by mode of nature are opposite modes of principling, from this it is not lawful to infer two distinct principles, and consequently not two processions nor two who proceed. The antecedent is evident, for principling necessarily and principling contingently are opposite modes of principling, yet they belong to the same principle, namely the divine will, with respect to diverse productions: for with respect to the production ad intra it principles necessarily, but with respect to production ad extra it principles contingently. Therefore a diverse mode of principling can be reduced to one principle.

Bl. Scotus responds, number 23, distinguishing the antecedent: a diverse mode of principling can be reduced to one principle when those two modes import no imperfection; he denies. When one of them connotes imperfection or lesser

perfection; he concedes. For it is necessary that every imperfect be reduced to the perfect. Hence since the mode of principling contingently connotes imperfection, because every contingency imports mutability and defectibility, it must be reduced to a necessary principle. But the modes of principling by mode of nature and by mode of will have no imperfection mixed with them, and therefore neither should be reduced to the other.

Or I distinguish the consequence: from a diverse mode of operating, taken in just any way, it is not lawful to conclude diversity of principles; I concede. From a diverse mode of operating such as fecund memory and the divine will have; I deny. For it is evident that the divine intellect does not have the same mode of operating as the will; the former acts naturally, the latter voluntarily. It is also evident that no other power is in God to which both of these opposite modes of operating could belong. Therefore from those diverse modes of operating the diversity of productive principles in God is rightly gathered, and consequently the diversity and distinction of the divine processions is rightly inferred.

Objection 2. The divine nature as nature is no less a productive principle than intellect and will. Therefore if from the diversity of principles the diversity of processions is justly gathered, three must necessarily be admitted, since there are three productive principles in divine things, namely nature, intellect, and will.

Bl. Scotus responds there by distinguishing the antecedent: the divine nature is a productive principle considered separately from intellect and will; he denies. Considered together with each divine faculty; he concedes. For fecund memory, which is the adequate and total principle of the production of the Son, includes the intellect and the divine essence, each of which

concurs partially in that production. The same must be said of the will with respect to the production of the Holy Spirit. Hence the divine essence with intellect and will constitutes two integral and adequate principles of divine productions, and is not an adequate principle distinct from them. Bl. Scotus gives the reason: the adequate principle of intellectual knowledge and of love is not the object alone, but the object with the power of understanding and willing. Hence since the divine nature concurs in the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit as the object for the uttering of the mental Word and the expression of subsistent love, it follows that the essence or divine nature constitutes only two adequate principles of production, and is not some adequate principle distinct from them.

Objection 3. Powers are distinguished by their acts. Therefore since from the two essential powers in God there are two essential acts, namely to understand and to will essentially, other two notional acts cannot be assigned to them, namely generation and spiration. Consequently from those two divine powers the duality of divine processions is not rightly inferred. The consequence is clear, because from the same distinguishing feature distinctions of diverse kinds cannot be drawn; but the distinction of notional acts and the distinction of essential acts are distinctions of diverse kinds. Therefore that diversity cannot be drawn from those same two principles.

Bl. Scotus denies the consequence there, number 22, and denies the consequence of its proof. For although one power cannot have several adequate acts of a distinct kind in the same way, such that it has each as produced or each as unproduced, nevertheless it can have several acts of a diverse kind if it is related in a diverse way to them: so that to one it is related by

mode of an operative or emanative principle, and to the other by mode of a productive principle. Thus the fecund memory is related to unproduced essential knowledge and to generated knowledge: to the former by mode of an operative principle and not a productive; to the latter by mode of a productive principle and not an operative.

Objection 4. Not only power is a principle of divine procession, but also the object, namely the divine essence. Yet although in divine things there are several powers, there are not several objects, for there is one object of intellect and will, namely the divine essence. Therefore although there are two powers, it does not follow that there are two diverse processions and productions.

I distinguish the minor: in divine things there are not distinct objects as material; I concede. As formal; I deny. For the same divine essence, since it is intelligible and lovable, has a diverse formality, and therefore a distinct reason of formal object, by which it is attained in a different way by the intellect as intelligible and by the will as lovable.

Objection 5. In divine things there is only one action; therefore only one procession. The consequence is clear: procession is either active, and then it is synonymous with action, or passive, and then it is correlative to action, and therefore can be multiplied only according to the multiplication of action. The antecedent is proved: active spiration and active generation in the divine Father are really identified, as we will prove below. Therefore they are one action in reality.

I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that spiration and generation are indeed one thing, but not one action. For if, notwithstanding the real identification of relations with the divine essence, there are nevertheless several relations diverse

and distinct, why, notwithstanding the real identification of spiration and generation, could there not likewise be diverse actions? Add that if real identification prevented the multitude of productions or processions, the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be several or distinct, since intellect and will from which they proceed are not really distinct.

You will press: in divine things nothing is distinct from another except according to origin and relation, that is, insofar as one proceeds from another. But one procession or production does not proceed from another. Therefore it is not distinct from it.

I distinguish the major: if it has no other principles by which it is distinguished except the character of origin from another by which it is distinguished; I concede. If it has them; I deny. For we will prove below that even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would nevertheless be really distinct from him, because passive spiration, by which he is constituted, is a distinct constitutive and distinguishing principle from filiation or passive generation by which the Son is constituted. Therefore, by parity, although one procession does not originate from another, it is nevertheless distinguished from it because they are diverse modes of operating, namely to proceed naturally and to proceed voluntarily, and proceed from distinct and diverse principles, namely intellect and will, which suffice to distinguish those processions.

Objection 6. The divine Father, by producing the Son, either expends all and the whole of his power and fecundity, or he does not. If the former, he cannot produce another person, for beyond the whole there is nothing. If the latter, it follows that the terminus produced is not infinite. For created things are not infinite because although God expends his whole power in their

production, since that power has no parts of which it could occupy one and reserve another, but is wholly indivisible, and therefore he expends it wholly when he employs it; created things are not infinite because God does not totally employ his power in producing them.

I respond that God, when he generates the Son, employs his whole power and totally insofar as he can employ it through one power, namely through intellect. For the Father expends the fecundity of the divine intellect in the production of the Son so that he cannot produce another Son, as will be clear in the following Conclusion. But this does not prevent him from being able at the same time to pass into act, also totally, through will, because this is productive of a terminus of another quasi species and through a production quasi specifically distinct from the production that is made through intellect. Therefore in the form: the divine Father expends all and the whole of his power in the production of the Son, such that this production attains and, as it were, exhausts the entire fecundity of the divine intellect; I concede, since the discussion concerns only the generation of the Word, that is, an intellectual terminus. That it attains and exhausts the entire fecundity of the Godhead in such a way that he cannot through another power, namely will, pass into productive act of another divine person; I deny.

You will press: the power expended in producing the Son is wholly infinite. Therefore it not only totally attains the fecundity of the divine intellect but also that of the Godhead itself. The antecedent is clear: for if it were not wholly infinite, it would be limited in some respects and thus would not produce a terminus wholly equal to the producing principle. The consequence is also evident, since what is wholly infinite includes

all that is of the same kind, and therefore an infinitely productive power must contain every conceivable productive power.

I distinguish the antecedent: it is wholly infinite in the character of the divine intellectual power and as productive of generated knowledge; I concede. In the character of divine power simply; I deny. For although an infinite perfection or productive power is required for each procession, which in each procession has an adequate act with respect to the formal reason of that act, nevertheless it does not have an extensive adequation according to the reason of all the acts which it can have ad intra. For as, in the opinion of some, infinite power is required to create any creature from nothing, and yet not every creation is an adequate act of that power, so similarly although an infinite perfection and fecundity of the divine nature is required for the production of the Son, it is not exhausted by that one procession, because it is not adequate in every way to the communicative power of the divine essence, which can be communicated not only through intellect by the way of generation and knowledge, in the character of knowable, but also through will by the way of spiration, as lovable. Hence each of those productions is adequate to its principle, and therefore cannot be multiplied in number, as the following Conclusion will make clear.

CONCLUSION II
IT IS OF FAITH THAT THERE ARE NOT, NOR CAN THERE BE, SEVERAL PROCESSIONS OF THE SAME KIND DISTINCT ONLY IN NUMBER

This is proved by all the arguments by which we already showed that there are only three divine persons and no more. It is also clear from all those texts of Scripture, especially John 1 and

3, in which the Son of God is called only-begotten, from which it is established that God has only one Son; therefore in divine things there are not two generations, and much less more. The same is confirmed from all the symbols in which we believe in Jesus Christ the only-begotten and only Son of God. Hence in the Symbol of St. Athanasius we expressly profess that there is one Son, not three sons; one Holy Spirit, not three holy spirits.

Bl. Scotus proves this truth in Question 2 of *Quodlibeta*, article 2, by this theological reason: if in divine things there can be several productions of the same kind, then there can be infinitely many, and consequently there necessarily will be infinitely many. For in a most necessary being, to be is the same as to be able. But the consequent is false. Therefore the antecedent is false.

The minor is clear, for no one has ever been so foolish as to assert that the divine persons are infinite in number. St. Bonaventure proves this truth in Book I, distinction 2, article 1, question 2 by four arguments, namely from distinction, order, connection, and completion. First from distinction: where there is distinction, he says, there is no confusion; but where there is infinity, there is confusion. Therefore since among the divine persons there is distinction, there will not be confusion, and therefore not infinity. Second: where there is order, there is termination and mediation; but where there is termination, there is not infinity, because infinity knows no limit. Therefore if in divine things there is order, there is not infinity. Third: where there is connection, it is necessary that all persons proceed from one; for if one proceeded from another and so on, there would be an infinite distance between the first and the last. But this is unfitting. Therefore all proceed from one. Finally: where there is supreme completion, there is not infinity, for completion is in

beatitude. But if there were infinite persons, it would be impossible for anyone to be beatified by God. For the knowledge of each person contributes to beatitude, therefore the blessed soul must know all divine persons; but it could not know infinitely many since its power is finite. Therefore an infinite number of divine persons would be absurd.

Bl. Scotus proves the major first by the authority of St. Augustine, who thus argues in Book III *Contra Maximinum*, chapter 12: The divine generation would be immoderate if the begotten Son begot a grandson for the Father, because that grandson, unless he begot a great-grandson for his grandfather, would be called powerless according to your marvelous wisdom. Then he adds: Nor would the series of generation be completed if another were always begotten from another, nor would it be perfected by it if one omnipotent did not suffice. As though he were saying that if one produced person does not suffice to complete the whole production of one action, neither will another suffice, nor again another, and thus it will be necessary to admit processions and persons of the same kind infinite in number.

Second, Bl. Scotus proves it thus: whatever is multipliable into several of the same kind is not determined from itself to a definite plurality; but if it is so determined, it must be determined by another. But a divine procession, if it is multipliable into several processions of the same kind, for example into several generations, cannot be determined by another to a definite plurality. Therefore if it is multipliable into several processions of the same kind, it is determined in no way to a definite plurality, but it is necessary that the series of those divine processions be infinite. The major is clear from the example of created being, which, since it is multipliable into many created beings of the

same kind, is not determined from itself to a definite plurality; and unless it were determined to a definite number by an extrinsic agent or by circumstances, its productions could be infinitely many in the sense of an unbounded series. The minor is proved: if the divine procession were determined to a definite plurality by another, it would be most of all either by something posterior to it or by something prior to it. But it can be done by neither. Not by something posterior to it, for no being has its entity from something posterior to itself, and therefore neither can it have its unity. Nor by something prior. For that would be either the formal principle of divine procession, namely fecund memory and fecund will, or it would be the producing principle, namely a divine person. But by neither of these would the divine procession be determined to a definite plurality if it were multipliable into several processions of the same kind. For the formal principle of production, that is the principle by which, and the producer, that is the principle which, if it can have several productions of the same kind, cannot determine itself to a definite number of productions. Hence if it were so determined, it would have to be determined by another. But this cannot be said, both because there is nothing in God besides fecund memory and fecund will by which such determination can be understood to be made, and because whatever it is, the same question returns about it, whether it is prior or posterior. It could not be posterior, because, as I said, nothing receives unity or plurality from what is posterior to itself. Nor could it be prior, because it would also be necessary, and thus could not determine another to a definite number unless it too were determined by another, and so there would be an infinite regress in those determinations of divine processions. Since this implies a

contradiction, it also implies that there cannot be several divine processions of the same kind distinct only in number.

Third, he proves it also by this reason: a power that has an adequate act cannot have another while it has that act. But the divine generative power has an act adequate to itself in the generation of the Son, that is, of the Word, in fact. Therefore it cannot have another simultaneously, otherwise that act would be and would not be adequate to it. The minor is proved: for the Son is an infinite terminus, as the intellect is; therefore he is truly its adequate terminus.

You will say: that adequation is understood either of an act adequate extensively or of one adequate intensively. If extensively, the principle is begged, for that is the same as to have an act beyond which another cannot be had, whose truth and proof is not clear. If intensively, it seems plainly false: for the soul of Christ, for example, has a created vision of the Word intensively adequate to it, and yet besides it it has other visions. Likewise the divine intellect has a vision of the divine essence intensively adequate to it, and nevertheless beyond it it also has vision of things other than itself. Hence Bl. Scotus in the *Reportata*, Book I, distinction 2, question 7, having brought forward the same reason, adds that this reason does not hold, and he proves it by the argument just made. Therefore.

I respond that this reason must be understood of intensively adequate. For Bl. Scotus explains this adequation by the infinite perfection of the productive principle and of the produced terminus. But it repugns that an infinite terminus be multiplied according to the same kind, because the infinite is of itself such, and thus it truly repugns that there be several sons infinitely perfect. Understood in this way, I respond that the examples proposed do not press, since neither the divine intellect

nor the intellect of the soul of Christ has several visions intensively adequate to it. Rather, the divine intellect by one vision sees the divine essence and in it beholds every visible thing. The intellect of the soul of Christ, although it has several visions, nevertheless does not have several visions adequate to its total power of understanding. For it has one vision of the Word and of certain things in the Word adequate to it insofar as it is instructed by the light of glory. It also has visions of other things outside the Word, or in their own proper genus, proportioned and perhaps adequate insofar as it is instructed and informed by other co-principles of understanding, so that, as our Fr. Smising says in Disputation 3, number 109, neither the created vision of the Word and of things in the Word, nor the visions outside the Word, taken separately, are in Christ adequate to the one total power of understanding that is in him. The instances that could be formed against this solution have already been solved in Question 3 of the preceding Article.

You will say secondly: the foregoing reason presupposes that the divine generative power is in perpetual use and act of generation. But this seems false. For what prevents God, after begetting his Son, from having ceased from generating him, so that he might then produce another? For if anything stood in the way, it would be that the actions of God must be measured by eternity and cannot pass into the past. But this reason seems weak, since in Genesis 2 we read: He rested from all the work which he had done. Further, God does not now produce past days or the things that passed with those days. Finally, that divine generation is said to have passed into the past, for in Psalm 2 and 109 we read: From the womb before the morning star I begot you. Therefore.

I deny the minor. For God is in perpetual act of generating his Son, and this necessarily and indefectibly. For the divine Father is in perpetual inception and conservation of his being. But his being is actual generation, or the reason of paternity, by which he is constituted, as will be clear below. Therefore he always necessarily generates the Son. The same, by parity, must be said of the Holy Spirit. For if God is always in actual generation and that generation does not pass into the past, by the same reason he must be in perpetual spiration. To the confirmations I say that God is in perpetual creation or conservation of creatures while they exist. Hence since the divine Son always is, it is necessary that there also be a continuous generation of him. As to Scripture, I respond that the past is truly said of that generation, but not as past in our mode of conceiving, that is, as purely past; rather as past in such a way as to include all times, as in Revelation 1: Who is, who was, and who is to come. Indeed this is also gathered from the same words of Psalm 2: Today I have begotten you, for as have begotten signifies the past, so today signifies the present.

CONCLUSION III
THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS ARE FORMALLY DISTINGUISHED BY THEMSELVES

This is the position of Bl. Scotus in Book I, distinction 13, number 18. For, as he says there, generation formally by itself is generation, and spiration formally by itself is spiration. And from their formal reasons it is impossible for generation to be spiration, with anything else excluded by an impossible supposition, so that it is not necessary to seek by what they are

distinguished, since the entire formal reason of one is not the same as the entire formal reason of the other.

He proves this first by the authority of St. Augustine in Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 27, where having declared the supreme difficulty of exploring the difference between the generation of the Word and the spiration of the Holy Spirit, which he says is to be uncovered only by the beatific vision, he says: Lift up your eyes to the light itself and fix them upon it if you can; for thus you will see what differs between the nativity of the divine Word and the procession of God, because of which the Only-Begotten is not said to proceed from the Father, lest he be his brother, but the Holy Spirit is said to proceed. And a little later he affirms that the will proceeds from knowledge but is not the image of knowledge, saying: That the will proceeds from knowledge no one doubts, for no one wills what he does not know at all or what it is. Yet it is not the image of knowledge, and therefore in this matter a certain distance of nativity and procession is understood to be insinuated, since it is not the same thing to behold by thought and to desire. By these words St. Augustine plainly confesses that those divine processions are distinguished from one another by their intrinsic principles, since from the distinction of processions he concludes the distinction of the persons who proceed.

Bl. Scotus confirms this from the same work, Book V of *De Trinitate*, chapters 9 and 14, where St. Augustine inquiring why the Holy Spirit is not the Son, although he goes forth from the Father, solves it saying: He goes forth not as born but as given. By this it is clear that St. Augustine insinuates that the distinction of the divine persons is to be drawn from their distinct emanations. Therefore it must be inferred that he teaches that the emanations of the divine persons are themselves distinct,

for if their distinction were drawn from another source, St. Augustine would affirm that the distinction of persons is to be drawn from that same source.

He proves it second: those differ per se first which disagree wholly formally and adequately. But such are the divine processions. Therefore they differ and are distinguished formally by themselves. The major is clear, since otherwise the discrepancy of individual differences, which all philosophers admit to differ by themselves, could not be drawn from anything. The minor is proved: those differ formally by themselves which disagree by a form intrinsic to them and are formal reasons for the distinction of others. But such are generation and spiration: from them the difference of the produced divine persons is drawn; and they themselves are distinguished from one another by their own proper formal reason. Therefore.

You will say first: processions of this kind agree in many predicates, such as in being, in divinity, in spirituality, and in the reason of one divine person proceeding from another. Therefore they do not differ wholly nor formally by themselves.

Some Scotists respond that this generic and, as it were, transcendental agreement does not prevent those divine processions from differing formally and adequately by themselves first. For if by a precision of the intellect they are considered under their proper formal reason of generation and spiration, and insofar as they abstract from those predicates as though transcendental, it will evidently appear that they are first diverse, because no predicate belonging to generation as generation is contained in the definition of spiration as spiration. This is not so with things that agree specifically: man, for example, as man, involves in itself a predicate common to brute as brute, namely the concept of animal or sensitive life. Hence man and brute do

not differ per se first nor wholly. Others respond that therefore the divine processions differ wholly, because they involve no common reality that can be contracted to each by proper differences. These solutions are excellent; nevertheless I add a third: generation and spiration signify an opposite mode of proceeding. For generation signifies proceeding naturally, and spiration proceeding freely. But proceeding naturally and proceeding freely are modes of proceeding diverse by themselves. Therefore so too are those divine processions.

From these I gather first: these processions are indeed gathered by us to be distinct from the diversity of principles, that is, intellect and will, from which they originate, but they do not have their formal distinction from those principles. For they have formal distinction from that from which they have formal being. But they do not have formal being from their principles, but only being from them as from principles. Therefore they do not have their formal reason from them, but only their origination.

I gather second: this diversity is not to be drawn from the fact that one person is from one and another from two, because, as Bl. Scotus says in Book I, distinction 13, the unity and plurality of supposita does not cause diversity of kind in forms or quasi forms that are in them or from them. For example, because whiteness by its reason and from itself is able to change sight, it does not vary this reason from the fact that it is in a wall, or in a sheet, or in other subjects. Therefore, similarly, generation and spiration do not differ from one another because they are in diverse supposita, of which one emanates from one, namely the Son from the Father, and another from two, namely from the Father and the Son, especially since the Holy Spirit by his formal reason does not require a plurality of supposita for his production and spiration, as will be clear below.

I gather third: this diversity of processions is not to be drawn from the fact that one origin is prior to another, namely generation prior to spiration, nor from the fact that one originates from another, namely passive spiration from passive generation or filiation. For when one thing is prior to another, the reason for such priority and origin is rightly asked. Hence things are not first distinguished precisely by the reason of such priority or posteriority found between them. Therefore those divine emanations are not first distinguished by this reason of prior and posterior. Moreover, even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would nonetheless be really distinct from him, as we will teach below. Therefore even if he did not originate from passive generation, he would nonetheless be really distinct from it, and thus their diversity is not drawn from the reason that one originates from another. It follows, therefore, that this diversity of the divine processions is drawn from their formal reason.

QUESTION III
WHAT THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS ARE AND WHAT SORT THEY ARE

Nearly all theologians agree, if you except Durandus and a few others of his followers, that the divine processions are operations of the divine intellect and divine will. But as to what operations these are and what sort they are, they do not agree. Some affirm that they are certain resultances or emanations of the divine intellect and will, so that the produced divine persons proceed from another almost in the way that properties flow from essences, not through a true action, but through a simple emanation. Fr. Francisco Suárez seems to think this in Book I *De Trinitate*, chapter 8. Hence in Book VI, chapter 1, he teaches that

the relation of the producing person alone is the whole active procession or productive action. Some Thomists teach that a twofold intellection must be distinguished: one essential, common to the three divine persons; another notional, proper to the Father, and productive of the Word. Others reject this distinction as contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, and affirm that in God there is one essential intellection which is productive of the divine Word insofar as it is modified by the relation of paternity and has the character of uttering and of a true productive action. Others, with Bl. Scotus in Book I, distinction 2, question 7, number 13, and distinction 29, the single question, and in *Quodlibeta* 14, contend not only that the divine processions are true actions, but also that they are equally and totally distinct from the essential acts of understanding and willing, so that uttering does not include formally the essential intellection, nor active spiration the essential volition. Hence although to understand and to will are operations common to all persons, to utter and to spirate are not. Since this opinion is truer and more consistent, so that it may be defended more evidently and effectively:

NOTE 1. With Bl. Scotus in the places cited, especially Book I, distinction 2, question 7, number 22, two acts of the divine intellect can be distinguished, namely to understand and to utter, and two of the divine will, namely to love and to spirate, of which the first is operative and the other productive. These two acts are formally distinguished from one another, for it implies a contradiction that one and the same act by its nature be productive and not productive of a terminus really distinct from the producing principle. Further, the productive act necessarily presupposes the operative. For the one who operates and produces through the same principle, Bl. Scotus says, is prior as

operating than as producing. Add that all theologians concede that essential perfections that involve no respect to creatures are prior to any notional. Hence since divine intellection is essential and uttering is notional, uttering presupposes intellection, not as a principle by which, but only as a condition without which, not from need but from the condition of the principle which is first determined to operation and then to production. Hence the divine Father is conceived as first understanding and knowing himself and his essence, and then producing and uttering the Word.

NOTE 2. Our intellection is not an action properly and formally, both because every action properly so called always has some produced terminus, but intellection is not productive of a terminus; rather it is the ultimate act and the ultimate perfection of the intellective power; and because, as Aristotle says in Book III of *De Anima*, chapter 4, to understand is not to act but to undergo in a certain way. Hence formal intellection is the reception of that quality, namely the mental word, which is produced by uttering and received in the intellect itself. Thus inchoatively and effectively intellection consists in that operation of the intellect by which that quality or mental word is produced; but consummatively and formally it consists in the reception of that quality. For since that quality or word is the expressed likeness of the thing understood, it will, by informing the intellect and adhering to it, assimilate it to the known object and thus make it completely understanding. If at times intellection is called an action, this is not to be interpreted of an action properly so called, but because it is like an action, since it is always in becoming and looks to a terminus, not one that it produces but the one about which it is engaged, namely the object of which it is a living and perfect expression.

NOTE 3. From Bl. Scotus in Book I, distinction 27, question 3, number 12: the mental word is an act of intellection produced by fecund memory, not having being without actual intellection, representing the divine Word. All parts of this definition Bl. Scotus gathers from St. Augustine. It is called, first, an act of intellection because it is a form that actualizes the intellect and makes it formally and actually understanding, as heat constitutes water formally hot. This is gathered from St. Augustine in Book IX of *De Trinitate*, chapters 12 and 13, where he expressly proves that the intellect alone and not the will produces the Word that perfects and informs it. It is added: produced by fecund memory, that is, by the intellect informed and, as it were, pregnant with an intelligible species. For as St. Augustine says in Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 10: Formed thought from the thing we know is a word; and in chapter 14: Our word is born from our knowledge; and in chapter 26: the word is expressed from remembered knowledge, that is, from the intellect having habitual knowledge as the seed of the object. It is then added: not having being without actual intellection. For since the word informs the intellect and denominates it actually understanding, as long as it subsists, actual intellection remains. Hence St. Augustine in Book IX, chapter 8 says: We have the true knowledge of things conceived as a word with us; and by speaking within it is generated and by being born it does not depart from us. Finally it is added: representing the divine Word. For St. Augustine in Book IX investigates the origin and nature of the divine Word from a certain likeness with our word. Hence in the last chapter he says: There is a certain image of the Trinity, the mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring, and its word from itself, and a third, love.

With these preliminaries, three things must be resolved: first, that the divine processions are true actions and not mere emanations and, as it were, resultances of one person from another; second, that they are not the essential acts of understanding and willing; third, that they are uttering and spiration equally distinct from essential intellection and love.

CONCLUSION I
THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS ARE TRULY AND PROPERLY VITAL ACTIONS, AND NOT PURE AND SIMPLE EMANATIONS

This seems to be the genuine position of St. Thomas Aquinas and of Bl. Scotus. For St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 40, a. 2 says: Origin signified actively is signified as proceeding from a subsisting person, and therefore presupposes it. But origin signified passively, as nativity, is signified as a way to a subsisting person and not yet as constituting it. And in q. 41, a. 2, reply to the second: With motion removed, action imports nothing other than the order of origin, according as something proceeds from some cause or principle into what is from the principle. By these words he plainly pronounces that divine origin or procession is a certain mode, as it were a middle between the producing person and the produced person, and therefore is not a simple immediate resultance of one person from another.

With him agrees Bl. Scotus in Book I, distinction 28, question 3, number 3, saying: Origin, as origin, is not the proper form either of the person in whom it is or of the person to whom it is, but is as it were a way. And then it is not the form of the first person, but as it were presupposes it. As though he were saying that origin considered formally is a way between the producing

person and the produced person, and therefore is not the form that constitutes either of them, but presupposes the producing person already constituted by its proper form, and is the reason by which the produced person receives its being. But this is truly to have the character of action. Therefore they judge the divine processions to be true and properly so called actions and not simple emanations and metaphysical resultances. This truth can be strengthened by all those sentences of the holy Fathers which we will cite below when we prove that the divine Word proceeds from the Father by a true and properly so called generation, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by active spiration. For generation and spiration are true actions. Therefore the divine processions must be said to be such.

This same truth is also proved by theological reason. First: the divine essence is determined to the Son and the Holy Spirit otherwise than to the Father. But it is determined to the Father by a simple resultance. Therefore it must not be determined to the Son and the Holy Spirit by a simple resultance, but by a real and properly so called action. The major is clear, since the divine essence is not determined to the Son and the Holy Spirit except insofar as they are said to be produced; but the Father is produced by no one. Therefore the divine essence is determined to him otherwise than to the other persons. The minor is also evident, since the formal constitutive reason of the first suppositum is not produced by another, but flows from the ocean of the divine nature itself as a property from an essence.

Next, a simple resultance is immediately from the substantial nature itself, for metaphysical properties flow immediately from the bosom of the essence itself. Therefore if the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit were a simple resultance, it would be immediately from the divine nature. Yet

Fr. Francisco Suárez himself, with other theologians, denies and rejects this against Durandus, as will be clear in the following Article.

Finally, a subsisting person must be produced by a true action. But it is established by faith that the divine processions are productive of subsisting persons. Therefore they are true actions.

Objection 1. In created things relations are not made through a true and proper action, but result once the foundation and terminus are posited. Hence Aristotle in the *Praedicamenta*, in the chapter on relation, affirms that there is no motion per se toward relation. Therefore similarly the relations constitutive of the divine persons are not produced by a true action but by a simple resultance and emanation. The consequence seems clear, since from created things to divine things one may reason with proportion.

I deny the consequence. The reason for the difference is that since created relations are accidents of small and diminished entity, as Bl. Scotus says, they cannot be termini of a true productive action. Hence they can be made only by pure emanation and simple resultance. But it is otherwise with the divine relations, which, since they are substantial and constitutive of the divine persons, also have the perfection of substances and of things subsisting per se, which are properly said to be made, and therefore can be proper termini of a true productive action.

Objection 2. Action properly so called involves several imperfections: that it is motion, an going-out from the agent, and reception in a patient, and that its terminus is really an effect and act, as the principle is really an agent and efficient. But all these imperfections are unworthy of God. Therefore action properly so called must be removed from him.

I deny the major. For action according to the common concept of action is only the ultimate actuality of the agent going out from it, by a virtual going-out in which no imperfection is implied, since it signifies neither contingency nor dependence. Nor does it follow from this that the produced terminus is an effect or act in the sense of inferiority, but only that it is truly and really produced, just as it does not follow from the fact that the Father is the principle of the Word that the Word is to be called principled, since principled denotes an inferiority which repugns to the Word.

Objection 3. Aristotle in Book IX of *Metaphysica*, chapter 7, distinguishes immanent operation from transient by this: by the latter something is produced, but by the former nothing. Therefore he holds that by the immanent action of the intellect nothing can truly be produced, and consequently it is not truly productive. But the divine persons proceed through immanent operations. Therefore those are not truly productive actions.

Bl. Scotus answers in Book I, distinction 3, question 7 near the end that the Philosopher must be understood of operative actions, which are occupied with an object not in order to produce it, but in order to perceive it, such as intellection, volition, sensation, and appetition, which are therefore more properly called acts than immanent actions. But he is not speaking of productive actions that are immanent, such as uttering and active spiration, which were not known to Aristotle. For if through immanent actions absolutely nothing were made, it would follow that neither the created intellect nor the divine intellect is truly productive of a word, which seems contrary not only to reason but also to faith.

CONCLUSION II
THE ESSENTIAL ACTS OF UNDERSTANDING AND WILLING IN GOD, THAT IS, THE DIVINE INTELLECTION AND DIVINE VOLITION, ARE NOT THE ACTIONS BY WHICH THE DIVINE PERSONS PROCEED

This seems to be the clear position of the holy Fathers to be cited in the following Conclusion, and Bl. Scotus in the places cited proves it in various ways. First: essential intellection and essential volition are common to the three persons. But the notional acts, that is, the active processions, are not common to them, as is clear. Therefore. Next: if those acts of understanding and willing were of themselves productive of persons, it would follow that each divine person would proceed from each, indeed even from itself. For since those acts are essential, they are truly in each person, and thus in each person they would produce. Finally: if those acts were productive and lacked in some divine person, it would follow that the person is not blessed; for the divine persons are beatified by the essential acts of understanding and willing. Therefore it must be concluded that divine processions do not consist in those acts.

Some Thomists reply that in God a twofold act of understanding and willing can be distinguished: one essential, the other notional; and that the divine persons are not produced by the former but by the latter.

Against this: this reply directly conflicts with St. Thomas Aquinas. For in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 34, a. 1, reply to the second, he says: Nothing that belongs to the intellect is said personally in divine things except the Word alone. And in reply to the third: To understand imports only the relation of the one

understanding to the thing understood, in which no reason of origin is included; but to utter imports principally the relation to the Word conceived. Therefore he does not admit that twofold intellection, one essential and the other notional. Rather he distinguishes intellection from uttering and says the former is unproductive, the latter productive.

Next: if notional intellection were distinct from essential, it would be chiefly by relation, since notional things are not otherwise distinguished in God from essential and common things than because the former imply relation and the latter do not. But relation is not sufficient to constitute some intellection distinct from the essential formally or virtually, because every intellection is a vital act and a perception of an object insofar as it is an object. But the divine relation is neither a vital act nor a perception of an object, but only the terminus of the divine nature constituting a person, and it is not occupied with an object insofar as it is an object, but only refers to it insofar as it is its terminus. Therefore.

Finally: in God several Godheads cannot be posited, of which one is essential and another notional. Therefore neither can several intellections and loves. The consequence is clear by parity of reason. For Godhead cannot be multiplied because it is formally infinite, and it implies a contradiction that there be several infinites of the same kind, since the infinite includes every conceivable perfection within its proper genus. But in God intellection and love are no less infinite in the character of intellection and love than Godhead is in the character of Godhead. Therefore if there cannot be a twofold Godhead, there cannot be in God a twofold intellection.

Others reply that the active divine processions are indeed the very acts of understanding and willing, not absolutely but

with this modification: that intellection insofar as it is in the Father is the expression of the Word, but not insofar as it is in the Son and the Holy Spirit; and the same must be said of divine love. As though they were saying that the essential intellection and love, as they are in some persons, have a terminus, but in others do not. They explain and confirm this by the example of intellect and will which are the principles of these processions and persons. For although intellect and will are in all persons, they do not in all persons principiate and produce. Therefore, they say, as intellect and will are communicated to several persons without carrying with them procession and principiation, why could the same not be said of essential intellection and love.

Against this: either that modification adds something to the real essential intellection and love or it adds nothing. If it adds nothing, there is no reason why in one person it produces a terminus and not in another, since the same remaining wholly the same is always naturally apt to do the same, as philosophers commonly say. If it adds something, it is either something essential or something notional. Not essential, because the same difficulty returns: essential things are common to the three persons. Not notional, because nothing is notional except the relations constitutive of persons. But relation, as we said, is not formally intellection nor formally the same as intellection, for the whole being of relation is to be toward another, but the whole being of intellection is to perceive an object and represent it. These are formally distinct. Add that if that modification adds something to essential intellection distinct from it either modally or formally, then intellection will not be production of a terminus as essential intellection, but only as notional intellection. But it is false that two intellections must be distinguished, one essential and the other notional. Therefore.

To their confirmation I say there is no parity. For one thing is to be able to principiate and another is to principiate in fact. Actual principiation or production can be separated from the power from which it arises, but principiation cannot be separated from itself. For it can happen, for example, that fire or heat does not heat, but it cannot happen that actual heating does not heat, because its whole essence is in second act, that is, in actual production of heat. Therefore if the actual production of persons were the essential intellection and volition themselves, it implies that they are in some person and yet in that person do not produce a terminus.

Others reply that the divine processions are not the acts of understanding and willing as acts, but as the actions of uttering and spirating.

Against this: intellection is something formally distinct from uttering. Therefore they are not one and the same, and the adversaries wrongly confuse them. The antecedent is proved: for intellection is something absolute in divine things, but uttering is something relative; or what is the same, uttering is notional, but intellection is essential. It is clear that essential and notional are distinct, and in divine things they are related analogically in the way substance and accident are related among us, or essential and accidental. Next: to utter is opposed relatively to what is uttered, that is, to the Word which is uttered. But to understand is not opposed to the Word itself; otherwise it would be really distinct from it. Therefore to utter and to understand are not one and the same. Finally: paternity itself is formally uttering, but it cannot be intellection, as we already said. Therefore intellection and uttering are not one and the same formally.

Some reply that uttering is not formally intellection, but it is really. Yet this is nothing other than openly passing into Bl.

Scotus's position, who holds that uttering is distinguished only formally from essential intellection, as also from the essence. Thus there remains only a dispute about a name: Thomists call intellection what we call uttering, differing only in the way of speaking. Nevertheless even in this they seem to stray far from the truth, for if real identification of uttering with intellection sufficed so that uttering could be called intellection, then volition would be the procession of the Son, since volition or love is really uttering. Then the essence also would be production of itself, since the essence too is really uttering.

Others reply secondly that to utter is indeed different from to understand, but only as including differs from included. For as man is different from animal because he includes animal and adds something else, namely rational, so likewise the notional act, besides the order that the essential act has toward the known object, adds an order toward the terminus produced by it. For, they say, the divine intellect simultaneously understands the object by producing the terminus, and produces the terminus by understanding the object.

I respond that divine uttering does not include essential intellection as man includes animal, because man adds a reason and a perfective difference to animal, namely rationality. Hence rationality is a certain animality, as the cleaving of feet is a certain footedness, as Aristotle says in Book VII of *Metaphysica*. But uttering does not include anything of intellection in its concept; otherwise the person who utters would understand more because it would have an intellection that the person who does not utter would not have, and thus one would be wiser than another. This implies a contradiction.

Next: uttering, as was proved, is formally an action, but intellection is not an action but an operation. Therefore one does

not include the other formally, since they are of disparate genus and wholly different.

Finally: what uttering would add beyond intellection would be either within the line and reason of intellection, and thus would be essential and therefore common, as intellection itself is; or it would be something distinct and therefore something notional, and thus uttering will truly be a formality distinct from essential intellection, which is what we intend.

This same Conclusion is proved second: if the production of the divine Word were formally the essential intellection, it would follow that the Father does not communicate perfectly beatific essence to the Son, and that the Father is not blessed before producing the Son. But this is absurd. Therefore the antecedent is false.

The consequence of the major is clear because beatitude consists rather in an act of the will than in an act of the intellect, for beatitude is fruition, which is formally an act of the will. But intellection precedes the act of the will, and therefore precedes fruition in which beatitude formally consists. Therefore if the divine Word were produced through intellection, the Father would be conceived as producing him before he was blessed, and thus the Son would receive an essence not yet perfectly blessed. If this were so, either the Son is thereafter blessed and thus has something not received from the Father, or he is not blessed and thus would not be God, who is beatitude itself.

Nor does it matter that the Thomists reply that beatitude does not consist formally in an act of the will but of the intellect, for even if this were true, which nevertheless we demonstrated to be false in philosophy, the foregoing reason still presses them. For then it would follow that something notional is prior to something essential, which is contrary to what is received among

theologians. The consequence is clear: if the production of the Word is through intellection, it will be prior to essential love, since intellection precedes love. This is confirmed: for in whatever instant essential intellection exists, the production of the Word would also exist if intellection were the actual production. But intellection necessarily precedes essential love. Therefore if the Word is produced through essential intellection, his production precedes that love, and thus something notional is prior to essential things, which repugns.

Third, the same Conclusion is proved: if the Word were the terminus of divine intellection as intellection, it would follow that the Father is formally understanding by the Word and thus formally wise by generated wisdom. But this is against the holy Fathers and Doctors. Therefore. The consequence of the major is clear, because the Father is the one understanding formally; and the one understanding formally understands by the intrinsic terminus of his intellection whenever intellection claims such a terminus. This is why Thomists affirm that we produce a word by intellection so that the object is understood through it. The minor will be clear below and is sufficiently proved by St. Augustine in Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 7: In that Trinity, who would dare to say that the Father understands neither himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit except through the Son? For if there only the Son understands, so that the intellection is for himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit, one returns to that absurdity that the Father is not wise from himself but from the Son, and that wisdom did not beget wisdom, but that the Father is said to be wise by that wisdom which he begot. For where there is no intellection, there can be no wisdom. And if by this the Father does not understand by himself but the Son

understands for the Father, then truly the Son makes the Father wise.

The Thomists object first from various authorities of the holy Fathers by which they seem to insinuate that by understanding and thinking we speak in the heart and produce the mental word, from which they infer a similar production of the divine Word. First St. Augustine in Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 10: Even if words do not sound, each nonetheless says in his heart what he thinks. He proves this by various texts of Scripture, especially Wisdom 2: They said within themselves, thinking wrongly; Matthew 9: They said within themselves: He blasphemes, which utterance is immediately explained when it is added: When Jesus saw their thoughts. Likewise Matthew 15: He thought within himself, saying. And Luke 5: They began to think, saying. From these St. Augustine concludes: Certain thoughts therefore are utterances of the heart; and further: When we think inwardly, utterance and vision are one. For formed thought from the thing we know is a word which we say in the heart. He also asserts there that this must be transferred to the divine Word, saying: Whoever can understand this, namely that we by thinking speak a mental word, can now see through this mirror and in this riddle some likeness of that Word of which it was said: In the beginning was the Word. With him agrees St. Fulgentius in Book I to Monimus, chapter 7: Thus the Word is with God as the word is in the mind, as counsel is in the heart. For when the mind has a word with itself, it has it by thinking, because to say within oneself is nothing other than to think within oneself. Likewise St. Anselm in the *Monologion*, chapter 28: This utterance, he says, can be understood as nothing other than the intellection of that same spirit by which it understands all things. For what else is it for him to speak a thing by this mode of speaking than to

understand? Although immediately in the same chapter and in the following chapter 29 he restricts this utterance so that it is the begotten Word itself. Again in chapter 34: It is the same for the highest spirit to know as to understand or to speak. And in chapter 46 about the middle: To think a thing whose memory we have is to say it in the mind.

I respond that the holy Fathers by these and similar ways of speaking mean nothing other than that we speak and talk mentally when we think something, whether that thought is the action by which the mental word is produced, or the formal reception of that word in the intellect. They did not weigh this with such exactness except St. Augustine, who inquiring more subtly also provided Bl. Scotus with an occasion to distinguish the production of the word from simple thought. Therefore the other Fathers judged it sufficient for explaining the mystery that just as we, when we think, form within ourselves an image of the thing thought, which is called a mental word, so God the Father, by conceiving his essence, forms a Word consubstantial to himself; and they call that conception of the Word, improperly, thought and intellection, so that they confuse simple thought with true internal uttering. This impropriety of speech St. Thomas Aquinas noted in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 34, a. 1, replies to the second and third, and it is clearly gathered from St. Anselm himself in the place cited. For in chapter 58 he says: As the Father is understanding and the Son is understanding and the Holy Spirit is understanding, so the Father is speaking and the Son is speaking and the Holy Spirit is speaking. By these words he plainly confuses uttering with simple intellection. For it is certain that the Son and the Holy Spirit are truly understanding as the Father is, namely by essential intellection, but they are not speaking by an uttering that is productive of the Word.

As to St. Augustine, I say that he must be understood of uttering and speech as it were in actual being, so that just as an outwardly spoken word is called by these words speech, uttering, saying, word as though synonyms, although properly speech and uttering are the expression or production of the word and the word, as it were, in becoming, so internal speech is sometimes taken for knowledge as though in actual being; and thought taken in this way is the produced word itself. Hence after the words cited above St. Augustine adds: Formed thought from the thing we know is a word.

The Thomists object second: every operation of the intellect is to understand. But to utter or to speak mentally is formally an operation of the intellect. Therefore to utter or speak mentally is to understand.

I distinguish the major: it is to understand either radically or formally. Radically; I concede. Formally; I deny. Therefore every operation of the intellect can be called intellection radically and by denomination because it proceeds from an intellective power, but not formally as if it were truly intellection and formal thought. For the intellect has a twofold operation, namely uttering, productive of the word, and intellection, which in creatures is the formal reception of the produced word.

You will press: if that action which we call uttering is not formally intellection, it will not be from the intellect formally or insofar as it is intellect, but only insofar as it is a productive power, and thus the divine Word will proceed from the intellect only materially, that is, from a principle which is really intellect but not formally. But this consequent is false. For if the Son does not arise from intellect insofar as it is formally intellect, it follows that by force of his procession he cannot properly be called the

word of the Father's mind, nor proceed from the Father's memory, nor be wisdom from wisdom and vision from vision, as St. Augustine says in Book XV, chapters 7 and 13.

The major is proved: for the intellect is not intellect formally except insofar as it expresses itself into the act of understanding, which is the adequate act of intellect insofar as it is intellect.

I distinguish the major: it will not be formally from the intellect insofar as it is intellect, that is, insofar as it produces an act that is formally intellection; I concede. Insofar as it produces an act that is at least intellection radically; I deny. I likewise distinguish the proof: the adequate act of intellect is intellection either formally or radically. Either; I concede. Formally only; I deny.

Add that the argument can be turned back on the adversaries. For essential intellection as intellection is not uttering, yet they concede that the divine Word does not proceed from divine intellection insofar as it is formally intellection, since that is common to the three divine persons; but only insofar as it is modified in the first suppositum and is called uttering. Therefore the argument presses them more than us. Nor does it follow that the Son is not rightly called Word, nor wisdom from wisdom and vision from vision, and so forth. Rather he has the name Word from the fecund memory of the Father, from whom he is produced by uttering, and he is more rightly called Word than if he were made through intellection; for then he would be called not a spoken word but only the Father's thought or intellection. From the name Word the other aforesaid denominations follow, which are synonymous with Word.

The Thomists object third: the divine processions are not only productions of persons but also communications of nature

and of essential acts. For a procession must contain in becoming whatever the produced terminus contains in actual being. But the produced Word contains nature and essential acts. Therefore its procession must also contain the divine nature and the essential act of understanding, and thus it must be nothing other than the divine intellection itself.

I respond that the divine procession in becoming indeed contains and, as it were, communicates the essence and essential acts, but I deny that it follows that for this reason it must be the formal act of understanding. For by this reasoning the production of the Son could also be called an act of willing, since in the Son there is not only the divine essence and the essential act of the Father's intellect, but also the essential act of his will. Therefore if to have that act of intellect by force of procession required that the act be formally included in the procession, it would also be required that the act of will be formally included in it, since by that same procession he has the whole essence and essential things. The same can be said of the Holy Spirit. Therefore essential things are not communicated to the Son because his procession is an essential act, but because the essence itself is another co-principle by which this birth and production occurs. Add that if the adversaries' inference were true, it would also conclude that the divine essence is formally included in uttering, because by force of procession the Son has the divine essence no less than divine intellection. But no theologian admits that consequence. Therefore neither should the antecedent be admitted.

The Thomists object fourth: if intellection were presupposed to uttering and were common to the three persons, it would follow that the Father would not know himself in the Word more than the Word itself and the Holy Spirit would be

said to understand themselves in the Word. But this is against the common assertion of theologians that the Word represents the essence to the Father and thus is called his image. Therefore.

The consequence is clear, because if the Father understands by essential intellection which is not formally uttering, then the other persons will be equal to him, since they too understand the divine essence by essential intellection and thus will know in the Word, and so forth.

I distinguish the consequence: the Father would not be said to know himself in the Word more by reason of the operation; I concede. By reason of representation; I deny. For when it is said that the divine Father knows himself in the Word, the sense is not that by producing the Word he knows his essence, otherwise he would be wise by generated wisdom, which we said above is false from St. Augustine. Rather the sense is that the Father gave to the Son the power to represent that essence as his Word, and not as the Word of the other persons. Therefore just as the created word expresses the object to the one speaking, so in divine things, although the Word is not in the one speaking as informing, as in creatures, nevertheless it has from him a peculiar relation by which it is said to represent the divine essence more to him than to the other persons.

The Thomists object fifth: Bl. Scotus distinguishes uttering from essential intellection so that the Word is not said to proceed through an essential operation of understanding common to the three persons. But the same difficulty returns by admitting an act in the divine intellect distinct from essential intellection. Therefore he falls into Scylla while wishing to avoid Charybdis.

They prove the minor: that action, formally distinct from essential intellection by the nature of the thing, is in the character

of action an absolute act, as intellection itself is. Therefore in the character of action it is common and essential as intellection is. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: that action in the character of action flowing from the intellect is not formally relation, for relation is neither productive nor goes out from the intellect by way of action, since it is the terminus of the divine nature constituting a person. Therefore such action under the concept of action is something absolute as intellection is. But in God whatever is not relative is absolute and pertains to essential things. Therefore from Bl. Scotus's position it follows that the Father produces his Word through an absolute act common to the three persons. Why then could the same not be conceded about essential understanding, so that actions are not multiplied in God without need?

I deny the minor and also deny the major of its proof. For divine uttering is in reality that formality constitutive of the first suppositum and therefore is the relation of paternity itself, not insofar as it is considered under the precise reason of relation referring one to another, but insofar as it is that divine operation by which the first suppositum communicates its existence and its essential things to the second suppositum, to which it therefore refers as generator to generated. Hence generative action in divine things can be called formally relation according to its adequate entity, even if it is not formally relation according to an inadequate entity and a diverse connotation. For one and the same constitutive formality of the first suppositum receives various names because of diverse connotation of terms and diverse functions. For first it constitutes the first person subsisting incommunicably; then it constitutes the principle able to produce as that which; third it gives active generation or

uttering; and finally it constitutes the Father actually and, as it were, predicamentally related to the Son.

CONCLUSION III
IN TRUTH THE DIVINE WORD PROCEEDS THROUGH UTTERING AND THE HOLY SPIRIT THROUGH ACTIVE SPIRATION

This is the position of Bl. Scotus in the places cited in the first Conclusion, and the truth of it follows from the preceding. For if the Word and the Holy Spirit do not proceed through the formal acts of essential intellection and essential love, whether formally or as modified, it follows that they must necessarily proceed through acts of uttering and spirating, since no others can be devised in divine things.

The Conclusion is further proved by Bl. Scotus in Book I, distinction 2, question 7, number 15, first by the authority of St. Augustine, who everywhere teaches that the word, both divine and ours, is produced from fecund memory and not from intellection. But fecund memory is productive through uttering, not through intellection. Therefore by St. Augustine's position the divine Word truly proceeds through uttering distinct from intellection.

The major is clear, namely that both the divine and our word must proceed from fecund memory. For St. Augustine expressly has this in Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 10, where of the word produced by us he speaks thus: It is necessary that when we speak a word, a word be born from the very knowledge which memory holds; for formed thought from the thing we know is the word which we say in the heart. A little before he had said that from this likeness of our word the production of the

divine Word can be discerned: In this mirror and in this riddle one can see some likeness of that Word of which it was said: In the beginning was the Word. That both words, divine and ours, proceed from fecund memory he sufficiently indicates in chapter 14: Our word, which has no sound, is in some way similar in this riddle to that Word of God which is also God, because this too is born from our knowledge as that is born from the knowledge of the Father.

The minor is likewise evident. For intellection is occupied with an object to be perceived, but fecund memory with a word to be produced. The former rests in the simple vision of the object, the latter is engaged in the production of its terminus. The former is the only operation of the Godhead by which the divine persons comprehend their essence and themselves. The latter is uttering and production by which the Father generates the Son wholly equal to himself by force of his procession and production. The things that could be objected against this Conclusion have already been solved in the preceding and will be solved in what follows.

You will ask whether the act of understanding is presupposed to the act of uttering in divine things. The Scotists commonly affirm it, both because Bl. Scotus plainly seems to assert it in Book I, distinction 2, the final question, as was observed in the first Note; and because essential things are prior to notional, and to understand is essential while to utter is notional; and finally because by the reason of a perfect principle it is fitting that it first have its ultimate perfection and then produce. But to understand and to will seem to be the ultimate perfections of the Godhead. Therefore it is first necessary that the divine person be understanding and willing before by the fecundity of nature it produces the Word. In creatures it is

otherwise: uttering precedes understanding, because the created intellect is not formally understanding except through the reception of the word produced by uttering.

Nevertheless some object, among whom our Fr. Baronius subscribes in *Apologia* 2, act 4 near the end, affirming that in the Father uttering is prior to intellection and volition, because, he says, uttering is constitutive of the Father, and nothing is prior in something than that by which it is constituted. For nothing can be in something before it exists, nor can it exist before it is constituted in being, nor can it be constituted except by its constitutive principle; therefore nothing can be in the Father before the Father is constituted in his being as Father. But he is not constituted in that being except by uttering, which, as is supposed, is active generation itself. Hence he concludes that although absolutely in God to understand is prior to to utter, nevertheless in the Father, insofar as he is the Father precisely, to utter is prior to to understand, as although animal is prior to rational, nevertheless insofar as it is in man, rational is prior to animal. Hence since the Father is constituted in being Father through uttering, it is necessary that he utter before he understands, because it is prior for the Father to be than to understand.

But the other Scotists object with Fr. Rada in the First Part, Controversy 12, article 3. First, because for Bl. Scotus the Father is blessed prior to generating; but beatitude is either in intellection, or in volition, or in both. Therefore the divine Father understands his essence prior to uttering and producing his Word. Second, because whenever things keep a necessary order among themselves, they keep the same order wherever they are found. But to understand is prior in itself to to utter. Therefore also in the Father intellection precedes uttering. Nor does the

example of animal help, for it is false that in man rational is prior to animal, since both concur to the constitution of man, animal as the higher predicate, rational as the lower. So similarly to understand and to utter together constitute the Father: to understand as the higher predicate, to utter as the ultimate predicate, and therefore the latter presupposes the former. Finally, because whatever follows upon a notional predicate is not communicated to other persons, for it is the proper character of a divine person. But divine understanding is communicated and extends to all the divine persons. Therefore it does not presuppose uttering, which is notional, but precedes it.

QUESTION IV
WHETHER AND WHICH PROCESSION IN GOD IS GENERATION

It is certain by divine faith that generation must be admitted in God; for the Scriptures of both Testaments proclaim this, in which divine generation is expressly affirmed. Thus Psalm 2: "You are my Son; today I have begotten you." Psalm 109: "From the womb, before the morning star, I have begotten you." And the last chapter of Isaiah: "Shall I, who make others give birth, not myself give birth?" All those texts confirm it, especially those of the New Testament in which a Son is attributed to God; for sonship most certainly implies generation. All those divine oracles likewise persuade us in which Christ the Lord is declared to be the Son of the living God, and he himself constantly calls God his Father. Therefore no room is left for doubt about the truth of divine generation.

But there remains to be resolved a great and serious difficulty: whether each divine procession—both that of the

Word and that of the Holy Spirit—must be called true generation, or whether only the procession of the Word, which proceeds, claims for itself the name of true and perfect generation.

1. It should be noted that this was the judgment of the ancient Fathers: that in God there must truly be admitted a certain generation by which he who begets is truly and properly Father, and is called Father, and he who is begotten is truly Son, and is called Son. But how that generation comes to be, and for what cause only one of the produced divine Persons is called Son, they judged was not to be investigated more precisely. Thus St. Athanasius, *Oration* 3, says that it is unfitting to ask how the Word exists from God, or how he is God's splendor, or how God begets, and what the mode of God's generation is. For he is mad who would dare such things, when he attempts by his speech to explain an inexpressible reality, proper to the divine nature, known only to God himself and to his Son. St. Gregory Nazianzen agrees, in *Oration* 1 on the Son: "How was he begotten?" he says (and I repeat the same indignantly): let God's generation be honored by silence. It is enough for you to know that he is begotten. But as to how he is begotten, I would not grant even to the Angels—much less to you—to understand it; do you want me to declare how? Let there be a Father who begot and a Son who was begotten. What is above this is covered by a cloud and escapes your dullness. St. Irenaeus had already taught the same, saying that this is so unknown that neither Angels nor Archangels nor Principalities nor Powers know it, but only the Father who begot and the Son who was born. Since, then, his generation is ineffable, whoever strives to narrate generations and utterances is beside himself, promising to explain what is ineffable.

The same was the opinion of the Latin Fathers. For St. Ambrose, *De Fide*, book 2, chapter 5, says that it is impossible to know the secret of that generation. And again: it is permitted to know that he was born; it is not permitted to examine how he was born—what I may not do is deny the former; what I fear is to ask the latter. And in the same place he calls this inquiry "the tortures of questions." St. Augustine subscribes to this in many places, especially in *Contra Maximinum*, book 3, chapters 14 and 15; in *De Trinitate*, chapter 27; and in Tractate 99 on John, where he says: "What difference there is there between 'to proceed' and 'to be born' is a long matter to discuss by inquiry, and rash to define once you have discussed it," and so on.

Nevertheless, it is pious and useful to seek, by disputing humbly and soberly, the reason for the distinction by which the generation of the Word is distinguished from the procession of the Holy Spirit—provided that the disputation itself rests primarily on faith and secondarily appears clearer by natural reason, which serves faith as a handmaid; and provided the disputation is undertaken so that it becomes clear that the objections of the heretics against this mystery are vain and sophistical. Hence St. Justin Martyr rightly says in his exposition of faith on the Trinity, after he had shown that in no way can we penetrate to the divine essence nor to its mysteries: we ought not, however, to desist from seeking altogether; but each person, according to the measure of knowledge received from the Lord, should examine the matter vigorously, certain not that he will grasp it exactly, but that by such contemplation he will benefit by drawing nearer to him.

2. It should be noted that the generation of living things can be distinguished in three ways. For, first, it is taken for the production of any living thing, whether such a production is

made by a living cause or not, whether by a cause of the same nature as the effect or of a different nature; and in this way the production of animals from putrefied matter by the assistance of the sun or fire can be called generation. In this sense the formation of Adam from the clay of the earth and of Eve from the rib of Adam can receive the name of generation, since the terminus of such productions is a living substance.

Second, the name of generation is taken more strictly, namely for the production of a living thing from a living thing. In this sense it is usually described as follows: the origin of a living thing from a living thing, by means of a principle joined to life, into the likeness of nature. This description includes four elements required for generation. First, that it be the origin of a living thing, because relativity belongs only to living things. Second, that it be from a living principle, so that productions of living things by fire, the sun, and other causes devoid of life are excluded from the perfect notion of generation. Third, that it be from a principle joined to life, that is, that that through which the begotten is produced was at some time joined to the generating living thing; for what is begotten is made through seed separated from the generating living thing. For this reason the production of Adam cannot be called generation, because although it is made by God who lives, it is not made through a separation and communication of the divine substance. Fourth, that it be into the likeness of nature—not indeed of the individual nature (for the begotten is sometimes seen to be utterly unlike its begetter in perfections both substantial and accidental), but into the likeness of nature either generic (as animal from animal, as in the generation of a mule from a horse and a donkey) or specific (as the generation of a human being from a human being).

Third and finally, the generation of spiritual living things, taken most strictly, can be described thus: the origin of an intelligent living thing from a living thing by an intelligent life, by means of a principle joined to intelligent life. In this are included the generation of all human beings, and the production of animals and plants is excluded. The Doctor proves that this description of generation fits the production of the divine Word in book 1, distinction 5, question 2, number 3.

3. It should be noted that two principal differences can be assigned between an act of intellect and an act of will. The first is that every act of will is free, at least with essential freedom, which consists in the order that the act has to its principle, determining itself to the act in a way that is capable of being chosen and delighted in. But an act of intellect is not free, but natural; and this naturalness consists in this, that the act proceeds from a principle by its nature determined to the act. The Doctor establishes this distinction in book 1, distinction 10, as will be shown more fully below when we speak explicitly of the free procession of the Holy Spirit. The second difference is that an act of intellect has the character of an image and likeness representing its object, which is the principle of that act together with the intellect itself. For through the object, or through the species received from the object as though its seed, the intellect is made fertile for conceiving a mental word, which is an image of the object. But an act of will does not have that character of image and likeness representing its object; rather, it has the character of inclination and tendency toward the object, as St. Thomas Aquinas notes in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part, question 27, article 4. This inclination of love is explained by a likeness of union or bond, by which the lover is said to be joined to the beloved, or to be in it, and as though borne toward it by a

certain weight. Hence St. Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chapter 4, calls love a unitive power, and St. Augustine agrees, *De Trinitate*, book 8, chapter 10: "What is love," he says, "except a certain life joining together two things, or desiring to join together the lover and what is loved?" And in book 13 of the *Confessiones*, chapter 9: "My weight is my love; by it I am carried wherever I am carried." St. Bernard also agrees, Sermon 83 on the Canticle, where he says of charity: "Truly this is the contract of a spiritual and holy marriage; I said too little, it is an embrace—an embrace indeed—where to will the same and to refuse the same makes one spirit out of two," and so on.

With these preliminaries, three things must chiefly be resolved in this question: first, that the production of the divine Word is true generation; second, that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not to be called generation; third, the cause of this distinction must be investigated, and the genuine reason set forth why the Son's procession, but not that of the Holy Spirit, is called generation.

CONCLUSION I
THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE WORD IS TRUE AND PROPERLY SO CALLED GENERATION

This is of faith as to both parts; for this has been openly defined in the councils of Nicaea, Ephesus, Toledo, and others, in those confessions of faith in which the second Person of the divine Trinity is asserted to be Son, begotten and born from the eternal Father, not made, nor created.

The same is gathered from various places of Sacred Scripture in which, as we said above, not only is true generation proved to exist in God, but that very generation is attributed to

the procession of the divine Word. Thus in Psalm 2: "You are my Son; today I have begotten you," which St. Paul, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, explains of the eternal generation of Christ the Lord. Likewise from Psalm 109: "In the splendors of the saints, before the morning star, I have begotten you." This divine oracle is not to be interpreted of the temporal nativity of Christ the Lord, as some contend; for how could he be said to be begotten before the morning star who was born only in the middle of time? Rather, it must be understood of that very divine generation, whose eternity, character, and principle are set forth by that oracle.

Its character is indicated when it is said, "in the splendors of the saints," by which it is signified that he is begotten through the fecundity of light, that is, by the divine intellect made fertile by the knowledge of the Godhead; hence also in the Nicene Creed he is rightly called "light from light." Its eternity is explained by the following words, "before the morning star," that is, not only before the production of every creature, but even before their eternal ordination and the decree concerning their being made. Thus that divine Wisdom says of itself in Proverbs 8: "From eternity I was ordained, before he made anything from the beginning; the depths were not yet, and I was already conceived." Finally, the principle of that origin and nativity is indicated by the words that follow, "from the womb I have begotten you," namely from the fertile memory, by whose act the Father communicates his substance to the Son. Hence some not without reason think that in these words there lies a mystery: that the divine Father, because of the supreme perfection of generation, fulfills the office of both father and mother. The mother's, as the phrase "from the womb" indicates; the father's, as the phrase "I have begotten you" signifies. For this reason Synesius learnedly and wisely calls him

"Father-Mother," that is, one acting with the roles of father and mother in the production of his Son.

This is also proved by reason. That procession is truly and properly called generation to which the three conditions required for perfect generation belong; but all of them belong to the eternal production of the Word.

First, the procession of the divine Word is the procession of a living thing from a living thing: of the Son, namely, who has life in himself from the living Father, who communicates it to him, according to John 5: "As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son also to have life in himself." Here St. Augustine, Tractate 22 on John, distinguishes two ways of having life. The first is to have life "from oneself," which belongs to the Father alone; for as he is from himself, so he has life not only in himself, that is, subsisting, but also from himself and not from another. The second is to have life subsisting in oneself, but not from oneself; and this belongs to the Son, who has life from the Father.

Second, it proceeds from a living principle by an intelligent life. For God is Spirit, whose living is understanding; and the Word proceeds by an intellective power, that is, by a fertile intellect; therefore it is truly and properly said to proceed from a living principle by an intelligent life.

Third, that same procession is from a conjoined principle. For the productive principle of the Word remains conjoined to him, since the Father pours his whole nature and substance into him; and this is signified by the words "from the womb." For, as St. Augustine says in *Contra Maximinum*, book 2: therefore he is said to be born "from his womb" because from himself, that is, from his substance, God begot God—just as from the mother's womb, when he was born, a human being begot a

human being—so that we might understand that in both generations the substances are not different: of him who is born, and of those from whom he is born. This truth Bishop Victor also explains clearly in the profession of faith addressed to Huneric, which is found in volume 4 of the *Bibliotheca Patrum*. "We profess," he says, "that the Father, from himself—that is, from what he is—has begotten the Son eternally and ineffably: not from outside, not from nothing, not from some other matter, but that he is born from God; and he who is born from God is not something other than what the Father is." The Second Council of Toledo likewise agrees: "For he is to be believed to have been begotten or born neither from nothing nor from some substance, but from the Father's womb, that is, from his substance."

Finally, that same procession is into the likeness of nature, and indeed most perfectly. For in Colossians 1 the Son is called "the image of God," and in Hebrews 1 he is called "the splendor of the Father and the figure of his substance." Indeed, he is not only into specific likeness, as is the perfect generation of living things, but into numerical and identical likeness. For the divine Father communicates to his Son by eternal generation the same numerical nature; hence in John 10 the Son himself declares: "I and the Father are one"—not indeed by unity of Person, as was said, but by unity of substance and Godhead.

You will say 1: The procession of the divine Word is through the intellect; but intellect of its nature is not generative, indeed it is non-generative; for neither Angels nor human beings beget things like themselves through intellect. Therefore the production of the divine Word is not generation.

I distinguish the minor: in creatures, intellect is not generative, I grant; in God, I deny. For since the created word is only accidental and is by no means consubstantial with the fertile

intellect that produces it, and therefore is not a univocal conception of it, it follows that it is not properly or really, but only by likeness and intentionally, a kind of generation, insofar as it produces a terminus that is indeed an image of the object, but an imperfect one, namely because of the limitation and finitude of the producing intellect, by reason of which it does not have the power to elicit a likeness of the object that is wholly adequate and perfect. But it is otherwise with God: since the divine intellect is infinite and unlimited, it cannot fail to produce a Word which is in every respect adequate to, and consubstantial with, that fertile intellect (that is, conjoined with the divine essence as its primary object). Therefore, not only by likeness but truly and really, the production of the Word is generation.

You will say 2: For a production to obtain the name of true generation, it must produce a terminus similar to the producer by the force of the action by which it produces it. But the eternal Father does not do this in producing the Son; for the Word produced by him is not made like him in nature by reason of the productive action, namely the uttering, but by reason of the object concurring with the intellect in that production, of which object the produced Word is the expression and likeness.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I say: although two things concur to constitute fertile memory, namely the intellect and the object, nevertheless the intellect itself, since it is an agent and producer, is said to form the likeness of the object when it produces the Word; and therefore that production is to be attributed more to the action of the intellect than to the concurrence of the object.

You will press the point: for the divine Son to be truly assimilated to the Father who produces him, he ought to share all the Father's proper marks; therefore he ought to have paternity,

for this is the Father's proper mark, which constitutes him in the being of Father. But this does not hold; rather, he has a constitutive feature not only different but opposite, namely filiation. Therefore, far from being similar to the producing principle, he is wholly dissimilar; and so he is not truly begotten.

I distinguish the major: he ought to have the Father's proper marks that are essential and compatible with filiation, I grant; those that are notional and incompatible with filiation, I deny. For it is not necessary for perfect generation that the begotten be assimilated to the begetter in every respect and in all things. For in human generation it is clear that the son not only has filiation opposed to paternity, but also has a suppositum and an individual difference by which he is really and personally distinguished from the producing principle. Therefore, for the divine Word to be truly called similar to its productive principle, it is not necessary that it have all its marks; it suffices that it have the same essence and the same essential perfections.

You will say 3: Therefore the production of the divine Word would be truly generation because Scripture affirms that he is begotten by God; but from this it does not follow that he is truly begotten and produced from the substance of the Father and by communication of that same essence; therefore neither may we affirm that his production is true generation.

The major is clear from what was said. The minor is proved: for Scripture pronounces not only the Word begotten by God, but also human beings, in Deuteronomy 32: "You have forsaken God who begot you." This surely does not mean that human beings were produced from God's substance, nor that their production is true generation.

I deny the minor; and to its proof I say that the word "to beget" in Sacred Scripture, as also among philosophers, is used in

three ways—more broadly, more strictly, and most strictly—as was noted above in the second note. Hence the production of human beings can be called generation in the broad sense, insofar as it is the origin of a living thing from a living thing into at least an accidental likeness of nature. But the production of the Word is called generation in the strictest sense, since it is made through the divine nature communicated to him, which is derived to him through a naturally productive principle, namely the divine intellect; hence he is one true God with the Father. "For the truth of nature holds this property," says St. Hilary, "that what is from God is God, and nativity is not a change, nor is there diversity: the Son does not subsist in a nature external to and dissimilar from God the Father; nor does the Father, by the nativity of the Only-Begotten, acquire something alien from himself, but rather he bestows without loss all that is his." Or, as he adds in book 11: "God's nativity is neither from elsewhere nor something other; for if it is from elsewhere, it is not nativity; and if it is something other, it is not God. But since God is from God, by this God the Father is both God to God the Son and God of his nativity, and Father of the nature, because the nature of God is both from God and the begotten is begotten in the nature by which he is God."

CONCLUSION II
ONLY THE PRODUCTION OF THE SON, NOT THAT OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, IS TRUE GENERATION

This too is of faith, determined in the First and Second Councils of Toledo, and likewise at Nicaea after the middle, where it says: "One God and Father unbegotten; one Son begotten from him, God, Word. Just as there is not another God

alongside the unbegotten God and Father, so neither is the Son co-begotten, nor prior, nor posterior, as a different son from the one only-begotten Son of God."

Second, the same is established from all the creeds: first from the Apostles' Creed, where Christ is called the only-begotten Son of God; and likewise from the Nicene Creed, where we believe in Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God. And in the creed of St. Athanasius received by the Church, where only the Son is said to be begotten; but the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.

This is also confirmed by Sacred Scripture. For if the procession of the Holy Spirit were generation, it would follow that the Holy Spirit is a begotten Son. But this plainly conflicts with Sacred Scripture, in which the divine Word is frequently preached as the one and only-begotten Son of God. Thus John 1: "The only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him to us." And chapter 3: "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son," and again: "Because he does not believe in the name of the only-begotten Son of God." Nor does it matter that John in the first chapter declares that he saw the glory of the divine Word "as of the only-begotten from the Father," for that "as" does not diminish the glory, but rather denotes truth and equality according to a Hebrew manner of speaking, as if it were saying: his glory was as great as befitted the only-begotten Son of God.

All the holy Fathers confirm the same by the same argument, for they expressly declare that the Holy Spirit is not begotten. Thus St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, book 3 near the end: "The Holy Spirit is neither unbegotten nor begotten, because there is one Only-Begotten." St. Gregory Nazianzen says the same

in his fifth theological oration: "Nor is the Spirit the Son, because he is from God; for there is one Only-Begotten." St. Athanasius agrees in *Dialogus* 3 on the Trinity: "He is called only-begotten because he alone is begotten from the essence. For it is not written, 'The Spirit is begotten from me,' but 'He proceeds from me.'" This truth is also established from what was said in the preceding conclusion, and it will be made clearer from what is to be said in the following conclusion, in which we shall set forth the genuine reason why the procession of the Holy Spirit is not to be called generation.

You will say 1: The Son of God is often called the Firstborn in Sacred Scripture; therefore he has another later begotten, namely the Holy Spirit, and so the procession of the Holy Spirit will also be called generation.

I answer that someone can be called Firstborn in two ways, negatively and positively. Negatively, when another firstborn is denied, without any comparison to later ones, that is, without attending to whether any are later begotten. In this way Christ is called Firstborn not only as God but also as man, both from the Father and from the Mother, because he has none prior by birth, although he has none later either. Thus in Matthew 1 the holy Virgin is said to have borne "her firstborn Son." Positively, someone is called Firstborn who has none prior but has other brothers younger by birth; in this sense Christ cannot be called Firstborn.

You will press: Scripture affirms that the Son of God is Firstborn not only negatively but also positively; therefore there is no solution. The antecedent is proved from St. Paul in Romans 8, where the Son of God is called "the Firstborn among many brothers."

I answer that someone can be called Firstborn positively in two ways: properly or metaphorically. Properly, when later begotten brothers are brothers who have the same nature as their elder brother, communicated from the same parents. In this sense Christ the Lord cannot be called Firstborn, neither according to temporal nor according to eternal generation, because neither God the Father nor the Virgin Mother begot other later sons in that way. Metaphorically, someone is called Firstborn when later "brothers" are begotten and called brothers in an improper sense, being brothers not by nature but by adoption. In this sense Christ is called Firstborn among many brothers, for he has many later-born by the grace of adoption, and therefore, as the same Apostle says in Hebrews 2, "he is not ashamed to call them brothers." This is clearly explained by the Council of Ephesus, chapter 4: the Son of God is "Firstborn and only-begotten": Firstborn by comparison with adopted sons, and only-begotten by excluding any other natural son. Hence St. Augustine, *De Fide et Symbolo*, chapter 4, says: "Insofar as he is only-begotten, he has no brothers; but insofar as he is Firstborn, he is able to call brothers all those who, after his firstfruits, are born in the grace of God through adoption as sons."

You will object 2: If anything persuades that the divine Word alone is the Son of God, it is chiefly because, as we said, he is affirmed to be Only-Begotten both by Scripture and by councils; but from this it does not follow that he has no brothers also truly and properly begotten. Therefore, and so on. The minor is proved from Proverbs 4, where Solomon says that he is his mother's only-begotten, although he had four brothers. For in 1 Chronicles 3 it is said that four were born to David in Jerusalem from Bathsheba, who in 2 Samuel 5 are called sons of David.

Therefore from the fact that the divine Son is called only-begotten, it does not follow that he has no brothers properly.

I answer that Solomon is not called absolutely his mother's only-begotten, but beloved before his mother, as the Seventy interpreters translate it: because he was loved by her with such affection as though he were her only and only-begotten son. But in this sense the Son of God cannot be called only-begotten, because the Holy Spirit is loved by the Father as much as the Son. Therefore it is necessary that he be called only-begotten because by a single true generation he is begotten by the Father.

You will say 3: Whatever exists is either begotten or unbegotten; but the Holy Spirit is not unbegotten, for only the divine Father is such; therefore he is begotten. Hence the Eunomians and Macedonians attacked the divinity of the Holy Spirit with this dilemma: either the Holy Spirit is God begotten or unbegotten. If unbegotten, there will be two Gods without origin and unbegotten. If begotten, then either begotten by the Father alone, like the Word, and then there will be two twin brothers; or the Holy Spirit will be a later son than the Word; or he is begotten by the Son alone, and so he will be the grandson of the Father and the Father will be the grandfather; or finally he is begotten by the Father and the Son, and thus one parent will be male and father, the other female and mother. This argumentation is reported and refuted by St. Gregory Nazianzen in his theological oration and by St. Athanasius in the epistle to Serapion.

I answer that "unbegotten" is used by the Fathers in two ways. First, insofar as it signifies the same as "what is produced from no principle"; in this sense the Father alone, not the Holy Spirit, is called unbegotten. Second, more strictly, for anything that does not proceed by generation properly so called; in this sense the Holy Spirit is called unbegotten by some of the holy

Fathers, though improperly. For, as St. Augustine says in Sermon 3 within the Octave of Epiphany, the Holy Spirit is called neither unbegotten nor begotten anywhere, lest if he were called unbegotten, like the Father, two Fathers be understood in the Holy Trinity, or if he were called begotten, like the Son, two Sons be judged to exist in the same Holy Trinity. The Second Council of Toledo agrees in its confession of faith: "This Holy Spirit is said neither to be unbegotten nor believed to be begotten, lest if we say 'unbegotten' we say there are two Fathers, or if we say 'begotten' we be shown to preach two Sons."

CONCLUSION III
THE NEAREST AND IMMEDIATE REASON WHY THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE WORD IS GENERATION, BUT NOT THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, IS THAT THE WORD PROCEEDS AND IS PRODUCED NATURALLY AND NOT VOLUNTARILY, WHILE THE HOLY SPIRIT IS PRODUCED VOLUNTARILY AND NOT NATURALLY

This is the genuine opinion of Bl. Scotus, which he teaches in many places, especially in book 1, distinction 10, number 13, and distinction 13, number 20, saying that generation is taken in one way for the generation of a substance, and in another way more specially for the production of a living thing from a living thing; and in this latter way an animal is said to be generated, but not fire. And there, on the part of the agent, there commonly concurs a natural inclination, or a natural form, which is the principle of generating; and in this last way there seems to be generation in God.

The same is taught by Fr. Alexander of Hales, first part, question 33, member 1; and by St. Bonaventure, who in many places, especially in book 1, distinction 6, question 2, says: if the will is the principle together with communicated nature, then there is the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds by way of love, yet similar in nature; but if nature is the principle together with communicated will, then there is the generation of the Son, who is produced as wholly similar and by way of nature. And in the *Compendium Theologicum*, book 1, chapter 7, he affirms that the proper mode by which the Son proceeds is in the manner of nature. Nor does it matter that in distinction 13, article 1, question 2, to the third objection, he assigns this difference, namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, but the Son as image; for that is only a mediated reason. The immediate reason why the Son is an image, that is, an expression of likeness, is (as he says in distinction 38, article 1, question 2, in the body of the article) because he goes forth by way of nature, and thus by way of word and species and by way of expressed likeness.

This conclusion is proved, first, by the authority of St. Augustine, who in *De Trinitate*, book 5, chapters 9 and 14, asks: why is the Holy Spirit not the Son, although he goes forth from the Father? And he solves it by saying: he goes forth not as one born, but as one given. This is the same as if he said: the Holy Spirit is not the Son because he does not go forth naturally as the second Person does, who goes forth as one born, that is, by way of nature, but he proceeds as one given, namely voluntarily and by way of an inclination of good will, or in the manner of love, which is the first among the gifts that proceed from the will of the giver.

If you ask St. Augustine why the Son goes forth as born and the Holy Spirit as given, he does not pass over the reason, as

though he judged this opinion improbable (as Vázquez says, incorrectly, as if he would have disapproved it). Rather, in *De Trinitate*, book 9, chapter 12, he gives the reason for this difference: that the Son proceeds through the intellect, whose task is to inquire and, by finding, as it were to beget. For inquiry, he says, is an appetite for finding; and what is found is as though begotten; hence it is like offspring, namely where it exists except in the knowledge itself, for there it is as though formally expressed. He adds: for a certain appetite precedes the birth of the mind, by which we want to know that thing; by seeking and finding, the offspring itself—knowledge—is born. And thus that appetite is conceived and knowledge is brought forth; yet the appetite cannot rightly be called offspring and birth. And that same appetite, by which we yearn to know the thing, becomes love of what is known; while it holds and embraces the pleasing offspring, that is, the knowledge, and joins it to the begetter. It is as though he said: no other reason is to be assigned why the Word is the begotten Son, except that he proceeds through the intellect, whose action, according to all, is to act naturally and not voluntarily; but the Holy Spirit proceeds through the will, whose action is to act voluntarily and not naturally.

To this can also be reduced another reason for the difference that St. Augustine himself gives in *De Trinitate*, book 15, chapter 27, where he asserts that the second Person is the Son because he proceeds from one Person alone; but the Holy Spirit is not the Son because he proceeds from two. "For," he says, "if he too were called Son, he would certainly be called the son of both, which is utterly absurd; for no one is the son of two except of father and mother; far be it that we should suspect anything such between God the Father and God the Son." This reason, however, he sets down as from an effect: from the fact that the Son

proceeds from one Person it is gathered that he proceeds naturally and through intellect, and consequently that he is Son; from the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two Persons it follows that he is produced voluntarily and not naturally.

This also seems to be plainly the opinion of St. Athanasius in the epistle *De Decretis Synodi Nicenae*, where he says: "What is born naturally from something and is similar in nature is not adopted from elsewhere; nature acknowledges it as a son, and the very word brings that force with it." From this the following reasoning is formed: all other sons are produced naturally; therefore the second Person of the divine Trinity is called Son because he is truly produced naturally, that is, by an intellect naturally determined to act.

Further, true generation is the origin of a living thing from a living thing by way of nature and likeness. Hence the word "nature" seems first to have been derived from "being born," and imposed to signify the actual origin of a living thing from a living thing, which is now called nativity. Therefore that procession must be called generation which is judged to be the work of nature. But the production of the Word is judged to be the work of nature because it is through the intellect, which is called a natural agent and is opposed to the agent through will; through will is the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called voluntary, not natural. Therefore, and so on.

Finally, it is clear that voluntary and non-voluntary production are utterly opposed; it is likewise clear that voluntary productions are nowhere called generations, otherwise creation and the making of artifacts would be called generation, which none of the philosophers admitted. Therefore, since the production of the Holy Spirit is voluntary and is made through will, but the production of the Son is not voluntary but natural

because it is made through intellect, for this reason it can truly be called generation.

This is confirmed as follows. All other reasons customarily produced by authors for this difference either fail or must be reduced, as to a mediated and primary cause, to ours. Therefore the proper and genuine reason why the second Person is called begotten but not the third is that the former proceeds naturally while the latter proceeds voluntarily.

The antecedent is proved. There are chiefly four distinct reasons and opinions of authors by which they strive to prove that the procession of the divine Word is true generation but not that of the Holy Spirit.

The first is proposed by Richard of St. Victor in *De Trinitate*, book 6, chapter 19, whom not a few more recent writers follow: namely that the Word is said to be begotten because he receives a nature fertile for the production of another divine Person, and thus is similar to his principle in the divine nature insofar as nature consists in a fecundity productive of another suppositum. Since the Holy Spirit does not receive such fecundity by reason of his procession, it follows, they say, that he is indeed similar to the productive principle in the divine essence insofar as it is essence, but not insofar as it is nature.

But against this: it would follow that the divine Word is not properly Son, because he would not be perfectly similar to the Father in nature. For they say that the Holy Spirit is not similar in nature with the Father because he does not have the power of spirating which the Father has; but the Word does not have the power of generating which the Father has. Therefore the Word is not perfectly similar to the Father in nature, and so he is not Son. This is confirmed: perfect likeness in nature, insofar as it signifies fecundity, requires that not only the essence but also the

same mode of fecundity be shared. But the Son does not share the same mode of fecundity. Therefore he does not have likeness in nature.

Second, if the Son must be similar to the Father in a fertile nature, it follows that a created son would be a son in a more perfect manner than the uncreated Son. For a created son is more similar to a created father in a fertile nature than the divine Son is: the former has the same mode of fecundity productive of another son, but the latter does not.

Finally, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, neither would the Son have the spirative power productive of him; yet for that reason the Son would not cease to be Son. Therefore he is not Son precisely because he has spirative power. Hence also none of the Latin Fathers disputing with the Greeks, in order to prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, ever used this reason: that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the divine Word would cease to be Son. But if the notion of Son were constituted by this, that he is assimilated to the Father in spirative power, they would certainly have used it. Since they did not, it is an argument that they judged that alleged reason for the difference between the two processions to be no reason at all.

The second opinion affirms that the procession of the Word is therefore generation because he receives the divine nature primarily as divine, whereas the Holy Spirit receives it only secondarily. Thus Fr. Francisco Suárez in book 11, chapter 3. He attempts to establish it by a twofold foundation. First, that the divine nature, according to its primary and most proper differentia, is intellection; therefore, since the divine Word proceeds through intellect, he receives intellection primarily. Second, because every agent that assimilates a patient assimilates it according to the form by which it acts; since the Son proceeds

through intellect, he is assimilated to the Father in intellection, which, since it is nature in God, produces one similar in nature.

Against this, first: it is false that the divine essence is formally constituted by intellection, as we proved when treating the constitutive differentia of the Godhead. It is likewise false that the divine Word is produced through intellect in the way Suárez means. It is also false that every agent produces something similar to itself according to the form by which it acts; otherwise it would follow that a man, by generating, would primarily produce the generative power. Add that the Holy Spirit is God primarily and per se; therefore he receives the divine nature primarily and per se, just as the Word does. This is confirmed: the divine nature no less essentially requires the Person of the Holy Spirit than the Person of the Son; therefore it is communicated as primarily to the Son as to the Holy Spirit.

The third opinion is that of almost all Thomists, who assert that the procession of the Word is therefore generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, because the Word proceeds into the likeness of nature by the force of his procession, but not the Holy Spirit.

Against this: the Word would therefore be said to proceed into the likeness of nature because he proceeds through intellect, whose act is to produce an image and likeness of the object. But this likeness, since it is only intentional, does not suffice for perfect generation, which requires likeness in nature; otherwise whenever a painter expresses someone's image, he would be said to beget him. Therefore that likeness made through intellection does not suffice to constitute true generation.

Further, when in the definition of generation it is said that it is a vital procession which by its nature tends to a terminus that by the force of the procession must be similar to the

producer, this is understood with respect to that which is said to generate vitally. Therefore that likeness should be understood with respect to the intellect; for the object does not concur vitally. But it is false that intellection or the word is similar to the intellect; for in creatures the intellect is a substantial faculty, but intellection and the word are accidents. Therefore that likeness produced through intellect does not precisely suffice to constitute the formal notion of generation.

Finally, even if intellect as such were of itself to produce something similar to the producer, it would not follow that it produces something similar to the producer in nature; otherwise every intellect could do so. But no intellect does so except the divine intellect. Therefore if any intellect produces a terminus similar to itself in nature, this does not belong to it insofar as it is intellect, but insofar as it is divine and most perfect. But the divine intellect, insofar as it is divine and most perfect, has no greater power to produce something similar in nature to the producer than the divine will has. Therefore for this reason the procession of the Word through intellect is not more to be called generation than the procession of the Holy Spirit through will. The minor is clear: for the will, insofar as divine, produces a divine Person not only similar but altogether equal.

They reply that the divine will is not as assimilative as intellect, because the divine intellect is assimilative both insofar as it is intellect, that is, according to the generic notion (since every intellect produces and expresses the likeness of its object), and insofar as it is divine (since as such it produces a Person altogether similar and equal to the producing principle). But the divine will is not assimilative according to its generic notion, insofar as it is will.

But this reply is nothing. For the likeness required in perfect generation is considered only with respect to nature, especially specific nature. Therefore that intellect is more assimilative in a genus than will does not help toward generation if the will is assimilative in nature, as the divine will is.

The fourth opinion is that therefore the Word is Son and not the Holy Spirit because, although by the force of their procession the divine nature is communicated to each, and consequently each proceeds as similar to his producing principle, nevertheless the Holy Spirit does not proceed by way of image, which is required for the notion of Son and generation.

Against this: this opinion explains what is obscure by something more obscure. For it does not appear more evident why the second Person is an image of the first than why he is a Son, except perhaps because he proceeds as similar to the producing principle by the force of his procession. But this is also true of the Holy Spirit, as has just been said. Therefore, and so on.

Further, when the Son is called the image of the Father, either it is meant that he is similar to him in nature, or that he must express the Father's special marks. If the former, then the Holy Spirit will be Son as much as the Word is, for he is equally similar in nature to the producing principle. If the latter, it cannot be said; for although a human son does not express the begetter's proper marks, nevertheless he is judged a son. Therefore for the true notion of generation nothing else is required than that the begotten be assimilated to the producer in nature. Consequently, since the Holy Spirit has this likeness no less than the Son, it follows that this reason does not suffice to distinguish those divine processions.

I concede, however, that these last two reasons help to make that distinction known as from an effect. For the divine

Word has this as something special by reason of his procession: that he is the perfect likeness and image of the Father. "For the Son is a brief, compendious, and easy declaration of the Father's nature," says St. Gregory Nazianzen in his fourth theological oration. "For everything that is begotten defines its begetter with a certain silent voice," or, as St. Basil says in Homily 16, "the Word is the image of the begetter, showing the whole begetter in itself." Hence St. Athanasius in the epistle *De Decretis Synodi Nicenae*: "If you name him image, you will by that very fact judge him to be Son." Nor does Bl. Scotus reject this, for in book 1, distinction 10, the single question, number 13, he says: "The Holy Spirit is not produced as similar by the force of his production; and it is true that he is not the image of the Father, as the Son is, who by the force of his production proceeds as similar to the Father." But this reason is only from an effect. For the Son proceeds as similar and as an image because the principle from which he originates, namely the intellect, is a natural power; and since nature is directed to the production of what is similar to itself whenever it can, and since the divine intellect is infinite and therefore capable of producing a terminus perfectly similar to itself, it follows that it is naturally determined to his production.

ARTICLE III
ON THE PRINCIPLES, OBJECTS, AND TERMINI OF DIVINE EMANATIONS

Once the existence and essence of the divine emanations have been investigated and, as far as possible, explained, there remains, for their more exact and more evident understanding, that we investigate and explain their principles, objects, and termini. For since by their formal notion they are actions truly

productive, it is necessary that they have principles from which they arise, objects by which they are formed, and termini as the offspring and birth of their fecundity. Therefore the present article will be completed chiefly by three questions. In the first it will become clear what are the immediate formal principles of divine emanations. In the second, from what objects they are formed: whether, namely, the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit presuppose and require the knowledge and love of creatures. In the third, finally, whether the terminus of those emanations is the divine nature, or relation and suppositum, or finally the divine Person itself as it were coalescing from nature and personality together.

QUESTION I
WHAT ARE THE IMMEDIATE PRINCIPLES OF THE DIVINE EMANATIONS

1. It should be noted that there is truly in God a true and real productive principle of the Persons. For where there is true production and a terminus truly produced, there must also be a true productive principle. This is commonly distinguished as twofold: the principle which is, namely the person itself, the very suppositum operating and producing—hence the common saying, actions are of supposita. The other is called the principle by which, namely the formal reason that concurs immediately to the action, or the power by means of which the suppositum elicits its action. This, again, is twofold: a radical or remote principle, and a formal or proximate principle, as is seen in illumination or the diffusion of light. For light is the principle by which illumination occurs; but the illuminative power, which in the sun

is substantial, is called the remote principle by which that illumination occurs.

2. It should be noted that it is certain that neither the divine essence, nor the intellect and will, are principles which of the divine Persons. For this reason belongs to the Persons of the Father and the Son: to the Father with respect to the generation of the Son, and to the Father and the Son with respect to the spiration. For what proceeds really from something as from a productive principle which is, is also really distinct from it. But it is clear that the produced divine Persons are not really distinct from the essence, nor from the intellect and will, but only from the producing persons. Therefore only the producing persons have the notion of principle which of the divine Persons. Hence the present difficulty concerns only the principle by which: whether, namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed immediately from the divine nature, or only remotely, that is, by means of intellect and will.

3. It should be noted that since in the Father generating the Son, and in the Father and the Son producing the Holy Spirit, there are absolute and essential perfections, namely the divine essence itself together with attributes, modes, and powers or faculties of intellect and will, and also relative or notional perfections, namely the divine relations and personalities, it follows that concerning the resolution of the present question a threefold opposed opinion seems chiefly to exist among authors.

Durandus, in book 1, distinction 5, question 2, affirms that the divine nature, taken precisely and formally, or as virtually distinct from intellect and will, is not only the radical and remote but also the proximate and immediate principle by which of the divine emanations. St. Thomas Aquinas, in book 1, distinction 11, question 1, article 3, teaches that emanations arise immediately

from the relations themselves; for he says: generation does not go forth from the essence insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is paternity; and if these two, namely essence and paternity, differed in God, generation would go forth from both, but immediately from paternity and from the essence as from a first principle. But since elsewhere he asserts that essence and paternity are virtually distinct, it follows that he maintains that generation arises immediately from paternity as virtually distinct. Nevertheless, the common opinion of Thomists now is that the divine emanations arise immediately not from the essence nor from the relations, but from intellect and will as determined to the person of the Father and the Son through the relations of paternity and filiation. So that this may be evident, let there be the following.

CONCLUSION I
THE DIVINE NATURE, INSOFAR AS IT IS FORMALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM INTELLECT AND WILL, IS NOT THE PROXIMATE AND IMMEDIATE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH OF THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS, BUT INTELLECT AND WILL CLAIM THIS FORMAL NOTION FOR THEMSELVES

This is the more common and truer opinion received among theologians.

It is proved, first, from all those texts of Scripture by which the Son of God is called Word. Thus John 1: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God," and so on. And 1 John 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one." And Revelation 19: "His name is the Word of God." But a word is the terminus produced by intellect and formed by

utterance, which is an operation of intellect. Hence St. Cyril, in book 1 on John, chapter 5: "The Son is called Word and Wisdom, because he is immediately and indivisibly from the intellect." St. Basil agrees in Homily 16 on John: "Word," he says, "so that it may be shown that he proceeds from the mind." St. Athanasius also agrees in the epistle on the opinion of Dionysius of Alexandria against the Arians, saying: "Just as it is impossible that a word should exist before the mind, so it can by no means exist without it; rather, it exists with it and is begotten from it. In the same way the supreme Father, wholly and entirely mind, has his Son as Word, interpreter and messenger of himself." From this St. Athanasius gathers that Dionysius teaches that the Word is proper to the substance of the Father, and for the same reason by which a word is from the substance of the mind. St. John Damascene subscribes, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, book 1, chapter 8: "The Word is the natural motion of the mind, according to which it is moved and understands and thinks, like its light and splendor."

Therefore from these oracles of Scripture and the saints it is clearly established that the Son of God is called Word because he proceeds immediately through the intellect, whose role is to utter a word, as we have proved abundantly above. The same can also be inferred concerning the Holy Spirit, who is called charity and produced love because he arises from the divine will. Thus 1 John 4: "Let us love one another, because charity is from God," which words St. Augustine explains of the Holy Spirit in *De Trinitate*, book 15, chapter 17. Add that many things are attributed to the Holy Spirit, either properly or by appropriation, which cannot proceed from nature, but rather are opposed to natural production. For he is a gift, and nothing is less fitting to a gift than to be natural, since a gift is free while what is natural is

necessary. He is holy, and holiness, as being worthy of praise, is the work not of nature but of freedom; for we are neither praised nor blamed for what is natural, as Aristotle says in the *Ethica Nicomachea*, book 3, chapter 1. Finally, he is love, and love is an offspring of will, not of nature. Therefore he proceeds immediately not from nature but from will.

Durandus replies that the Son of God is indeed called Word and the Holy Spirit love, but not properly: rather metaphorically, by a certain proportion and likeness to created things—namely that, just as intellect is the first property of an intellectual nature and will the second, so the Son is called Word because he proceeds first, while the Holy Spirit is called love because he arises second and presupposes the origin of the Son.

Against this: this reply smells of the error of the Alogians, who, since they denied that the divine Word is a person distinct from the Father, also contended that the name "Word" is only metaphorically appropriated by Scripture to a divine Person. Further, if the Word used so often by St. John in the first chapter could be explained as improper and metaphorical, then with equal audacity and rashness it will be permitted to assert that the names "God" and "Son" are also metaphorical and improper; and likewise that "all things were made through him" does not speak of true creation but of a metaphorical and apparent or merely accommodated one; and finally that "the Word was made flesh" is used of a merely metaphorical incarnation. Since this is absurd and intolerable, and since all the other statements must be taken in their proper sense, the name "Word" must likewise be taken properly. Therefore St. Cyril rightly says in book 7 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 1 near the beginning: "John calls the Son Word, and he seems to have chosen this name as a proper one

and maximally expressive of the Son's being; you see how this name signifies his being Son according to nature."

Finally, it is certain that St. John in that place undertook to explain Christ's divinity against Cerinthians and Ebionites, as all interpreters admit. But who, unless he were alien to the truth, would say that he used improper and metaphorical words to explain the two principal mysteries of faith, namely the distinction of the divine Persons and the incarnation of one of them? Hence Cyril says in the same place: "In vain do we marvel at the Evangelist, as though he had thundered something great and proper, when we call the Son 'Word,' unless he had pronounced something proper, marvelous, and unheard-of."

This response is confirmed, and the conclusion is proved. It is established by faith that there are two processions in God, and only two: the first is of the Son from the Father alone; the later is of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Therefore the former is first and the latter second; for since the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit, he must be produced first in origin. It is also clear that the first procession is generation, while the second is not. But this diversity of processions and persons cannot be derived from elsewhere than from the fact that the Son proceeds through intellect and the Holy Spirit through will. For if it is supposed that the Son does not proceed immediately through intellect and the Holy Spirit through will, no efficacious reason can be given why there are two processions. For if they arose immediately from the divine nature, someone could say that the divine nature would pour out all its powers into one Person, and thus there would be no place for the production of another divine Person. Nor could any reason be given why the production of the Son is from the Father alone, and that of the Holy Spirit from both; nor why the former is prior in origin and

the latter posterior; nor, finally, why the former is generation and the latter spiration. Therefore the reason for all these cannot be given or derived from elsewhere than from the fact that the Son proceeds immediately through intellect and the Holy Spirit through will.

You will object 1: The holy Fathers, some of whom call the eternal Father also "Word." Thus St. Ambrose, in the single book *De Filii Divinitate*, chapter 50: "Whether you say 'light from light,' or 'Word from Word,' or 'Spirit from Spirit,' or 'Lord from Lord,' whatever you say of him, still believe the Father and the Son to be of one essence." Likewise St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, book 5, chapter 11: "The Word of God is the Son; the Word of the Son is the Spirit. For," says the Apostle in Hebrews 1, "upholding all things by the word of his power," and because the Word of the Son is through God, and so on. But from the fact that the Father and the Holy Spirit are called "Word," it is not permitted to infer that they proceed through intellect; therefore neither may one infer from this that the procession of the Son is made immediately through intellect.

I answer that the holy Fathers sometimes extend the name "Word" more broadly to an improper and unusual sense, so as to signify not only the operation of speaking, which is in the Father, but also every action and communication toward creatures that is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, those same Fathers use the name "Word" in its proper signification, to signify the divine Son. For St. Ambrose in the same place says: "He is called Word because he has proceeded from the proper divine mouth, and the Father has commanded or done nothing without him." And St. Basil in the same place, around the middle, also signifies that the name "Word" is proper to the Son, saying: "The Father is the begetter of the Son, as the

mind is the father of the word; the Father is wise, who has begotten wisdom." Therefore nothing can be pressed from those texts against the truth of the conclusion.

You will object 2: The holy Fathers assert that the Son proceeds from the divine nature. Thus St. Augustine in *De Trinitate*, book 15, chapter 20, says that the Word through whom all things were made is the Son of God by nature. Likewise St. John Damascene, in *De Fide Orthodoxa*, book 1, chapter 8, calls the procession of the Son the work of nature. But it could not rightly be called so unless the Word proceeded immediately from nature and not from intellect. Therefore, and so on.

I deny the minor. For that is not the intention of the Fathers praised there. They are disputing against the Arians, who said that the divine Word is a creature, and therefore that his procession arises not from nature but from the divine will. To refute this, the holy Fathers assert that it is the work of nature, that is, necessary and natural, not free and voluntary. Or I distinguish: the procession of the Word proceeds from nature as from a proximate and immediate principle, I deny; as from a remote and radical principle, I grant.

You will object 3: If the Son and the Holy Spirit proceeded immediately from intellect and will, they would proceed chiefly through understanding and willing. But this cannot be said. First, because the productions of the Persons are notional acts and not essential; but understanding and willing are essential acts, not notional. Second, because to whomever belongs the act by which the Person is produced, to that one belongs producing the Person to which the act terminates, just as to whom it belongs to generate also belongs producing the Son; but understanding and willing belong to all the divine Persons. Therefore producing the Son and the Holy Spirit belongs to all of

them. Third, because the productions of the Persons differ really (active generation differs from filiation), but understanding and willing do not differ really. Therefore, and so on.

I answer that this argument of Durandus does not at all bear against us, for we do not affirm that the processions are made through the essential acts of understanding and willing, but through the notional acts of uttering and spirating.

You will object 4: In the same way, with proportion preserved, fecundity belongs to creatures and to God. But productive fecundity in creatures does not belong to them through intellect and will. For purely spiritual creatures do not produce others, as is clear in Angels, although they are endowed with the most excellent power of understanding and willing. And bodily or mixed creatures, such as a human being, composed of body and spirit, do not generate one like themselves through intellect and will but through another faculty. Therefore the productive power of the divine Person does not belong to God by reason of intellect, but proceeds immediately from the fecundity of nature itself.

I answer, first, that the argument can be turned back against Durandus. For if fecundity must belong proportionally to God and creatures, it follows that God also cannot communicate his substance and essence to another Person, because no created spiritual person can communicate his substance to another, not only through understanding and willing, but through no fecundity of nature at all. Therefore, if that proportion must be preserved strictly, the divine nature will have no fecundity of communicating itself, which Durandus nevertheless asserts.

Second, to the minor: that there is no fecundity through intellect in spiritual creatures, I distinguish. Fecundity that is productive of a substantial terminus, I grant; fecundity that is

productive at least of an accidental terminus, I deny. For the production of a created word is a kind of spiritual generation, as we said: for every knowledge is begotten from the object and the power. But a birth signifies generation. The reason why only an accidental word is produced by created intellect is that, as the Doctor says in book 1, distinction 3, question 8, created intellect is productive of intellection only with the species intelligible concurring partially; since that species is an accident, it will be productive only of an accident, because no effect is more perfect than its cause. But the divine intellect concurs in the production of the begotten knowledge together with the divine essence; these two are adequate and substantial; therefore it is not surprising that they are productive of a substance.

From these points gather 1. that the divine essence is not indeed the proximate principle, but at least the remote and radical principle by which of the divine processions. This is clear, first, from the holy Fathers. For St. Cyril, *Thesaurus*, book 1, chapter 7, says that the generative power is the essence of God. And St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, book 1, chapter 8: "Generation is of nature—not as of the one who generates, but as of that by which he generates." St. Anselm agrees in the *Monologion*, chapter 52, where he says of the Holy Spirit: "The Father and the Son send forth so great a good not from their relations, which are many, but from the essence itself, which is one." Hence St. Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chapter 2, calls the Son and the Holy Spirit the gems and sprouts of the fruitful Godhead.

Second, reason also persuades this. For the principle by which and radical of generation is that in which the begotten is assimilated to the generator. But that in which the divine Son agrees with the Father who generates is not relation but the

divine nature. Therefore this is the first and radical principle by which of the generation of the Word, not indeed considered simply and absolutely, but insofar as modified and determined to the first suppositum by the relation of paternity.

From these points gather 2. that the proximate principle by which of the generation of the Word and the production of the Holy Spirit is indeed the intellect and will of God, but insofar as they are modified and determined by the relations of paternity and filiation. This is so, first, because intellect and will are proximate principles in the same way in which the divine essence is a remote principle of the divine processions. But the divine essence, as we said, is such insofar as it is determined by personal relations. For if it were considered absolutely, it would follow that it is formally a principle of generation in the Son and of generation and spiration in the Holy Spirit, since it is formally in them. Therefore, by parity of reason, the divine intellect and will are principles of the divine processions insofar as they too are determined by those same personal relations.

Second, because powers do not have the notion of proximate principle except insofar as they are in supposita; hence actions are of supposita. Therefore the divine intellect and will will not be proximate principles except insofar as they are determined to the Person of the Father and the Son.

Finally, because St. Athanasius says in *Dialogus* 1 on the Trinity: the Father begets by hypostasis; and St. Ambrose, *De Fide*, book 4, chapter 4: "Generation belongs to the Father's property, not to power." And St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, book 1, chapter 5: he is called and is Father by the very fact that he has a Son. Therefore since the Father has a Son only by the generative power determined by paternity, he also begets by a principle by

which only through hypostasis and a personal relation thus determined.

QUESTION II
WHAT OBJECT'S KNOWLEDGE AND LOVE THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS PRESUPPOSE

The present question is commonly proposed in a different way by the Thomists. For since they teach that the divine Word proceeds through intellection, and the Holy Spirit through love, they therefore, and not without reason, ask: from the knowledge and love of what object does each of these divine Persons proceed?

We, however, following in the footsteps of the Subtle Doctor, since we assert that those divine processions do indeed presuppose essential knowledge and essential love, and that they are actions of "speaking" and "spirating" distinct from those essential operations, are led consequently to inquire and resolve this: by the knowledge and love of what object is the divine intellect and the divine will made fecund, so that the former, by the act of speaking, produces the Word, and the latter, by the act of spirating, produces the Holy Spirit?

And thus the present difficulty (whatever some may protest) concerns the adherents of both schools, although its statement is different, and the manner of solving it is diverse.

Note 1. Since the object of divine knowledge and of divine love can be distinguished fourfold—namely: first, the divine essence with all its absolute perfections, that is, its attributes, modes, and faculties of understanding and willing; second, the divine Persons, consisting in their relations, ὑπόστασις, and personalities; third,

possible creatures, abstracting from all futurition and existence; and fourth, finally, all creatures, whether actually existing or to exist at some time—so also, in resolving the present question, the theologians' opinions are chiefly opposed in a fourfold way.

The first affirms that the Word proceeds from the knowledge, and the Holy Spirit from the love, of all those objects, even of future creatures. Thus Ruiz, Disputation 63, section 4 and 5, etc.

Some contend that future creatures must indeed be removed from the number of those objects from whose love and knowledge the divine Persons proceed; yet they want the divine Word to proceed from the cognition of possible creatures, as well as from the cognition of the three divine Persons and of the divine essence. This is the common opinion of the Thomists.

All Scotists, together with the Subtle Doctor, teach that the divine Word presupposes no knowledge of creatures for its production. Vázquez, Disputation 142, holds that it proceeds indeed from the knowledge of the Father and of itself, but not of the Holy Spirit.

There are also those who assert that it proceeds not from the cognition of creatures and of the divine Persons, but from the cognition of the divine essence alone; and the Doctor seems especially to favor this in the passages to be cited below.

All, however, agree that those divine processions either are knowledge and love of the divine essence, or at least presuppose both, and are posterior to them.

Note 2. That "presupposition," or "priority," by which the divine Father is said to know his essence, or the divine Persons, or creatures, before he produces the Son or the Holy Spirit, is not a priority of existence and of the thing itself, but only of sign—not, as they say, a priority of "in which," but of "from which." That

is, it does not imply an order of duration in which one exists while the other does not, since in the adorable Trinity nothing is earlier or later by duration; rather, "all three Persons are co-eternal," as St. Athanasius says in the *Symbolum*. For what is earlier than another by duration cannot be co-eternal with it, since eternity acknowledges nothing earlier or later.

Accordingly, there are only "signs from which," that is, pre-exigencies of one thing for another, either according to the order of nature, or of origin, or of presupposition.

The order of nature is attended, not according to causality—by which a cause is prior to its effect, because in the divine there is no true causality and no true and properly so called effect—but only according to the consequence of subsisting. In this way, Aristotle says in the *Praedicamenta*, in the chapter "On the modes of the prior": one is prior to two, for if there are two, one follows to be; but if one is, it does not necessarily follow that two are. Hence, with one posited, the consequence does not convert so that it would follow that two are.

The order of origin is that by which one is from another, and this in two ways: either by an origin according to something, as attributes are said to emanate from the divine essence; or by a perfect and adequate origin, as a produced person emanates from the producer.

Finally, the order of pre-exigency is that by which one is pre-conceived before another and is presupposed to it.

The order of nature is between essential items, both among themselves and when compared with notional items, because once the notions and the divine attributes are understood, the divine essence must be understood as their root; but once the essence is understood, it is not necessary that those

be conceived. Therefore, between them there is an order of nature according to the consequence of subsisting.

The order of origin is only among the divine Persons, one of whom proceeds from another.

Finally, the order of pre-exigency, or presupposition, is between the Father and the divine essence, because the divine essence is presupposed as the root of paternity, and likewise of all properties in God, whether absolute or relative.

Note 3. Just as, in the same instant of time, there can be various instants of nature—so says the Doctor in Book II, distinction 1, question 1, number 13—for example, an angel, in the first instant of time in which it is created, could produce in itself knowledge and love. These, although they have no order as to temporal duration because they are produced in the same instant, nevertheless have several instants of nature, because by nature the angel is produced before knowledge, and knowledge before love, since the angel is produced by God alone, knowledge by God and the angelic intellect, and love by the will presupposing the angelic intellect and the divine concurrence. For by nature the intellective power must operate before the will.

So too, just as various instants of nature can be distinguished in the same instant of time, so various instants of origin can be distinguished in the same instant of nature; for in that very instant of nature in which the divine intellect and will regard their primary object, namely the divine essence, the whole order of origin is found, since nothing is required for the productions of the Persons besides those powers and the primary object.

Hence, in that same instant of nature, three instants of origin can be distinguished: first, that in which the Father has being from himself—this origin, however, is only according to

something; second, that from which the Son has being from the Father; third, that from which the Holy Spirit has being from the Father and the Son. These latter two origins are real and complete.

Indeed, one instant of nature can be subdivided and distinguished into several more minute instants, as can be gathered from the Doctor in Book II, distinction 1, question 13, where he assigns only two instants of nature: the first, in which God knows and wills himself by essential knowledge and essential willing, and in which by fecund intellect and will within himself there is a twofold procession of Persons and a twofold order of origin, which he asserts is contained in that first instant of nature; the second, in which God, one and triune, knows and wills creatures—so that in the first instant he comprehends all that belongs to God ad intra, and in the second he embraces what belongs to God ad extra.

Hence that first instant of nature can be divided into seven more minute instants, so that the first instant of nature in the divine is that in which the essence is understood to be under the account of this essence; the second, in which it is understood to have its intrinsic modes; the third, in which it is understood to have its first attributes; the fourth, in which those attributes are understood to have their first intrinsic modes; the fifth, in which it is understood to have its other attributes founded in the first attributes; the sixth, in which these attributes are understood to have their proper intrinsic modes; the seventh, in which the processions of the Persons are understood—after which follows an eighth, in which creatures are understood in possible being, etc.

With these preliminaries in place, two things must be resolved: first, that the divine processions presuppose knowledge

and love not only of the divine nature, but also of the divine Persons; second, that they in no way presuppose knowledge and love of creatures, whether future or possible.

CONCLUSION I
THE GENERATION OF THE WORD AND THE SPIRATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT DO NOT PRESUPPOSE LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE OF CREATURES, WHETHER FUTURE OR POSSIBLE, NOR DO THEY ARISE FROM THEM AS FROM OBJECTS MAKING THE DIVINE INTELLECT AND WILL FECUND

This conclusion, as to each part, is the Doctor's in Book I, distinction 18, the single question, numbers 4 and 5; and in Book II, already cited; and also in *Quodlibetum* 14.

It is proved, first, from the Doctor in Book II, distinction 1, question 1, number 9: the divine intellect and the divine will are terminated to the divine essence before they are terminated to creatures under possible being or future being; but in that prior instant, each of those divine powers is fecund for the production of the Word and the Holy Spirit; therefore the Word and the Holy Spirit proceed from the intellect and will terminated to the divine essence before they extend themselves to the knowledge and love of creatures.

The major is clear, for the divine essence is the primary and adequate object of the divine intellect and of the divine will. Moreover, it is what moves each divine faculty to the knowledge and love of creatures; creatures, however, are only a secondary object. But intellect and will are terminated first to the primary object rather than to the secondary—especially when the

primary, per se and necessarily, moves to the knowledge and love of the secondary. Therefore, and so forth.

The minor is also evident. For intellect and will are made fecund by a perfectly adequate object. But the divine essence is a perfectly adequate object to the divine intellect and to the divine will, since it is altogether infinite under the account of object, just as those faculties are infinite under the account of productive power. Therefore, those powers are made wholly fecund by their termination to the divine essence, and there is no need that they be terminated to secondary objects.

This is confirmed: there is no need that a faculty be terminated to a secondary object in order to draw from it its complete fecundity, when every perfection to be found in the secondary object is found in a more excellent way in the primary. But every account of being and perfection is found in a more excellent way in the divine essence than in creatures, whether possible or future. Therefore, for the divine intellect and will to become fecund for the production of the Word and the Holy Spirit, it is not necessary that they be terminated to creatures; it suffices that they be terminated to the divine essence as to the primary object.

It is proved, second, in the same place, number 8: the divine Persons are produced before creatures have possible being or future being; therefore the productions of the divine Persons cannot presuppose knowledge and love of creatures. The consequence is evident, for if, in that prior instant, creatures have no being, then they can in no way be known or loved.

The antecedent is proved: the divine Persons are produced first if their productive principle is first. But the productive principle of the divine Persons is truly prior to the productive principle of creatures, especially in being under the

account of futurition. The Doctor proves this as follows: the principle of a necessary production is prior to the principle of a contingent production. But the productive principle of the Persons is necessary; the productive principle of creatures is contingent. Therefore the latter must presuppose the former.

He proves the major: every production that goes out from a suppositum presupposes the suppositum from which it goes out. But the production of creatures goes out from the three divine Persons. Therefore it must presuppose them, and thus must presuppose their necessary productions and consequently their necessary productive principles.

It is proved, third, from *Quodlibetum* 14: the motion of the divine essence to an infinite terminus is prior to the motion to a finite terminus. But the procession of the Word and the Holy Spirit has an infinite terminus. Yet the being of creatures in known being is a finite terminus. Therefore the productions of the Persons are presupposed before the being of possible creatures.

The major is proved, since what is infinite simply cannot pre-exige what is finite; rather, the finite pre-exiges the infinite. Therefore cognition of creatures does not precede the production of the Persons.

This is confirmed: if the prior is removed, the posterior is removed, and not conversely. Therefore, if finite being—namely the being of possible creatures—is removed, the production of the Word is not removed. Therefore, the production of the Word is prior to the finite being of creatures.

A further confirmation: that does not concur, per se, in the production of the Word and the Holy Spirit, the removal of which would still leave those divine Persons subsisting no less. But if there were no knowledge and love of creatures, whether

future or possible, those divine Persons would nonetheless be produced and subsist no less. Therefore their production does not presuppose the love and knowledge of creatures.

The major is clear. The minor is proved, first, from St. Anselm in the *Monologion*, chapter 30, where he says: whether God is thought to exist with no other essence existing, or with others existing, it is necessary that his Word be co-eternal with him; and in chapter 31: if nothing else ever existed except that supreme Spirit, reason nevertheless compels that the Word by which he speaks himself exist of necessity. By these he plainly teaches that even if no creatures existed, whether possible or future, the divine Word would nonetheless subsist wholly unchanged. But if no creatures were possible or future, there would likewise be no knowledge of them in God. Therefore, with the cognition of creatures removed, the divine Word would subsist wholly unchanged; and the same must be said of the Holy Spirit.

Second, it seems ridiculous and absurd to assert that God exists and the divine Word proceeds because, for example, a fly or an ant is possible. Therefore it is also ridiculous to say that if this or that creature, which is possible, were to become impossible, the divine Word would not remain intrinsically unchanged.

Third, what is more necessary cannot depend on what is less necessary. But the necessity of the procession of the Word is greater than the necessity of the possibility of creatures, since it is the necessity of being from itself, whereas that necessity is the necessity of being dependent on another. Therefore, the Word cannot depend, in its production, on the possibility of creatures, and thus cannot proceed from the cognition of them.

The Thomists reply that even if the Word proceeds per se from the cognition of possible creatures, it does not follow that it

depends on them or needs them, but only that it is necessarily connected with them.

Against this: by the very fact that the Word is thus necessarily connected with the possibility of creatures so that without it it could not subsist, it depends on creatures. For those depend mutually on one another which mutually imply and remove one another. But if a necessary connection between the production of the divine Word and the possibility of creatures is admitted, they would mutually imply and remove one another. Therefore, if the divine Word cannot proceed and subsist without creatures, it follows that it depends on them.

This is confirmed especially concerning future creatures: the divine Word is simply necessary; therefore its procession is simply necessary, and thus it arises from the divine intellect made fecund by a supremely necessary object. But future creatures are not necessary; indeed, they are wholly contingent, because God can, at will, decree or not decree their futurition. Therefore they cannot be presupposed as a required object exerting influence on the generation of the Word.

Moreover, if the divine Word presupposed the cognition of future creatures, it would follow that free knowledge is in God before the Word is produced; but this is absurd. For if free knowledge were in God before the production of the Word, then free decrees would precede that production by a priority of nature, since free knowledge presupposes a decree. Thus if free knowledge is prior, a decree is also prior.

But decrees are not in God before the Word is generated: first, because in God what is natural is prior to what is free; therefore the generation of the Word, which is natural, is prior to free decrees. Second, because if decrees were in God before generation and spiration, they would necessarily be

communicated—as the Word is—in the very generation. But this implies an absurdity, because then the decree would not be free with respect to the Word to which it is communicated; for that act is not free to the Word, since the Word does not freely determine itself to it. But if it receives the decree from the Father in its generation, it does not determine itself to it; and thus with respect to it the decree would not be free.

Finally, because the works of God that concern creatures are indivisible works of the Trinity. But those decrees about the futurition of creatures are works of God concerning creatures. Therefore they belong indivisibly to the adorable Trinity, and so they presuppose it; consequently, the Persons to be produced do not presuppose that futurition of creatures, nor therefore are creatures objects by which the divine intellect and will are made fecund in producing the Word and the Holy Spirit.

Objection 1. The divine Word is expressive of all those things that are represented in God's knowledge; therefore it presupposes the cognition of them. But all creatures are represented in God's essence; therefore, and so forth.

The major is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 14: for, he says, he would not have spoken himself wholly and perfectly if there were something less or more in his Word than in himself; for whatever is in that knowledge from which it is begotten is in it, and what is not in that knowledge is not in it. Therefore God the Father knows all things in himself; he knows them in the Son; but in himself as in himself, and in the Son as in his Word, which is about all things that are in himself.

And Zeno of Verona, Sermon 1, *De Aeterni Verbi Generatione*: he is born whole from the whole, perfect from the

perfect, having all that belongs to the Father, taking nothing away from the Father.

The minor is also established from St. Augustine, who teaches in many places that creatures are represented and are in the divine essence as in an ocean of being. Thus, in *De Trinitate*, chapter 10, he calls the Word perfect, lacking nothing, and as it were an art of the omnipotent, full of all the living and changeable reasons; and all are one in it, as it itself is one from one, with whom it is one; there God knows all that he has made through it.

I distinguish the major: for that instant in which they are representable, I concede; before it, I deny. Therefore, because creatures are not representable in the same instant in which the Word is produced—since in that prior instant of origin, in which the Word is produced, they are not yet conceived as possible or future, but only in a later instant—therefore in that prior instant the Word is not said to represent or express creatures.

I likewise distinguish the minor: that creatures are represented in the divine essence in that prior instant of origin in which the Word is produced, I deny; in the later instant, I concede. Or otherwise: that creatures are in God's essence according to their virtual being, insofar as the divine essence is the fountain and ocean of every entity, both uncreated and created, I concede; but according to their formal and proper being, I deny. Hence, even though creatures are presupposed for the production of the Word according to that virtual being, they still cannot be said to concur for that production under the account of object, because that virtual being is nothing other than the divine essence itself.

You will press: the divine Word is infinite under the account of Word; therefore it is also infinitely representative and

expressive, and consequently it must express and represent every representable thing for whatever instant in which the Word exists. But in that prior instant of origin the Word is produced under the formal account of Word; therefore it must represent whatever is representable, and consequently, since creatures are representable, it must express them, and thus must presuppose their cognition for that instant of its generation.

I distinguish the consequence: it must represent everything that is representable for that prior instant in which it exists as Word, I concede; it must represent what is not yet representable for that instant, I deny. Therefore, since creatures are not possible or future for every instant in which the Word is formally Word, but only in an instant following the divine processions, it therefore need not represent them for that prior instant, but only for the consequent instant.

You will urge: the Word, by the formal account of Word, cannot represent except what it proceeds from. Therefore either the divine Word in no way represents creatures for any later instant, or else it proceeds from them. But to assert that the divine Word does not represent creatures is openly contrary to St. Augustine's teaching cited above. Therefore, and so forth.

I distinguish the antecedent: a created word, because of its limitation, cannot express except what it proceeds from, because all the things of which it is the word concur in its formation; I concede. But that the divine Word cannot represent except what it proceeds from, I deny. For since it has an infinite power of representing, it can express whatever is representable for that instant in which it is representable.

Hence it is fittingly called the "Mirror," Wisdom 7. For we know that mirrors can represent even things that are not—though not when they are not, but later when they are. So the

Word expresses and represents creatures according to their virtual being in the prior instant of origin; but in a later instant it represents them according to their formal being, namely after the order of the divine processions is completed.

Objection 2. The divine Word proceeds from comprehensive knowledge of the divine essence and omnipotence, and consequently from the cognition of all things without which omnipotence cannot be comprehended. But omnipotence cannot be comprehended unless creatures are known at least under the account of possible; therefore the Word presupposes their cognition.

The major is clear. The minor is proved: a causal power cannot be comprehended unless all effects able to arise from such a cause and contained virtually in it are known. But omnipotence is God's operative power in which all possible creatures are contained. Therefore, if they are not known, it cannot be comprehended.

I distinguish the major: that it proceeds from comprehensive knowledge, that is, knowledge that is intensively infinite and adequate to the infinite object that per se moves and makes the divine intellect fecund for producing the Word, I concede. That this means it must, in that prior instant of origin in which the Word is produced, be terminated to all secondary objects that have being only in a later instant after the order of the divine processions is completed, I deny.

For it suffices for the perfect account of the Word that it proceeds from an infinitely perfect object which virtually contains in its omnipotence, as in a root, all secondary objects; it is not required that it proceed from those secondary objects as formally and actually known.

As to the minor, I say that to comprehend some power it is not necessary that all effects and all objects to which it can extend be formally and actually known; it suffices that they be known virtually and habitually, or that the power's all-encompassing force be known according to all degrees of activity, if it has such degrees. But it is certain that in that prior instant of origin in which the divine Father produces the Son, he also knows his omnipotence to be of infinite power and activity, and thus he comprehends it.

Objection 3. Either the eternal Father, in the instant of the Son's generation, knows creatures or he does not. If he knows them: then since in that instant the Son proceeds, creatures are presented to the divine intellect, and thus the Son proceeds from them. If he does not know them: then he acquires something in generation that in the prior instant he did not know.

I reply: it can be said that in that prior instant of the Son's generation the Father is indeed not yet conceived as knowing creatures, nor are they presented to his intellect, but only when the divine processions are wholly completed. Nor does an absurdity follow from this, any more than from the fact that in that prior instant of generation he is not yet conceived to produce the Holy Spirit, who is produced only in a later sign of origin.

You will press: whatever the Word has, it receives from the Father through eternal generation, according to Matthew 11, "All things have been handed over to me by my Father," and John 17, "All that is mine is yours, and all that is yours is mine," and "My teaching is not mine but his who sent me, the Father." But the Word has cognition of creatures. Therefore it received it from the Father through eternal generation and by the force of its procession. Therefore, in the instant of the Son's generation,

creatures are perceived by the divine intellect, and consequently the Son proceeds from the cognition of all those things.

I distinguish the major: whatever the divine Word has, it receives from the Father either formally and by the force of its procession, or concomitantly and identically, by reason of the divine nature communicated to it with all its attributes and infinitely operative powers. In the latter sense, I concede; in the former, I deny. Likewise, I distinguish the minor: that the divine Word has cognition of creatures by the force and formal account of its generation, as though the eternal Father knew creatures in that very instant of generation, I deny; that it has it concomitantly and identically, insofar as in its generation it received the divine nature and the divine intellect infinitely cognitive, and thus able to extend itself to every knowable thing for that instant in which it will be knowable, I concede.

Add that even if we conceded that the divine Father knows creatures in that prior sign in which he generates the Word, it would still not follow in our position that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of creatures, since it has been proved above that the Word's procession is not intellection but "speaking."

Hence, even if creatures were objects of the divine intellect in that prior sign in which the Word is generated, they would not thereby contribute to the production of the Word. For not every object makes the divine intellect fecund so that it is productive of the Word; only the moving and adequate object does so. But creatures are not such with respect to the divine intellect; only the divine nature is. Therefore these preceding and similar objections do not directly strike at our assertion.

CONCLUSION II
THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS NOT ONLY PRESUPPOSE KNOWLEDGE AND WILLING OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND OF ALL ATTRIBUTAL PERFECTIONS, BUT ALSO OF THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor as to each part.

Concerning the first part there is no difficulty, since all theologians of both schools—the Angelic and the Subtle—agree that the divine essence, with all its absolute perfections, and thus with intellect and will, and with most perfect knowledge and willing terminated to the essence itself and its perfections, is prior to the processions and relations, and thus is known and loved before the Word and the Holy Spirit are produced.

But that the Doctor judges that even the divine Persons are likewise known and loved in that prior sign, I gather from various statements of his.

First, in Book I, distinction 6, the single question, number 5, he says: the Father in this way generates the Son while willing, because the Father in the first sign of origin understands formally, and then he can also have an act of willing formally. In the second sign of origin he generates the Son; and he not only wills that generation by a volition following that generation, but by a volition had in the first sign of origin, by which volition the Father formally wills, presupposing some intellection by which the Father understands, but not presupposing the generation of the Word.

Thus he says that the Father generates while willing, not only by a will consequent, but by a will antecedent—as though he

were saying that the Father generates the Son by a volition that precedes and is terminated even to generation itself before the Son is, by some priority of reason or origin. This is how Faber, Smising (Disputation 3, number 284), and Rada explain and defend him in Controversy 2, around the fourth conclusion, where he says it is more conformable to Scotus to assert that the Father's cognition and the will's simple complacency toward the Son precede the Son's generation in the Father. And the same reason, proportionately, applies to the procession of the Holy Spirit, so that in the Father and the Son cognition, and simple willing and love of the Holy Spirit, precede his procession.

Second, the Doctor in Book I, distinction 1, question 2, number 5, asserts that the divine Father is blessed before he generates the Son, by origin, because he has no intrinsic perfection from a produced person. But blessedness is an intrinsic perfection of the blessed person; and this blessedness comes through the vision of the essence either absolutely, or insofar as it is essence, or, he says, precisely as it is in one person. Therefore he thinks that the divine essence can be seen as it is in the person of the Father before the Son is generated by origin. But it cannot be thus seen unless the Son is also seen. For the essence cannot be seen intuitively as it is in the Father without paternity being seen, which constitutes the Father; nor can paternity be seen without filiation being seen, because correlatives are simultaneous by nature and by cognition. Therefore, in the Doctor's mind, vision and love of the Son and of the Holy Spirit precede, in the instant of origin, their production.

Third, the Doctor confesses in many places—especially in Book II, distinction 1, question 1, number 14—that the divine Persons proceed from intellect and will made fecund by the primary divine object. But there, number 3, he teaches that not

only the essence and attributes but also the divine Persons are included under the primary object. For there he distinguishes two instants of nature: in the first are contained divine productions and operations ad intra; in the second are the operations of the divine intellect and will concerning creatures as secondary objects, which, he says, "are not objects from themselves, but are produced through intellect and will in the being of object." Therefore he thinks that the divine processions presuppose knowledge and love not only of the divine essence but also of the divine Persons.

Nor does it matter that in Book I, distinction 10, the single question, number 14, he says that the Holy Spirit, antecedently to his production, is not known: "It is necessary," he says, "that the divine essence, whose love is spirated, be pre-known to the Father and the Son in order that they may spirate; but it is not necessary in that instant of origin to concede that the Holy Spirit, who is the love spirated, is pre-known to the Father and the Son." For he did not say this resolutely and assertively, but rather doubtfully and problematically. Thus he adds: "Otherwise it could be said that in that prior sign of origin, before the Holy Spirit is understood to be spirated, the Father and the Son know the Holy Spirit intuitively, though not as existing in himself, because they know the divine essence, which is the reason for knowing intuitively whatever intelligible object there is." That is: the Holy Spirit can be known by the Father and the Son before he is conceived as produced, namely in the divine essence itself, in which God knows intuitively even created things before they exist.

From these things, therefore, it is clear that the Subtle Doctor, in resolving this question, is either altogether problematic or inclines to our position; and thus it can be seen

how much certain more recent theologians wander who ascribe to the Doctor the opposite opinion, as though he had taught and defended it assertively.

The conclusion is further proved.

The divine Father knows and loves himself before he generates the Son; therefore he also knows and loves the Son before he generates him.

The antecedent is clear because in that prior sign of origin the divine Father is adequately constituted in his personality. Therefore, under that account, he was knowable and lovable in that prior sign; for anything, in the way it is, is also knowable and lovable. Therefore, under that account, he actually knows and loves himself for that sign. For infinite knowledge and love, such as the divine, cannot fail to attain every knowable and lovable thing according to the manner of its knowability and lovability.

The consequence is proved: by the same act by which the Father knows and loves himself under the account of Father, he also knows and loves the Son under the account of Son. For since the whole being of the Father, insofar as he is Father, is relative, and since no one can know or will a relative as such unless by the same act he knows and wills the correlative at least obliquely, it follows that the divine Father, in that prior sign of origin in which he knows and loves himself, also knows and loves the Son.

The same reason holds for the Holy Spirit. For if there were any reason why the Holy Spirit could not be known and loved for that sign, it would be chiefly because in that prior sign the Holy Spirit is not yet understood to be; and nothing is intelligible and lovable unless it has being. But in the same way, neither is the Son, for the first sign, understood to be, and yet for that sign he must be known and loved by the Father, because the

Father, insofar as he is Father, cannot be understood without the Son. Therefore, and so forth.

Again, the Word presupposes comprehensive cognition of the divine essence. But the divine essence cannot be comprehended unless the divine Persons are also known in it. Therefore, and so forth.

The major is clear. The minor is proved: the divine essence cannot be comprehended unless whatever is intrinsic to it and wholly identified with it is also known. But the divine Persons are identified with the essence. Therefore it cannot be known without the Persons.

Finally, the divine essence cannot be comprehended unless it is also known as fecund and communicable to three Persons. But it cannot be known as such unless those divine Persons are known. Therefore, and so forth.

The major is clear: for "to be communicable to three Persons" is an absolute predicate of that divine essence. Therefore it implies that God's essence is comprehended as communicable to three Persons.

The minor is also clear: for the essence, as communicable to three Persons, is essentially connected with them and really identified with them; but it is impossible to know comprehensively what is essentially connected with and identified with another without knowing the terminus of that essential connection—just as neither a relation without its terminus, nor knowledge without its object, can be comprehended. Therefore, and so forth.

I reply, first, it will be said: in that sign the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot be known and loved, in which they are not knowable or lovable; but in that prior sign they are neither knowable nor lovable. This is proved: either they are knowable

abstractively or intuitively; but neither can be said. Not abstractively, because such knowledge would be imperfect and not commensurate to the object, which cannot be abstracted from existence since it is a necessary being; and because the divine Persons are pure act, whereas such objective abstraction would be a kind of potentiality repugnant to pure act. Nor intuitively, because intuitive cognition terminates in a thing existing or future; but the divine Persons, in that prior sign, are not conceived as existing, nor can they be called future in later signs, since futurition is repugnant to pure act and to a supremely necessary being, such as the divine Persons. Therefore their cognition is not presupposed for the divine processions.

I deny the minor and its proof. For produced Persons can be known in the same instant in which the producing Persons are known. Something can be prior to another in origin and yet be simultaneous with it in cognition, because priority of origin is not a priority of "in which" but only of "from which," whereas simultaneity of cognition belongs to the instant "in which." Therefore, although the Son and the Holy Spirit are posterior to the Father by origin, nevertheless because they are simultaneous with him in duration, nature, and consequence of subsisting, they are in the same instant "in which" knowable together with the Father. Thus they are known not as future, nor as abstracting from being, but as present and as a necessary being, as the Father himself is.

You will insist: intuitive cognition presupposes its object as existing. But in that prior sign, in which the divine intellection terminates to the essence, the Word is not presupposed as existing because it is not yet presupposed as produced. Therefore, in that prior sign, knowledge cannot terminate intuitively, and

consequently the Word can be known neither abstractively nor intuitively; thus it is in no way knowable in that sign.

I distinguish the major: it presupposes its object as existing in a real instant of nature or of duration, I concede; in an instant of origin and emanation, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: in that prior sign of origin the Son is not conceived as produced, I concede; that in reality there is an instant in which the Son is not, I deny. For priority of origin says only that the Son is from the Father; it does not say that the Father exists in some instant in which the Son does not, since in the adorable Trinity nothing is earlier or later.

You will urge further: if the Word presupposes cognition of itself and of the Holy Spirit, it follows that it proceeds from itself and from the Holy Spirit, and that it is posterior to itself and to the Holy Spirit. But each is absurd. Therefore, and so forth.

I deny the consequence. For, as has been said, that priority of origin does not infer an anteriority of one with respect to another in existence, but only with respect to the termination of cognition, so that the simple operation of the divine intellect and will is first terminated to the essence and the divine Persons, and only then are "speaking" and "spirating" conceived as terminating in the Word and the Holy Spirit as productions. Therefore it does not follow that produced Persons are prior or posterior to themselves; it follows only that they can be conceived and known before they are produced—not by a priority of duration, but of concept.

I reply, second, it will be said: if the production of the Word presupposed cognition of the Holy Spirit, the Word would be his image. But this cannot be said, since he is the image of the Father alone, as will be said below. The consequence is clear: for

the Word is an image and expression of that cognition which its production follows.

I deny the consequence, and I deny the proof. For the Son is an image only of the one from whom he is produced, because as such he claims a twofold respect of image: the respect of what is principled to the principle by which it is produced, and the respect of likeness, that is, of what represents to what is represented. Hence, since the Holy Spirit is not the productive principle of the Word, but only the terminus of that divine cognition which the production of the Word presupposes, the Word cannot be called the image of the Holy Spirit. This is also because the Holy Spirit is not the moving object for that prior cognition, but only the divine essence, which the divine Father has from himself and not from the Holy Spirit; and because the Word does not have to the Holy Spirit the respect of the principled to the principle. Therefore, and so forth.

QUESTION III
WHO AND WHAT SORT THE TERMINI OF THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS ARE

Note 1. Since the divine processions are truly productive actions, they necessarily require a terminus, just as—proportionately—do all productive actions of creatures. In created things a twofold terminus of a productive action is distinguished, namely the terminus "from which" and the terminus "to which"; for a productive action is like a tendency from one thing to another.

The terminus "from which" is again twofold: properly and improperly so called. The former, from Aristotle, Book I of the *Physica*, chapter 5 and following, is nothing other than the

privation of that form which is acquired through a new production or change; hence, once the form is produced, the terminus "from which," that is, the privation of that form, ceases. The latter can be called that from which something arises and is produced; thus the divine nature can be called the terminus "from which" of the Son's generation, because it is the principle of the Son's productive action.

Similarly, the terminus "to which" is distinguished twofold: formal and total. The former is that by reason of which the action is referred to the total terminus; the latter is the produced Person itself according to its whole being, both essential and personal.

Note 2. In the divine there is no terminus "from which" properly so called, since the terminus "from which" is the privation of that form or thing that is produced, which ceases in the same instant in which the form is produced. But in the divine there is no privation of produced Persons, nor is there anything that is extinguished and ceases to be in God through the production of the divine Persons, as privation is extinguished in that very instant in which the produced form begins to be.

But the difficulty concerns the terminus "from which" according to something, and improperly so called: namely, whether it should be admitted in the divine, and whether it can be said that the divine Persons emanate from the substance of the producer.

Note 3. Although all Catholic doctors agree that the Son arises from the substance of the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the substance of the Father and the Son, they do not agree about the manner in which the produced Person is "from" the substance or essence of the person from whom he proceeds.

For Durandus in Book I, distinction 5, question 2, and Henry in the same place, judge that the Son is said to be from the substance of the Father because the essence of the Father constitutes the Son as matter, though with the imperfections of matter excluded—namely, that matter is pure potency, which does not become act except through some form coming to it; that it is transmuted from privation to form; and that by acquiring one form it loses another, etc.

But Durandus assigns three perfections of matter suitable to the divine essence: that matter pre-exists in producing and exists in the produced; that with form it constitutes the whole; that it receives the form in itself and is the subject of generation. Hence Durandus concludes that the divine essence has as it were the account of matter with respect to the Son and the Holy Spirit. For the divine essence, by a certain order of nature, pre-exists the Person proceeding in the divine and exists in the produced; with the relative property, which is the form of the person, it constitutes the whole person producing; and it receives that same relation into itself and is as it were the subject of divine generation. Hence it follows that it is of the essence of the producing person as matter.

Against this opinion, however, almost all other Catholic doctors protest, asserting that the divine essence is neither matter nor quasi-matter of the divine processions, but only a subsisting formal principle, insofar as the essence of the Father, communicated to the Son through generation, subsists in him.

With these preliminaries, three things must be resolved in the present question: first, whether the proceeding Person is truly "from" the substance of the one from whom he proceeds; second, whether the divine essence is the terminus "from which" of the processions by way of matter or of form; third, whether the

terminus "to which" of the divine processions is the essence, or the relation, or both.

CONCLUSION I
IN TRUTH THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS ARE "FROM" SOMETHING, NAMELY FROM THE DIVINE ESSENCE

This is the position of almost all theologians.

It is proved first by the authority of councils. For the Councils of Toledo—third, fourth, and especially the eleventh—in the Confession of faith speak thus: the Son must be believed to have been begotten not from nothing nor from another substance, but from the womb of the Father, that is, begotten from the substance. Here it echoes Psalm 109:3: "From the womb, before the morning star, I have begotten you." The Second Council of Seville also uses this testimony, canon 13.

The Council of Nicaea in the Confession of faith, and the Council of Ephesus in the letter to Nestorius: "We believe," it says, "in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, born from the Father, that is, from the substance of the Father, God from God."

Finally, the same is found in the Council of Florence, session 19, saying: "All the Doctors handed down this teaching to us, expounding these phrases: the Son is from the substance of the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the substance of the Father and the Son."

This is also clear from the creeds, in which the Son is said to be God from God, light from light, etc.; and especially in the creed of St. Athanasius, where we read: "God is from the substance of the Father, begotten before the ages."

All the holy Fathers prove the same, and especially St. Augustine in Book III *Contra Maximinum*, chapter 14: "Either

the Son of God was born from some substance, or from none. If from none, then from nothing—which we now hold you Arians cannot say. If from some substance, and yet not from the Father's, he is not a true Son. If from the Father's, the Father and the Son are of one and the same substance."

And in chapter 15 he extends the same proof proportionately to the Holy Spirit, saying: "The Holy Spirit is not from nothing, but is from that from which he proceeds."

The same truth is proved by the same St. Augustine—or rather another author—in the book *Contra Felicianum*, chapter 6: "Those who search out the nativity and origin of the Son of God encounter these—unless I am mistaken: namely, that he is either from the Father, or from nothing; or from another, or from himself. Let us consider the consequence of these. If from himself, he is not rightly called Son, who is declared not born but unbegotten. If from nothing, he is shown to be a creature with the others, not the author of creatures. If from another, he is declared not the Son of the one in whom we believe, but the Son of some unknown and unrecognized father. But if because of these four a fifth cannot be found; and if of these, because of evident blasphemy, three cannot be asserted at all; it remains that he was begotten substantially from the Father."

The conclusion is further proved: the divine Son is not produced from nothing, otherwise he would be created and a creature; therefore he is from something pre-existing. But nothing else pre-exists except the Father himself. Therefore he must arise from the Father's substance.

Second, every son has something of his father in himself. For a son is not what is produced from external matter; otherwise keys and tunics and the other artifacts would be sons of smiths, cobblers, and craftsmen. Therefore the divine Son too must have

something of the Father in himself. But he does not have paternity. Therefore he has the essence from which he arises.

Finally, if he were not from the substance of the Father, he could not be called consubstantial with him. But that consequence is absurd and against the faith. Therefore, and so forth.

It will be said, first: the divine essence and substance is most simple and indivisibly common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Therefore if the Son arises from the divine essence, by the same reasoning he is said to be from his own substance and from the substance of the Holy Spirit. But this consequence is absurd. Therefore, and so forth.

I deny the consequence. For when the Son is said to be from the Father's substance, nothing else is signified than that the same essence and substance which is in the Father in the first sign of origin is communicated to the Son in the second sign of origin. But in that prior sign of origin the Son is not rightly said to have the essence that is communicated to him in the second sign; nor does he communicate substance to himself. Therefore he must not be said to be from his own substance, but from the Father's substance.

It will be said, second: if the divine Father generated the Son from his substance, then the Word could be called "Son of the Father's substance." But this is absurd, since "Son" is said only with respect to the correlative, namely the Father. But the divine essence does not have the account of Father, nor of a correlative to the Son; therefore the Son cannot be said to be begotten from it.

I deny the consequence. Although St. Augustine in Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 19, expounding Colossians 1:13—"Who delivered us from the power of darkness and transferred us

into the kingdom of the Son of his charity"—says that the Son of charity is "the Son of the Father's substance," that is, the Son who is begotten from his substance, nevertheless this way of speaking is improper. For "Son" is not properly said by respect to the principle by which he is produced, but by respect to the principle which is the producer. Hence the Word should not properly be called "Son of the Father's substance," but rather "Son from the Father's substance," as St. Augustine himself explains there, and also in chapter 12 or 13: "Such is what I say," he says, "from the Father's knowledge, or from the Father's essence, as if I had said more explicitly from the Father by knowledge, or from the Father by essence."

CONCLUSION II
THE PROCEEDING PERSONS ARE FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF THOSE WHO PRODUCE THEM NOT BY WAY OF MATTER BUT BY WAY OF FORM

It is proved first from the authority of the holy Fathers, who with the greatest agreement affirm that material causality must be removed from the divine processions. Thus St. Hilary, Book XII of *De Trinitate*: "Here, therefore, the unbegotten before all time begot the Son from himself—not from any underlying matter, since through the Son are all things; nor from nothing, since from himself is the Son."

Similarly St. Augustine, Book III *Contra Maximinum*, chapter 14: "You, however, neither want the Son to be begotten from the substance of the Father, and yet you concede that he is neither from nothing nor from some matter, but from the Father, and you do not see how necessary it is that he who is not from

nothing, nor from some thing, but from God, cannot be except from God's substance."

Hence the Doctor rightly gathers in Book I, distinction 5, question 2, number 11, that all ancient Doctors, from the time of Augustine up to Henry, did not dare in the divine to name matter, nor quasi-matter, although all say with Augustine that the Son is generated from the Father's substance.

The Doctor proves this conclusion in the same place, number 5.

First, because the divine essence is the formal terminus of the generative production of the Son; therefore it is not quasi-matter of it. The consequence is clear: what is matter or quasi-matter in generation is in potency or quasi-potency with respect to the formal terminus; but the same thing cannot be in potency to itself. Therefore the same cannot be both the formal terminus and quasi-matter of generation. Therefore if the divine essence is the formal terminus of divine generation, it is not its quasi-matter.

He proves the antecedent first by authority: in John 10 the Son says, "My Father, what he has given me, is greater than all." But what is greater than all is nothing but something infinite, and thus it is the divine essence, which the Father gave to the Son. And St. Augustine, Book XV of *De Trinitate*, chapter 26: "Just as generation from the Father bestows essence on the Son without any beginning of time, without any mutability of nature, so procession from both bestows essence on the Holy Spirit without any beginning of time, without any mutability of nature."

Second, the formal terminus is what is more perfect in generation. But the essence is more perfect in produced Persons, since relations do not signify perfection. Therefore it is also the formal terminus.

He adds that in created things nature is the formal terminus of generation, not the individual property. Therefore the same must be said in the divine.

Finally, generation in the divine would not be univocal if the divine essence were not the formal terminus, because for a univocal generation it is required that the generator and the generated agree in the formal terminus. But the produced Persons would not agree with the producing Persons unless the divine essence were the formal terminus. Therefore, and so forth.

Second, because if the Son were generated from the essence as quasi-matter, either that essence, so taken, would be something absolute and common to the three Persons, or it would be taken as it is in the first suppositum. If the first: then the Son proceeds from himself, because he proceeds from an essence common to the three Persons. If the second: then the essence as it is in the Father would be the Son, because as it is in the Father it would receive the relation of filiation as the form constituting the Son.

Third, because the Holy Spirit is from the essence no less than the Son; and yet, in Henry's view, he is not from the essence as from matter, otherwise his production would be natural. Therefore neither should the Son be from it as from matter.

Although, however, this more common way of speaking among Doctors is more fitted to Catholic truth, Henry's opinion is not altogether to be rejected—if the sense is this: just as matter is presupposed both to the thing made from it and is found and subsists with that thing, which is the determining and constituting form, so the divine essence of the Father is presupposed in the prior sign of origin to the Son, who is said to be generated from it; and it is intrinsically included in the Son

together with the relation of filiation, which is as it were the constituting form of the Son.

Hence this question is almost entirely about a name. For it is certain that in the divine there is properly neither form nor matter; each is attributed to God only by metaphor and a certain proportion which the divine essence can have with form and matter in creatures. Nevertheless the name "matter" is less fitting to God than "form," since as God is a spiritual substance and pure act, each of these militates directly against the word "matter," though not in the same way against the name "form."

CONCLUSION III
THE TOTAL TERMINUS "TO WHICH" OF THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS IS THE WHOLE PRODUCED PERSON, BUT THE FORMAL TERMINUS IS THE DIVINE NATURE ITSELF COMMUNICATED TO THE PRODUCED PERSONS BY THE PRODUCERS

This conclusion has two parts.

The first part is proved first by the holy Fathers, who pronounce that the Son of God is wholly originated and produced wholly from the whole. Thus Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 50, calls the Son "perfect from perfect, whole from whole, full from full"; and below: "In the Father, the whole that is in him, he generated wholly as Son." St. Ambrose agrees, *De Filii Divinitate*, chapter 7: "So great is the Son," he says, "as the Father will be seen to be: whole from whole, entire from entire, perfect from perfect, with consummate power; and as the Apostle says, 'in whom dwells all the fullness of divinity bodily.'"

St. Hilary likewise, Book VII of *De Trinitate*: "One from one, and whole from whole, God and Son, neither by nativity did

the Father lose what he is wholly, nor did the Son by being born fail to hold with himself this very whole."

St. Augustine says the same in many places, especially Sermon 125 *De Tempore*: "He begot the Son, whole from whole, perfect from perfect, full from full."

The same must be said, proportionately, of the Holy Spirit. Hence the Council of Florence, session 18, by the common consent of Latins and Greeks through John and Mark, determined that procession is that by which the Holy Spirit receives being, and that whole by which he is, and by which he is properly named the Holy Spirit.

From these it is established that the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to themselves as wholes—that is, insofar as they consist of the divine essence and a personal relation, but not according to the relation of filiation or spiration taken precisely—are the total termini of the divine processions.

Second, the produced Person is not composite but wholly indivisible; therefore it is wholly produced—especially since production terminates to the thing insofar as it exists on the side of the thing. St. Hilary presses this reason in Book IX of *De Trinitate*: "Since," he says, "he is not composed from a part, but is perfected from simplicity, it is necessary that, according to what the Father is, the Father is wholly the Father, in all his own things, of him whom he begot from himself; since the perfect nativity of the Son consummates the Father from all his own things."

The second part is the Doctor's in Book I, distinction 5, question 2, and distinction 13, number 12, where speaking of the divine productions he says: "That production is not some flux, nor a flowing form, nor is it of the same account as a form, because the formal terminus of the production is something essential." Therefore the Doctor holds that the relation

constituting the produced Person is not the formal terminus of the production.

It is proved first: nature is the formal terminus in the production of creatures, not personality or suppositality. Therefore the same holds in the divine by a complete parity of reason.

Second: the formal terminus of a production is what confers that being which is first and per se intended in the production. But the divine essence confers that being which is first and per se intended in the divine productions, namely that the produced Person is God. Therefore the essence must be called the formal terminus of the divine production.

This is confirmed: generation tends to this, that the Son be perfectly likened to the Father in essence by the most formal force of his generation; and the Holy Spirit by the identity of essence communicated to him. But this likeness and identity are conferred not by relation but by essence. Therefore the communication of essence is primarily intended in the divine production.

Third: if relation, and not essence, were the formal terminus of the divine processions, it would follow that they are not univocal but equivocal. But that consequence is false. Therefore so is the antecedent.

The consequence is clear: univocals are those whose name is common and whose account of substance accommodated to the name is altogether the same, as Aristotle teaches in the pre-categories. But if the relations constituting the Persons were the formal termini of their productions, then the produced Persons would not share a common name with each other or with the producers, for the Son is not called Father. Nor would the formal signified by the name be common to them: what is

signified by filiation is not common to the Father or the Holy Spirit. Consequently, they would not be univocal but equivocal.

But this is absurd, for it would follow that they are of different species and nature—which is impossible. For equivocal things are of different natures, and thus of different species.

Nor does it matter that the Persons taken adequately are not of the same account because they include opposed and disparate relations. For to univocation, the Doctor says in Book I, distinction 13, number 23, it is not required that the things univocated, taken adequately, be altogether of the same account; otherwise Peter and Paul would not be univocal, because they include "thisness" of Peter and "thisness" of Paul, which are first diverse. It suffices, therefore, that they agree in the univocation of essence.

It will be said, first: the formal terminus of a production ought to be produced. But the essence is not produced. Therefore it is not the formal terminus of the production. The minor is clear, since the divine essence neither produces nor is produced.

The minor is proved: what something is such by, that is still more such. But the total terminus that is said to be produced is so denominated because of the formal terminus. Therefore the formal terminus should even more be said to be produced. The minor is clear, for the formal terminus of a production is the reason formally constituting the produced thing in the being of the produced.

I deny the major. For the rational soul in the production and generation of a human being is the formal terminus giving the formal being of man to the one generated; yet it is not produced by the generating man. It suffices that it be communicated by a natural exigency to that body from the man generated. Likewise the Blessed Virgin is called "Mother of God,"

not because she generated the Word or effectively produced the hypostatic union, but because she physically concurred in producing the human nature that naturally required a suppositum, whether proper or divine. So too here, it suffices that the divine essence be communicated to the produced Persons and give them divine being, for it to be called the formal terminus of production.

To the proof I answer that the axiom "what something is such by, that is more such" does not hold in every genus of cause, especially not in the formal cause. For Peter is a man because of the rational soul; nevertheless the soul is not "more man" than Peter. Add also that neither in creatures nor in God is the formal terminus of the produced thing the reason that formally constitutes it in the being of the produced; rather, in creatures that account belongs to the category of action or passion and thus is accidental—which certainly is not the produced substantial form.

It will be said, second: the terminus that is produced receives its reality formally by virtue of the formal terminus. But the Son does not receive his reality formally by virtue of the essence, but by virtue of filiation, which is his personal property. Therefore the essence is not the formal terminus of divine production.

I distinguish the minor: that he does not receive his personal reality by virtue of the essence, I concede; that he does not receive his essential and divine reality by virtue of the essence, I deny. For through the essence communicated to him, the Son receives divine being, in which filiation is founded and without which it would be nothing. Therefore filiation is as it were the form constituting him in the being of Son and person, and this belongs to the total terminus which is produced as that

which is produced; but the terminus as "by which" is the essence itself.

It will be said, third: the formal terminus is that which in the total terminus has the account of constituting and distinguishing form. But only the personal relation has this in the produced Person. Therefore only it is the formal terminus.

The major is clear from what has been said. The minor is proved: the relation constitutes the person and makes the distinction between producer and produced terminus; for they are not really distinguished by essence. Therefore the essence is not the formal terminus.

I distinguish the first part of the minor as before: relation has the account of constituting form in personal being, I concede; in substantial being, I deny. Hence the divine essence is as a form giving divine being, while relation is as a mode, or the terminus of essence, conferring personal being.

To the second part of the minor I say: indeed, in created products the formal terminus of what is produced establishes an order and real distinction between producer and produced formal terminus, because the formal terminus in creatures is ordinarily produced. But it is otherwise in the divine, where that formal terminus is not produced but only communicated. Hence, as to this part, the parity must be denied.

You will insist: the essence, as we have said, is the terminus "from which," at least improperly so called; therefore it cannot be formally the terminus "to which." The consequence is clear, since the terminus "from which" and the terminus "to which" are opposed.

I deny the consequence. For just as it does not repugn that the same essence which is in the Father be communicated to the Son by generation, so too it does not repugn that the same

essence be a formal principle "by which" and also a terminus "to which," insofar as it is considered in diverse suppositum and Persons.

From these things the Doctor gathers, first, in Book I, distinction 5, question 2, number 13, that the divine Son (and the same must be said of the Holy Spirit) is not from nothing, from the fact that he is from the substance of the Father—that is, because he receives from the Father the same numerically one nature. For just as those things are not made from nothing which presuppose their matter, so those things must not be said to be made from nothing which presuppose their form. But the Son presupposes the divine essence in the Father as a form communicated to him. Therefore he must not be said to be made from nothing.

Second, he gathers that this total communication of the divine nature suffices for the true and genuine account of generation—no less, indeed far more perfectly—than if it occurred through a cutting-off of the producer's substance. For just as a man who generates is truly judged a father because he cuts off a part of his substance and supplies it for the formation of the son, so much more perfectly must the divine Father claim the name of Father: not by cutting off something of himself, but by communicating his whole essence, and this as the formal terminus of that production.

For just as, if a created father were to cut off a son immediately from himself, he would truly be father because what would be would truly be a terminus of the action from himself, so much more the eternal Father is said perfectly to generate the Son by communicating not only a part but the whole nature to him indivisibly.

Third, he gathers that the Word is produced not by a cutting-off of the divine substance nor by its destruction, but by an indivisible communication of that very same essence, not only by real identity but also by formal identity of the divine essence, as is determined in the chapter *Damnamus*, *De summa Trinitate*: that it cannot be said that the Father gave part of his substance to the Son and kept part for himself, since the Father's substance is indivisible, being altogether simple.

A QUESTION IS RAISED

Is it lawful to use, in the same way and without distinction, the prepositions "from" and "of" to signify the consubstantiality of the proceeding person with the producing principle?

I reply, first: these two prepositions scarcely have a difference among the learned and interpreters of the Greek and Latin languages. Hence many of the holy Fathers use both indiscriminately to denote the consubstantiality of the produced with the producer. Thus St. John Chrysostom, tome 3, proves the divinity and consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father from 1 Corinthians 2: "the Spirit who is from God." "From God," he says, is said of nothing unless it is from his substance.

Thus Gregory Nazianzen uses each preposition in Oration 2, *De Fide Nicaena*, where we read: "God of God, light of light, life from life, perfect of perfect… whole from whole, full from full."

Thus, finally, the Latin Church recites the Nicene Creed: "born from the Father, before all ages; God of God"; and of the Holy Spirit: "who proceeds from the Father and the Son."

I reply, second: the preposition "of" is more apt and is more frequently used to signify the consubstantiality of what is produced and what produces. For the preposition "from," according to the force of its signification, imports only the order of the produced to the producer, without signifying consubstantiality; but the preposition "of" signifies consubstantiality besides.

This is explained by St. Augustine in the book *De natura boni contra Manichaeos*, chapter 26: "From him," he says, does not signify the same as "of him." For what is "of him" can be said to be "from him," but not everything that is "from him" is rightly said to be "of him." For heaven and earth are from him because he made them, but not of him because they are not from his substance. Just as if some man generates a son and makes a house: the son is from him, and the house is from him; but the son is of him, and the house is of earth and wood.

Hence the Arians also, as Theodoret reports in Book I of the *Historia Ecclesiastica*, chapter 8, and as is read in the acts of the Council of Nicaea near the end of chapter 2, in order to pretend consent with the Catholic faith, conceded that the Son is "from God." For Eusebius of Nicomedia, their leader, said: "We too are from God; and 'one God, from whom are all things.'" But the Catholic bishops, recognizing their fraudulent attempt, explained more plainly that "to be from God" is said of creatures because they do not arise from themselves or without cause, but have the principle of their origin from God; whereas the Son alone is judged to be from the Father's essence, for this is proper to the only-begotten and true Word of God the Father.

But because the bishops wrote "from the Father's essence," this was the cause: thus they noted the insidious vocabulary of the Arians. Gregory Nazianzen marked this in

Oration 49, where he reproaches an Arian as follows: since the Father is light and the Son is light, rightly we believe "light of light." But you assert not "light of light" but "light from light," as though from the Father, who is truly light, another light had been made which is not of the Father's substance, but as any other light, although made by God, is nevertheless far other than the one who made it; and therefore you say "light from light," not "of light."

Nor does it matter that the particle "of" sometimes seems not to signify consubstantiality of principle and what is principled, as Driedo gathers in Book III *De regulis et dogmatibus sacrae Scripturae* from Matthew 1: "What is born in her is of the Holy Spirit," and from the Apostles' Creed: "conceived of the Holy Spirit, born from the Virgin Mary," and in the Nicene Creed: "incarnate of the Holy Spirit"—which phrases indicate the formation of Christ's humanity, according to which he is not consubstantial with the Holy Spirit.

For I reply that the particle "of" there signifies the same as "from": first, because St. Athanasius explains that context in Dialogue 3 *De Trinitate* near the end: "She was found," he says, "with child from the Holy Spirit." Second, because Maldonado and Salmeron, expounding the same context, affirm that the preposition "from" corresponds more to the Greek word. Third, because St. Ambrose, Book II *De Spiritu Sancto*, chapter 5, expounding Matthew 1—"she was found to have in her womb of the Holy Spirit"—observes that although many have "of the Spirit," the Greek from which the Latins translated says "from the Holy Spirit." For what is "from" something is either from its substance or from its power: from its substance, as the Son, who says, "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High"; as the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father; but from the Father as

that is said, "one God, from whom are all things." From these he infers that the Most Holy Mary gave birth from the Holy Spirit not from his substance but from his power, and thus he presupposes that the preposition "of" determinately signifies consubstantiality, whereas "from" indicates it only indeterminately.

QUESTION IV
HOW DIVINE PROCESSIONS OCCUR, FREELY OR NATURALLY?

NOTE 1. The philosophers distinguish four modes of operating, namely freely, naturally, contingently, and necessarily. Of these, the first two are opposed to one another in such a way that they cannot both belong to the same principle in respect of the same effect, just as two differentiae dividing the same genus cannot both be found in the same species. For every agent either is determined to act, and thus acts naturally; or it determines itself, and thus acts freely. The latter two modes of operating, however, are not opposed in this way; for the same faculty can act necessarily and at the same time contingently. An action is called necessary when it cannot fail to follow, from whatever source the necessity arises, whether from a free determination of the faculty or from elsewhere. But an action is contingent when it can fail to be, whether because it is impeded from without or because it is suspended by the free determination of the will. Hence contingency and necessity can stand together with operating naturally and freely. For from the fact that something is free it does not follow that it is not necessary; rather, the greater the freedom, the greater the necessity. Thus, as St. Anselm says in *De libero arbitrio*, chapter 5: "He who so possesses what is fitting and

expedient that he cannot lose it is freer than he who so possesses the same thing that he can lose it." Hence he adds: "Therefore the will that cannot deviate from rectitude is freer." St. Augustine teaches the same in the *Enchiridio*, chapter 105, speaking of the supreme freedom that man will enjoy after the miseries of this life: "Thus it was fitting that man should first be made so that he could both will well and will badly," that is, so that he might have freedom of contradiction and of contrariety. "But afterwards it will be so that he will not be able to will badly; nor will he lack free choice; indeed free choice will be much freer, since it will not be able to serve sin at all. For the will is not to be blamed, and either it is not will, or it is to be called free, by which we so will to be blessed that to be miserable we not only do not will, but in no way can we will."

NOTE 2. Freedom is distinguished in many ways, but most especially in four ways: 1. Freedom of contradiction, which concerns the positing or not positing of an act, for example, willing or not willing. 2. Freedom of contrariety, which concerns contrary and positive acts with respect to some object, as when one wills or does not will, loves or hates. 3. Freedom of complacency, by which the will takes pleasure in something, even if, with respect to it, it does not have the reason of a cause, nor elicits any positive act. 4. Finally, essential or simple freedom, which consists in the order of the act to a principle that determines itself to the act in an eligible and delighting way.

Similarly, necessity is fourfold. 1. Necessity of violence, which occurs when nature resists; thus a heavy body is borne upward violently, and a light body downward. 2. Necessity of coercion, which occurs when the will resists, as when someone does or suffers something against his own inclination. 3. Necessity of immutability, by which it comes about that the

opposite cannot occur, even though the thing could absolutely not have been; thus God is said to do necessarily whatever He has decreed to be done, otherwise He would change, though He could have refrained from decreeing that thing. 4. Finally, there is necessity that is wholly unavoidable, when something is such that it absolutely cannot not be; thus God necessarily loves Himself, because He cannot not love Himself.

NOTE 3. When it is asked whether the divine Father begot His Son by willing, this question has a twofold sense. The first is whether the Father produces the Son by will, whether by a will concurring in the production of the Son, as in the production of creatures, or by a will immediately eliciting the production of the Son, as it concurs in the production of the Holy Spirit; or finally by a will applying or joining the parent to the offspring, that is, applying the Father's intellect to the generation of the Word.

The second sense is whether, at least, the Father begot the Son voluntarily: and this either antecedently, concomitantly, or subsequently, that is, whether He willed the generation of the Son in the first sign of origin, in which the Son is not yet understood as produced, or while He is produced in the second sign, or when He is conceived as produced in the third sign.

CONCLUSION I
THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE WORD IS IN NO WAY FREE, BUT NATURAL

This conclusion remains proved from what we have said: the Son does not proceed through will, but through fruitful memory and through the divine intellect of the Father, which, as

is evident, is not a faculty operating freely, but naturally, and producing.

It is further confirmed by authority. First, by the Council of Nicaea, book 2, about the middle: "Of the Father's wisdom, God truly is from God Himself, eternal from eternal, true from true, since the Son is eternal by nature, God and of the Father." Likewise, St. Athanasius, *Contra Arianos*, Oration 2, says that the Son is from the Father as a natural offspring, a natural fruit and birth; and in Oration 3 he calls the generation of the Word a natural generation; and in Oration 4 he inveighs against the Arians, who ascribed to God a necessity of coercion because Catholics said that the Son of God was begotten naturally and necessarily from the Father.

Hence he adds: "They perceived what is opposed to will; but what is greater and higher they did not perceive. For just as what is against the mind's judgment is opposed to will, so what is according to nature is higher and prior to will." St. Basil speaks in the same way: in book 2 *Contra Eunomium* he calls the generation of the Son connatural to the Father. St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 1 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 6, says: "The Son Himself has dignity by nature, so that God the Father is naturally His own." St. Ambrose, book 4 *De Fide*, chapter 4, says: "Just as a good father exists not by will nor by necessity but beyond both, that is, by nature, so the Father generates not by will nor by necessity." Likewise St. Hilary, book 6 *De Trinitate*, says: "From Himself the natural nativity of His Only-begotten is taught." And St. Augustine, book 5 *De Trinitate*, chapter 20, notes that the Word is the Son of nature, not of will. From these it is clear that the generation of the Word is natural, not free.

It is also confirmed by reason. Every production that proceeds from an intrinsic principle determined of itself to one,

and therefore operating necessarily, is wholly natural. But the generation of the divine Word proceeds from an intellect intrinsically determined to one and operating wholly necessarily. Therefore it is wholly natural. Again, that production must be judged absolutely natural which, per se and most formally, communicates nature by producing something similar to itself in nature. But the production of the divine Word is such, as we saw in the preceding article. Therefore, and so forth. Finally, a production is all the more to be judged natural the farther it stands from the free. But the generation of the Word stands most far from freedom, because it in no way proceeds from will, which is the throne and origin of freedom. Therefore it must be called absolutely natural.

You will object 1. Many of the holy Fathers assert that the Word proceeds through will. First, James the son of Zebedee, who in Clement of Rome, book 8 of the *Constitutiones*, chapter 12, addresses the eternal Father thus: "Before all ages You begot Him by will, power, and goodness, without any intermediary, the Only-begotten Son." The same is found in chapter 16. Second, Athanasius, in the Gospel on the most holy Mother of God, writes that the Word is from the Father's will. Third, Hilary, book *De Synodis*, just before the example of the Sirmian faith, says: "The nativity is so perfect in nature that He who is born from the substance of God is also born from His counsel and will." Similarly, St. Augustine, book 15 *De Trinitate*, chapter 20, calls the Son of God "counsel from counsel, will from will," and the Second Council of Toledo concurs in its Confession of Faith, writing: "According to essence, will begot will; the Son is will from will." Therefore the divine Word must be said to be produced not naturally but voluntarily.

I deny the consequence. For this is not the meaning of the holy Fathers. Rather, they say that the Son is produced by will because in His production the divine nature is communicated, which essentially includes all attributes, and thus also will. Hence all these are said, as it were, to concur in the formation of the Word, not as principles producing, but as divinity communicated, namely in such a way that the Father, who is His own will, counsel, wisdom, and the other perfections, begot the Son, who is also His own will, counsel, and so forth, as the said Council of Toledo explains when it writes that the Son is called "will from will" in the same way as He is called "nature from nature," since according to Athanasius will is not one thing and the Father's nature another.

This response is also confirmed from those words of St. James, "without any intermediary," by which he signifies that the Son is not begotten with will concurring as a productive principle, but as will included in the essence together with the other attributes. Hence he says that the Son is generated by will in the same way as by power and goodness. But it is certain that the Word does not proceed from power and goodness as from principles; therefore neither does He proceed from will in that way. That this is also the mind of those Fathers is clear. For Hilary and Augustine, in their books *De Trinitate*, aim throughout to prove that the Word is the Son not by adoption or free will, but by nature; and St. Athanasius proves the same at length against the Arians. Thus in Oration 4 he says: "The Word, being begotten from nature, does not deliberate; since the Father, in the Word, does and establishes all the other things that He decrees by will." And as the Apostle James teaches: "Of His own will He begot us by the word of truth." And below, bringing forward the distinction between the production of the Son and that of

creatures, he adds: "The Son, the proper offspring of the Father's substance, is not from elsewhere but from the Father; therefore He is not deliberated about, lest it seem that deliberation is had even about Himself." For if the Father had decreed not to have a Son, by that very fact He would have decreed that He Himself was not Father, and thus simply was not.

You will object 2. The sophism of the Arians, which Nazianzen reports in Oration 3 *De Theologia*: "Either the Father begot the Son willing, or unwilling. If unwilling, then it must be that force was brought upon Him; and who brought force, and how can He be God on whom force was brought? But if willing, then the Son is Son by will; therefore how is He begotten from the Father, when they invent some new Mother, the Father's will, in place of the Father?" Nazianzen retorts the objection there: "The Father is either God willingly or unwillingly. If willingly, how did He begin to will? For He is not before He is." And below: "What can you bring forward, when, according to your mode of arguing, He Himself would also be an offspring of will? But if unwillingly, who compelled Him to be?" St. Augustine has the same, book 15 *De Trinitate*, chapter 20, and Cyril, book 1 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 8.

Hence I respond in form. That the Father produces the Son by an effective or productive will, I deny; by an operative and essential will, I concede. Therefore a threefold divine will can be distinguished according to a threefold relation to three distinct termini, namely to creatures, to the Holy Spirit, and to the Son. For it is an effective principle of creatures, which it produces ad extra freely, with freedom of contradiction, because it could not produce them if it so willed. It is also a productive principle of the Holy Spirit ad intra by spiration, which is free with essential freedom, as we shall say below. Finally, it is operative concerning

the divine essence, and also concerning the production of the divine Word; because in the first sign of origin the divine Father knows and wills and loves His essence and Himself—indeed even the Son and the Holy Spirit—by an essential intellection and volition that is simply operative, before He is conceived to produce the Son and the Holy Spirit in the later signs, as will again become clear.

CONCLUSION II
THE FATHER PRODUCES THE WORD VOLUNTARILY, BY A WILL THAT IS ANTECEDENT, CONCOMITANT, AND CONSEQUENT

This is the teaching of Bl. Scotus in 1, distinction 6, number 5, where he proves the first part thus: "I say," he says, "that the Father begets the Son in this way, by willing, because the Father in the first sign of origin understands immediately, and then also can have formally an act of willing. In the second sign of origin He begets the Son, and He does not will that begetting merely by a volition following the first begetting, but by a volition had in the first sign of origin, by which volition the Father formally wills, presupposing in some way the intellection by which the Father understands, but not presupposing the begetting of the Word. Thus, therefore, I say that the Father begets by willing, not only by a consequent will, but by an antecedent will."

He, or anyone else, thus explains this truth in the following addition. In the first instant the Father has perfect understanding of whatever is intelligible and volible by Him; therefore in that sign He understands the generation of the Son; and in the second sign of the instant He has the produced

terminus. For in the first sign, even if no person proceeded from Him, He has understanding and will; and in that prior sign He understands the act of speaking, which is as it were posterior with respect to the act of understanding and willing. Therefore the Father not only takes complacency by will in the production of the Son, but by willing He precedes the act of the generation of the Son; because whatever the Father understands, He understands by His essence, and whatever He wills, He wills by His essence. Hence, although the Father's understanding precedes His willing, His willing nevertheless precedes His speaking; so that the Father is first perfect in Himself and blessed through understanding and willing before He communicates these to another person through production. For what does not belong to Him in the first instant in which the Father is, never belongs to Him, since no perfection can be added to Him by the production of any person, because no person has anything except what is communicated to it by Him. Therefore willing, like understanding, precedes speaking; thus spiration in some way follows speaking, namely in the order of origin.

The second and third parts are proved from all those texts of Scripture by which it is intimated that the Son is loved by the Father and that the Father takes complacency in Him. Thus Matthew 3: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Likewise Proverbs 8, where eternal Wisdom says: "I was with Him, arranging all things, and I delighted day by day," and so forth. In that place the Septuagint reads: "I was the one in whom He rejoiced daily," and so forth. Hence Athanasius, Oration 2 *Contra Arianos*: "God Himself is the begetter of the image, by contemplating which He is gladdened." Tertullian likewise, book 6 *Contra Praxeam*, reads that passage: "I was with Him, fitting things together; I was that one in whom He rejoiced; and daily I

was delighted in His person." Here one must note love with joy, not only concerning the divinity, but also concerning the persons of Father and Son.

It is also confirmed by all those sayings of the holy Fathers who say that the Son of God is loved by the Father and begotten by a willing Father. Thus Clement of Rome, book 7 of the *Constitutiones*, chapter 42, says that the Son was begotten by the Father's good pleasure; Justin, in the Dialogue with Trypho, says He was brought forth by the Father's willing; and Cyril, in the Dialogue *De Trinitate*, book 2, after denying that there was a will preceding divine generation as a productive principle, says: "For the generation is not without will, which is natural, since will runs together with its nature, so that it is what it is." Whatever could be objected against this conclusion has been solved in Question 2 of the present article, where we proved that the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit presupposes knowledge and love not only of the divine essence, but also of the same Son and the Holy Spirit.

CONCLUSION III
THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IS NECESSARY, AND YET FREE WITH ESSENTIAL FREEDOM

This is the teaching of Bl. Scotus in 1, distinction 10, number 10 and following, and also of St. Thomas, as is especially clear in question 10 *De potentia*, article 2, reply to objection 5. For when he had objected: "If the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will, it follows that He proceeds by way of freedom. But what proceeds by way of freedom can proceed or not proceed, because things done freely are not determined to one. Therefore the Father could produce the Holy Spirit or not produce Him, and

could give Him whatever measure of magnitude He wished," he replies: "Natural necessity, according to which the will is said to will something of necessity, as happiness, is not repugnant to the freedom of the will, as Augustine teaches in book 5 *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 10. For freedom of the will is opposed to violence and coercion; but there is neither violence nor coercion in something's being moved according to the order of its nature. Rather, it is when the natural motion is impeded, as when a heavy body is impeded from descending to the center. Hence the will freely desires happiness, even though it desires it necessarily. Thus God also by His will freely loves Himself, and it is necessary that He love Himself as much as He is good, just as He understands Himself as much as He is. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds freely from the Father, not indeed possibly, but of necessity; nor was it possible for Him to proceed lesser than the Father, but it was necessary for Him to be equal to the Father, as also the Son, who is the Word of the Father."

From these words it is manifest that St. Thomas asserts not only that freedom can subsist with necessity, but also expressly agrees with Bl. Scotus that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely and yet necessarily. Nor does it matter that in the same place, replying to objection 3, and in the First Part, question 41, article 2, he calls both divine processions natural and affirms that the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by way of will. For there he takes "natural" as "necessary" and as opposed to the contingent; and he takes "voluntary," which he there opposes to natural, as free with freedom toward opposites, not as essential freedom, which he teaches can subsist with the necessary.

Therefore the conclusion is proved. The Holy Spirit proceeds through will, that is, through the proper mode of

operation of the will. But the proper mode of operation of the will is free. Therefore He proceeds freely. The major remains proved from what has been said and is conceded by all. The minor is proved thus: freedom belongs to the intrinsic reason of will, so that it no more repugns a man to be conceived without being a rational animal than it repugns will to exist without freedom. For either the will is not will, or it must be called free, as the cited St. Augustine said in Note 1. Therefore whatever is produced by will as the principle by which it is produced, is produced freely.

Further, whatever proceeds as love and as gift proceeds freely; for nothing is freer than love and gift. But according to St. Augustine, book 15 *De Trinitate*, the Holy Spirit proceeds not as born but as given. Therefore He proceeds as love and gift, and consequently freely.

Finally, the adversaries deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely because they contend that no freedom can subsist with necessity and that every freedom is either of contrariety, or of contradiction. But this is false. Therefore so too is that from which it follows. The minor is proved. First, the act of love and desire by which we seek happiness is without doubt free, as we experience. But it is not free with freedom of specification, because that act cannot become hatred or aversion, for we cannot hate happiness. Therefore that act is at once necessary and free, not indeed with freedom of specification, by which we can love or hate some object. Therefore it must be free with the freedom we call essential, which can be defined as: a volitive power acting with full deliberation, without coercion and violence, or, as others speak, a power acting in an eligible and delighting way.

Second, Christ died freely, according to John 10: "No one takes my life from me, but I lay it down." And yet He could not

fail to accept the death imposed on Him by the Father, since He was impeccable. For if He had refused to die, He would have been disobedient to the Father's will and thus would have sinned. Therefore He died both freely and necessarily, not indeed with freedom of specification or of exercise, but with essential freedom.

Third, in God there is true holiness, and that infinitely worthy of praise, according to Psalm 98: "For the Lord our God is holy." But holiness necessarily requires freedom in acts, for it can in no way be compatible with mere naturalness of actions; in things that are natural we are neither worthy of praise nor of blame. Therefore God must be said to be free in His acts, not only toward creatures (for even if creatures were not possible, God would nonetheless be infinitely holy), but most of all with respect to loving Himself. And God's love for Himself is supremely necessary both as to specification and as to exercise; for He can in no way omit it, and much less change it into hatred. Therefore there is some act that is at once necessary and free, not indeed with freedom of specification or of exercise, and thus with essential freedom.

All these reasons are confirmed by the Scotists from the fact that the most perfect mode of operating that we can conceive must be conceded and assigned to the divine will. But to operate freely and at the same time necessarily is the most excellent of all modes. Therefore we must assign it to God. The major is evident. The minor is proved: the firmer a good is possessed, the better. Now it is certain that to operate freely is a good for a free principle. Therefore the more certainly and fixedly it is possessed by it, the better and more perfectly it is in it. But what is had necessarily is possessed most certainly. Therefore freedom of

operation can belong necessarily to something, indeed it must, in order that it operate in the most perfect way.

You will say 1. The Holy Spirit proceeds naturally; therefore not freely. The consequence is clear from what was said, for to operate naturally and freely are directly opposed. The antecedent is proved from St. Cyril, book 13 of the *Thesaurus*, chapters 1 and 2, where he says that the Holy Spirit exists naturally from the Son Himself and in the Son, and below: "Therefore He is not other than the Spirit of the essence of the Godhead, but from it and in it naturally, as a finger in the hand and the hand in the body." And near the end of the same chapter he calls the Holy Spirit "the very essence of the Godhead naturally sent forth." Therefore His procession is not free but natural.

I distinguish the antecedent. The Holy Spirit proceeds naturally, that is, from the divine nature itself, which is the remote principle of His procession as of the Son's: I concede. He proceeds by a natural mode, insofar as natural is opposed to free: I deny. Thus the proof must be distinguished. For St. Cyril intended nothing other than that the Holy Spirit is produced through the divine essence communicated to Him. Hence in the same place, chapter 1, he says: "The Holy Spirit is essentially in God Himself and proceeds inseparably from Him," that is, He has the same essence as His productive principle.

You will press: The Holy Spirit proceeds from a principle determined to one; therefore His procession is natural even as to the mode of producing naturally. The antecedent is evident because the Holy Spirit cannot not be, and thus necessarily proceeds from a principle determined to His production.

I distinguish the antecedent. He proceeds from a principle determined to one by its own voluntary determination:

I concede. He proceeds by a determination through a natural form, as a heavy body is determined by its natural form to motion downward: I deny. Therefore the divine will is determined by itself because of its rectitude concerning the infinite object. For, as the Doctor cited in number 11 says, "The divine essence, which is the first object of that will, is of itself to be willed; therefore the will is of necessity in a right act of willing that object, which is of itself rightly to be willed; and as it is of necessity a principle of willing, so it is of necessity a principle of producing love for that object. And such a will having such an object present is a principle of communicating the divine nature, because it is a principle of producing an infinite love as produced. For such a produced love is proportioned both to the power and to the object." Hence it follows that the productive act of the Holy Spirit is necessary both on the part of the infinite object and on the part of the rectitude of the will, which cannot not love the infinite good and produce a terminus adequate to the object itself.

You will say 2. Such is the productive action of some terminus as the terminus produced is. But the Holy Spirit is naturally God; for He cannot be said to be God freely in any sense of freedom. Therefore His production is also natural and in no way free.

I deny the major. For God freely produces a stone, since He does all things ad extra most freely. Yet the stone is in no way free, indeed it exists purely naturally. Therefore there can be freedom in the action of the producer together with naturalness in the produced terminus; and thus, although the Holy Spirit is in no way God freely, His production can nevertheless be in some way free.

You will say 3. Even if the procession of the Holy Spirit is free, it can nonetheless be natural. Therefore on this point our conclusion lacks truth. The antecedent is proved: just as natural and free divide a principle of acting, so too necessary and contingent divide it. But the same principle can act contingently and necessarily. Therefore it can also act naturally and freely. The major is clear from what was said in Note 1. The minor is proved: the divine will, one and simple, is at once a principle of acting contingently and necessarily, for it produces the Holy Spirit necessarily and creatures contingently. Therefore, and so forth.

I distinguish the minor. The same principle can act contingently and necessarily with respect to the primary and adequate terminus: I deny. It can act necessarily concerning an adequate, primary, intrinsic terminus, and contingently concerning a secondary, inadequate, extrinsic terminus: I concede. Thus the divine will, as it has the reason of a first act, per se and from within, is productive of the Holy Spirit, who is its adequate, primary, intrinsic terminus. But with respect to a creature, which it produces contingently, its act of willing is not terminated except secondarily, extrinsically, and inadequately. Hence, since the diversity of this act arises from the diversity of its termination, and this from the diversity of the terminus, and since the creature is a contingent being, even that termination of the divine will to the creature is called contingent.

Or I deny the minor absolutely, and to its proof I say that the divine will is not the immediate productive principle of creatures, but the divine omnipotence, which is formally distinct from the divine will. Therefore that diversity of productions, namely of the Holy Spirit and of creatures, must be referred not to one and the same principle but to distinct principles.

You will say 4. If the Holy Spirit proceeds freely, it follows that He is foreknown before He is produced. But this is absurd. Therefore, and so forth. The major is clear: nothing is produced by an act of will unless it is foreknown. The minor is proved: for if the Holy Spirit is known, then while He is foreknown He is either something or nothing. He cannot be said to be nothing, for thus He could not be foreknown, and besides it would follow that nothing is presupposed before His production, which no one would say. But if He is something, then He is either something existing or something possible. Not the first, for then He would exist before existing. Nor the second, because the Holy Spirit cannot have possible being.

Bl. Scotus responds there, number 14, that in that prior sign of origin, before the Holy Spirit is understood to be spirated, the Father and the Son know the Holy Spirit intuitively, though not as existing in Himself, because they know the divine essence, which is the reason for knowing intuitively whatever intelligible object. This we too taught above, namely that the Holy Spirit and the Son are pre-understood for their production. Therefore that argument has force against others, but not against us. How He is foreknown has been stated in the preceding article.

DISPUTATION II
ON THE CONSTITUTIVE, DISTINCTIVE, AND NOTIFICATIVE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

Since the origin and existence of the divine Persons have been published as far as possible, the order of doctrine requires that their whatness, or their constitutive principles, be thoroughly inspected and more precisely explained. For besides the divine nature common to those adorable Persons, and besides the discrepancy of one proceeding from another, it is certain that certain properties are in them, by which they are constituted in the formal reason of Person and are distant from one another.

But if even the most clear-sighted philosopher cannot uncover the nature of any, even the smallest and most contemptible worm, which theologian would dare to ascend to the very bosom of the Godhead and there, with curious investigation, scrutinize by what characters the divine Persons are constituted and appear distinct from one another? Indeed, who would not with St. Hilary, book 2 *De Trinitate*, pronounce: "Immense is what is demanded, incomprehensible is what is dared, that a discourse about God should be beyond the definition of God. Natural names are set forth: Father, Son, and

Holy Spirit. Whatever is sought beyond is beyond the signification of speech, beyond the intention of sense, beyond the conception of intellect: it is not expressed, not attained, not held." Yet he adds: "Going out from dangerous places into the deep, we are on a troubled sea; neither to go back nor to go forward is permitted without danger; yet there is more difficulty in traversing than in what has been traversed."

Nevertheless, so that we may somewhat alleviate the immense difficulties that occur in this disputation, we shall close them all in a just order in three articles. The first will disclose how the divine Persons are constituted and distinguished. The second will treat the relations of the divine Persons as constitutive and distinctive in personal being. The third will finally include the characters, or notions, by which those adorable Persons are made known to us as distinct from one another.

ARTICLE I
ON THE DIVINE PERSONS, HYPOSTASES, AND SUBSISTENCES

St. Hilary wisely and learnedly admonishes in book 2 *De Trinitate* that heretics receive the simplicity of heavenly words according to the sense of their own will, not according to the true absoluteness of truth, interpreting otherwise than the force of the sayings requires. "For heresy is from understanding, not from Scripture; and the crime becomes a matter of meaning, not of wording." He adds: "Thus they both destroy those who heard before, when they assert a reasoning of this preaching; and they deceive those who hear, when they take away nature by names." He concludes: "Therefore, since malice, stirred up by a diabolical

impulse of fraud, corrupts the truth and evades the names of natures, let us put forward the nature of names."

Most especially, the genuine signification of the names ὑπόστασις, person, and subsistence must be opened, since it is evident that their varied interpretation was for many a stumbling block and a stone of scandal. Therefore, for easier and safer understanding of the determinations in this article, I have judged it worthwhile to touch briefly on these names, and first:

ON THE NAME ὙΠΌΣΤΑΣΙΣ

Nicephorus rightly reports, book 10 of the *Historia*, chapter 15, that the question of ὑπόστασις and subsistence once troubled the whole Church. For a long time the holy Fathers contended about the signification of that name, namely whether it signified the same as substance, or rather what is meant by suppositum. The same Nicephorus writes that Hosius, bishop of Cordoba, first provided the occasion of this controversy. Sent to Alexandria by the emperor Constantine to calm the turmoil stirred up by Arius, he first made mention of substance and subsistence, that is, οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, and called into question whether they altogether signified the same. The Nicene Synod first judged this question unworthy to be treated in a council, as Nicephorus reports there. But when shortly afterwards, in the Council of Alexandria (as Rufinus testifies, book 1 of the *Historia*, chapter 29), the controversy arose again among the Fathers about the signification of these two names—some asserting it to be the same, others different—then it came about, says Nicephorus, that in that Council of Alexandria it was decided that no one should commonly use the word ὑπόστασις, since it is not contained in Sacred Scripture, and that St. Paul,

compelled by the necessity of teaching, only made use of the name "subsistence" in Hebrews 1 to signify essence.

But it seems that the great Athanasius settled that dispute in the Council of Alexandria in the year 362, since Nicephorus, chapter 16, affirms that Athanasius was present at that council; and Nazianzen, in Oration 21 in praise of Athanasius, says of him: after gently and humanely summoning both parties, and carefully weighing the meaning of the words, when he found them concordant and not differing at all in doctrine, he so managed the matter that, granting them the use of names, he bound them to the realities. Nazianzen himself did the same at Constantinople, as he testifies in Oration 32 addressed to the 150 bishops. For when they had been convoked to Constantinople by Theodosius and a similar controversy arose among them, Nazianzen proved that there was no dissension about the realities between those who spoke of three hypostases and those who confessed one: for the former understood persons by ὑπόστασις, while the latter understood essence. Hence up to that time it seemed permissible to use the name ὑπόστασις indifferently to signify nature and essence, which is called οὐσία, or person, which is called πρόσωπον.

Yet the controversy about ὑπόστασις was not fully quieted nor wholly exhausted there. Shortly afterwards the bishops of the Church of Antioch renewed it: some admitted, with the Westerns, one hypostasis; others, with the Easterns, three hypostases, as is clear from St. Athanasius's Epistle 10, where he reproaches the Westerns for establishing heresy of themselves. Again we gather from the writings of St. Jerome and St. Augustine that this dispute also flourished in their time. For when St. Jerome was pressed and importuned by an Arian bishop of Antioch to confess and admit three hypostases in the divinity,

he consulted the Roman Church as the mother of the others and to which the greater questions of faith are referred, and asked St. Damasus the supreme pontiff what he ought to believe, Epistle 57. There, among other things, he writes: "The whole school of secular letters knows nothing other by hypostasis than οὐσία." Hence after a few words he adds: "Whoever says there are three, that is, three hypostases, that is, three οὐσίαι, under the name of piety strives to assert three natures." And a little below: "Let three hypostases be silent, if you please, and let one be held." And again: "Poison lies beneath honey; the angel of Satan has transformed himself into an angel of light."

The same difficulty troubled and detained St. Augustine. For in book 5 *De Trinitate*, chapter 8, he says: "I speak of essence, which in Greek is called οὐσία, which we more commonly call substance. Indeed they too—namely the Greeks—say hypostasis, so that many of ours who are accustomed to treat this in Greek speech are accustomed to say: μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, which is altogether the same as one essence, three substances." And immediately in chapter 9 he adds: "But because our manner of speaking has now obtained, so that what is understood when we say 'essence' is what is understood when we say 'substance,' we do not dare to say one essence, three substances." And in book 7, chapter 4: "In the beginning," he says, "it was said by our Greeks one essence, three substances; by the Latins one essence or substance, three persons, as we have said, since in our speech, that is, Latin, essence is usually understood no otherwise than substance."

From these it is clear that Augustine held the word ὑπόστασις suspect among the Latins in the same way Jerome did, except that at length, in book 7 *De Trinitate*, chapter 6, he concedes that one may say in Latin three substances in God, as in

Greek three hypostases are said, where scandal would not arise and the Catholic sense were evident. Hence, in the course of time, the word ὑπόστασις, by ecclesiastical usage, came to signify not substance or essence but person or suppositum. Indeed, whatever certain heretical grammarians protest, if we consult antiquity itself it will be evident that the more learned used ὑπόστασις for subsistence. For Aristotle, or the author of the book *De mundo* to Alexander, about the middle, says: "Of those things that are observed from the air, so that these may be touched briefly, some appear, some subsist," that is, in Greek, some are according to hypostasis, that is, truly exist. Likewise Dionysius, chapter 1 *De Divinis Nominibus*, calls God "a tri-subsistent unity," and in chapter 3 he uses the name ὑπόστασις three times to designate the subsistence of the persons. Justin Martyr used the same name and in the same signification in the exposition of the true confession of the Trinity, and so forth. From these it is clear that Nicephorus, book 10 *Historia*, chapter 15, and Socrates, book 3, chapter 7, spoke wrongly when they said that the word ὑπόστασις used by ecclesiastical writers is barbarous and that none of the ancients used it to signify person.

ON THE NAME OF SUBSISTENCE

The word "subsistence" had various meanings among the ancients. For, as Rusticus says in his disputation against the Acephali, subsistence sometimes signifies person, but sometimes substance; for in the holy synod of Ephesus both are shown. Indeed Athanasius, in the *Quaestiones*, question 4, seems to extend the name "subsistence" to signify any individual, even of an accident. For he says: "There are three subsistences of the solar

orb: ray and light," and moreover, "three subsistences of the subject of fire: burning and shining."

Yet more frequently it was used in the councils to signify hypostasis or person. Thus the First Council of Nicaea, book 2, says: "One divinity of the holy Trinity is considered in three perfect and equal subsistences." And near the end of the same book, after distinguishing the divine persons and hypostases, it adds: "Whatever subsists per se, insofar as it subsists per se, is properly said to have the person, that is, face or figure, of a nature." Likewise the First Council of Constantinople, in its epistle to Damasus, says that God is in "three most perfect subsistences," that is, "in three perfect [subsistences], so that neither the languor of Sabellius may have place through confusion of subsistences with persons, nor through the destruction of properties."

Finally the Second Council of Constantinople, anathema 2, says: "If anyone does not confess one Godhead to be adored in three subsistences, that is, in persons, let him be anathema." The Lateran Council under Martin I repeats the same, Consultation 5, canon 1: "If anyone does not confess, according to the holy Fathers, properly and truly Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, Trinity in unity and unity in Trinity, that is, one God in three consubstantial subsistences, let him be anathema." This is confirmed by all the holy Fathers whom Ruiz cites at length, disputation 34, section 3. Hence Theodoret, in the Breviary of Liberatus, at the last chapter of the additions, says: "Subsistence and person differ in none of the things signified except in name; for subsistence is person. But nature and substance signify something general; subsistence and person signify something proper."

DISPUTATION TWO

ON THE NAME OF PERSON

As Boethius affirms in the book *De duabus naturis*, the name "person" seems to have been transferred from those who in comedies and tragedies represented the men whose parts they played. As Anicius adds: "Because actors, with the masks they put on, represented those whose parts they played in tragedy or comedy, therefore the rest of men, whose recognition according to their form was definite, the Latins called persons, and the Greeks called prosopa." Hence, according to its primary institution, it was used to designate a face and figure, as the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea, book 2, used it: "When we hear 'person,'" they say, "let us not suspect that the divine has a human appearance; for it is without composition and without figure." And after they proved from the Gospel—especially from Matthew 16, "You know how to judge the face of the sky," where in Greek πρόσωπον is read for "face"—they conclude: "For whatever subsists per se, insofar as it subsists per se, is properly said to have the person, that is, face or figure, of a nature."

Nevertheless, usage prevailed such that the name "person" signifies the same as suppositum, or the ultimate completion of an individual nature. In that sense it is used throughout Scripture where we read that God is not an accepter of persons, especially in Acts 10 and Romans 2, and the like. Hence, to follow the Greeks, we shall use "essence" for οὐσία, "substance" for ὑπάρξις, "suppositum" for ὑπόστασις, and "person" for πρόσωπον.

With these preliminaries, three things must be resolved in the present article. First, whether and how the name and reason of person belong to God. Second, by what properties the

divine Persons are constituted, namely whether by absolute properties or by relative ones. Third, whether besides the three relative subsistences constitutive of persons one absolute subsistence must be admitted, by which the divine essence subsists.

QUESTION I
WHETHER AND HOW THE REASON OF PERSON BELONGS TO GOD

NOTE 1. The definition of person is varied, but especially twofold. The first is given by Boethius cited above: "A person is an individual substance of a rational nature." Although Bl. Scotus does not reject this definition in 1, distinction 23, number 4, he nonetheless judges that it must be explained through the definition given by Richard in book 4 *De Trinitate*, chapter 22, saying that a person is "an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature." For according to Boethius's definition it would follow that a rational soul—and even the Godhead, insofar as it abstracts from the divine supposita—would be a person, because both the Godhead and the rational soul are an individual substance of a rational nature. Yet no one will call the Godhead so considered a person, otherwise there would be four divine persons. Likewise no one should assert that the rational soul is a person, since it is not ultimately complete nor incommunicable, for it always implies an order to a body, either which it informs or which it can inform. Still, I am not unaware that many oppose this view regarding the rational soul; but let the natural philosophers and metaphysicians see to these matters.

NOTE 2. From the same place it is noted that nature differs from person in this: nature is communicable, but person is

incommunicable, both as what and as that by which. To be communicated as what is to be communicated as a superior to inferiors with which it is the same; thus human nature is communicable as what to Peter and Paul, each of whom is truly a man. To be communicated as that by which is either to be communicated as a singular nature to its suppositum, or as a form to a subject from which it is denominated; thus human nature in Christ, even if it is singular, is communicable as that by which, because it is able to be united to the suppositum of the Word. Likewise whiteness in a wall is communicable as that by which, because it is united to the wall as a subject which it informs. The reason of person and of suppositum excludes both kinds of communicability. For a personed nature is neither communicable to another as a superior and common nature, since it is singular and individual, nor as that by which, since it cannot be communicated to another either as to a suppositum or as to a subject. For it has the reason not of a part but of a wholly complete and terminated whole.

NOTE 3. Although the divine nature, precisely considered in itself and as abstracting from the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is perfect in being as divine nature and infinite—because as such it includes all essential predicates, intrinsic modes, and attributes that constitute it in every respect in the being of an infinite nature—nevertheless, as such it is not complete in hypostatic being, nor is it ultimately terminated according to existence. For it is communicated to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who subsist in themselves and ultimately terminate the divine nature. Hence it comes about that although the divine nature so considered has existence and subsistence, as will be clear in Question 3 following, nevertheless as such it does not have the reason of suppositum nor of person,

but is constituted in the reason of person through relative properties which determine the divine nature to the suppositum of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

With these noted, three things must be resolved in the present question. First, that the reason of person properly belongs to God. Second, that this reason is not something positive but negative. Third, that it belongs univocally to the three persons.

CONCLUSION I
THE NAME AND REASON OF PERSON TRULY AND PROPERLY BELONG TO GOD

This is common and of faith, as is clear from all those oracles of Scripture and the councils by which three divine persons are affirmed as distinct from one another in God.

It is also proved by reason. A person, from what was said, is an incommunicable existence of a rational nature. But it is most evident that these three things placed in the definition of person—namely rational nature, existence, and an incommunicable mode of existing—belong to God most perfectly. Rational nature belongs to Him, since God holds the first and most excellent rank among spiritual natures and is endowed with infinite power and wisdom not of discursive reasoning but of understanding. Existence likewise belongs to Him, since to Him first and most of all it belongs to be a being necessarily existing. Finally, incommunicable existence belongs to Him, since natural reason itself shows that to the first and greatest necessary being belongs a mode of existing independently of another, and consequently a mode of subsisting per se, which is the same as to exist incommunicably. Therefore, and so forth.

Moreover, if He existed in another as a form in a subject, or as a nature in a suppositum, He would not exist precisely per se, but only by reason of another by which He would be sustained. But this is unworthy of God, the first being wholly independent. Therefore, and so forth.

Finally, the more perfectly it belongs to God to subsist per se and to exist wholly incommunicably, the truer and more perfect the reason of person will be in God. But God most perfectly has the mode of subsisting per se, since He depends on nothing both in being and in being preserved. He also has the mode of existing most perfectly independently of another, as from a subject or an alien suppositum that is not divine and not really the same as the Godhead. Therefore the reason of person belongs to Him most perfectly.

You will say 1. The name "person" is not attributed to God in Sacred Scripture. Moreover it was unusual and unknown to the first Christians, as Cocceius reports, book 1 *De Trinitate*, article 4. Finally, properly there is nothing in God that that name signifies, and theologians use the name "person" not to express something, but lest they seem to remain silent, as St. Augustine says in book 5 *De Trinitate*, chapter 9: "When it is asked what three, human speech labors under a great poverty. Yet it is said three persons, not so that that might be said, but so that we might not be silent." Therefore it must be admitted either that the name "person" does not truly belong to God, or at least that theologians have nothing certain here.

I deny the consequence. To the first I say: although the name "person" is nowhere found in Sacred Scripture as said of God, nor do we read "the person of God," nevertheless what the name "person" signifies is found affirmed in Sacred Scripture about God in many ways, namely that He is Spirit endowed with

infinite wisdom and thus of a rational nature, and likewise that He has existence incommunicable both as that by which and as what, since because of His singularity He cannot be communicated as a common nature, and because of His independence He cannot be communicated either as a form to a subject or as an individual nature to a suppositum. Therefore, since the reason of person belongs to God most perfectly, the name "person" is fittingly attributed to Him.

To the second I say that indeed the name "person" was not at first used by the faithful and attributed to God. Yet, as Richard says in book 4 *De Trinitate*, chapter 5, those who first transferred this name to the divine did so out of necessity, so that they might answer those asking what those three in the Trinity were, since they could not answer "three gods." He adds: let us not now ask from what necessity it was afterwards transferred to the divine, but with what truth it was inspired in the translators by the Spirit of truth and universally made frequent by the Latin Church. Therefore it is certain, from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and the common usage of the Church, that the name "person" properly belongs to God.

To the third I say that indeed the name "person" does not perfectly declare the whatness and the particular properties by which the three supposita of the Godhead are distinguished from one another. Nevertheless Catholics used that name wisely so that they might answer the Sabellians with one term when they asked what those three were. St. Augustine intended nothing else in the cited place, which fits with what he adds in book 7, chapter 4: "When, therefore, it is asked what three or what the three are, we strive to find some special or general name by which we might encompass these three; and it does not occur to the mind, because the eminence of the Godhead surpasses the ability of

customary speech. For God is more truly thought than spoken, and He is more truly than thought."

You will say 2. The reason of person renders the same nature incommunicable in number to another suppositum; for human nature, for example, which is personed in Peter cannot be communicated to another. But the divine nature, which is communicated to the Father, is also communicated to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore in the Father it is not incommunicable and thus not personed.

I respond first by distinguishing the major. A personed nature is incommunicable precisely insofar as it is a singular nature: I deny; for the human nature of Christ is truly singular and individual, and yet it is communicated and united to the Word. It is incommunicable reduplicatively as personed, that is, insofar as it signifies nature as determined by personal being, or the person in the concrete: I concede. And with the minor thus distinguished, I deny the consequence. For the divine nature in the Father is indeed communicable to another insofar as it is the divine nature, but not insofar as it is the Father's personal being. For as such it signifies nothing other than the suppositum constituted by the divine nature and paternity, and thus signifies nothing other than the Father. But it is certain that the divine Father is not communicable to the Son so as to be one and the same with Him; indeed He is really distinct from Him.

I respond second that it is proper to the divine nature that it can be communicated wholly and indivisibly to three supposita, because its infinity does not permit several divine natures in number, and its supreme unity and simplicity does not tolerate any multiplication and division. But it is otherwise with created natures, which, since they are finite and multipliable, do not allow the same nature in number to be in several supposita.

You will say 3. The divine nature, insofar as it abstracts from the divine persons, is wholly complete and incommunicable to another nature, since it is individual and singular. Therefore it does not need any supervening reason of person and suppositum that would complete it and make it incommunicable.

I distinguish the antecedent. It is wholly complete in the reason of divine nature, namely because it includes essential predicates, intrinsic modes, and attributes perfecting and constituting it in the reason of an infinitely perfect being: I concede. It is complete in hypostatic being and ultimately incommunicable: I deny. For the divine nature, precisely taken, wholly and entirely is in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Hence of itself it does not have the reason of suppositum nor of person, since it is not ultimately terminated according to existence; rather it is constituted in personal being by those relative properties which are the ultimate terminus of the existence of the divine nature, and together with it constitute three subsistents further incommunicable to others as terminating it.

CONCLUSION II
IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT THE DIVINE PERSONALITIES ARE A POSITIVE MODE TERMINATING THE DIVINE NATURE AND AS IT WERE COMPLETING IT IN INCOMMUNICABLE BEING

This seems to be the genuine teaching of Bl. Scotus in 3, distinction 1, question 1, number 10. For after he had said that a created nature can be called communicable in three ways—actually, as the soul is communicated to the body which it actually informs; or by aptitude, as the separated soul which has

an inclination to inform a body; or obedientially, as the obediential potency in the rational soul to inform its body—he adds: "A divine person not only has the negation of actual and aptitudinal communication, but also has a repugnance to communication as what and as that by which. But such repugnance cannot exist except by a positive entity; and therefore it follows that that person is never without such an entity. But the created person, which does not have repugnance to being communicated, since it is in obediential potency, is not so incommunicable; and therefore one must not attribute such a positive personal entity to it, but the twofold negation of actual and aptitudinal communication suffices."

It is also proved. A divine personality has a twofold function: it completes the divine nature and ultimately terminates it, and it constitutes and distinguishes the divine persons. But the divine nature cannot be completed by a mere negation, nor can the divine persons be constituted and really distinguished from one another by something purely negative. Therefore the reason of person in the divinity must be something positive.

Moreover, from St. Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana*: "The things to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." And from the same, book 7 *De Trinitate*, chapter 5: "To be God is not other than to be person." But reality and Godhead are something positive. Therefore the divine personality too is, most formally, something positive. Finally, a divine person is a real positive being. Therefore its formal constitutive must also be real and positive.

You will say: a created personality formally consists in a twofold incommunicability, as that by which and as what, and imports nothing positive beyond the reason of an individual. Therefore the same must be said of the divine personality.

I deny the consequence. The reason for the disparity is first that, as the Doctor said above, the divine personality indicates a repugnance to all communication, which a created person does not indicate. A negation founded on repugnance, since it is wholly inseparable from its subject, requires something in the subject by reason of which it cannot be separated from it. Hence every repugnance is a repugnance of something, that is, of something not having a potency to something. But the simple negation indicated by the created personality is not so inseparable from the subject, since in fact it is separated in human nature assumed by the divine Word. Add that even with created personality excluded, the reason of individual remains, which sufficiently distinguishes one singular nature from another. But if the divine personality were excluded, nothing would remain by which the divine persons would be constituted and distinguished from one another.

CONCLUSION III
A COMMON CONCEPT CAN BE ABSTRACTED FROM THE DIVINE PERSONS THAT IS UNIVOCAL TO THEM IN THE REASON OF PERSON

Thus Bl. Scotus in 1, distinction 25, number 1. He proves it: because each of the three divine persons is called a person; and truly the three agree in the reason of person as such, not as Peter and Paul agree in "this man," for "this man" is said only equivocally of Peter and Paul. For the pronoun "this" signifies what it points out; hence when it is said of Peter "this man," that singular reality is pointed out which is Peter and which is wholly different from the singular reality which is Paul. Hence it comes

about that "this man" is not said of them univocally. But "divine person" is truly said of the three according to its proper reason, since each of them truly is an incommunicable existence of the divine nature. Therefore it belongs to them univocally.

He confirms it: if the name "person" did not belong to them univocally, they would not be called three persons. For nothing is numbered except what is univocal. Hence the heavenly dog and the earthly dog are not correctly said to be two dogs, because the name "dog" is not univocal to the heavenly and the earthly. But in truth there are said to be three divine persons. Therefore the name and reason of person belong to them univocally.

You will say: three created individuals and singulars are said just as truly as the three divine persons; but according to Bl. Scotus created singulars do not agree in a common univocal reason, since "this man" is not univocal to Peter and Paul. Therefore even if three divine persons are said, it does not rightly follow that the name and reason of person belong to them univocally.

I respond to the major that in created individuals the nature is numbered which belongs to them univocally. But since the divine nature cannot be numbered in the divine persons because it is the same in number in the three, therefore something else univocal to them must be numbered in them. But this cannot be anything other than what formally signifies person. Therefore the reason of person must be univocal to them.

You will press: not only three created individuals but also three individual differentiae and singularities are properly said; but three individual differentiae do not agree in a common univocal reason. Therefore, even if three divine persons are said, it does not follow that they agree univocally.

I respond: indeed three singularities are rightly said, not because of a common univocal concept of nature, but because of a proportion of office, since they equally distinguish ultimately and render nature incommunicable to several inferiors. But the divine persons agree not only by a proportion of office, but also by the definition and reason of divine person that belongs to them. For each of them truly is an incommunicable existence of the divine nature, both as that by which and as what. Hence there is no parity.

QUESTION II
WHETHER AND BY WHAT PROPERTIES THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE CONSTITUTED AND DISTINGUISHED IN PERSONAL BEING

NOTE 1. The theologians' opinion concerning the resolution of the present question is varied, but chiefly threefold. The first, says Bl. Scotus in 1, distinction 2, number 1, was that of Praepositivus, affirming that the divine persons are constituted and distinguished wholly by themselves. Though this opinion had long since been eliminated from the schools, Gregory of Rimini brought it back in 1, distinctions 26 and 27. The second is that of the Bishop of Lincoln and of John of Rupella, who there say that there are indeed properties in the divinity that are constitutive and distinctive of the persons, but that these are absolute, not relative. Because Bl. Scotus refutes this view with various arguments and solves all that are usually objected against it, certain recent authors wrongly attribute it to him. The third, the common and universal opinion of theologians, now prevails: that the divine persons are constituted by relative properties.

Yet not all explain in the same way how this occurs. For, says Vazquez, disputation 189, chapter 1, the arguments of Bl. Scotus have so exercised the minds of the Thomists that they have divided into various opinions. Some assert that the persons are not constituted by relations insofar as they are relations, but insofar as they are hypostatic forms. For they say that a divine relation claims two things for itself, namely being in itself or per se, and being to another; and according to being in itself it constitutes a person, while according to being to another it does not constitute but relates a person to another correlative. Others, with St. Bonaventure in 1, distinction 26, question 3, teach that the three persons are constituted by relations as origins, for example that the divine Father is constituted in the reason of person by paternity, not as paternity, but as active generation. Others finally, with the Subtle Doctor, hold that the divine relations are constitutive of the divine persons insofar as they are formally relations.

NOTE 2. Here the question is not moved concerning a real constitution that takes place through constitutives really distinct from one another, but concerning a formal constitution that is effected through constitutives formally distinct. For although each divine person is a really simple and indivisible being because of the real indistinction of personal properties from the essence, nonetheless a twofold entity is conceived in it, one absolute and simple, the other relative and modal, that is, a mode of being thus. By the first God is one and is constituted formally in the reason of God; by the second He is three and is constituted in the reason of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The absolute being is prior by priority of reason and sign to the relative, for it is primary and is contracted and determined to a person by the relative as by a secondary being. Hence relations

are rightly conceived as if they come to the divine nature and constitute it in personal being, which, considered in itself insofar as it is divinity, it does not have.

NOTE 3. Although the relative properties are conceived as coming to the divine nature already essentially constituted, they are not accidental but substantial, as forms are, though they are not essential to matter but come to it and are, as the logicians say, accidental to it; nevertheless in themselves they are substantial and together with matter constitute the composite not from an accident and a subject, but from diverse substances. Moreover, these properties are not only substantial and constitute substances or realities existing per se, but also are hypostatic forms and reasons of supposita and persons, which together with the divine essence constitute the divine person in the being of an intellectual nature complete and ultimately terminated according to existence.

With these preliminaries, three things must be determined: first, that the divine persons are constituted by properties; second, that those properties are relative; third, that they constitute the divine persons formally precisely insofar as they are relations.

CONCLUSION I
THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE NOT CONSTITUTED AND DISTINGUISHED WHOLLY BY THEMSELVES, BUT BY PERSONAL PROPERTIES

This is common among theologians and is gathered and confirmed first from various councils, especially the Lateran Council in the chapter *Firmiter*, where it is said that the most holy Trinity, according to the common essence, is undivided, but

according to personal properties is distinct. Likewise in the Council of Florence, session 1, it is asserted that the divine persons differ by their properties. Finally the Church sings in the preface of the Mass of the Feast of the most holy Trinity: that in the persons property, in the essence unity, and in the majesty equality are to be adored.

It is proved second by the authority of the holy Fathers. First, St. Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chapter 2, says that "the things of the divine fruitfulness are not reciprocated among themselves, but only the Father is the font of heavenly divinity, so that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, but the praises preserve for each divine person its own properties." St. Basil, book 2 *Contra Eunomium*, says: "Properties and notions, as it were certain characters and forms, distinguish what is common by their proper characters, but do not cut off the communication of substance." St. Athanasius, Dialogue 1, says: "Hypostasis has a property not at all common to the hypostases under which essences subsist; and it does not admit multiplication of number since it is one and singular. But whatever admits multiplication of number altogether has a property, and what has a property admits number." St. Ambrose, in the exposition of the Apostles' Creed, chapter 11: "We distinguish the persons of the Godhead in their properties; yet we confess the inseparable unity of the most holy Trinity." St. Augustine, sermon 38 *De Tempore*: "Each person in the Trinity has something proper, by which, in inseparable equality, it shows some property in itself." Hence the Second Council of Toledo rightly concludes in its Confession of Faith: "In each person there remains its own property: the Father has eternity without nativity; the Son has eternity with nativity; the Holy Spirit has procession without nativity."

Bl. Scotus proves it third by theological reason. Whatever are not first diverse but have something in which they agree are not distinguished wholly by themselves, but by something of themselves. But the divine persons are not first diverse, because they are of the same essence. Therefore they are not distinguished wholly by themselves, but by something of themselves. Moreover, there are several properties in the same person, as in the Father innascibility and active generation, which according to St. Augustine, book 5 *De Trinitate*, chapter 6, are distinct from one another: "If the Father were not unbegotten, He could nonetheless be Father, and conversely." Therefore, even if, per impossibile, one did not distinguish the Father from another, the other could distinguish, and conversely. Hence the Father always has something by which He is distinguished from the Son, and therefore they are not distinguished wholly by themselves. Finally, in the Father there is active generation and active spiration. But by active spiration he is not distinguished from the Son; indeed it is common with the Son. Therefore the Father is not distinguished wholly by himself, but by something of himself.

These reasons are confirmed. If persons are distinguished wholly by themselves, then they are distinguished also in essence. But this cannot be, since they agree in essence; and the same thing cannot be the principle of agreeing and of being distinguished. Moreover, either the divine person, for example the Father, has something beyond the essence that the Son does not have, or it does not. If the first, we have what we intend. If the second, no reason can be given why that person is Father rather than another, indeed not even why it is a person distinct from another. Therefore many recent authors pronounce the contrary opinion rash and almost heretical.

Nevertheless its supporters object.

They object 1. A divine person is as simple as the essence. But the divine essence itself is distinguished by itself from whatever is other. Therefore so too is the person. It is confirmed: paternity is no more simple than the Father; but paternity, since it is simple, is not constituted by anything distinct from itself. Therefore neither is the Father.

I deny the major. For, as we observed in Note 2, the divine person is constituted in the being of a complete person by the entity of the Godhead and of personality; and thus the person signifies two entities or formalities constitutive of itself, and so it can be called less simple than the essence. Or I distinguish: it is as simple as the essence in real simplicity, which excludes real composition from really distinct parts: I concede. It is as simple in formal simplicity, which excludes a plurality of formalities: I deny. But this formal simplicity does not belong to God, only the real, as we proved when treating divine simplicity. Similarly the confirmation must be distinguished. I add that paternity is not constituted by something distinct from it not because it is simple, but because it is conceived by way of a form that does not consist in other formalities. But since the Father is signified by way of a whole and of a concrete, and consists of nature and paternity which are formally distinct, he must also be constituted by something distinct from the divine nature, and thus the same reason does not hold of paternity and of the Father.

They object 2. What is constituted depends on and is caused by what constitutes. But the divine persons are wholly independent and uncaused. Therefore they are not constituted by anything distinct.

I distinguish the major. A real constituted whole that arises from the union of really distinct constituent parts, as in a physical composite constituted from matter and form, depends

on the constituent and uniting principles: I concede. A formal constituted whole that arises from formalities really indistinct, which are united of themselves and independently of anything extrinsic and constitute a whole, does not so depend: I deny.

They object 3. From the Lateran Council, chapter *Firmiter*, it is said that the Father gave the whole substance to the Son. But those properties, if there are any, whether relative or absolute, are substance. Therefore he gave them to the Son. Hence he is not distinguished from the Son by them. Therefore neither is the Father constituted in personal being by them.

I respond that the council understands by "substance" the divine essence and nature insofar as it abstracts from personal properties, as the holy Fathers in this matter are accustomed to oppose substance to relation. Hence Boethius near the end of the book *De Trinitate*: "Substance contains unity; relation multiplies Trinity."

CONCLUSION II
THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE CONSTITUTED AND DISTINGUISHED NOT BY ABSOLUTE BUT BY RELATIVE PROPERTIES

This is the more common and truer opinion of theologians.

It is proved first from all those texts of Sacred Scripture in which the divine persons are named by relative names: Father, Son, and the Spirit of truth proceeding from the Father, and most especially from Matthew at the end, where Christ, sending the apostles to convert the nations, commands them to baptize them "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." From these places I argue thus: Sacred Scripture and Christ the

Lord designate the divine persons by names that are most proper and that signify personal properties. But these names from their primary imposition signify relation, not something absolute. Therefore those personal properties are relative. The major is clear, for Christ the Lord imposed those names on the persons that most fit them as they can be conceived and distinguished by us in this life.

It is proved second from the councils, especially the Second Council of Toledo in the Confession of Faith, chapter 1: "In the relative names of the persons, the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both. Although three persons are said relatively, one nature is nevertheless believed according to substance." And below: "In the relation of the persons the number is seen." The same is gathered from the Council of Florence, where John the theologian, pleading the cause of the Latin Church with the tacit approval of the council, said: "Relation alone suits all Greek and Latin doctors: by divine procession it multiplies the persons," to which those two, "from which" and "to which," spoken of above, also belong. "Since, therefore, relations of this kind multiply the persons, it follows that the Father differs from the Son, and one person from another, for no other reason than by force of relation." Therefore it holds that the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by relations, which is also confirmed by the speech that Bessarion the patriarch gave for the union of the Greek and Latin Churches, where in chapter 6 he says that the divine persons are distinguished in both ways, but "first and principally" in our mode of understanding "by relations, by which the divine persons are also constituted," and afterwards by another mode, namely by origin.

It is proved third by the authority of the holy Fathers. Nazianzen, Oration 37: "The difference of their mutual relation produced different names for them," namely Father and Son. Chrysostom, homily 5 *De incomprehensibili Dei natura*, distinguishes the proper names of God so that the property of the persons is denoted: "Father and Son are proper names of person; but God and Lord are common." St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 12 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 15: "There is no difference between the Father and the Son except the personal one, because the Father is Father and He is Son. How then will the Son be created, since the Father is uncreated—especially since relative names are said of one another, and once one is said the other is immediately understood? For he who says 'Father' at once understands 'Son,' and he who names 'Son' immediately refers to 'Father.'" Damascene concurs, *De Fide*, chapter 11: "We acknowledge one God in the properties alone, namely of paternity, filiation, and procession; and as to the cause and those things that proceed from the cause, we perceive a distinction of the persons' perfection, that is, of the mode of existing." Finally St. Anselm in the book *De Processione Spiritus sancti*, chapter 1, writes: "This alone is the cause of plurality in God, that Father and Son and Holy Spirit cannot be said of one another, but are other to one another," and so forth. From all these it is clear that the holy Fathers' meaning is that the divine persons are constituted not by absolute but by relative properties.

This truth cannot be proved by an efficacious reason, for Bl. Scotus proposes and subtly solves all that can be devised in 1, distinction 23, number 31. Therefore only this argument can be formed: in the mysteries of faith, especially in the mystery of the Trinity, nothing should be asserted except what appears more conformable to Sacred Scripture and to the sayings of the holy

Fathers. But Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers signify that the divine persons are constituted not by absolute but by relative properties. Therefore it must be held.

Moreover, the holy Fathers commonly teach that all absolutes are common to the three divine persons. But personal properties are not common to the three. Therefore they are not something absolute. Finally, the divine persons are constituted formally by that by which they are formally distinguished and multiplied. But this is done by relations alone, as is clear from what was said: relation alone multiplies the Trinity. Hence the common axiom: "In the divinity all things are one where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way." Therefore, and so forth.

You will object 1. In Proverbs 20, where Solomon, speaking of God, asks among other things: "What is His name," that is, the Father's, "and what is the name of His Son, if you know?" From this it is argued: every question presupposes something and inquires something else. But here the divine Father and Son are presupposed to exist, and moreover their proper names are asked. Therefore Solomon presupposes that the proper name of the first and second person is not "Father" and "Son," otherwise there would be no place for the question, for thus he would both know and not know the same thing, or would presuppose knowledge and yet inquire it, which is absurd.

I respond that Solomon rightly asks there for something else that adequately and exactly expresses the nature and property both of the divine Father and of the divine Son. For although these names Father and Son signify that the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by relations, nevertheless they do not sufficiently explain what and what kind of relations those constitutive relations are, and how those divine persons are

constituted. They signify the constitution of persons by relation, but they do not explain the dignity of the persons.

You will object 2. One divine person is referred to another by a relation; therefore by that relation they are not constituted in personal being. The antecedent is evident. For what is referred is neither the essence, since the related must be really distinct from its terminus, but the divine essence which is in the Father is not really distinct from itself in the Son, rather it is really the same; nor is it the relation that is referred, since it is itself the reason for referring. Therefore what is referred is the person. The consequence is proved first by the authority of St. Augustine, book 7 *De Trinitate*, chapter 2: "Every relative is something, except relation." And chapter 3: "If the Father is not something to Himself, he is not that which is referred." Moreover, what is referred by a relation is prior to the relation, since it is the foundation and subject of the relation; but the foundation is presupposed for what is founded in it. Finally, what is denominated as related is neither essence nor relation; therefore it is suppositum and person. Hence, just as the wall that is denominated white is presupposed for whiteness, so the person must be presupposed for the relation by which it is referred, and therefore it is not constituted in the reason of person by that relation.

Bl. Scotus denies the consequence, number 41. For what is referred is the whole suppositum consisting of essence and relation, which suppositum so constituted is called relative. To the first proof he responds in number 42 that St. Augustine does not mean that what is related as what is something absolute, but only that it includes something absolute as the foundation of the relation. To the second he says that the antecedent is true of created relations, which do not constitute a suppositum in being

as suppositum, but not of divine relations, which are constitutive of supposita. For what is constituted is posterior to all its constitutives, or at least is simultaneous in nature with them. Hence the person constituted by relation is simultaneous in nature with the relation by which it is constituted in the being of a divine person. Add that created relations must presuppose that which they relate because they are accidents that come to foundations as to subjects; but it is otherwise with divine relations, which, since they are substantial, do not require a subject that they relate, but only presuppose the essence from which they arise and with which they constitute the person. In the same way the third proof is solved: whiteness presupposes what is white because it is an accident coming extrinsically and really distinct. But the divine essence is not really distinct from relation, nor is the related person; therefore it ought not be presupposed.

You will object 3. A real relation presupposes extremes constituted as really distinct. But the divine relations are real. Therefore they presuppose persons related to one another as already really constituted and distinct, and so do not constitute them. The major is proved: because what is referred is constituted before it is referred; because Aristotle proves that identity is not a real relation precisely because it does not require extremes really distinct; and finally because the producing person, constituted in personal being, is prior by origin and reason to the person proceeding from it. But a relation cannot be prior in either way, since related things are simultaneous in nature and knowledge. Therefore the producing person is not constituted in its personal being by relation.

Bl. Scotus denies the major, number 42. First, this is false of transcendental relations, which do not presuppose extremes

already constituted and distinct, but are one of the extremes, which by itself formally and from its nature is referred to another, and per se is formally a relation to another. Thus cognition is referred to its object, potency to the possible, and the like. But the relations of the divine persons are transcendental.

To the first proof I say: what is referred by something else must be constituted before it is referred: I concede. What is referred by itself, I deny. But the divine persons are referred to one another by themselves. Hence it follows that a divine person is not constituted in being before it is referred.

To the second proof he says that Aristotle does not conclude that identity is not a real relation merely because it does not require extremes really distinct, but also because it presupposes that the identity of one to itself does not constitute extremes really distinct.

To the third proof I distinguish the major. The producing person is prior to the produced by priority of that in which, or of duration: I deny. It is prior by priority of that from which, or of origin: I concede. To the minor I say that related things are simultaneous in nature and knowledge because from the production of one the existence of its correlative is inferred, either in being of existing or in objective being. Hence in the first sign of origin in which the Father is conceived, the Son too is known, not indeed in being of existing for that prior sign, but only in objective being, as was said when treating the objects of divine processions. Add that, as the Doctor says in number 41, although relations are simultaneous in nature, nonetheless in some correlations one can be prior to another by priority of origin; thus action is prior to passion correlated with it.

You will press: suppositum is pre-understood in some way prior to action, because each thing is understood to exist per

se before it is understood to act per se. Therefore in the prior sign of origin either the Father's suppositum is understood as something absolute, or as something respective. If the first, we have what we intend. If the second, then in that prior sign of origin the Son is also presupposed before He is generated, and thus He will not be the terminus of generation. It is confirmed, because whatever correlative is pre-understood prior to something, its correlative is also pre-understood with the same priority. Add that if paternity is constitutive of the Father, it will be prior to the Father; therefore filiation, which is simultaneous with paternity, will also be prior to the Father, and thus the Son will not be produced by the Father.

Bl. Scotus distinguishes the major. When the suppositum is not constituted by productive action, he concedes it; when it is so constituted, he denies it. But the divine Father is constituted in being as Father and first person by active generation; therefore he ought not be presupposed to it. He also denies the second part of the consequent along with its confirmation, because, as was just said, simultaneity of nature in correlatives does not remove priority of origin, and therefore it does not prevent paternity from belonging to the Father prior in origin to filiation's belonging to the Son or being understood to belong to Him.

You will object 4. Every real relation is terminated to something absolute. But this would be false if the person to whom paternity is terminated were constituted by relation, for then it would not be something absolute but something respective. Therefore, and so forth.

Bl. Scotus denies the major, number 43. Although it is true of relations that do not constitute extremes that they must terminate in something absolute, it is false of those that constitute extremes really distinct. For just as their foundation is something

respective, so too their terminus can be something respective, since it is constituted in being as terminus by relations.

CONCLUSION III
THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE CONSTITUTED IN PERSONAL BEING BY RELATIONS UNDER THE FORMAL REASON OF RELATIONS

This seems to be the genuine teaching of Bl. Scotus, as is gathered from various places, especially *Quodlibet* 4, number 4; *Quodlibet* 19, number 5; and in 1, distinction 2, question 7; distinction 5, question 2; and distinction 11, question 4; and most fully in distinction 26 throughout.

It is proved first from the authority of the Second Council of Toledo, chapter 1, where it is said that the divine persons "insinuate number by this alone, that they are to one another, and in this number they lack what they are in themselves." Therefore, by the council's definition, relations do not constitute and distinguish persons according to their esse in, as the Thomists wish, but according to their esse ad, that is, under the formal reason of relation. It is likewise gathered from the discourse of John the theologian in the Council of Florence, session 18: "Therefore relations of this kind multiply the persons, so that the Father differs from the Son, and one person from another, for no other reason than by force of relation." But to differ by force of relation is to differ under the formal reason of relation. Yet the proper being of relation, as the Philosopher says, is esse ad, not esse in. Therefore the divine persons are truly constituted under the formal reason of relation.

It is proved by reason. A relation cannot constitute or distinguish the divine persons except according to the formal

reason it has. But it has no formal reason other than the relative. Therefore it constitutes precisely insofar as it is relative, that is, insofar as it regards a terminus. It is confirmed: a relation cannot be conceived unless it is understood according to its essence and formal reason by which it differs from other beings. But the proper essence of relation is to regard a terminus, for by this it differs from other beings; for other beings have being in themselves, but relation is wholly to another. Therefore, and so forth.

Second, that by which relation formally constitutes a person is either something per se or something to another. If the first, it is absolute, and thus persons are not constituted by relation. If the second, then truly it constitutes the divine persons insofar as it is relation.

Third, it is impossible to conceive a form inhering in something without attributing to it its formal effect. But the formal effect of relation is to refer one to another actually. Therefore, by the very fact that divine paternity is understood, it is also understood as actually referring the Father to the Son, and consequently it implies that paternity is understood to constitute the Father in the reason of person without being understood as actually referring Father and Son. Moreover, that esse in which relation is said to have either signifies the essence with which it constitutes the person, or the constituted person. Not the first, because the relation of paternity is not said to be in the essence but in the Father. Not the second, for then the relation of paternity would not constitute the first suppositum but would presuppose it already constituted, as a form presupposes a subject in which it is.

They object 1. St. Augustine, book 7 *De Trinitate*, chapter 2, says: "The Father Himself is substance, not insofar as He is

Father, but insofar as He is; but thus the person of the Father is said to be to Himself; for 'person' is said to Himself, not to the Son or the Holy Spirit." Therefore, according to St. Augustine, a divine person is not formally to another, and thus it is not constituted in being as person by relation reduplicatively as relation.

I respond that by "to himself" St. Augustine does not deny that the person is relative to another, which he asserts there, but only that each person has in itself a constitutive principle of itself really distinct from the other person. Or I say that he means that the divine personal relations are substantial and per se, not accidental and in another as in a subject of inherence, as are created relations.

They object 2. The reason of person and the reason of relation are opposed. For person is something subsisting in itself, but the relative is essentially to another. Personality is substance in itself, but relation is reference to another. Therefore a person is not constituted in the reason of person by relation reduplicatively as relation.

I distinguish the antecedent. The reasons of person and relation are opposed in created things: I concede. In the divinity they are not: I deny. The disparity is that a created relation is an accident presupposing a subject already wholly completed substantially and thus having the reason of subsistent and person. But in the divinity the relation itself constitutes and distinguishes the persons.

They object 3. If the divine relations, reduplicatively as relations, constituted and distinguished the divine persons, then they would do so either insofar as they are relations, or insofar as they are divine relations. Not the first, because then every created relation would be constitutive and distinctive of person. Not the

second, otherwise every divine relation would constitute a divine person, and thus active spiration, which is a divine relation, would constitute a divine person, which is false. Therefore, and so forth.

I respond that this constitutive reason belongs to divine relations not precisely insofar as they are divine, but insofar as they have opposition to one another by reason of procession and the origin of one person from another; or rather insofar as they import and signify a real distinction of one from another. But active spiration does not import such a distinction, because it is by one and the same formal principle by which, namely by will.

COROLLARY I

From what has been said it is inferred, first, against the Thomists, that the divine relations are not constitutive of the persons insofar as they are hypostatic forms, as Bl. Scotus rightly proves in 1, distinction 28, question 3, number 2. First, because a relation considered as a hypostatic form is conceived as an entity either absolute or respective. For although the concept of being in general is neither respective nor absolute, since being as such abstracts from respective and absolute being and includes both, nonetheless a singular entity, such as the entity constitutive of a person in incommunicable being, must be either absolute or respective, since between singular absolute being and singular respective being there is no middle. But the entity constitutive of person cannot be absolute, otherwise it would follow that the divine persons are constituted by absolutes, which has been rejected. Therefore it must be conceived as relative.

Second, because that reason of hypostatic form either signifies something distinct from the formal reason of paternity

as relation, or it does not. If it does, then the Father is not constituted by relation but by a formality distinct from the formality of relation, which nonetheless all Thomists reject. If it does not, then the persons are formally constituted by relations as relations, since they are constituted by an entity that is formally relation.

It is confirmed by a likeness: although whiteness can be conceived as a power that divides sight without being conceived as a quality, nonetheless no one can say it is not sight-dividing as it is such a quality. Thus, although we can form some concept of divine paternity in which explicitly the concept of relation is not involved, nevertheless it must not be inferred that it does not constitute persons as relation.

COROLLARY II

It is inferred, second, from the same place, number 3, that although the divine origins are not formally distinct from the relations—both because otherwise they would be something absolute and thus common to the three persons, which is impossible, and because nothing is so to another as generation and active or passive spiration, so that active generation is nothing other than paternity, and passive generation is formally the same as filiation—nevertheless they do not constitute the divine persons precisely as origins reduplicatively, but only as relations. For origin as origin is only a way between the producing person and the produced person. Therefore it is not a constitutive form of them; rather it seems to presuppose in the producing person its own constitutive form. For something is conceived to have its being before it is conceived to operate; therefore the Father is conceived as constituted in the reason of

person, at least inadequately, before He is conceived adequately as producing the Son; and the same must be said of the produced person. For origin is the way by which the produced person receives its being, and consequently by which it receives the form constitutive of it in being as person.

Second, the constitutive of a thing that has fixed and permanent being must be expressed by way of something fixed and permanent, not as a way to being, that is, not as in becoming but as in accomplished being. But the divine persons have fixed and permanent being. Origin, however, signifies something flowing, and precisely signifies being that is made and produced. Therefore the divine persons are not adequately constituted in accomplished being by origins but by relations.

Third, origin as origin is either absolute or respective. Not the first, as was said; moreover it would follow that persons are constituted by something absolute if they were constituted in personal being by absolute origins. But if it is the second, then they do not constitute persons precisely as origins, but as relations.

Therefore the divine origins indeed properly signify persons really distinct, but they do not formally constitute them. In this sense those holy Fathers must be understood who seem to assert that the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by origins. Thus St. Cyril, book 2 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 3, says: "So that Sacred Scripture might distinguish by reasons the hypostasis that begets and the hypostasis that is begotten, it used the names Father and Son." Thus St. Anselm, book *De Processione Spiritus sancti*, chapter 2: "This alone is the cause of plurality in God, that Father and Holy Spirit cannot be said of each other, but are other to one another, because in those two ways God is from God, which can wholly be called relation." Thus Damascene,

book 1 *De Fide*, chapter 2, says: "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are wholly one, except for the property of being unbegotten, generation, and procession." Not that the Fathers truly meant that the divine persons are constituted by origins, but that the persons, once constituted and really distinct, are better made known to us by relations insofar as they are origins than insofar as they are conceived under the formal concept of relation.

This same doctrine, taken from the Subtle Doctor, Cardinal Bessarion clearly expounds in the Council of Florence in his Oration for the union of the Greek and Latin Churches, chapter 6, saying that relation and origin, although they differ according to the mode of understanding—since origin is signified by way of act, as generation, while relation is signified by way of form, as paternity—nevertheless do not differ in reality. Therefore the divine persons are distinguished in both ways, but first and principally, according to our mode of understanding, by relations, by which the divine persons are also constituted, and afterwards by another mode, namely by origin. For to beget and to be begotten, which belongs to origin, does not principally constitute person, but paternity and filiation, namely to be Father and Son, which belongs to relation. But because relation and origin are the same in reality and relation follows origin in concept, therefore the divine persons are distinguished in both ways, but principally by relation.

COROLLARY III

It is inferred, third, that the divine Father is not constituted by the reason of being unbegotten, but by the relation of paternity. For, as Bl. Scotus says in 1, distinction 28, question 2, number 11, "unbegotten" formally signifies a negation, but a

divine person cannot be formally constituted by a negation. Therefore, and so forth. The major is clear: unbegotten is the negation of begotten. Bl. Scotus proves the minor: no negation can be of itself incommunicable, but must be incommunicable by reason of something else. Therefore it cannot by itself make a person incommunicable, but only by reason of an incommunicable thing in which it is. But there is nothing in the divine essence that is incommunicable. Therefore no negation together with the divine essence can constitute a person.

This is confirmed, and the preceding reason is further clarified. In the first divine person there must be a negation of communicability inseparable from its foundation and rendering that foundation wholly incommunicable both actually and aptitudinally and obedientially, because the divine person has repugnance to its being communicated. But that foundation is not the divine essence, nor any absolute common to the three persons. Therefore it must be some positive thing that is constitutive and distinctive of the first person. Therefore the first person is not formally constituted by a negation, and thus neither by the reason of being unbegotten, which is formally a negation.

Some reply that the reason of being unbegotten is not a pure and simple negation, but imports something positive, namely the reason of first principle and font of the Godhead. But against this the Doctor insists in *Quodlibet* 4. That reason of first principle signifies that the Father is from Himself, either effectively, because He is the cause of Himself, or only negatively, because He has no principle of Himself. Not the first, because it is repugnant that something be the author and cause of its own being, otherwise it would be before it was, as has often been said. If the second, then to be first principle is only the negation of another prior principle, and thus is not something positive.

Second, if "unbegotten" signifies something positive, then it signifies either something absolute or something relative. If absolute, then the first person is constituted by something absolute, which the Fathers and councils deny. If relative, either that relation is formally the same as paternity, and we have what we intend, or it is formally distinct from it, and then there will be more than four distinctive relations of the divine persons, which no theologian admits.

Third, that fontal reason of the Godhead which is in the Father is either essence or relation. If essence, it cannot be constitutive and distinctive of person. If relation, either it is paternity or distinct from paternity, and thus the prior difficulty returns.

Therefore one must confess that the first person is constituted formally by paternity, which in its formal concept as relation includes the reason of being unbegotten and first principle, and so forth.

QUESTION III

WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE THREE PERSONAL RELATIVE SUBSISTENCES AND ONE ABSOLUTE

NOTE 1. The name "subsistence" is used here to signify a mode of existing *per se*. Now it is taken in two ways. First, as opposed to existence in another through inherence: in this sense every substance is called a being subsisting *per se*, whether it is complete or incomplete. Thus any part of a physical body, whether integral or essential, although it exists in the whole, is called a being subsisting *per se*, no less than the physical body itself.

Second, it is taken as existing *per se* insofar as it signifies an existence most perfect and independent of another as completing or sustaining it. In this way any nature that is in every respect complete and established in its essential predicates, and likewise in its attributes and properties, is said, prior by nature to being in its own suppositum or in an alien one, to be a being subsisting *per se*. Thus humanity, prior by nature to being assumed by the Person of the Word, is said to exist *per se*, or to subsist *per se*. For by the name "subsistence" a person, or a suppositum, is not signified, but also any thing whatsoever existing *per se* and in itself, as Rusticus teaches explicitly in the book *De Incarnatione contra Acephalos*: "Most clearly," he says, "the name 'subsistence' sometimes signifies a person, sometimes a nature."

NOTE 2. The mode of existing *per se* completely is again twofold, namely communicable and incommunicable. The former belongs to every common substantial nature, which, insofar as it is prescinded from those to whom it is communicated, just as it is called a truly complete and real nature, so likewise must be called existing *per se*, or subsisting *per se*. The latter belongs to a singular nature not only complete in the aspect of a singular nature, but also in the aspect of a person, or suppositum.

Hence a twofold difficulty arises concerning the present question. The first is whether the divine nature, insofar as it is prescinded from the divine persons and from the relations constitutive of the persons, can be called subsisting *per se*, and whether it has an absolute existence and a subsistence distinct from the relative subsistences. The second is whether, on the hypothesis that this absolute subsistence is given, three other

relative subsistences must be admitted, really distinct from one another and formally distinct from absolute existence.

NOTE 3. Concerning the two difficulties just mentioned, there are two opposed positions among authors. For first, Fr. Vázquez, in disputation 125, affirms that the divine nature subsists in the divine persons only through their own relative subsistences; and thus he denies that there is in the divine any absolute subsistence common to the three persons and proper to the divine nature. Durandus, however, in book 1, distinction 13, question 2, judges that the three divine persons draw the whole character of subsisting from the absolute subsistence of the divine essence included in them, and that they have incommunicability from their constitutive relations; and thus he holds that three relative subsistences for constituting the divine persons are altogether superfluous.

Between these extreme positions, the disciples of Bl. Scotus proceed by a middle and safer path, followed by the more serious Thomists, affirming that one absolute subsistence and three relative subsistences must be admitted.

CONCLUSION I
TRULY, THERE ARE THREE RELATIVE SUBSISTENCES IN THE DIVINE PERSONS

This conclusion is sufficiently established from the holy Fathers praised at the beginning of the present article in the explanation of the name "subsistence," and it is further proved as follows. There are multiple subsistences in the divine; but there are not multiple absolute subsistences; therefore there are multiple relative subsistences. The major is clear both from what has been said and especially from the Sixth Ecumenical Synod,

session 11, where it is said that the Most Holy Trinity has been made numerable by personal subsistences.

Likewise this is clear from the holy Fathers, especially from St. Cyril of Alexandria in the *Dialogus De Trinitate*, book 3, where he says: "All the discourse of our faith tends to this, that we may see one nature of the Godhead which properly subsists in three subsistences." So likewise St. Athanasius, in the *Sermo De Deipara*, says: "We proclaim one God in three subsistences, in which there is one substance." Finally, St. Ambrose, in the *Symbolum Apostolorum*, chapter 2, says: "It is Catholic that we confess both one God according to the unity of substance, and that we conceive the Father and the Son each in his own subsistence."

Some reply that when councils and holy Fathers proclaim multiple subsistences in God, they take "subsistence" for personality. Against this: that acceptance is either proper speech or improper. If it is proper, the point is granted, namely that subsistence, in some proper acceptance of its own, is multiple in God. If it is improper, it is surely unworthy to distort the words of councils and Fathers to an imperfect sense without any urgent necessity. Add that if the Fathers and councils used "subsistence" for "personality," the point is in fact concluded; for just as there are multiple relative personalities in the divine, so also there will be multiple relative subsistences.

Others reply that councils and holy Fathers take "subsistence," not for personality in the abstract, but for persons and for the subsisting thing in the concrete. Thus when they affirm that multiple subsistences must be admitted in God, it is the same as if they said that there are multiple persons and subsisting things with the same essential subsistence. Against this: the holy Fathers and councils speak of subsistences as

though of forms by which the divine persons are constituted, distinguished, and numbered; but this is to use "subsistence" in the abstract and not in the concrete; therefore, and so forth.

Moreover, even if they should use "subsistence" in the concrete, it can always be inferred that relative subsistences are distinct. For, for the multiplication of a concrete substantive, it is necessary that forms be multiplied. Hence the three persons cannot be called three gods, because the name "God" is a substantive, and there is only one form signified by that name, namely the Godhead. Therefore, if only one absolute subsistence is given, it will not be able to be multiplied in the persons, just as the Godhead itself is not multiplied. Consequently, since councils and holy Fathers affirm that subsistences are multiplied, it is necessary that they distinguish relative subsistences from the absolute.

The conclusion is proved further by a theological reason. Whatever belongs to the divine persons by reason of the relations by which they are constituted in personal being is multiplied in them; but subsistences belong to them in that way; therefore they are multiplied.

The major is evident, for when the formal reason is multiplied, it is necessary that what is formally the same with it be multiplied as well. But subsistences are formally the same as the relations constitutive of the divine persons. For subsistence, insofar as it states a mode of subsisting incommunicably, is the very reason constitutive of a person in personal being. Indeed, the divine persons, insofar as they are persons, subsist *per se* independently and incommunicably; therefore they truly have incommunicable subsistences.

Further, where there are diverse productive principles that, there must be diverse subsistences. For just as operating

follows being, so a productive principle that presupposes complete being, and thus being subsisting *per se*. But in God there are diverse productive principles that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. For the Father is the principle that of the Son, and the Father and the Son are the principle that of the production of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Father and the Son must have distinct subsistences.

Finally, the humanity of Christ is assumed and terminated only by the subsistence of the Word, not by the subsistence of the Father or of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the subsistence of the Word is distinguished from the subsistence of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, and thus they do not subsist by one absolute subsistence.

YOU WILL SAY 1: To subsist is a perfection simply and without qualification; but relation in the divine states no perfection, as will be established in the following article; therefore likewise no relation is a subsistence. I distinguish the major. To subsist *per se* communicably and absolutely states a perfection, I concede. To subsist *per se* incommunicably and relatively states a perfection, I deny.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: The notion of subsistence is something absolute; therefore no relative subsistence is given in the divine. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved from St. Augustine, book 7 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 4, saying: "Every thing subsists with respect to itself; how much more God." But what is with respect to itself and not with respect to another is absolute. Therefore the notion of subsisting is something absolute. I deny the antecedent; and to its proof I say that St. Augustine is speaking there of subsistence insofar as it states a selfhood excluding dependence on another that sustains, such as the absolute subsistence belonging to the divine persons by

reason of the essence communicated to them, not by reason of the relations.

Or I say that he intends only that subsistence, or the subsisting, is not toward another such that it is the subsistence of another thing, or something subsisting for another, as the Father, for example, is the Father of the Son. Yet this does not prevent subsistence from being relative, just as a person, although it cannot be said to be the person of another person, is nonetheless relative.

YOU WILL SAY 3: The divine nature, as we will soon prove, subsists by an absolute subsistence; therefore it does not subsist by relative subsistences. The consequence is clear, for subsistence is the ultimate terminus in the line of subsisting. Therefore it cannot be terminated by another, and consequently besides the absolute, a relative subsistence must not be admitted. I distinguish the antecedent. It subsists by a communicable subsistence, I concede; by an incommunicable subsistence, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the consequent. Other communicable and absolute subsistences must not be admitted, I concede; incommunicable and relative ones, I deny.

I likewise distinguish the proof. Personal and incommunicable subsistence is the ultimate terminus in the character of subsisting, I concede; non-personal and communicable subsistence, I deny.

For absolute and essential subsistence, just as it is not incommunicable, so it does not have the character of an ultimate terminus, but only of a terminus constituting a nature wholly complete in the aspect of the divine nature and rendering it capable of being communicated to the three divine persons.

CONCLUSION II
SUBSISTENCE, TAKEN FOR A MODE OF EXISTING PER SE EXCLUDING DEPENDENCE ON ANOTHER EXTRINSIC IN EXISTING, BELONGS TO THE DIVINE NATURE INSOFAR AS IT IS PRESCINDED FROM PERSONALITIES

This is the doctrine of Bl. Scotus in book 2, distinction 7, question 1, and in book 3, distinction 1, question 1, number 6, where, speaking of the divine nature insofar as it is prescinded from personal relations, he affirms that it could have been the terminus of the hypostatic union: "Because," he says, "it has no being from a person, but is prior by nature to being in a person, and gives being to the person. For the nature is of itself this and subsisting *per se*, although not incommunicably."

The conclusion is proved first by the authority of the holy Fathers. For Pope Agatho, in the decretal letter found in the Sixth Synod, article 4, says: "We confess God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, not three gods but one God; not the subsistence of three names, but one subsistence of three subsistences."

Likewise St. Augustine, book 7 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 4: "Every thing," he says, "subsists with respect to itself; how much more God." And chapter 5 near the end: "For God, to be is the same as to subsist; and therefore, if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one subsistence." St. Jerome agrees with him in Epistle 57 to Damasus: "One," he says, "is the nature of God and of itself, which truly is; for what subsists does not have it from elsewhere, but it is its own."

St. Hilary also urges the same in the book *De Trinitate*: "This," he says, "is not the condition of bodily natures, that they be in one another so as to have a perfect unity of nature by their subsistences." After a few intervening words: "But to be in does not mean that one is in another as a body in a body, but that it is and subsists so as to be in the subsisting. And to be in in this way, so that it subsists, is proper to God alone."

St. Anselm also subscribes in the *Monologion*, chapter 43, where he says that the Father, by begetting, gave to the Son that he subsist, be wise, and live, not through an extraneous essence, but through his own essence, wisdom, and life, and so forth.

Finally Boethius concludes in the book *De duabus naturis* about the middle: "God," he says, "is hypostasis, that is, subsistence; for he subsists needing nothing. Hence we say that there is one ousia, or ousiosis, that is, one essence or subsistence of the Godhead."

The conclusion is proved by reason. To the divine essence insofar as it is prescinded from the divine persons belongs every perfection simply and without qualification; but to subsist *per se* is such a perfection; therefore it must be attributed to it. The major is clear, for the divine essence, with relations prescinded, is infinitely perfect in the genus of being, and is true God, and thus a being complete in the character of Godhead. Therefore all compossible perfections must be attributed to it. The minor is also clear, since to subsist *per se* is far superior to existing either in another or dependently on another. Therefore it is a perfection simply and without qualification to be attributed to the divine essence, and not by personal relations, which state no perfection. Therefore it subsists *per se* and immediately.

Second, the divine essence insofar as it is prescinded from the persons exists *per se* completely and independently of

any extrinsic, and likewise independently of the persons. Therefore it truly subsists. The consequence is clear, since by absolute subsistence we understand nothing other than a complete substance existing *per se* and incommunicable to any extrinsic complement really distinct from it. The antecedent is proved because the divine essence receives no perfection from the persons, but bestows on them many perfections, indeed all, since all the perfections of the divine persons flow from the essence. Therefore it subsists independently of them, and much more independently of every extrinsic really distinct, and thus subsists *per se*.

Third, what is a sufficiently active principle *per se* is also subsisting *per se*; but God, as presupposed to the persons, is a sufficiently active and productive principle; therefore he is subsisting *per se*. The major is evident, since subsistence is the complement of a nature, and since a nature must first be complete in being before it operates, because being is prior to operating; therefore it must be subsisting before it acts. The minor is also evident, because the works of the Trinity *ad extra* are undivided by reason of the indivisible Godhead. For whatever belongs to all the persons altogether belongs to them by reason of the essence common to them. But to create, for example, belongs to them undividedly. Therefore it belongs first to God before it belongs to the persons; and producing cannot belong to the essence unless it is subsisting, since actions belong to subsisting things. Consequently God, insofar as he is prescinded from the persons, is subsisting.

This is confirmed by the authority of the holy Fathers, who affirm that creatures are produced by the subsisting God. Thus St. Dionysius, chapter 1 of *De Divinis Nominibus*, says that the subsistence of goodness by its being is the cause of all

subsisting things. And St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book *De Vita Moysis*: "Nothing," he says, "besides the supreme essence, which is the cause of all and on which all depend, truly subsists."

YOU WILL SAY 1: If the divine essence subsisted insofar as it is prescinded from the persons, it would be a person; but this is absurd, otherwise there would be a quaternity of persons in God, which was condemned in the Lateran Council; therefore God, insofar as he is prescinded from the persons, does not subsist. The major consequence is proved because a person states nothing other than the subsistence of an intellectual nature; but the divine essence insofar as it is prescinded from the persons is an intellectual nature; therefore, if it subsists *per se*, it will truly be a person. It is confirmed because, according to the holy Fathers praised at the beginning of this article, "subsistence" signifies the same as "hypostasis"; but in God hypostasis is the same as person; therefore, if the divine essence subsists, it will truly be a person.

I distinguish the major. If it subsists by a personal subsistence and incommunicable to another as suppositum, it will be a person, I concede. If it subsists by an absolute subsistence, incommunicable indeed to any extraneous complement really distinct from the subsisting essence, but communicable to the divine supposita really indistinct from the essence itself, it will be a person, I deny. For it belongs to the nature of a person that the subsisting is an intellectual nature incommunicable to another, both to what is extraneous and to a suppositum.

To the confirmation I distinguish the major. "Subsistence" in Latin signifies the same as "hypostasis" in Greek according to some acceptance of its own, and indeed the more frequent, I concede. According to every acceptance of its own, I

deny. For, as we observed, the name "subsistence" is taken by the Fathers in two ways: first, for selfhood excluding dependence on one who sustains; second, for selfhood excluding communicability to a suppositum. In the first way it does not signify the same as hypostasis, but only in the second. According to the first acceptance we say that there is one absolute subsistence in God; according to the second, there are truly three relative subsistences.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Subsistence is the ultimate terminus of the nature which it affects; but the divine essence antecedently to the personalities does not have something that is its ultimate terminus. Therefore it does not have subsistence. The minor is proved because an ultimate terminus excludes a later terminus; but the divine essence does not exclude a later terminus, since it is still terminated by relative subsistences; therefore, and so forth.

I distinguish the major. Personal subsistence, incommunicable to another suppositum, is the ultimate terminus of a nature and admits no later terminus, I concede. Absolute and natural subsistence, which makes a nature existing *per se* and nonetheless communicable to another as suppositum, must be its ultimate terminus, I deny. For thus the divine nature, since it is infinitely fecund, by its own reason requires to be communicated to the divine persons and to be ultimately terminated by them and to be made incommunicable beyond that.

YOU WILL SAY 3: To subsist is to exist *per se* not only independently of another but also with repugnance to being in another, just as to inhere is to be in another with repugnance to existing *per se*. But the divine nature insofar as it is prescinded from the persons does not enjoy this mode of existing *per se*; rather it demands to exist in the persons; therefore in this way it does not truly subsist.

I distinguish the major. To subsist is to exist *per se* and not in another as in one who sustains, I concede; as in one who is the ultimate terminus, I deny. With the minor distinguished similarly, I deny the consequence. For the divine nature, even if it demands to be in the persons as in the termini of its fecundity, nevertheless it is not in them as in one who sustains and completes it. For the divine essence receives no perfection from the persons; indeed every perfection of the persons flows from it. Nor is it completed by them in the character of the divine nature, but only its infinite fecundity is derived in them and is terminated by them.

ARTICLE II
ON THE RELATIONS CONSTITUTIVE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

Theologians distinguish, most especially, a twofold genus of relations in God: some they call relations *ad extra*, others relations *ad intra*. Relations *ad extra* are those by which God is referred to creatures, either from eternity, as are the relations of omnipotence and of simple knowledge to possible things, and likewise of predestining, reprobating, and the like, to future rational creatures; or in time, as are the relations of Creator, Governor, Redeemer, and the like. Relations *ad intra* are those by which the divine persons are mutually referred to one another.

These are again of a twofold genus: for some are proper to individual divine persons, while others are common to the three. Those proper to the persons are also called relations of origin, by which the divine persons are chiefly constituted; and these are paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. All of these, if you except active spiration, are in the

individual persons with a distinct and diverse character, and are really distinguished from one another. The common relations are those found in each person, founded upon unity and upon the metaphorical divine quantity and quality, and they are called equality, identity, and similarity.

It is not necessary in the present place to dispute about relations *ad extra*, but about relations *ad intra*, concerning which three things chiefly must be resolved. First, whether all relations *ad intra*, both common and proper, are real. Second, which of the proper relations are truly constitutive of the divine persons. Third, whether the relations constitutive of the persons import and connote some perfection.

QUESTION I
WHETHER ALL THE DIVINE RELATIONS AD INTRA ARE REAL

NOTE 1. By the name "relation" we understand that as it were form by which one thing looks to another and is compared with it. Hence it comes about that in any relation a twofold being is distinguished, namely *esse in* and *esse ad*. For since a relation is a habitude of one to another, it must necessarily be in the subject that is related, and toward the terminus which it regards.

But whether a relation is real according to that twofold being is not agreed upon by authors. For some, with William of Paris, praised by the Carthusian in book 1, distinction 26, question 2, affirm that both in God and in all creatures relations are not real entities but only beings of reason, or at least only extrinsic denominations, as Ockham taught in book 1, distinction 30, question 4. Some contend that relations are not real insofar as they are toward something, but only insofar as they

are in something, as most Thomists do with St. Thomas in *De potentia*, question 4, article 5, and in distinction 26, question 2, article 2, to the third. Others finally agree with Bl. Scotus that the divine relations *ad intra* are real according to that twofold being, namely in something and toward something.

NOTE 2. From Bl. Scotus, *Quodlibet* 6, number 33, three things are especially required for the reality of a relation. The first is a real foundation which is in the thing and from the nature of the thing. The second is real extremes, really distinct. The third is that the relation itself be in the extremes from the nature of the thing, that is, without any consideration of an intellect, or without the operation of an extrinsic power.

It must further be noted that real relations, especially those called mutual, have three properties. The first is that they are simultaneous by nature. The second is that they are simultaneous in cognition, or in definition. The third is that they are said reciprocally. All these, from Aristotle, St. Cyril thus expounds in book 2 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 3: "Those things which are toward another," he says, "are simultaneous both in nature and in reason, and one is inferred from the other."

It follows, therefore, that those relations must be called real to which the three conditions mentioned and the three designated properties belong. But whether these fit all the divine relations *ad intra* must now be determined.

NOTE 3. Divine relations differ from created relations in three chief ways. First, a created relation has scarcely any entity and existence, any activity and efficacy, any solidity and permanence; indeed, by a defect of fragility and thinness it almost vanishes in the same moment in which it arises. A divine relation, however, is of such and so sublime an entity that it

institutes the most august Trinity and constitutes the divine persons in personal being.

Second, relations in creatures are accidental, and therefore need a subject both to exist and to be preserved. Divine relations, however, are substantial and subsisting *per se*; and although they flow from the divine essence as from a sea of all entity and perfection, and determine it to the constitution of the persons, nevertheless they are not in the divine essence as in a subject, but are really identified with it.

Third, relations that come to creatures intrinsically presuppose their extremes, that is, a foundation and a terminus really existing and distinct, since they arise only from the positing of foundation and terminus. Divine relations, however, do not presuppose but constitute the divine persons and make them really distinct.

With these preliminaries set down, three things remain to be established. First, whether the divine personal and proper relations are truly real. Second, whether they are real both according to being toward another and according to being in something. Third, whether the common relations of identity, equality, and similarity are also truly real.

CONCLUSION I
THE RELATIONS PROPER TO THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE SIMPLY REAL

This is sufficiently established from those things we said in proving that the divine persons are constituted through relations precisely insofar as they are relations.

It is proved further by the authority of councils, especially of the Eleventh Council of Toledo, chapter 1, which

says: "In the relative names of the persons, the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both. Although three persons are spoken of relatively, nevertheless one nature is believed according to substance." The same is clear from the Council of Florence, session 18, where John the Theologian, from the common opinion of the Greek and Latin Fathers, says: "Relation alone, among all Greek and Latin Doctors, by the divine procession multiplies the persons, so that one person differs from another for no other reason than by the force of relation."

From these I argue thus: the divine persons are really constituted and distinguished; therefore they are constituted and distinguished by something real, constitutive and distinctive. But that, from the councils, is nothing other than relation; therefore it is truly real.

It is proved in a second way. Those relations must truly be called real to which the three properties required for a real relation belong; but these belong to the notional relations; therefore they are real. The major is evident, for property follows entity; and thus if the entity is real, the property will be real as well.

The minor is proved. The three conditions are that mutual relations be simultaneous by nature, simultaneous in cognition, and reciprocal by inference, as was said in Note 2. But these fit the relations constitutive of the divine persons. For the divine Father and Son, for example, are simultaneous by nature, and from the existence of the one the existence of the other is inferred, as St. Cyril expressly proves in the *Dialogus De Trinitate*, book 4: "If the Son who is begotten does not exist," he says, "neither would the Father exist according to a fitting account; for

the Father is because he begot. Therefore it is true that both subsist together and that both are taken away together."

They are also simultaneous in cognition. For St. Basil says in book 2 *Contra Eunomium*: "From the fact that the Father is, the Son is, and at once, when anyone grasps a thought of the Father, he also falls upon the Son, since the Father is the Father of the Son." St. Cyril of Jerusalem agrees with him in *Catechesis* 7: "The name of Father," he says, "together with the utterance of that name, presents the Son also to be understood; just as likewise anyone naming the Son also understands the Father." For, as St. Gregory of Nyssa adds in the Epistle *Contra Apollinarem*: "Where anyone has named the Father, it is certain that he has introduced the signification of some Son; for how will he be called Father unless a Son also is understood?" St. Hilary also supports this in book 7 of *De Trinitate*: "The name of Father," he says, "has in itself the name of Son; for he is not Father except through the Son. And the signification of the Son is a demonstration of the Father, because the Son is only from the Father."

Therefore, if the property of real relation belongs to the personal relations, they must truly be called real.

It is proved in a third way. Those relations must truly be called real to which the three conditions required for a real relation belong, namely that the foundation be real, that it be between real extremes, and that it be in the foundation from the nature of the thing and apart from the consideration of an intellect. But these three conditions belong to the personal relations. The first, because active and passive origin, in which the relations of producer and produced are founded, is truly a real foundation. The second, because those relations are between really distinct extremes, since the producer and the produced are really distinct from one another. Finally, those relations and

habitudes of one person to another belong to them apart from any operation of an intellect; for even if no created intellect had ever existed, no less truly would the divine Father be Father of the Son and the Son be Son of the Father; therefore no less truly would they have had relation to one another.

YOU WILL SAY 1: A real relation requires extremes really distinct; but the divine relations do not have extremes really distinct. This is proved, because those relations are between the essence, which is communicated by one person to another, and the essence in the person to whom it is communicated; but the divine essence in the communicating person is not distinguished from itself insofar as it is in the person to whom it is communicated; indeed it is altogether the same; therefore, and so forth.

I deny the minor; and to its proof I say that the divine essence itself is not the extreme, or proximate foundation, of the relation that intervenes among the divine persons. Rather, the divine persons themselves are the extremes of the relations. For it is not the essence but the divine persons themselves that are really referred to one another. Therefore, since the persons are really distinct, their relations are between really distinct extremes.

You will press: a relation not only requires but also presupposes the reality and distinction of the extremes; but the divine relations do not suppose real extremes really distinct; therefore they are not real.

I distinguish the major. A created relation presupposes the reality and real distinction of the extremes, because it arises only from the foundation and terminus having been posited, I concede. An uncreated and divine relation presupposes real extremes really distinct, I deny. For since it is constitutive and distinctive of the divine persons, because it terminates the

communication of the divine essence, it does not presuppose but effects the distinction of the extremes.

YOU WILL SAY 2: For this reason it is affirmed that there are real relations in God, because the divine persons are denominated by relative names. But from this it is not lawful to gather that there are in them any real relations; therefore, and so forth. The major is evident from the proofs of the conclusion. The minor is proved, because God is truly and really called Lord, Creator, and the like, no less than the first person is called Father. But from the fact that God is called by the relative name "Lord," it does not follow that there is in him the real relation that intervenes between lord and servant in creatures. Therefore from the fact that the first person is called Father, it is not lawful to conclude that it is the same relation that is between father and son in creatures.

I deny the minor; and to its proof I distinguish the major. God is really called Lord as truly as the first person is called Father, with a reality of termination, namely because the relation of lordship is terminated in really existing creatures, just as, with due proportion, the relation of paternity is terminated in a really existing Son, I concede. God is really called Lord as intrinsically, or through an intrinsic relative form, I deny.

For the relation of lordship arises only from without and belongs to God already constituted wholly in his being, both essential and personal; therefore it is called a relation coming to him from without, namely from the production of a creature. The relation of paternity, however, belongs to him from within, not only because it flows from the essence with which it is really the same and from which it is distinguished only formally, but also because together with the divine essence it concurs for the intrinsic constitution of the divine person in personal being.

YOU WILL SAY 3: Boethius in book 1 of *De Trinitate*, about the middle, after enumerating all the categories, says: "When one turns these to divine predication, all those things that can be predicated are changed; but 'toward another' cannot at all be predicated." Therefore from this it follows that relation, which is the category toward another, does not belong really to God as substance does, and as those things are signified beyond substance by way of quantity, quality, action, and so forth.

I respond that Boethius intends that relations are not predicated of the divinity in the same way in which the other categories are enunciated, but in an altogether different way. For after he inquired in the following book whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are predicated of the divinity substantially, he thus concludes after the middle of the book: "From these, therefore, we understand that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not said of the divinity itself substantially, but in a certain other way. For if it were predicated substantially, it would be said of each singly and of all singly. But now it is manifest that it is said toward another, for the Father is Father of someone."

Therefore Boethius confesses that relations are predicated and said of God as toward another, which is a certain other mode of predication distinct from the predication of substance and of the other categories that are verified of each person. For each person is said to exist *per se*, to be equal, to be similar, and the like; but each person is not said to be Father, and so forth.

CONCLUSION II
THE RELATIONS OF ORIGIN CONSTITUTIVE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE T RULY REAL ACCORDING TO ESSE AD

This is proved from all those things by which it has already been indicated that the divine relations are constitutive of the persons precisely insofar as they are relations. For the relations of origin are constitutive of the divine persons insofar as they are real and according to their proper character by which they are relations. But they are proper relations according to *esse ad*. Therefore they are relations and constitutive according to their *esse ad*.

The major is clear from what has been said. The minor is proved, because if *esse ad* is excluded from relation, nothing further remains by which one is understood to be referred to another. But if from relation the account of referring one to another is removed, no relation remains. Therefore if *esse ad* is excluded, there will no longer be a true relation.

This is confirmed, because in the way the divine relations constitute the persons, in that same way they distinguish them. But they distinguish them only according to *esse ad*. This is proved because they do not distinguish except insofar as they are opposed to one another only according to *esse ad*, not according to *esse in*, which is common to them with absolute forms; therefore, and so forth.

Second, paternity according to the most formal account of paternity is a relation to the Son. Therefore relation according to the most formal account of relation, that is, according to *esse ad*, is a real entity. The major is evident. For if paternity, according to its most formal account, were not a real entity, God would not be truly and properly Father, but only through a certain comparison of the human intellect; and thus he would be less properly Father and Son than a man who begets and is begotten, who are really father and son.

The minor is clear from what has been said, by which we proved from very many authorities of the holy Fathers that the proper account of paternity is wholly to the Son, just as the whole account of the Son is to the Father. It is further proved from the Council of Worms in the profession of faith, where, repeating the words of the Eleventh Council of Toledo, "In the relative names of the persons, the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both," it adds: "What the Father is, he is not toward himself but toward the Son; and what the Son is, he is not toward himself but toward the Father." St. Bernard agrees in Epistle 192 to Innocent, where he says: "It is not what he is toward himself but what he is toward the Son that is signified by the name of Father." Therefore the true account of relation is toward another.

Third, if relation according to *esse ad* were not of itself properly real but only from the fact that the substance of God is real, or his love and intellection, it would follow that the eternal divine relations are not real in a more perfect and truer way than are the temporal relations belonging to God, by which he is really denominated Lord and Creator. For those too are founded on the operations of the divine intellect and will. For God is in time really and properly called Lord by reason of the reality of creatures, presupposing the foundation of will and command by which God from eternity determined to produce and govern creatures.

But this consequent is absurd; otherwise the relations of origin would be only extrinsic denominations and thus would not be real and intrinsic principles constitutive of the divine persons. Therefore, and so forth.

YOU WILL OBJECT: *Esse ad* formally looks only to a terminus; but to look formally to a terminus is not a real account;

therefore *esse ad* is not real. The major is evident. The minor is proved, because that is not of itself real which is common to a real being and a being of reason; but to look to a terminus is something common to a real relation and a relation of reason, for each refers a foundation to a terminus; therefore, and so forth.

I deny the minor; and to its proof I deny the minor. For a relation of reason does not truly look to a terminus; rather, it is conceived in the manner of those relations that look to a terminus, just as any being of reason is not a being, but is conceived in the manner of a being.

Moreover, *esse in* is said of a real relation and of a relation of reason no less than *esse ad* is. For relations of reason are conceived both in the manner of accidents inhering in subjects and as being toward another. Therefore if, from the fact that *esse ad* is said of a real relation and of a relation of reason, it followed that relation is not real insofar as it is toward another, it would likewise follow that it is not real insofar as it is in something; and thus relation would be real according to none of its account, which is absurd.

YOU WILL SAY 2: The whole reality of any being is in itself; therefore it can be real only according to *esse in*, not according to another being opposed to this, such as *esse ad*.

I distinguish the major. The whole reality of an absolute being is being in itself and toward itself, I concede. The whole reality of a relative being is such, I deny. Indeed, from the definition of relatives their whole being is toward another. For Aristotle, defining relation, says: those things are toward another for which this very being is to be disposed toward another, that is, to have a habitude toward another.

The rest of what could be objected is taken from philosophy, and we have already solved it in our *Philosophia*

Academica in proving that relations are real entities. Therefore let it suffice.

CONCLUSION III
TRULY, IN GOD THERE ARE RELATIONS OF IDENTITY, EQUALITY, AND SIMILARITY, AND THEY ARE REAL

This conclusion has two parts.

The first part is proved. Those in whom there is perfect identity, equality, and similarity have relations of identity, equality, and similarity. But these exist most perfectly among the divine persons.

First, among them there is the highest essential identity, both because the same essence is numerically one in the three persons, and because the divine essence, by reason of its infinity, identifies to itself the relations constitutive of the divine persons. Hence it comes about that although there are three persons, nevertheless there is one God. Therefore among them there is the highest and perfect identity.

Second, there is also complete equality among the divine persons, as is gathered from Philippians 2:6, where Paul says of the divine Word: "He did not deem it robbery to be equal to God," that is, he did not usurp the equality of God tyrannically or by robbery, but it was connatural to him. This divine equality is especially considered in three respects: in the infinite magnitude of perfections, in the eternal immutability of existence, and in the inexhaustible fecundity of power, as St. Fulgentius explains in the book *De Fide ad Petrum*, chapter 1, saying: "None of these, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is outside any of the others, because no one precedes another in eternity, or exceeds another in magnitude, or surpasses another in power. For

neither is the Father earlier or greater than the Son or the Holy Spirit, nor can the eternity and immensity of the Son naturally precede or exceed the immensity and eternity of the Holy Spirit."

The Sixth Council of Toledo agrees with him in the profession of faith before the middle: "In this Trinity," it says, "there is such unity of substance that it lacks plurality and holds equality: nor is it less in the individuals than in all, nor greater in all than it remains in the individual persons." It is likewise confirmed from the Symbol of St. Athanasius: "In this Trinity nothing is prior or posterior, nothing greater or less, but the whole three persons are coeternal and coequal with one another."

Third, the same is clear concerning similarity. For among the divine persons there is perfect assimilation by reason of the divine attributes and perfections, in which those divine persons are said to be wholly similar. Hence Athanasius in the Symbol: "Such as the Father is, such is the Son, such is the Holy Spirit." Hence in the first oration *Contra Arianos* he says that the Son, insofar as he is the Word and Wisdom of the Father, has all that is the Father's: eternity, immutability, and in all things and in all respects the same similarity.

The Holy Spirit also has this similarity, not indeed by the most formal force of his procession as the Son does, but by reason of the divine nature communicated to him. For this reason some Fathers went so far as to call the Holy Spirit the form and image and Word of the Son, as will be evident in the following disputation.

St. Hilary proves this divine similarity in book 3 of *De Trinitate* from the words of Genesis, "Let us make man," and so forth. "He who says," he writes, "'Let us make man to our image and likeness,' shows by saying 'our likeness' that they are similar to one another." Richard of St. Victor also proves it in book 3 of

De Trinitate, chapter 7, from the perfect charity that is among the divine persons: "The fullness of charity," he says, "requires that each be supremely loved by the other, and consequently, according to the aforesaid norm of distinction, that each be supremely lovable. But where each must be loved equally, it is necessary that each be equally perfect. Therefore it is necessary that both be equally powerful, equally wise, equally good, equally blessed," and so forth.

Whatever could be objected against this truth has already been resolved from what was said concerning the consubstantiality and equality of the divine persons.

The second part is proved, namely that those relations of identity, equality, and similarity are truly real, as Bl. Scotus affirms in book 1, distinction 31, and elsewhere.

It is proved first. A real relation is that which belongs to the extremes with the work of the intellect excluded. But such are the aforesaid relations. Therefore they are real. The major is evident. The minor is proved from the holy Fathers and councils, especially from Nicaea, the First Council of Toledo, and the First Council of Constantinople, in which the divine Son is said to be of the same essence with the Father, and equal to him in all things, and perfectly similar.

This is confirmed. In reality the divine Son has all that is required on the side of the foundation for relations of identity, equality, and similarity with the Father. Therefore in reality he also has those relations. The consequence is clear, for in relations coming intrinsically, once a sufficient foundation and terminus are posited, relation necessarily results. The antecedent is proved, for from Aristotle, book 5 of the *Metaphysica*, chapter 5: "Those are the same whose substance is one; those similar whose quality is one; those equal whose quantity is one." But in reality in the

Father and the Son there is one substance, namely the divine nature; likewise one quality, namely the perfections of attributes and modes; and finally one quantity, not of bulk, but of mode, namely divinity, majesty, and sublimity. Therefore in them there are in reality relations of identity, equality, and similarity.

Second, equality and similarity are real relations in creatures. Therefore much more in God. The consequence is proved because equality and similarity are much more perfectly in the divine than in creatures. Therefore all the more it stands that they are real in God. The antecedent is from St. Augustine in book 3 of *De Trinitate*, chapters 4 and 5, where he proves the highest equality of the persons from their highest simplicity; and in chapter 10, speaking of the Son insofar as he is an image, he says: "Here now is such congruence that there is first equality and first similarity, differing in nothing, and in no way unequal, and in no respect dissimilar, but answering altogether to him whose image it is."

Third, the Doctor praised proves it in the same place, number 2. Those relations are real to which all the conditions required for a real relation belong, namely, first, that the extremes be real; second, that they be really distinct; third, that the relation result from the nature of the thing, or of the extremes, and thus without any comparison of the intellect. But these three conditions truly fit the aforesaid relations.

First, the divine essence and perfections, which are the foundations of identity, equality, and similarity of the persons, are truly real. Second, the persons themselves, between whom those relations intervene, exist really and are really distinct from one another. Third, no comparison of the intellect is required for those divine persons to be the same, equal, and similar. Therefore

the three conditions necessary for a real relation belong to those relations.

The Thomists reply that besides the three assigned conditions, a fourth is required, namely that there be a foundation by which it is really distinguished in each extreme. But in the divine this does not occur, for the same essence and the same perfections, numerically one, are in the three adorable persons. Therefore, by defect of this condition, the aforesaid relations cannot be real in God.

Against this, first: paternity and filiation in creatures are real relations. But the foundation of paternity is not really distinguished from the foundation of filiation. For the foundation of paternity is active generation and the foundation of filiation is passive generation. But action and passion are not really distinguished, according to the Philosopher in book 3 of the *Physica*, as the Thomists themselves readily concede. Therefore the foundation of created paternity is not really distinguished from the foundation of filiation; and thus, for relations to be real, a real distinction of foundations is not necessary.

Second, if the same quantity or quality, numerically one, were constituted in diverse subjects, there would intervene between those subjects a relation of equality and similarity. But in such a case the foundation would not be distinct really in those extremes. Therefore the unity and identity of the divine essence and perfections in the divine persons does not prevent there being real identity, equality, and similarity in them.

They reply secondly that in that case equality and similarity would not arise among those subjects, because, as they say, a form posited in two subjects does not render those two such; for duality requires the forms to be multiplied.

But this reply is shown false by two instances. First, in the eternal Father and in the Son there is one active spiration, and yet the Father and the Son are two spirating. Likewise in the three persons of the most Holy Trinity there is one eternity, and yet St. Athanasius in the Symbol teaches that the three are coeternal. Therefore whiteness, for example, posited in two subjects will truly make two white things, and thus two similar things, although the form is numerically one. Consequently, for the reality of relation a real distinction of foundation in the extremes is not necessary; it suffices that the extremes themselves are really distinct.

They reply third: if the foundation were not multiplied, it would follow that the same thing would be referred to itself, for the foundation is that which is referred.

I deny the consequence. For the foundation is indeed the reason for referring, but not that which is referred. The extremes are those which are referred, and these are the divine persons really distinct from one another.

These reasons are confirmed. Those relations are founded upon unity. Therefore, the greater the unity of essence, perfection, and magnitude, the more excellent will be identity, equality, and similarity. Consequently, if a relation of identity arises between two substances distinct in number or in species, much more will it arise between extremes in which there is one substance numerically one.

Further, you will say:

YOU WILL SAY 1: If equality and the other relations were real in the divine, it would follow that there are in God more than four real relations. But this consequent seems false and contrary to the common opinion of theologians. Therefore the antecedent is false as well.

The consequence is evident, for relations of identity, equality, and similarity are formally distinct from relations of origin. Therefore there would truly be in God more relations than four. Indeed the Doctor himself establishes in each divine person two relations of similarity, two of equality, and two of identity, one referring to one person and the other to another person. From these there result eighteen real relations; and if you add the four relations of origin, there will be in God twenty-two real relations. Again, since all the divine perfections are distinguished from the nature of the thing and are all infinite intensively, it will follow that there are as many relations of equality and similarity as there are attributes, which will certainly produce a vast number of relations in the divine.

Bl. Scotus denies the minor in the same place, number 7. "It can be conceded," he says, "that as many as there are perfections in God simply, so many are there also habitudes and so many equalities. Yet just as those perfections are simply one thing, so also the equalities according to them are simply one thing." Therefore it does not imply that there are in God more relative formalities, just as there are more absolute formalities.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Formalities and entities in the divine are not to be multiplied without some urgent necessity. But no necessity seems to exist for multiplying so many relative entities. For the divine persons can be said to be equal, the same, and similar to one another of themselves. For by this nothing else can be signified except that they have the same essence and perfection, or that one does not have another essence, nor a greater or lesser perfection than another. Therefore those positive entities are superfluous.

I deny the minor; and to its proof I say that since divine equality, identity, and similarity are positive, those denomin-

ations must also be made through something positive, and therefore through some positive formality. But to have the same essence and perfection, or not to have another essence and perfection, is not formally something positive, but purely negative. Therefore this does not suffice for the denomination of identity, equality, and similarity. For this there is required some entity or relative formality, formally, or at least modally, distinct both from the essence and the attributes and from the relations of origin.

YOU WILL SAY 3: Equality is a perfection simply and without qualification. But relation in the divine is not such. Therefore equality is not a relation.

Bl. Scotus distinguishes the major in book 1, distinction 19, question 1, number 8. Equality taken fundamentally is a perfection simply and without qualification, because it presupposes a perfect nature and one in every way infinite in the persons, I concede. Equality taken formally, namely insofar as it is a relative formality by which the divine persons are referred to one another, is a perfection simply and without qualification, I deny.

Or, as the Doctor speaks there: "I say that perfection simply, that is, what formally could be infinite, says only something that can be essential in the divine and toward itself, and such is in some way pre-understood to the relations of origin, like wisdom, goodness, and the like. Equality, however, is not pre-understood to the relations of origin, nor can it be toward itself. For the Father is not equal to himself but to the Son; and therefore equality in this way does not state perfection simply. It does, however, state a perfection such that in every nature, when comparing one to another of the same nature, it is better than its opposite; because its opposite necessarily states

imperfection. For there is not inequality in the same nature unless one individual has that nature imperfectly."

Nor is it an obstacle that in distinction 26 he affirms that equality, formally, states perfection. For he does not say this from his own position, but according to the mind of others, who, from the fact that persons were said to be constituted by an absolute, inferred that it would follow that there is some perfection in one person that is not in another. The Doctor shows that this inference is nothing, saying that they would conclude better that relation does not constitute the person. For, he says, it seems more probable that relation could be a perfection than that it is a hypostatic property, in the opinion of the one arguing.

QUESTION II
WHICH RELATIONS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

NOTE 1. The common opinion of theologians is that four personal relations of origin must be admitted, namely paternity, filiation, passive spiration, and active spiration. For these alone are relations founded in the divine processions considered by way of action and passion. For there are only two real processions, as we proved above, namely the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit. These can be considered in two ways, namely actively or passively. Generation taken actively is called paternity; taken passively it is called filiation. Likewise the procession of the Holy Spirit can be viewed actively or passively. In the first way it is called active spiration, which is in the Father and the Son and by which they are distinguished from the Holy Spirit. In the second way it is called passive spiration.

NOTE 2. Almost all theologians also agree that paternity is truly constitutive of the first divine person, filiation of the second, and passive spiration of the third. But there is no slight difficulty concerning active spiration: namely, whether it also constitutes some distinct divine person. For if it does not constitute a person, why does it hold a place with the constitutive personal relations? But if it does, then there will be not only three but truly four divine persons, and thus the mystery of the divine Trinity collapses altogether.

In order to avoid these rocks of error, some theologians judge with Gregory in book 1, distinction 26, that active spiration must be removed from the relations of origin. Our Baro, in *Apologia* 3, action 3, partly agrees with them. The Thomists do not reject it, but contend that it is distinguished from paternity and filiation only virtually. Durandus, however, contends that it is really distinguished from paternity and filiation. Bl. Scotus, however, in *Quodlibet* 5 affirms that spiration is indeed real, but is diverse from paternity and filiation not really but only formally and actually.

NOTE 3. It is most certain that the Father and the Son are really distinguished from the Holy Spirit and that the Holy Spirit likewise is distinguished from them. But by what force this distinction is made is not agreed upon by all. For some will that this distinction is to be taken from paternity and filiation, so that active spiration is superfluous for this. Others, on the contrary, affirm that this real distinction must be gathered from nothing other than active spiration.

Hence two things chiefly must be established in the present question. First, that active spiration is a real relation necessary for the distinction of persons. Second, that it is

distinguished from paternity and filiation not really, nor only virtually, but formally.

CONCLUSION I
ACTIVE SPIRATION IS A REAL RELATION AND IS NECESSARY FOR GATHERING THE COMPLETE DISTINCTION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

This conclusion is proved. Between a principle and a terminus proceeding really from the principle, a real relation intervenes, especially when the proceeding terminus is of the same nature as its principle. But the Father and the Son are one principle from which the Holy Spirit proceeds really, and he is of the same nature as the Father and the Son. Therefore the Father and the Son look to the Holy Spirit by a real and mutual relation.

I add: but they do not look to him in this way through paternity and filiation. Therefore they must look to him through another relation, and thus through active spiration.

The major of the syllogism is evident. For there is no stronger reason why between the first and second persons there should intervene a mutual real relation of principle and proceeding terminus, namely paternity and filiation, than between the Holy Spirit and the Father and the Son, from whom he proceeds as terminus from principle.

This inference is proved from St. Augustine in Sermon 38 *De Tempore*, where he says: "The relation of the Holy Spirit cannot be converted by a reciprocal account in the same way as Father and Son. For the Father is called Father of the Son, and the Son is called Son of the Father. But the Holy Spirit is uniformly said toward the Father and the Son, because he is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. For we call the Holy Spirit the Spirit of the

Father. But we do not in turn say Father of the Holy Spirit, lest the Son be understood to be the Holy Spirit. Likewise we say the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, but we do not say the Son of the Holy Spirit, lest the Father be understood to be the Holy Spirit." Therefore that mutual relation is not by the account of paternity and filiation, and thus another relation must be admitted.

This is confirmed from the same author in book 5 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 11, where he proves that among the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit there is a mutual relation, not under the account of Spirit, but under the account of Gift. For he says: "That relation does not appear from this name, namely Holy Spirit, but it appears when he is called the Gift of God. For the Gift is of the Father and of the Son, because he proceeds from the Father, and the Apostle says: 'If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not his.' Therefore when we say 'the gift of the giver' and 'the giver of the gift,' we say each relatively to the other."

Therefore St. Augustine judges that there is a mutual relation among the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But the Father and the Son do not refer mutually to the Holy Spirit by paternity and filiation, but under the account of Gift, as he himself teaches in chapter 12, where he proves that the relation of the Holy Spirit does not have as its correlative the relation of the Father, nor the relation of the Son. "When we say," he writes, "'the gift of the Father and of the Son,' we cannot say 'the Father of the gift' or 'the Son of the gift.' But in order that these might correspond to each other, we say 'the gift of the giver' and 'the giver of the gift,' because here a customary word could be found, there it could not."

Therefore St. Augustine says that Father is said relatively, and likewise that "principle" is said relatively, and perhaps

something else. But Father is said toward the Son; "principle," however, is said toward all things that are from him. Therefore St. Augustine holds that the Father and the Son truly refer to the Holy Spirit, not by the relation of paternity and filiation, but by the relation of principle. But this relation is called active spiration. Therefore it is truly real.

Bessarion proved the same clearly from the holy Fathers in the Council of Florence in the Oration for Union, chapter 6. For after he persuaded that between the Son and the Holy Spirit there is a mutual relation, as of cause to caused and of caused to cause, using in the Greek manner the name "cause" for "principle," he proves that this relation is not made by filiation. Hence he concludes that since the Son, as Son, is not referred to the Spirit, for he is not called the Son of the Spirit, it remains that he is referred to the Spirit as spirating, while the Spirit is referred to the Son as Spirit. For the Spirit is called in many places of Sacred Scripture the Spirit of the Son, and his spiration; for "this Spirit," as Athanasius says, "is the spiration of the Son." Therefore since the Spirit is referred to the Son both as spiration and as Spirit, the Son also is referred to the Spirit as spirating. From these he concludes two things: first, that between the Son and the Spirit there is a mutual relation; second, that this relation, on the side of the Son, is not filiation but active spiration; and consequently, since the Son is really referred to the Holy Spirit, active spiration must necessarily be real.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Nothing is to be asserted in the mystery of the Trinity unless it is supported either by the oracles of Scripture, or of councils, or of the holy Fathers. But there is no mention of active spiration among the holy Fathers; indeed Albinus Flavius in book 1 *De Trinitate*, chapter 5, says that the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son is not

reciprocal, that is, not mutual. Therefore this active spiration is not to be asserted. I deny the minor. For although the holy Fathers did not call the relation between the Father and the Son "active spiration," they sufficiently designated it by establishing a mutual relation among all the persons, as we have asserted above from St. Augustine, and as is also clear from the Eleventh Council of Toledo saying: "By this alone they indicate number, that they are toward one another." And Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 37, says: "The mutual manifestation, as I might say, and the difference of their relation produced also their diverse names."

Therefore among those divine persons there is a mutual real relation. But this, on the side of the Father and the Son, is not paternity and filiation with respect to the Holy Spirit. Therefore the holy Fathers sufficiently affirm that another must be admitted, namely active spiration, which the Council of Florence tacitly approved, as we said above. Indeed the Council of Lyons under Gregory X had also indicated it in the single chapter *De summa Trinitate*, not only by saying that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by one spiration, but also that they are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Therefore by the same reason they have relation to the Holy Spirit by which they are his principle. But from the council they are his principle by active spiration, and consequently, in the mind of the council, they are referred to him by active spiration. To Albinus Flavius I respond that he indeed holds that the Father and the Son are not referred to the Holy Spirit by a mutual relation under the account of Father and Son, but only under the account of principle, as we have said above from St. Augustine.

YOU WILL SAY 2: The holy Fathers assign only three personal relations. Further, the Lateran Council in the chapter *Damnamus* excludes a real quaternity in the divine. But if active

spiration were real, there would truly be in the divine a quaternity of real relations. Therefore, and so forth. Finally, St. John Damascene in book 1 of *De Fide*, chapters 10 and 11, treats amply of the divine relations. But he nowhere mentions active spiration. Therefore he judges it is not to be admitted. I respond first: the holy Fathers assigned only three really distinct personal properties because they were treating only of relations constitutive of persons and really distinct. Since active spiration neither constitutes a person nor is really distinguished from paternity and filiation, there was therefore no discourse about it. To the Lateran Council I say that it excludes quaternity in the divine insofar as from it a quaternity of persons would be inferred. But from admitting active spiration this is not inferred, for it is not constitutive of a divine person. Therefore the council does not exclude it. Further, the council excludes a quaternity of things really distinct as thing from thing. But active spiration is not distinguished from paternity and filiation in that way, as we will prove at once. Therefore it does not conflict with us.

To St. John Damascene I respond that from a negative authority nothing certain is gathered, especially when the contrary can be inferred. But Damascene supplies sufficient foundation in the same chapter 11 to assert a real relation of active spiration, when about the middle he says that God is understood in the properties of paternity, filiation, and procession according to cause and caused. By these words he indicates that there is a mutual reciprocation of producing principle and produced terminus between the Holy Spirit and the Father and the Son. But this cannot be paternity and filiation. Therefore it must be active spiration.

YOU WILL SAY 3: The relation of principle in God is not always real. For God is truly a principle of creatures, and yet he

does not have toward them a real relation. Therefore even if the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, it does not follow that they have a real relation of active spiration. I distinguish the antecedent. When the producing principle and the produced terminus are of a diverse order and of diverse natures, I concede. When they are of the same, I deny. But the relation of Creator to created things is toward things of another order and nature, and it comes to God only in time. Active spiration, however, is toward a terminus of the same order and nature, and it belongs to God from eternity, and therefore it is real.

YOU WILL SAY 4: Active spiration presupposes the Father and the Son as constituted. Therefore if it is real, it will come to them only by resultance and in the manner of an accident. But this is unworthy of God. Therefore, and so forth. I deny the minor. For this resultance does not happen according to the thing, but according to formality. Nor does it come from an extrinsic action as created relations do, but from within and from the fecundity of the divine will. Therefore, just as it does not repugn that attributes result from the essence, distinct from it not really but only formally, so also it does not repugn that from the Father and the Son there results that active spiration.

CONCLUSION II
ACTIVE SPIRATION IS NOT DISTINCT REALLY BUT FORMALLY AND ACTUALLY FROM PATERNITY AND FILIATION

This is the position of almost all theologians as to the first part. It is proved first from the Lateran Council in the chapter *Damnamus*, where the opinion of Abbot Joachim is condemned,

who said that a quaternity must be admitted in God because the essence would be really distinct from the persons really distinct from one another. The council establishes that therefore there is only Trinity and not quaternity, because each of the three persons is that thing, namely substance, essence, or nature. From this it may be argued thus: the council establishes that there is not a quaternity of things in the divine. But if active spiration were really distinct from paternity and filiation, there would be in the divine a quaternity of things. Therefore, in the mind of the council, it is not so distinguished. This is confirmed, because the council chiefly proscribes a quaternity of persons. But if spiration were distinguished really, there would be a quaternity of persons, since that relation would be subsisting *per se* and thus would be a suppositum, and consequently would be a person, because any suppositum of an intellectual nature is a person.

Second, it is proved from the holy Fathers and from very many councils we have often cited, and especially from St. Anselm, who teaches that in the divine all things are one except where an opposition of relation stands in the way. Whether that opposition is relative, as the Thomists will, or disparate, as will be evident below when we treat the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son, nevertheless between paternity and active spiration there is no relative opposition, because one is not produced by the other, nor is it between producing principle and produced terminus. Nor is there disparate opposition, because for that it is required that it be constitutive of a person, while active spiration does not constitute a person. Therefore it states no opposition with paternity and filiation, and thus it is not really distinguished from them.

Third, it is proved. In the divine, what does not proceed from another is not really distinguished from it. But active

spiration does not proceed from paternity and filiation. Therefore it is not really distinguished from them. The minor is evident, since there are only two divine processions. The major is also clear. For there are only three indications of real distinction: that one is producing and another produced; that one can exist while the other does not exist; and that they can inhere in really distinct subjects. But the two latter cannot be in the divine. Therefore only the first indication of distinction is admitted there.

Hence John the Theologian in the Council of Florence, session 18, says deservedly: "Relation alone, which we name above the principal habitude, among all Greek and Latin Doctors, by the divine procession multiplies the persons."

The second part is sufficiently gathered from what has been said. For active spiration is a real relation. But it is not formally the same as paternity and filiation, and it is not really distinguished from them. Therefore it is at least formally distinguished. The major is clear from the first conclusion. The minor, as to the second part, is clear from what was just said. Therefore the first part of this is proved: those relations are at least formally distinguished which have distinct termini *per se* and are reasons from which the distinction and diversity of persons is gathered. But active spiration is such with respect to paternity and filiation. For paternity looks *per se* to the Son, and filiation to the Father, while active spiration looks to the Holy Spirit and is the reason why the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Further, it itself effects a mutual relation among the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which paternity and filiation do not effect in that way, as was proved in the preceding conclusion. Therefore at least active spiration is formally distinguished from paternity and filiation. Further, a disparate relation is not formally the same as a directly

opposed relation. But paternity and filiation are disparate relations only with respect to passive spiration, whereas active spiration is directly opposed to passive spiration. Therefore it is at least formally distinguished from paternity and filiation.

Finally, if active spiration were formally the same as paternity, it would be as true to say that the Father produces the Son by spirating as by generating, and thus the Word could be called Spirit as well as Son. But this consequent is absurd. Therefore, and so forth. The consequence is evident, for where there is no distinction in reality, there cannot be a diversity of real predicates of the thing; therefore if paternity and active spiration were in no way distinguished on the side of reality, whatever is affirmed of one could also be affirmed of the other.

YOU WILL SAY: Just as there is a disparate opposition between filiation and passive spiration, so likewise there is between filiation and active spiration. But the former opposition suffices to distinguish filiation really from passive spiration. Therefore the latter will also suffice to distinguish it from active spiration; and thus they will be distinguished not only formally but also really.I respond that the Son is not for this reason alone distinguished really from the Holy Spirit under the formal account of Son, because filiation is a relation opposed disparately to passive spiration, but chiefly because passive spiration is wholly incompossible with filiation in the same suppositum. For if filiation and passive spiration were in the same suppositum of the Son, it would follow that he is produced, namely by generation from the intellect and by spiration from the will. But the same does not follow from active spiration and filiation. For although the Son spirates and produces the Holy Spirit, he does not therefore cease to be Son.

YOU WILL SAY 2: As being generated and being spirated are related, so generating and spirating are related. But being generated and being spirated are really distinct and effect really distinct relations. Therefore generating and spirating are also really distinct and effect really distinct relations.

I deny the major. For being generated and being spirated are opposed at least through the mediation of active spiration and constitute diverse persons. But generating and spirating are not properly opposed. Therefore being generated and being spirated are really distinct, but generating and spirating are not distinct in that way.

You will press: as generating is to being generated, so spirating is to being spirated. Therefore by a permutation of proportion, as generating is to spirating, so being generated is to being spirated. But being generated and being spirated are really distinct. Therefore generating and spirating will also be really distinct.

I deny the consequence. For although a permuted proportion has force in quantity for inferring, in other matters it proves nothing, and indeed appears false by many examples. For example, as fire is to heat, so water is to cold. Therefore by a permuted proportion, as heat is to cold, so fire is to water. But heat and cold can be together in the same subject in remiss degrees. Therefore water and fire will also be able to be together in the same matter according to some degrees, which consequence is altogether false.

The reason for the disparity is that passive being spirated, that is, the Holy Spirit, proceeds really from active being generated, which is the Son as produced, and therefore is necessarily distinguished from him as from a producing principle. But spirating does not proceed from active generation

as from a producing principle; therefore they do not preserve the same permuted proportion.

QUESTION III
WHETHER THE RELATIONS OF ORIGIN ARE FORMALLY INFINITE AND PERFECT

NOTE 1. From Bl. Scotus, *Quodlibet* 5, relations of origin can be considered in two ways: either really and identically, insofar as they are really the same as the divine essence and as the persons which they constitute together with that essence; or formally and according to their proper relative entity, insofar as they are formally distinguished from the divine essence and are as it were hypostatic forms determining it to the constitution of the divine persons.

In the first way it is certain that they are really infinitely perfect; for thus they are one and the same thing with the divinity itself, whose infinite perfection they absorb into themselves. But the difficulty is whether the relations themselves, considered in the second way, import some perfection and infinity, so that just as attributes add to the divine essence some absolute perfection formally distinct from the perfection of the essence itself, so likewise the relations of origin, besides the absolute perfection of the essence which they really include, add to it some relative perfection also formally distinct from its essential perfection.

NOTE 2. From the same, number 27, real being as such is first divided into quantified being and non-quantified being. Then quantified being into finite and infinite. After that finite being into the ten categories. By quantified being he understands perfect being, or being quantified by a quantity of perfection. By

non-quantified being he understands being not having this perfection.

Further, it must be noted that a threefold perfection can be distinguished. The first is moral, which in God is absolute and one, namely divine holiness, of which there is no discourse here. The second is transcendental or entitative, which is the integrity of a thing consisting in all that is required for its constitution in the character of such a being; and this belongs to every being whatsoever. The third is a perfection of virtue, or qualitative, which is a gradual perfection of the unity of any nature, according to which a nature is said to be more or less or equally perfect.

All agree that the divine relations are perfect with that transcendental perfection, since they have whatever can be required for the complement of a divine hypostatic relation. But they do not agree that they are perfect with the qualitative perfection by which they could be said to perfect the divine essence relatively, as attributes perfect it absolutely.

NOTE 3. From the same, there is a twofold infinite: intensive and extensive. The infinite extensively is that which extends to more and more in number without limit, such as the infinite number of possible creatures.

The intensive infinite is described by him in two ways. First, absolutely, so that the infinite is that to which nothing of entity and perfection is lacking, in the way it is possible for it to have this in some one thing, namely either formally, or really and identically, or eminently. In this way infinity can be described as the simplest and most eminent comprehensiveness of all entity and of every perfection that can be conceived.

Comparatively, the infinite can be described as that which exceeds every finite being beyond every determinate or

determinable proportion of being. Thus, the Doctor says, the infinite is distinguished from any finite being however perfect. For there is no finite being that is not exceeded by another. Whiteness, for example, is exceeded by science threefold; science by an intellectual soul tenfold; this by the angels a hundredfold. But God, who is infinite, exceeds every finite being beyond every assignable proportion of entity and perfection.

By the former description of infinity it is required that lack of any entity and perfection whatsoever be removed from the infinite, since a being infinite in this way must lack no perfection at all. By the latter description there is removed from the infinite any superior by which it could be exceeded.

With these things premised, it must be resolved whether the divine relations constitutive and distinctive of the persons are formally infinite perfections.

CONCLUSION
THE RELATIONS OF ORIGIN STATE NO PERFECTION FORMALLY, AND THEY ARE NEITHER FINITE NOR INFINITE

Thus Bl. Scotus teaches in many places, but especially in book 1, distinction 8, question 3, number 16, where he says: "Whatever is said commonly of God and of a creature is indifferent to finite and infinite, speaking of essentials; or at least to finite and non-finite, speaking of whatever things; because a divine relation is neither finite nor infinite."

He says the same in question 4, number 23, where he says that if paternity and deity are conceived in the abstract, this predication, "Deity is paternity," cannot be true, "because," he

says, "one of them is not formally infinite, but only deity is formally infinite."

But he embraces and proves this conclusion explicitly in *Quodlibet* 5: "On the second article," he says, "I hold this conclusion: paternity is not formally infinite. And for this there are three reasons: the first is taken from the unity of infinite being, the second from its communicability, the third from its simplicity and incompossibility, since an intensive infinite is one, not multipliable, and not restricted, but communicable and incompossible with anything."

He frames the first reason thus. There cannot be multiple things really distinct that are formally infinite intensively. But there are multiple relations of origin really distinct. Therefore they are not formally infinite intensively. The minor is clear from what has been said. He proves the major by three means: first from the comparison of those infinites among themselves, second from the comparison between finite and infinite, third from the comparison of those multiple infinites to intellect and will.

First, the intensive infinite lays claim really to every perfection simply. But it does not lay claim really to that perfection which another being has from which it is really distinguished. Therefore there cannot be two infinites simply really distinct from one another.

By the second means he proves the major thus. In beings essentially subordinated one finally comes to some being which sufficiently terminates the dependence of all finite beings and which must necessarily be infinite and one: infinite indeed because it must have from itself every perfection, otherwise it would again depend on another and there would not be a stopping point in it of subordinated beings; one because there

cannot be multiple total causes of the same effect of the same order.

Finally, by the third means he proves the same major thus. Infinite being is the adequate object of an infinite intellect and infinite will. But there cannot be multiple adequate objects of the same intellect and will. Therefore there cannot be multiple infinite beings really distinct.

He frames the second reason thus. Every perfection simply is communicable. But every intensive infinite is a perfection simply. Therefore every intensive infinite is communicable. I add: but no personal property is communicable, because it is the formal reason of existing incommunicably. Therefore no personal property is a perfection simply; and thus a relation of origin, which is a personal property in the divine, is not a perfection simply.

He proves the major of the first syllogism from the description of a perfection simply, which, from St. Anselm, is that which in any thing is better than not itself; that is, as the Doctor explains, in any thing insofar as it is a suppositum of being, it is better than another thing incompatible with it in the same. But what is formally incommunicable is formally incompossible with another in the same suppositum of being. Therefore what is formally incommunicable is not a perfection simply.

But every perfection simply in the divine is communicable. Therefore the relations of origin, since they are incommunicable, are not perfections simply.

From this I gather with the Doctor in the same place that no perfection simply and without qualification is incompossible with another perfection simply and without qualification. For if, for example, A were incompossible with B and both were perfections simply and without qualification, then A would be

better than B, which is not itself; and B, since it too is a perfection, would be better than A, which is not itself. Consequently A would be more perfect and less perfect with respect to B, which is impossible.

The third reason of the Doctor is formed thus. A perfection simply and infinite must be so really identified with every perfection compossible with it in the same suppositum that one can be predicated of the other in the abstract. But a relation of origin is not so really identified with everything compossible with it in the same suppositum. Therefore a relation of origin is not a perfection simply and infinite.

The minor is clear. For although active spiration, for example, is really identified with active generation, as was proved above, nevertheless this proposition is not true: active generation is active spiration. Otherwise it would be true that the divine Father would produce the Son by spirating as much as by generating; and thus the Son would proceed by will as much as by intellect, which is plainly false.

He proves the major as to the first part, namely that a perfection simply and infinite must be really identified with every compossible in the same subject. This is because nothing is essential in the divine that is not really the same as the divine essence and as every essential, which arises from nothing other than that every essential is a perfection simply and without qualification. And because the infinite cannot be composed with another, otherwise that other would be part of it and it would be exceeded by the whole, but excess repugns the infinite. If, therefore, something compossible with it in the same suppositum were not altogether the same as it really, they could not constitute one except by some composition. Therefore every perfection

simply and infinite must be really the same as every compossible with it in the same suppositum.

From this the second part is inferred. For things that are really the same are truly predicated and affirmed of one another by reason of the identity of predicate with subject. For however abstraction is made from the subject, since the identity of the predicate with the subject always remains, the affirmation of one of the other always remains true.

The conclusion is confirmed by the absurdities that follow from the opposite position.

First, if the divine relations stated some perfection, it would follow that one person would contain some perfection which another does not contain, since each contains a personal relation proper to itself and not belonging to another. For to the Father filiation does not belong, nor to the Son paternity, nor to the Holy Spirit paternity and filiation. Consequently the divine persons would not be infinite, because each would lack some perfection. But nothing can lack any perfection simply and without qualification if it is infinitely perfect.

Further, since in the Father and the Son there are two relations, namely in the Father paternity and active spiration, and similarly in the Son filiation together with the same active spiration, while in the Holy Spirit there is only one, namely passive spiration, it would follow that if relations are perfections simply and without qualification, the Father and the Son would be more perfect than the Holy Spirit, since they have one perfection simply and without qualification to which the Holy Spirit has no corresponding perfection. But this is utterly absurd. Therefore that from which it follows is also absurd.

The Doctor objects in the same place four difficulties against this doctrine of his.

First, what is not comprehensible by a created and finite intellect is infinite. But a relation of divine origin is not comprehensible by a finite intellect, according to Isaiah 53:8: "Who shall declare his generation?" Therefore it is formally infinite, for every finite is comprehensible.

Second, every action adequate to an infinite principle and terminus is formally infinite. But divine generation is an action adequate to an infinite formal principle, namely an infinitely fecund memory, and to an infinite terminus which, namely the Son, and to an infinite terminus by which, namely the communicated essence, and each of these termini is infinite. Therefore divine generation is formally infinite.

Third, the account of subsisting *per se* is the most perfect mode of being. But the relations of origin are accounts of subsisting *per se*. Therefore they are most perfect.

Fourth, what is the same as an infinite essence cannot fail to be infinite. But relations of origin are identified with the divine essence. Therefore they cannot fail to be infinite.

The Doctor answers the first by denying the major. For to the incomprehensibility of something it suffices that it is identified with the infinite. For something cannot be comprehended unless its being is known perfectly; and it cannot be known in this way unless all its modes and all its perfections are apprehended. But infinite perfections cannot be comprehended by a finite intellect. Therefore, for something to be incomprehensible, it suffices that it is identified with the infinite. But relations of origin are identified with the infinite essence. Therefore although of themselves they are not formally infinite, they are not for that reason comprehensible by a created and finite intellect.

To the second he responds that there is a twofold adequation: proportional and quantitative. And proportional adequation is again twofold: intensive and extensive. Hence in form he distinguishes the minor. Divine generation is adequate to its principle and terminus by a proportional extensive adequation, which requires only that origin or action be from such a principle and to such a terminus in such a way that it cannot be from another and to another, nor can such a principle extend itself to eliciting another action, nor can such a terminus be produced by another action. This he concedes.

But it is not adequate by quantitative adequation or by proportional intensive adequation, which would require the same perfection in origin and terminus as is in the principle. This he denies. For neither is a created origin adequate to its principle in that way, because the principle is always more perfect than its action and produced terminus, since it depends less. But from proportional extensive adequation it does not follow that if one is formally infinite intensively, the other must likewise be formally infinite, because formal intensive infinity looks to quantity and the intensity of degrees, not to extension.

To the third he responds that "to subsist *per se*" is equivocal and is taken in two ways. First, for a mode of existing *per se* and independently of anything else, and in this way it is something absolute in the divine. Therefore it is a perfection simply and without qualification, and it is absolute existence, of which we spoke above.

Second, it is taken for a mode of existing incommunicably to another as suppositum, and thus it is neither a perfection simply and without qualification nor a perfection in a certain respect. It is only in this latter way that the divine

relations are called accounts of subsisting *per se*. Therefore they are neither perfect nor imperfect.

To the fourth he distinguishes the major. Whatever is identified with the infinite is infinite if it is capable of infinity, he concedes; otherwise he denies. But relations of origin are not capable of infinity by reason of their incommunicability and for the reasons already assigned. Therefore the consequence must be denied.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: The divine relations are called perfections both by councils and by the Fathers. Therefore they are truly such. The antecedent is proved from the Council of Constantinople in its epistle to Damasus: "We believe," it says, "an equal honor and dignity and coeternal dominion in three most perfect subsistences, that is, three perfect persons." Likewise Justin in the exposition of faith on the Trinity says: "We preferred to expound the knowledge of one Godhead in three perfect subsistences." Likewise Cyril of Alexandria in book 1 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 6: "He is perfect," he says, "not only because he is God, but also because he is Father." Damascene agrees in book 1 of *De Fide*, chapter 11, saying: "In the properties of paternity, filiality, and procession according to cause and caused, we understand personal perfection, that is, a difference of mode of existing." Likewise in the book *De Decretis primae institutionis*: "The hypostases and persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each of them is a perfect hypostasis and a perfect person." Therefore the personal relations are perfections and perfect.

I deny the antecedent; and to its proof I say that the holy Fathers and councils in those texts and others like them take divine hypostasis and person not in the abstract for formal subsistence and personality insofar as it is formally distinguished from the divine essence and concurs with it to constitute the

divine person, but in the concrete for the divine person itself, insofar as it at once includes essence and personality. In this way the divine persons are truly most perfect.

That the sayings of the Fathers must not be taken otherwise is sufficiently gathered from their cited words. To St. John Damascene above all I respond that he does not will that the personal properties are formally perfections. For he teaches the contrary in chapter 9, saying: "All that the Father has is the Son's, except this one thing, that he is not unbegotten." This word indicates neither a difference of nature nor dignity and authority, but a mode of existing. Therefore he calls those properties perfections only when taken in the concrete, that is, for the persons.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: The mystery of the Trinity, insofar as it is Trinity, is supremely to be adored and therefore infinitely perfect. But Trinity, insofar as it is Trinity, connotes and includes the divine relations. Therefore it is true that relations state a supreme and infinite perfection.

I distinguish the major. The mystery of the Trinity states a supreme perfection that has its source on the side of the divine nature, which is communicated to the three persons together with its attributes and perfections, I concede. It states a supreme perfection coming from the divine relations, which are the termini of divine communication and fecundity, I deny.

For the whole perfection that shines forth in the adorable mystery of the Trinity must be taken from the side of the divine nature, which supremely and infinitely constitutes and perfects the divine persons, not from the side of the relations, which are pure termini of divine fecundity and add no perfection to the nature, but only give it a mode of subsisting incommunicably.

YOU WILL OBJECT 4: The subsistence of the divine Word, insofar as it is formally distinct from the essence, terminates the assumed human nature and confers upon it and its actions a supreme perfection and dignity. Therefore it itself has that perfection formally. The consequence is clear. For what the personality of the divine Word bestows upon the human nature, it does not confer as an efficient cause but as a formal cause. Therefore it itself, as form, gives being to the actions and perfects the nature of the assumed man; and consequently it itself either is a perfection or formally contains a supreme perfection.

The antecedent is proved, because the assumed man by reason of the personality communicated to him is adorable, and by the adoration of latria. Therefore he contains a good not any sort of good, but infinite and supreme, because he merits the supreme worship.

I deny the antecedent as to the second part, namely that the subsistence of the Word, insofar as it is formally distinguished from the divine essence, confers supreme perfection upon the humanity of Christ. And I distinguish its proof. The assumed man is adorable and supremely perfect by reason of the personality of the Word alone, I deny. By reason of the Godhead hypostatically conjoined to him, I concede. For Christ is therefore said to be supremely perfect and worthy of supreme worship not merely because he subsists by the subsistence of the Word, but because by reason of this subsistence he is united hypostatically to the Godhead and is God-Man.

ARTICLE III
ON THE DIVINE NOTIONS

By the name "notion" theologians intend nothing other than a proper reason for knowing one person. This reason is taken either as a formal concept, by which we know that divine person in a special way and discern it from another, concerning which St. Augustine speaks in book 5 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 6, saying that one notion is that by which "begetter" is understood, another that by which "unbegotten" is understood; or else it is taken as an objective concept, that is, as some special mark and, as it were, a character that stands on the side of the same person, by reason of which we know it as distinct from another, concerning which St. Basil says in book 2 of *Contra Eunomium*: "Properties and notions, like certain characters and forms observed in the substance, distinguish."

Concerning notions in this latter acceptance, two things must be resolved. 1. Whether any characters are to be admitted in the divine persons by which they appear distinct from one another. 2. That these characters are commonly numbered as five. But since the chief difficulties that concern this matter have already been explained above from what we said about properties and personal relations, this single question will contain and resolve the three aforementioned investigations.

SINGLE QUESTION
WHETHER, HOW MANY, AND WHAT SORT OF NOTIONS OF THE DIVINE PERSONS THERE ARE

NOTE 1. Although one and the same real formality is at once a property, a relation, and a notion, nevertheless these differ from one another according to a diverse bearing. For paternity, for example, is called a relation insofar as it regards a terminus and refers the generating person to the generated; but it is called

a property insofar as it belongs only to the first divine suppositum and affects the first person; and it is called a notion comparatively to the intellect, since it is for the intellect a reason for knowing the first person as distinct from the others. Although all these signify one and the same formality, they observe this order: that the formality is called first a relation, then a property, and finally a notion. For nothing can be a reason for manifesting something else unless it is proper to it, nor can it be proper unless it is distinguished from others. But the distinction of the divine persons is drawn from their constitutive principle, which is the personal relation itself.

NOTE 2. Three conditions are especially required for a notion. The first is that it be a property of some person or persons, yet not common to all three; for this reason neither the divine essence nor anything essential has the character of a notion. The second is that it be signified and expressed in the abstract. For notions are, as it were, forms by which the divine persons are known; hence it follows that the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not, nor can be called, notions, because they directly signify the persons themselves in the concrete, and do not of themselves denote those forms by which the persons can be made known, such as paternity and the like. The third is that it signify that form not as in becoming, but as it were in being already done; for lack of this, to beget and to be begotten, likewise to spirate and to be spirated, cannot be called notions, since they are signified as in becoming. Some Scotists also add a fourth, namely that a notion signify and import the dignity of a person; but this is opposed to the Doctor and to the truth, since, as we said above, personal relations formally connote no perfection.

NOTE 3. Theologians describe a notion in this way: A notion is a proper reason or mark for knowing a divine person as distinct from another. This is more than sufficiently clear from what has just been said. It is called a reason or mark because it is as it were a character or sign by which one person is designated and marked as distinct from another; hence St. Justin says in *Expositio fidei de Trinitate*: "When we hear the word 'begotten' as a kind of mark, we at once think of the Son, just as we also call the mark of the one proceeding the proper person of the Spirit." Next it is added, a proper reason for knowing a person. "For," says St. Basil in book 2 of *Contra Eunomium*, "since the Godhead is one, it is impossible to grasp the proper notion of Father or Son unless our thought is confirmed by the acceptance of properties." Finally it is added, as distinct from another. "For," says St. Basil, in the sole book *De Spiritu Sancto*, chapter 5, explaining that saying of the Apostle to the Ephesians 4, "One God and Father," and so forth, "notions are used here not to introduce a diversity of nature, but to approve the unmingled notion of Father and Son; thus the Apostle used them."

CONCLUSION I
NOTIONS ARE TO BE ADMITTED, AS CERTAIN CHARACTERS BY WHICH THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE MORE EASILY MADE KNOWN TO US

This is common among theologians, and also among the holy Fathers. This truth is evident from what was stated in Note 3. It is proved especially from St. Gregory of Nyssa in Epistle 43: "It is necessary," he says, "that by certain proper notions an unconfused comparison be held within the Triad." And below, about the Holy Spirit: "He has the essence inserted from the

cause, that is, from the Father; and from this he proceeds; he has this notion and knowable sign of his property according to hypostasis, by which, together with the Son, he makes himself known." And after a little, about the Son he says: "He has absolutely no communication of notions according to his own property either with the Father or with the Holy Spirit, but from the signs already mentioned he alone is recognized." Finally, about the Father he adds: "But the Father, who is God over all, alone has the proper notion of his hypostasis: that he is Father and that he subsists from no cause at all; and by this indication again he too is known properly and separately." By these words he plainly confesses that the divine persons are recognized as distinct from one another by their own marks and characters. And although he uses the word "notion" in the concrete, as many Fathers do, it is nevertheless clear that it is more correctly taken in the abstract. For when one asks how the three divine persons agree and differ, it is easier and more correct to respond by saying that the Father is distinguished from the Son by paternity, than if, using the concrete name Father, one said that the Father therefore differs from the Son because he begets him. For the latter is a circumlocution, not a formal reason.

This is confirmed by other holy Fathers who use notions in the abstract. First, St. Basil in book 2 of *Contra Eunomium* says: "Properties and notions, like certain characters and forms observed in the substance, distinguish what is common by proper characters." Tertullian agrees in the book *Contra Praxean*, chapter 2, where he teaches that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three not in substance but in form, not in power but in species; and he gives the reason, "because one God, from whom those grades and forms and species are assigned in the name of Father and Son and Holy Spirit." It is as if he said that the three divine persons are

known as distinct from one another not by their concrete names, but by relations and, as it were, by their constitutive and distinctive forms. Hence St. John Damascene in book 3 of *De Fide Orthodoxa*, chapter 6, calls such properties "characteristic and signifying"; and in chapter 7 he says: "The characteristic and distinguishing property of the filiation of God the Word, according to which it is distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit."

The same conclusion is proved by reason: that must be admitted in divine matters which greatly conduces to more easily perceiving and explaining the distinction of the divine persons. But the divine notions contribute wonderfully to this. Therefore they are to be admitted. The major is clearer, since theologians must use those words that more contribute to explaining and unlocking a mystery so hidden and so ineffable. The minor is proved: the property and distinction of the divine persons can be made known and expressed in two ways, namely by concrete and by abstract names. But abstract words are more suitable than concrete words for signifying not only simplicity but also the distinction of the persons, since abstract terms are conceived as most simple forms, and for that reason are more apt for conceiving and signifying divine simplicity. Hence St. Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 39, says: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, yet not by the mode of filiation, just as not by the mode of generation, but by procession. For let it be permitted, for the sake of clarity, to coin names." Therefore he judges that abstract names contribute clarity and distinctness to the distinction of the persons.

This is confirmed: three notions belong to the Father, two to the Son, and one to the Holy Spirit. For to the Father belong innascibility, paternity, and active spiration; to the Son belong

filiation and active spiration; but to the Holy Spirit alone belongs procession, that is, passive spiration. Therefore the proper concrete name of each person does not sufficiently make it understood as distinct from another; and so it was fitting that notions be signified in the abstract by the peculiar properties of each person, by which all the ways in which it is distinguished from another person might more easily be made known. For by these abstract names we easily explain that the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit, not by paternity and filiation, but by active spiration, in which they agree with one another; but they differ from one another by paternity and filiation.

Objection 1. Things that are simple are known and distinguished by themselves and do not need forms or marks by which they may appear distinct. But the divine persons are most simple. Therefore they do not need notions in order to be distinctly known.

I distinguish the major: things that are simple both formally and really do not need marks and characters, I grant; things that are simple only really and not formally, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: the divine persons are most simple really, that is, they are not constituted from parts really distinct, I grant; they are most simple formally, I deny, for they include several entities formally distinct from one another. For they consist of the divine essence and also of relations by which they are constituted as persons. Hence, just as concrete things that are really simple are better known through some form signified in the abstract than through the concrete name itself, so also the divine persons are more easily made known through the divine notions than through the concrete names Father, Son, and so forth.

You will object further: Nothing is signified by the name Father that is not likewise signified by the name Paternity; for paternity denotes generation no less than the name Father. Therefore either neither suffices, or one of them is superfluous.

I distinguish the antecedent: the same thing is signified really but in a different mode, I grant; formally and in the same mode, I deny. For the word Father not only imports the form of paternity, but also connotes the Godhead, either directly or at least obliquely. But paternity neither directly nor obliquely formally signifies the Godhead; rather, directly it signifies the property, and obliquely it connotes the person of the Father of whom it is a property. Although divinity is really imbibed and contained in paternity, this inclusion comes only from the thing signified, not from the mode of signifying of the word.

CONCLUSION II
THEOLOGIANS RIGHTLY COMMONLY NUMBER FIVE NOTIONS BY WHICH THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE MADE KNOWN TO US, NAMELY INNASCIBILITY, PATERNITY, FILIATION, ACTIVE SPIRATION, AND PASSIVE SPIRATION

It is proved: as many notions must be admitted as there are modes by which the divine persons can be known as distinct from one another. But that mode is fivefold. Therefore, and so forth. The major is evident, since notions are admitted only to more easily disclose and perceive the distinction of the persons.

St. Bonaventure proves the minor in book 1, distinction 26, the sole article, question 4: "The reason for distinguishing," he says, "is taken from the side of origin, either positively or privatively. If privatively, either it excludes origin by way of

producer, and this does not signify nobility, namely not to produce, and thus it is not a notion; or it excludes origin by way of the produced, and this either specially or generally. If specially, it does not signify nobility; if generally, it does signify nobility, and thus the privative notion is one alone, namely innascibility. But if it is taken from the side of origin positively, since origin is twofold and to each there necessarily corresponds a twofold relation, there will necessarily be four: active and passive generation, and active and passive spiration, and in all five."

St. Thomas proves it in nearly the same way in the first part, question 32, article 3: since a notion pertains to the order of origin, as many notions must be admitted as there are orders of origins. But these are five. Therefore there are likewise five divine notions. The minor is proved: in divine things there are only two processions, and each implies a twofold positive order of origin, namely of the one from whom another is, and of the one who is from another. For the procession through intellect implies the order of the one from whom another is, and this order is called paternity and is the notion of the Father; likewise it implies the order of the one who is from another, and this is called filiation, which is the notion of the Son. Likewise the procession through will implies the same twofold order, namely of the one from whom another is, and this order is active spiration, by which the Holy Spirit is produced, and this notion distinguishes the Father and the Son from the Holy Spirit; and of the one who is from another, and this order is called passive spiration, which is the notion of the Holy Spirit. Besides these positive orders of origin, there is yet another pertaining to origin negatively, namely the order of the one from whom another is and who is not from another; and thus there is innascibility, which is another notion

of the Father. Besides these five there appears no other mode of origin. Therefore there are only five notions.

You will say: As many notions, and no more, should exist as there are constitutive and distinguishing properties of the divine persons, since notions are set in order to the cognition of the persons as they are constituted and distinguished in themselves. But those properties are only four, namely paternity, filiation, and spiration both active and passive. Therefore the notions are likewise only four, and since innascibility does not constitute a person, it cannot have the character of a notion.

I distinguish the major: as many positive notions must exist as there are properties, I grant; as many notions, both positive and negative, must exist as there are properties, I deny. For those four properties can found more than four concepts, whether positive or negative. For the divine persons can be known by us either positively according to the bearing and relative opposition they have to one another, or negatively according to the exclusion of an external or internal principle. Hence, although the person of the Father is sufficiently made known positively as distinct from the other persons by paternity and active spiration, nevertheless, since there would remain room for doubt whether the Father is produced from another or not, in order for him to be understood as a person wholly unproduced it is necessary that innascibility be attributed to him, which is the negation of generation and of being produced from another.

You will say again: Active spiration is common to the Father and the Son. Therefore it is not a proper notion of any divine person. The antecedent is clear from what has been said and will be clearer from what will be said. The consequence also follows from the conditions required for notions that we assigned.

I respond: properties are of two kinds. Some are singular and belong to one person alone, such as paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. But another is not singular and yet is not common to all, but is proper to two persons only, namely active spiration, which belongs to the Father and the Son but not to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that under the aspect by which it does not belong to the Holy Spirit, it sufficiently distinguishes him from the Father and the Son; and since it is proper to the Father and the Son, it must also be called a notion of the Father and of the Son.

You will say further: Innascibility in the Father is taken either materially or formally. If the first, it is nothing distinct from paternity, for thus taken formally it signifies paternity. If the second, it cannot be called a notion, since it is a pure negation of a productive principle and consequently does not explain dignity, which seems required for the character of a notion.

St. Thomas answers that innascibility formally signifies a negation and nevertheless implies dignity. For a negation, he says, implies dignity when the opposed affirmation signifies imperfection. Thus, in a king there is dignity in not being an artisan or a merchant. Innascibility denies procession from another; and although in the Son and the Holy Spirit such procession does not signify imperfection but perfection, nevertheless in the Father it would import imperfection, for it would signify that he is not the first principle, the fountain and origin of the whole Trinity.

Bl. Scotus responds in book 1, distinction 28, question 2, number 7: "Unbegotten," under its proper reason, insofar as it signifies not having a begetter, is a property of the Father and sufficiently imports dignity, that is, not indignity; for this suffices for a personal property, that it not be an indignity, just as the

personal properties in divine things are not said to be imperfections, though they are not perfections simply, that is, universally, in every case it is better that it be than that it not be. Then, according to the mind of St. Thomas, he adds: Unbegotten, insofar as it denies having a begetter, signifies the personal dignity of the first person in divine things, because just as it is a dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a dignity in the first person not to have one; and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some positive thing properly connoted by this name 'unbegotten.' Hence a negation can be called a dignity in something insofar as it would be an indignity if the opposed affirmation were placed in it, just as it is a dignity in a king not to be base or shameless."

You will say: For the same reason that innascibility is established as a notion proper to the Father, so also "non-inspirability" must be attributed to the Son, and "non-generativity," that is, the negation of the generative power of another Son; likewise to the Holy Spirit "non-generability" must be attributed, and "non-inspirativity," that is, the negation of the power of spirating and generating. For the Son can be understood to generate another Son: if he is at once Son and Spirator, why will he not also be at once begotten and begetting? And what is spirated can also be understood as generative; for in created things love can apply the intellect to conceiving a word, and thus can be a principle of the word, if not elicitive, at least imperative. Therefore, in order for it to appear that these do not belong to the Son and the Holy Spirit, the aforementioned notions must be attributed to them, and thus far more than five notions can exist.

Bl. Scotus answers in book 1, distinction 28, question 1, number 9, that it is not unfitting that more than five notions be

admitted. For just as in the time of St. Ambrose the notion of innascibility and of unbegottenness was unknown and was rejected by St. Ambrose himself and other Fathers, but afterwards was accepted by St. Augustine and others, or, as the Doctor himself adds, if from the beginning only three notional properties were known, namely paternity, filiation, and spiration, from the word of the Savior in the Gospel and of John in his canonical epistle, chapter 1, nevertheless afterwards through investigation other notions and properties became known, which before were indeed in themselves but were not previously known. And thus, just as later writers conceded more notions than earlier writers, yet earlier writers did not deny them even if they did not mention them, so also it does not seem unfitting for later doctors to posit such notions, provided they can conclude them from what earlier writers said.

Therefore the Doctor truly judges that more notions than five can be admitted. Yet, to follow the more common opinion of theologians, I respond that the aforementioned notions are either reducible to the earlier ones or excluded by other reasons. For since active spiration is attributed to the Son, it is sufficiently understood that he cannot be produced by spiration, otherwise he would produce himself. Add that active and passive spiration are relatively opposed and therefore require termini really distinct; thus they cannot be in the same person, and consequently from the position of active spiration in the Son it is sufficiently understood that the character of passive spiration is excluded from him, and so he does not need another reason, namely non-inspirability, to signify that exclusion.

Likewise, since, as proved above, there cannot be several processions and several persons of the same kind in God, nor can one person proceeding through intellect proceed through will

and vice versa, it follows that since there is one Son in divine things proceeding through intellect and one Holy Spirit proceeding through will, it is sufficiently known that no other Son or Holy Spirit can be produced. Therefore, to signify that, there is no need for notions of non-inspirativity in the Holy Spirit or of non-generativity in the Son and the Holy Spirit. That negation of generative or spirative power is sufficiently known to be excluded from elsewhere.

You will say: The reason of Word and image is proper to the Son, just as the reason of love and gift is proper to the Holy Spirit. But each reason signifies those divine persons as distinct. Therefore each has the force of a notion, and thus there are more notions than five.

I respond that these names do not so much signify properties as appropriations. For they signify the mode of the Son's procession through intellect and of the Holy Spirit's procession through will, and these modes of proceeding appear sufficiently and more than sufficiently distinct through the origins and relations that constitute the divine persons. Therefore, to express this, there is no need of a multiplication of divine notions beyond five. Add that even if an evident reason did not support this truth, it would nevertheless not be fitting to depart from the common opinion of theologians. For one must think and speak as the many do, especially concerning this hidden mystery of the Trinity.

DISPUTATION III
ON THE DIVINE PERSONS IN PARTICULAR

The sacred text of Exodus 19 and 20 relates that when Moses, urged by a divine command, had prepared himself for the sight and fellowship of God for two whole days, then on the third day, ascending the summit of Mount Sinai, he approached the cloud in which God was. From the two disputations now completed it is clear that we have fulfilled as it were two mystical days, that we might traverse the mountain and height of the divine Trinity; for once its existence and principles have been explored, our mind is more prepared and more vigorous for the intimate contemplation of those divine persons.

Now, therefore, it is permitted to ascend to the sight and throne of each divine person, and to inspect their proper and singular characters and to unfold them one by one. This, indeed, we shall accomplish in three following articles.

ARTICLE I
ON THE PREEMINENCES OF THE FIRST DIVINE PERSON

The first person in divine things is illustrated by three titles of glory, according to a threefold consideration of it. For it can be considered either according to its primacy and insofar as it derives its origin from no other, and thus it is called innascible or unbegotten; or with respect to the Son, whom it alone produces, and thus it is called Father; or finally by its bearing toward the two produced persons together, to whom it communicates the Godhead from its infinite fecundity, and thus it is called their principle. Some things concerning these are to be sampled in the three following questions.

QUESTION I
WHETHER AND HOW THE NAME FATHER BEFITS THE FIRST PERSON IN DIVINE THINGS

NOTE 1. The name Father, attributed to God in the sacred writings, is taken in a threefold way. First, in a general way, for the productive principle of creatures, according to that saying of Deuteronomy 32: "Is he not your Father, who possessed you, and made you, and created you?" In this way the name Father is common to the three divine persons, no less than the power of creating and its exercise.

Second, more specially, it is taken for God justifying and adopting to himself a rational creature as a son through the benefit of sanctifying grace, of which Paul speaks to the Romans 8: "You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, in whom we cry: Abba, Father." In this way too it is common to the three persons, as are the will and power of creating and justifying; yet it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, because sanctifying grace is granted and justification is brought about through love, and the Holy Spirit is love by reason of his procession.

Third, it is taken notionally, for the generative principle of the consubstantial Son and of the same nature with his principle. In this way the name Father is said to belong properly to the first person alone, and to the other divine persons only analogically.

NOTE 2. The adverb "properly" is used chiefly in three ways: first, to signify the same as truly and not falsely, as when Christ says in John 15: "I am the true vine, and my Father is the vinedresser." Second, to designate a proper and not metaphorical expression, as when Christ is called Savior, and so forth. Third, "proper" is said of what is not common to many but belongs to one alone; thus paternity is said to be proper to the first person, filiation to the second, and passive spiration to the third. It is in this last way that we use the word "properly" in the present question.

NOTE 3. Although in this mortal life we cannot attribute any name to God so as to signify and make him known as he is in himself, nevertheless it is permitted to borrow names from created things by which we signify divine realities according to a certain likeness and proportion they have with those creatures for signifying which those words were first imposed. "The infinity of our intellect," says Hilary in book 1 of *De Trinitate*, "thinks to seek certain forms from lower things as indications of higher things, so that, by the custom of familiar things admonishing us, we might be led from the consciousness of our sense to an opinion about an unfamiliar sense." Hence it comes about that the mode of signifying of those words, insofar as they are attributed to God, is always improper unless we first cut away from such words all passions of sense and the other imperfections that accompany the entity or operation of creatures signified by those words.

With these points noted, two things remain to be established: first, that the thing signified by the name Father belongs properly to the first divine person alone; second, that this august name fits him far more eminently than it fits any creature.

CONCLUSION I
THE FIRST PERSON IN DIVINE THINGS IS PROPERLY CALLED FATHER

This is of faith and is gathered from innumerable scriptural texts in which the incarnate Word calls the person from whom he receives his eternal origin and life and divine being his Father, as has been indicated above in many places, especially from Matthew 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father," and so forth.

Hence St. Cyril, in the dialogue *De Trinitate*, chapter 2, says: "He commanded baptism in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, namely because he chose and proposed above others the most distinct names for us, establishing the proper existence of each signified." It is also clear from what we said in proving that the divine persons are constituted by true relations of origin. But these are nothing other than paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. Therefore the relation of paternity truly and properly belongs to God, and thus the first person is truly called Father.

It is further proved: the name Father truly and properly belongs to the first person if what is signified by that name truly and properly belongs to him. But it does. It is proved: what is properly signified by the name Father is that the person to whom it is attributed produces another through true generation, which is the origin of a living being from a living being in likeness of

nature. But the first divine person produces the second in this way, as has been proved. Therefore, and so forth.

This is confirmed from the fact that Christ himself professes that among his mandates and commissions he had this: to make known to human beings the proper name of his principle. Thus near the end of his life he addresses the Father in John 17: "I have manifested your name to men," and so forth, namely the name Father, as the holy Fathers understand, St. Augustine in tract 106 on John and St. John Chrysostom in Homily 80; and rightly, for earlier in John 16 Christ had said: "The hour is coming when I will no longer speak to you in proverbs, but I will plainly announce to you about my Father." Hence St. Cyril in book 10 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 6, says: "I have manifested your name to men, because indeed you are the true Father and you have a true Son." John also says in chapter 5 of the first epistle: "That we may be in his true Son."

St. Athanasius also proves that the name Father belongs primarily to God and that from him its property has passed into the human race; and thus it must be attributed more properly to God than to human beings, because no human being is simply to be called father, since there is none who is not the son of another parent, and none who cannot be deprived of a son and thus of his fatherhood. "But," he says, "in the Godhead it does not happen so: for the Father is not from another Father, nor is the Son from a flowing of the Father, or begotten from a begotten Father." From this he concludes that in the Godhead alone the Father is properly Father and the Son properly Son; and in these alone it consists that the Father is always Father and the Son is always Son. Faustinus agrees in book 2 *Contra Arianos*: "He alone," he says, "is properly the true Father who is Father without beginning and end; for he did not at some time begin to be what he is,

Father, but is always Father, always having the Son begotten from himself."

You will say: The holy Fathers deny that the name Father and Son belongs to God. Therefore there is no conclusion. The antecedent is proved, first from St. Dionysius, who in *De Theologia Mystica*, chapter 5, near the middle says that God is neither Spirit as we know it, nor is there in him a reason of Son or of Father, nor anything of those things known to us or to any nature. Likewise St. Basil in the treatise *De Vera et Pia Fide*, near the middle, says: if we take the word Father with its whole signification, as it is in use among us, and apply it to God, we act impiously.

I deny the antecedent. The opinion of these Fathers is not that the name and reason of Father must be removed from God, but only that they do not belong to God in the way in which they are attributed to creatures. To make this clearer, I answer the authorities in order. St. Dionysius denies that God is Father in the same way in which he had earlier said in that same place that he is not knowledge, nor truth, nor kingdom, nor wisdom, nor one, nor unity, nor divinity, nor goodness, namely in the way in which the weakness and infirmity of our mind is accustomed to conceive such things. Yet he is all these in a certain supereminent manner, since he says at the end of the chapter that "that perfect and singular cause of all surpasses every affirmation and is above every negation; for the excellence of him who is altogether hidden from all and greatly surpasses all is above every negation." To St. Basil I say similarly that he does not exclude the reason of Father from God, since in book 5 of *Contra Eunomium* he affirms that God truly begets and truly brings forth the Word, and in book 2 he had said, speaking of the words generation, Father, and Son, that whoever dares to neglect these words simultaneously

overthrows the whole power of the Gospel. Therefore he wills only that the signification of passion found in created generations be removed, while retaining only the production of one similar in nature when speaking of divine generation. Hence after the words cited in the objection he adds: "Since together with it there necessarily arise affection, and a flowing of generative seed, and ignorance, and infirmity, and whatever such things are displayed in the very name Father among creatures."

CONCLUSION II
THE NAME AND REASON OF FATHER BELONG FAR MORE EMINENTLY TO GOD THAN TO CREATURES

This is most certain among the holy Fathers, and they confirm it by various reasons.

First, because every fatherhood in creatures takes its origin from the divine paternity. Hence St. Cyril of Alexandria in book 1 on John, chapter 8, writes: "God does not have the name of fatherhood from us, but rather we seem to have received it from him; for faithful is the saying of Paul crying out to the Ephesians 3: 'From him every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named.'" St. Jerome, on the same words of the Apostle, says: "As God imparts the name and substance of his essence to others, so that they too are called by it, so also he has bestowed the name of fatherhood from himself upon all. Therefore, as he alone who is good makes others good, and he alone who is immortal grants immortality, and he alone who is true imparts the name of truth, so he alone who is Father, who is the Creator of all and the cause of all, excels other substances, so that they may be called fathers."

Second, they infer the excellence of divine paternity above created fatherhood from the fact that the divine Father

acknowledges no other father, nor does the Son beget another son. Thus St. Athanasius in the epistle to Serapion: "For this reason," he says, "the Father alone and one is Father of the one and only Son, and in the Godhead alone this constitutes being Father and being Son, and it always is so. For among men, if someone is called father, he was the son of another; and if someone is the son of this one, he in turn is called the father of another, so that among men the appellation of Father and Son is not properly preserved."

Third, because paternity belongs to God quidditatively and substantially, but only accidentally to creatures. Therefore St. Cyril in book 12 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 5, professes that the Son proceeds essentially from the Father.

Fourth, they infer this preeminence from the fact that the eternal Father regards the most perfect Son, produced by the most excellent generation and most perfectly assimilated to him. Hence St. Gregory Nazianzen thus touches upon these and other preeminences of divine paternity in Oration 23: "Let us believe that he is Father, Father far more truly than he who among us holds that name: because he is Father in a proper and singular way; because he is Father alone, not by union and intercourse with a woman; because he is Father of the only one, namely the Only-begotten; because he is Father alone and not first a Son before being Father; because he is Father wholly and of the whole, which cannot be affirmed of us with certainty; because he is Father from the beginning, for he did not later begin to be Father."

From these things gather that God is said to be Father of his Son far more eminently than he is said to be Father of creatures. First, because God is called Father of creatures not naturally and necessarily, but contingently and freely. Second, not

through a conjoined principle and an immanent and generative action ad intra, but through a making and creative action ad extra. Third, not from eternity, but in time. Fourth, paternity in God is not something real in relation to creatures but a mere extrinsic denomination. Fifth and finally, he does not pour into creatures a likeness in nature, nor perfectly assimilate them to himself in substance, but only either in the likeness of a vestige, which belongs to irrational things with respect to which he is sometimes called Father, as in Job 38: "Who is the father of the rain?" or in the likeness of an image, which is found in every rational creature, according to which all human beings can say: "Our Father, who are in heaven"; or finally in the likeness of grace, and for this reason the appellation Father is frequent in both the Old and the New Testament.

Nor does it matter that St. Basil in book 2 of *Contra Eunomium*, near the middle, says: "God is our Father not by abuse or by metaphor, but properly, first, and truly." By these words Basil intended nothing other than that God is our principle in a more eminent way than are parents from whom we draw our origin: first because he alone creates the soul and forms the parts and organs of the body; second because he supplies all things necessary for life; third because by his gentle providence he disposes, guards, and preserves all things. Hence Christ in Matthew 23 rightly warned the disciples: "Do not call anyone your father on earth, for one is your Father, who is in heaven."

QUESTION II
WHETHER AND HOW THE NAME AND REASON OF UNBEGOTTEN BEFITS THE FIRST PERSON

NOTE 1. The word "unbegotten" was first devised by Aetius, the master of Eunomius, as St. Athanasius relates in the second dialogue *De Trinitate*. The Arians used it so that they might more easily impugn the consubstantiality of the divine Word and attack Catholics by asking whether there are many unbegotten ones or only one. For if Catholics responded that there is only one unbegotten, the Arians immediately inferred that the Son is not unbegotten but only the Father, and thus they numbered the Son among creatures made and created. But if Catholics replied that there are two or three unbegotten ones, namely Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the Arians inferred that Catholics affirm three gods. For the Arians held as certain that the nature of God consists in this, that he is unbegotten. Hence St. Epiphanius observes in heresy 76 that more than forty arguments were hurled by Aetius from the name unbegotten against Catholics. Therefore St. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 37 calls the word unbegotten the art and wall of refuge of those heretics. St. Gregory of Nyssa in book 1 of *Contra Eunomium* calls it the bulwark from which Eunomius made an assault upon Catholic doctrine. Hence some holy Fathers had an aversion to the name unbegotten and thought it should be rejected from theological disputations; thus St. Athanasius in Oration 2 *Contra Arianos*, near the middle, says it is a vain invention of this word, since it contains nothing in itself but a mere sleight.

NOTE 2. This same word unbegotten has several meanings, especially four, as St. Athanasius observes in Oration 2 *Contra Arianos*. First, insofar as it is opposed to what is unfinished or does not yet exist but can exist. Thus, he says, unbegotten is said of what has not yet been made, as wood that has not yet passed into the form of a boat. Second, for what is opposed to a thing that neither exists nor can exist; thus, he says,

a triangle can in no way become a quadrilateral. Third, insofar as it is opposed to what is produced, and thus it signifies what already exists but is not from another, nor has in any way a father of its origin; and in this acceptance it notes that the Father alone is unbegotten. Fourth, unbegotten is said of what has not been made but is everlasting and incorruptible; and thus the Son and the Holy Spirit, as well as the Father, can be called unbegotten. Indeed, in this acceptance St. Maximus of Turin, in the homily on the Creed, pronounces the Godhead unbegotten and innascible, saying: "In God a nature that is innascible is shown; in the Father the truth of the Only-begotten; in the Almighty the fullness of power; for by the unbegotten Godhead he is Almighty, and by omnipotence Father." But here we use the word unbegotten in the third acceptance.

NOTE 3. The name unbegotten, insofar as it is attributed to the eternal Father, must be taken privatively, insofar as it denies every production and signifies the same as unproduced and unproducible. For if by this word only generation or nativity properly taken is denied, the Holy Spirit will be called unbegotten no less than the Father, since each is incapable of nativity and generation. But if any production whatsoever is denied only negatively and not privatively, that is, signifying a pure negation of producibility, the reason of unbegotten will belong equally to the Godhead and to the Father, for the Godhead is altogether incapable of real production. Therefore, so that being unbegotten, that is, unproducible, be proper to the eternal Father alone, the name unbegotten must be taken privatively, not indeed insofar as privation signifies a lack of some positive thing that can or should be in the Father, but insofar as it denies production that does not repugn belonging to him, not as Father, but as a divine person. Thus this privation is like what philosophers call a privation

according to genus and not according to species. For this reason a mole is said to be deprived of sight, because insofar as it is an animal it is not repugnant that it see, although it is repugnant insofar as it is a mole. So too, if it is permitted for the sake of explanation to argue from lower things to divine things, since the divine Father is a divine person and since, in the genus of divine persons, it is not repugnant to be produced, because in reality the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced, it follows that production is not repugnant to the Father insofar as he is a divine person, but only insofar as he is Father. Therefore the reason of unbegotten must be taken in him privatively.

Whether, however, this reason must be attributed to him as a personal property will be made clear in the following conclusion.

CONCLUSION I
THE NAME AND REASON OF UNBEGOTTEN, INSOFAR AS IT PRIVATIVELY EXCLUDES ALL PRODUCTION, IS TRULY A PROPERTY OF THE DIVINE FATHER

It is proved first from the First Council of Antioch, in the Profession of Faith, where it is decreed that there is one unbegotten God without principle. Here the name God stands for the person of the Father, according to the custom of sacred Scripture. Further, the Fathers of Nicaea in book 2 of the disputation propose these things to be believed and not scrutinized: "One unbegotten God and Father; one begotten from him, the Only-begotten Son, God the Word. As there is no other God with God the Father, unbegotten, so neither is there a co-begotten nor a prior nor a posterior Son." Hence St. Athanasius in

the epistle to Serapion, as St. Thomas relates in the first opusculum *Contra Errores Graecorum*, chapter 8, says: "The Catholic Church gathered at Nicaea faithfully attributed to God the Father alone that he is without beginning and unbegotten, and under anathema commanded the whole world that it must be believed so."

The holy Fathers prove the same. For St. Athanasius in the Questions *De Natura Dei*, question 5, says: "It is proper to the Father to be unbegotten, to the Son to be begotten, to the Holy Spirit to proceed." St. Gregory Nazianzen teaches the same many times, especially in Oration 23 where he says: "This is the property of the Father, that he is unbegotten." St. Gregory of Nyssa in the book *De Differentia Essentiae et Hypostasis* says: "The singular mark and note of the Father alone is that he subsists from no cause." St. Augustine agrees in book 15 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 2: "The Father alone is not from another; therefore he alone is called unbegotten, not indeed in the Scriptures, but in the custom of disputants." The other Fathers, as many as have written on the adorable Trinity, speak likewise.

The same truth is proved by theological reason: the divine Father has as proper and singular not only that by generative fecundity he is the principle of the Son and by spirative fecundity, together with the Son, the principle of the Holy Spirit, but also that among the divine persons he alone exists without another principle from which he is really produced, as the other two persons are produced. But this reason of not being produced is called by the name unbegotten. Therefore it truly belongs to the eternal Father as a property.

Again, there is only one unproduced person in the divine Trinity, namely the Father. Therefore the reason of the unproduced belongs to him alone. The antecedent is clear from

what was said in the third question of the first disputation, where we proved it impossible that there be several divine persons unbegotten, that is, unproduced.

You will say: The holy Fathers judged the word unbegotten should be proscribed, because it is not expressed in the sacred Scriptures and offers heretics an occasion for deceiving and blaspheming; and besides, the word Father sufficiently signifies whatever the word unbegotten can express. Therefore this word is not to be ascribed to the eternal Father as a singular property. The antecedent, as to all its parts, is proved from St. Basil in book 1 of *Contra Eunomium*: "I would say," he writes, "that the appellation unbegotten or innascible, although it suits our thoughts most especially, nevertheless, since I find it nowhere in the Scriptures and since it is the first element of their blasphemy, it should rightly be handed over to silence, especially since the word Father can do what unbegotten does."

I respond: indeed, the word unbegotten was rejected by some holy Fathers for these causes. Nevertheless, rightly interpreted and received, they used it to signify the difference of the eternal Father from the other two divine persons, as St. Basil himself also uses it in book 2 of *Contra Eunomium*, where he teaches that begotten and unbegotten are certain specific properties of the Son and of the divine Father. Nor does it matter that this word is not expressed in the divine Scriptures, for the word Trinity is likewise not read in them; and yet the Trinity of divine persons is not on that account to be denied.

Hence St. Sixtus I, in his first decretal letter, says after the middle: "They can neither read nor prove that in the divine writings Father is properly placed as unbegotten; but because the Christian faith requires it, without any doubt he is believed to be unbegotten." Fulgentius agrees, in response to the seventh

objection of the Arians: "Unbegotten Father," he says, "is nowhere read in the canonical Scriptures, and yet according to the truth of faith he is called unbegotten."

You will say again: Unbegotten, according to the genuine signification of the word, signifies the same as uncreated. But not only the Father, but also the Son and the Holy Spirit are truly uncreated. Therefore they too are unbegotten.

St. Cyril answers in book 11 of the *Thesaurus*, the sole chapter: unbegotten written in Greek with one nu signifies not made and not created and is predicated universally of God, that is, of each of the divine persons; but written with two nus it signifies not born and not from another and is accommodated to the Father, namely as the proper mark of the Father alone. Hugh Etherianus agrees in book 2 *Contra Graecos*, chapter 5: "Unbegotten," he says, "since among the Greeks it is written with one nu insofar as this name signifies uncreated, belongs not only to the divine nature, so to speak, but also to the three persons, for the nature together with the persons is equally without cause. But when it is written with two nus, ἀγέννητον, it belongs properly to the Father alone, not to the Son, not to the Holy Spirit, nor to any creature."

QUESTION III
WHETHER AND HOW THE FATHER IS CALLED PRINCIPLE, CAUSE, AUTHOR, AND FOUNTAIN IN DIVINE THINGS

NOTE 1. The name principle can be used in divine things in a threefold way, namely essentially, notionally, and principally. In the first way it signifies the fecundity of the Godhead ad extra, which belongs to the three persons, by which

through omnipotence they produce all creatures. In the second way it designates the fecundity of the same Godhead ad intra, by which the Father produces the Son and the Father together with the Son produces the Holy Spirit. In the third way it signifies that dignity by which the first person in divine things, produced by none, produces the others. Principle taken essentially belongs to the three persons indivisibly, for the works of the divine Trinity ad extra are indivisible, since the divine persons produce creatures by one will and one power. Principle taken notionally is common to the Father and the Son, since the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Hence St. Augustine in the book *Contra Maximinum*, chapter 17: "The Father is principle not from a principle, the Son is principle from a principle, but both together, not two, but one principle." Finally, principle taken principally is said to belong to the Father alone.

NOTE 2. Although Aristotle in book 5 of the *Metaphysica*, text 1, after enumerating all the ways in which principle is said, also affirms that cause is said in as many ways, as if he meant that cause is the same as principle, nevertheless, as Asclepius notes in his commentary on that place, the Philosopher says this neither from the truth of the matter nor from his own opinion, but from the sense of the multitude. For the signification of principle is broader than that of cause; therefore Aristotle mentioned principle first and before cause. For whatever is a cause is also a principle, but not conversely whatever is a principle must be a cause. The chief difference between cause and principle is that principle is that from which another thing or another person is; but a cause is that which pours being into another that previously did not exist. Hence cause signifies superiority and greater perfection in the producer than in the produced, and thus it denotes in the effect a dependence,

contingency, and a certain imperfection. For, as St. Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chapter 2, "There is not a perfect likeness between effects and causes; effects indeed bear images of the causes insofar as they can; but causes are hidden from effects and are superior by reason of their own principle." Hence cause properly taken differs greatly from principle.

NOTE 3. The name author among the Latins sometimes signifies the same as principle. I say among the Latins, for the Greeks either have no word that answers to it, or if they have one that could be properly adapted, they do not at all use it in divine matters, as St. Thomas observes in the opusculum, chapter 1. Therefore only the Latin Fathers transfer this appellation from creatures to divine things. Yet in using it some caution is needed, since author is sometimes said of one who has power over another, or who precedes by right and dignity, as Tertullian in the book *De Fuga*, chapter 1, calls the leaders and teachers of the Church "authors," that is, leaders and standard-bearers to whom others are inferior: "But when," he says, "the authors themselves, that is, the deacons, priests, and bishops, flee, how will the layman understand why it was said, 'Flee from city to city'? For when the leaders flee, who among the common number will sustain persuading others to hold their rank in battle?" Therefore the name author is not to be attributed to any divine person with respect to another except to signify the same as principle.

CONCLUSION I
IT IS PROPER TO THE DIVINE FATHER THAT HE IS PRINCIPLE AND FOUNTAIN PRINCIPALLY OF THE GODHEAD COMMUNICATED TO THE TWO PRODUCED DIVINE PERSONS

This conclusion contains two parts. The first part is proved from the authority of the holy Fathers, who call the divine Father a principle without a principle. Thus St. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 32: "The name of the one who lacks a principle is Father; of the one from a principle, Son; of the one with a principle, Holy Spirit." Thus Phoebadius in the book *Contra Arianos* says of the Father: "He is the principle without principle." Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria in book 2 of the *Thesaurus*, chapter 1: "One is Father, another is Son, and another is principle, another from a principle." Thus St. Augustine in *De Trinitate*, chapter 14: "He who begets is a principle to that which is begotten; the Father is a principle to the Son, because he begets him." Hence the Master of the Sentences in book 1, distinction 29, chapter 1, says: "The Father is principle without principle; the Son is principle from a principle; the Holy Spirit is principle from both." St. Thomas agrees in the first opusculum *Contra Errores Graecorum*, chapter 32: "It is necessary," he says, "to believe the Holy Trinity, namely that the Father is without a principle; the Son is a principle from the Father who is principle; the Holy Spirit is with a principle and with the Son one God."

The second part is proved, first from the sixth Council of Toledo, chapter 1: "We confess," it says, "the Father unbegotten, uncreated, the fountain and origin of the whole Godhead." The Council of Worms repeats the same in its Profession of Faith.

This is confirmed by the testimony of the holy Fathers, especially Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chapter 2: "We have received," he says, "from the divine Scriptures that the Father is, so to speak, the fontal Godhead; but the Son and the Spirit are, if it is lawful so to speak, buds or offspring of the fecund Godhead." St. Athanasius agrees in the work *Contra Gregales Sabellii*, where he says of the Father near the end: "The

Father is the root and fountain of the Son and the Holy Spirit." St. Augustine also agrees in book 4 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 20, where he thus explains John 15, "the Spirit of truth, whom I will send to you from the Father": "Showing," he says, "that the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead, or if it is better said, of the whole Deity." Pope Eugene IV also preserved this manner of speaking in the Letters of Union, saying: "The Father is the fountain and principle of the whole Deity."

You will say: Not only the Father, but also the Son, indeed even the Holy Spirit, are called without principle. Therefore the name and reason of principle belongs not principally to the eternal Father. The antecedent is proved from Zachary of Mytilene in the book *De Mundi Opificio*: "The Father," he says, "is without a principle and unbegotten; the Son begotten without a principle; the Spirit of God proceeding from the Father without a principle." Likewise Athanasius in the Questions, question 19, asserts that all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are without principle and lacking a principle. And Hippolytus the martyr in the homily on the consummation of the world addresses the Son: "You together with the Father lack a principle." Athanasius in the letter to Liberius also attributes to him this appellation, "lacking a principle."

I respond: the holy Fathers are to be understood as meaning that the divine persons lack a principle of duration, creation, and making, but not a principle of emanation of one from another, as St. Gregory of Nyssa clearly explains in *Contra Eunomium*: "When in the word ἀνάρχον nothing else is understood except what has subsistence from no principle at all, we confess that this is proper to the Father alone. But when inquiry is made about the other meanings of principle, since there is a principle of creation and of time and of order, in these

too we testify that the Only-begotten Son is above every principle, that is, above every principle of creatures and every motion of time and every succession of order, as the one through whom all things were made. Therefore the one whom we think is not without a principle as to subsistence, in all other respects we confess to be without a principle. And thus we say that the Father is without a principle and unbegotten, but that the Son is without a principle in the way we have mentioned, yet is not unbegotten."

You will say: A principle is that from which something proceeds or is produced. But the Godhead does not proceed or is not produced from the Father. Therefore he is not its fountain or principle. I distinguish the minor: the Godhead in the abstract and insofar as it prescinds from the persons does not proceed from the Father, nor is the Father its principle, I grant; the Godhead in the concrete, taken for the divine persons who derive their origin from the Father and are produced, I deny. Hence I said deliberately in the conclusion that the Father is the principle of the Godhead communicated, that is, the principle from which the Godhead is communicated to the two produced persons. And although through the Son the Godhead is also communicated to the Holy Spirit, nevertheless the Son cannot be called the principle of the whole communicated Godhead insofar as it is communicated through production, since he is not the reason for communicating the divine nature to himself, but receives it from the Father.

CONCLUSION II
THE FATHER IS TRULY CALLED THE CAUSE AND AUTHOR OF THE SON, BUT NOT ACCORDING TO THE PROPER SIGNIFICATION OF EITHER NAME

The first part is proved from the authority of the Greek Fathers, especially Basil in book 1 of *Contra Eunomium*: "The very word Father," he says, "what else does it signify but that he is the cause and principle of him who is begotten from him?" Thus also Gregory of Nyssa in the book *Ad Ablavium*: "We do not deny the difference considered between cause and caused, by which alone we find one distinguished from the other, namely because we believe that one is cause and the other from the cause." Likewise St. John Chrysostom, on chapter 1 of the epistle to the Hebrews, Homily 2: "For if the Father is the cause of the Son, much more is he the cause of those things that are declared to have been made through the Son." St. John Damascene agrees in book 1 of *De Fide Orthodoxa*, chapter 11: "There is one Father without principle, that is, without cause, for he is from nothing. There is one Son, who is Son and not without principle, that is, not without cause, for he is from the Father."

The same is gathered from the Latin Fathers. Hilary in book 12 of *De Trinitate* says: "The Father is cause of that which is." Likewise Augustine in book 7 of *De Trinitate* says: "That which is the cause for him that he be wise is the very cause for him that he be; therefore, if the Wisdom whom he begot is the cause for him that he be wise, it is also the cause for him that he be."

The same is proved concerning the name author. For St. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 29 affirms that the Father is the cause and author of the Godhead that is considered in the Son and the Holy Spirit. Likewise St. Athanasius in the second dialogue *Contra Anconam*: when he had said that the Father is the cause and author of the Son, he adds: "God is the fountain of the Holy Spirit and his author, not receiving him from outside, but allowing him to spring forth from himself." The Latin Fathers

affirm the same, especially St. Augustine in book 3 *Contra Maximinum*, chapter 11, where he thus reproves him: "But you say the Son of God has the Father as author. If therefore you call God the Father the author of God the Son because he begot him and he was begotten, because he is from him and he is not from him, I admit and concede it. But if by the name author you mean to make the Son lesser and the Father greater, and the Son not of the same substance as the Father, I will detest and reject it." Hilary agrees in book 9 of *De Trinitate*: "For since the unbegotten God is author to the perfect divine nativity of the only-begotten God, it is the paternal mystery that he is author of the nativity."

That this appellation of cause and author is altogether improper insofar as it is attributed to producing divine persons is sufficiently clear both from the notion of cause and author, which sounds of inferiority in the produced, and from the cited words of St. Augustine. Hence St. Cyril in book 2 of the *Dialogi de Trinitate* says: "It is not lawful, nor fitting, to name cause and caused; rather, concerning God one should say Father and begotten Son." Bessarion explains this clearly in the oration he delivered at the Council of Florence: "It must be noted," he says, "that the holy Doctors of the East use in divine matters the name cause and caused in a broad way, not as it imports limitation and dependence, but as it signifies production and emanation from a principle and of the one that is from a principle." Therefore a producing divine person is called the cause of the produced insofar as it is only its principle.

ARTICLE II
ON THE PROPER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECOND DIVINE PERSON

Just as the theologians, says St. Dionysius in book 1 of *De Divinis Nominibus*, praise the Godhead called by many names—when again they introduce it speaking and saying, "I am He who is," "life," "light," "God," "truth"—and when those same theologians praise the cause and author of all things from all its effects by many names, as "good," as "beautiful," as "wise," as "to be loved," as "God of gods," as "Lord of lords," as "Holy of holies," etc.; so, says St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 15, a. 2, ad 3: to express the diverse perfections of the Son of God, diverse names are attributed to Him. For that He may be shown connatural to the Father, He is called Son; that He may be shown coeternal, He is called Splendor; that He may be shown wholly similar, He is called Image; that He may be shown begotten immaterially, He is called Word, etc.

All the names that Sacred Scripture attributes to the Son of God are contained, according to St. Ambrose in book 2 of *De Trinitate*, under the number twelve: for He is called the Son of God, the Word, the Image, the Idea, the Principle, Wisdom, Light, the Brightness of eternal light, the Figure of Substance, the Character, the Mirror, Truth. "These," says Ambrose there, "are precious stones—sardius, jasper, emerald, chrysolite, and others—with which the vestment of holy Aaron, who bore the figure of Christ, is woven: this is the true garment of the Priest; this is the nuptial robe; this is the precious rational breastpiece." The Son of God is called so because He is born from God the Father; Word, because He comes forth from the mouth of the Most High with His perfect knowledge; Image, Splendor of glory, and Mirror, because nothing is lacking to Him whereby He might be able perfectly to express the Father; Vapor of the power of God, because He is of the same nature as the Father; Brightness of eternal light, because He is coeternal with Him; Character,

because He is distinguished from the Father by personal difference, not by essential perfection.

Among all these names, some are common to the three Persons and are appropriated to the Son alone, such as Light, Power, Idea, etc. Others are notional and proper, such as Son, Word, Image, Character, Figure of Substance. That the name Son is proper to the Second Divine Person is sufficiently clear from what has been said in Question 5 of the first Disputation and Question 3 of the second. It remains, therefore, that in the following questions we examine the other names that are proper and appropriated to the three.

QUESTION I

WHETHER THE NAME AND REASON OF WORD BELONG ONLY TO THE DIVINE SON

NOTE 1. Concerning the Word of God, various heretics have been mistaken. First, Valentinus dreamed that the Word is not the Son of God, nor proceeded immediately from God, but was begotten by the union of the Ineffable as Father and Silence as Mother, who brought forth Mind, which together with the Only-begotten Son bore Truth; and then, after many centuries, the Word proceeded from Mind and Truth together, as Irenaeus relates in book 1, chapter 1. Second, Paul of Samosata asserted that the divine Word is not subsistent, but uttered and transitory, as Epiphanius narrates in heresy 65. "Certain disciples of the Samosatene," says St. Athanasius, *Orations Against the Arians* 5, "dividing the Word from the Son, say that the Son is indeed Christ, but the Word is something else." Their reasoning we shall set forth and solve below. Third, the Alogi, that is, "without a Word," rejected the name Word on the ground that, as they said,

the Son of God was uttered neither by mouth nor by mind; for which reason they rejected all the writings of St. John because mention is made in them of the divine Word. Thus St. Augustine in *Heresies* 30. Arius and Eunomius seem to have asserted the same thing, thinking that every word is an utterance of the voice, as St. Athanasius relates in *De Decretis Nicaenae Synodi*. Some Arian disciples, however, not agreeing with them, said that the Word had always existed, but had not always been the Son; some wished that the man assumed by the Word was the Son; others, with Arius varying his opinion, distinguished two words: one existing in God, which is His Wisdom, indistinct from the Person of the Father; the other foreign to the substance of the Father, about which Arius said that St. John had spoken when he said, "In the beginning was the Word." Finally, Michael Servetus, in the year 1540, calling back from hell errors long since buried, asserted that the Word of God is nothing other than "a disposition by which it pleased Him to reveal to us the hidden decree of His will." In order to thrust all these errors back into the hell from which they emerged:

NOTE 2. From St. Augustine in *De Fide et Symbolo* chapter 3: the Son of God is called the Word of the Father because through Him the Father becomes known. For just as by our words we do this when we speak truly, that our mind may become known to the hearer, and whatever we secretly carry in the heart may be brought forth to another's knowledge through signs of this kind, so that Wisdom which God the Father begot—since through it the most hidden mind of the Father becomes known—is most fittingly named His Word. Hence Richard of St. Victor in book 6 of *De Trinitate* chapter 12 concludes that the Son alone is Word, and not likewise the Holy Spirit, because, he says, the word is born from the heart alone, and through it the

intention of the one speaking is produced. "Therefore," he says, "the Word is rightly named of the Father alone by His begetting alone, through which He who is the principal Wisdom is made manifest." He nevertheless adds another, and indeed genuine, reason why the Son is called Word, namely, because He is produced by utterance; for as he observes there, the word conceived in the heart and the word uttered by the voice are the same. "For what," he says, "is the voice except the vehicle of the word, or, if you prefer, the garment of the word? Is there one man clothed, and another when he has been unclothed?" Hence he infers that if someone had an ear for the speech of the heart as he has for the speech of the mouth, he would not at all need an outward speech to be made to him. It is therefore settled and certain that the Son of God is rightly called Word, either because He represents and manifests the Father, or because He is produced by utterance.

NOTE 3. Although St. Athanasius in *Orations Against the Arians* 3 said that we must not seek the Word of God to be such as ours is, because God is not such as we are, nevertheless the uncreated Word and the created word agree especially in three things. First, both are spiritual and a permanent offspring of the mind, not transitory; for as the author—whoever he is—of the book *De cognitione verae vitae* among the works of St. Augustine, tome 9, speaks: "The Most High Father, thinking Himself, begot His Word, which subsists coessentially in the essence of the Father and the Holy Spirit together." Second, both are immanent within the one speaking; thus the divine Word goes forth from the Father in such a way that it never goes out from His bosom. "He proceeded from the Father," says St. Peter Chrysologus, "but did not wholly depart from the Father"; or as Tertullian says in *Contra Praxeam*: "God brought forth His discourse as a root a

shoot, a spring a river, and the sun a ray… and yet the shoot is not severed from the root, nor the river from the spring, nor the ray from the sun; for as John says, the Word was with God." Hence Zeno of Verona, sermon 3 *De aeterna Verbi generatione*, calls the Son of God the noble inhabitant of the Father's heart. Third, both represent and express the object at whose vision they are formed. For whatever thing, says St. Anselm in *Monologion* chapter 31, the mind truly thinks either through bodily imagination or through reason, it strives to express in itself the likeness of that thing in the thought itself as far as it can.

The created word and the uncreated word differ chiefly in three things: first, the former is an accident, the latter a substance; second, the former is a form constituting the knower in act in the second act, and so is produced from the need of the knower, namely, that he may be actually understanding; but the latter is produced from fecundity, not from any need, because the Father is essentially understanding before He utters the Word; third, the former is not of the same nature as the one speaking, but the latter is altogether of the same nature as the Father, by whom it is spoken and produced.

CONCLUSION
THE REASON AND NAME OF WORD BELONG PROPERLY TO THE DIVINE SON ALONE

This is the position of almost all theologians against Durandus in book 1, distinction 27, question 2, where he teaches that Word, properly taken, is an essential predicate common to the three Persons. This is proved first from all the texts of Sacred Scripture in which the Son is expressly called Word, especially from chapter 1 of John, where the name Word is expressed many

times. "So that," says Cyril in book 7 of the *Thesaurus* chapter 1, "he seems to have chosen this name as the proper name of the Son: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was…' You see how this name signifies His being the Son according to nature." And later: "In vain do we marvel at the Evangelist and as if he had thundered something great and proper; we call him 'son of thunder' unless he had uttered the Word as something proper, wonderful, and unapproachable."

Other Fathers prove this same truth by their testimonies; above all St. Augustine in book 7 of *De Trinitate* chapter 2: "The Father and the Son together are one essence and one greatness and one truth and one wisdom; but the Father and the Son are not together one Word, because they are not together one Son. For as the Son is said in relation to the Father, not to Himself, so also Word is said in relation to Him whose Word it is, when it is called Word." For He is Son by the same that He is Word, and Word by the same that He is Son. Therefore the reason of Word is not a distinct property, but is formally the same as Filiation; hence he concludes: "Since the Father and the Son together are not one Son, it follows that the Father and the Son together are not one Word." But the reason of Word, which is proper to the Son, is distinguished from Wisdom, which is only appropriated; hence he adds: "Therefore He is not Word by that by which He is Wisdom, because Word is not said of Himself but only relatively to Him whose Word it is, as Son is said to the Father; but Wisdom is said by that by which essence is said, and therefore, because there is one essence, there is one wisdom." Yet because the Word is Wisdom, but not Word by that by which He is Wisdom, since Word is understood relatively and Wisdom essentially, let us take what is said when He is called Word as

though it were said "begotten wisdom," so that He may be Son and Image.

This is proved third by theological reason. That name must be judged proper to the Son of God which Sacred Scripture ordinarily uses to designate the second Person in the Godhead; but for that it uses the name Word, as is clear both from what has been said and from 1 John 5: "There are three who give testimony in Heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." For by that expression, "three," the number and distinction of the Persons is signified; therefore it was necessary to assign to each a proper name by which each Person is distinguished from the other. Therefore, as the name Father is not metaphorical but proper, so the name Word must be such. Moreover, the formal reason of Word consists in this: that it is a terminus produced by utterance representing its object; but the Son of God, as has been proved in Disputation 2, is a terminus produced by utterance and represents His object most perfectly; therefore the Son alone is properly and truly Word.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Where the Vulgate in John 1 expresses "Word," many of the holy Fathers, especially Cyprian, Jerome, etc., read "Discourse" and "Reason"; but discourse and reason are not a property of the divine Son; therefore neither is Word. St. Augustine answers in *Eighty-Three Questions* question 63 that what is said in Greek as λόγος signifies both reason and word in Latin, but in this place of John 1 we interpret it better as Word, so that not only a respect to the Father is signified but also the operative power by which all things were made through the Word. Reason, although nothing is made through it, is rightly called reason; but even if the Son from eternity were Word even if nothing were to be made in time, nevertheless that power and quidditative property, by which through the Word whatever must

be made is made, is more fittingly signified by the name Word than by the name Reason or Discourse.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Word in the divine is common to the three Persons; therefore it is not the property of the Son alone. The antecedent is proved, first, from St. Irenaeus, book 2, chapter 48: "God, wholly being mind and wholly being λόγος, that is, Word." Likewise St. Ambrose in the one book *De Filii divinitate* chapter 5: "Whether you say light from light, or word from word, or spirit from spirit, or lord from lord, whatever you say of Him, you will nevertheless believe the Father and the Son to be of one essence." Moreover St. Athanasius, against those who say that God the Word suffered in the flesh, says that whoever calls God λόγον signifies a simple essence. St. Dionysius also professes the same in *De Divinis Nominibus* chapter 1, where, recounting names fitting to God, he mentions among them that He is called Giver of life, Wisdom, Mind, Word, etc. Therefore he truly judges the name Word to be not a notional predicate but an essential one.

I deny the antecedent. For this was not the mind of the holy Fathers. For Irenaeus there affirms that the Word is emitted from thought and sense; and thus he judges that that alone is called Word which is produced by utterance, whether internal or external. But the Son alone, as is evident, is produced in this way, and consequently He alone is Word. As for Ambrose, he is not asserting from his own mind that the Son is "word from word," but only that He is wholly God and not a part of God; and if someone were to say "word from word," he would not on that account derogate from the faith of consubstantiality. To Athanasius I respond that he denies that by Word the Person is signified, but he denies that two natures are signified in one Person, as they are signified by the name Christ; hence he adds

that whoever says "Christ" declares the conjunction of two natures. Finally, to St. Dionysius I say that there he is gathering together all names, whether personal or essential, that are attributed to God by theologians; and therefore he lists the name Word among other personal names.

YOU WILL SAY 3: The name Word is attributed to God only metaphorically; therefore it does not designate a peculiar property of the Son. The antecedent is proved from Theophylact on John 1, "This was in the beginning with God," where he says: "No one will find any other proper name worthy of God; the word itself is not substantially and properly the name of the Only-begotten, but only manifests the Son begotten of the Father without passion," etc. Likewise Chrysostom, homily 1 on John, says that the chief reason why John called the Son Word was because he was going to announce the Father to us: "For," he says, "whatever I have heard from the Father, I have made known to you."

I respond: those Fathers mean nothing other than that no name can be devised by us that is proper to God and worthy of Him and truly significative and expressive of Him; hence Chrysostom a little above had said: "No one can speak or understand God according to His greatness"; and since what the substance of God is cannot be said, He manifests it to us through His works. Therefore the name Word is attributed to God to signify that it proceeds from the divine intellect as a terminus expressive of its object, and no name more fitting is commonly used by us to express this.

YOU WILL SAY 4: The name and reason of Word also belong to the Holy Spirit; therefore it is not a peculiar property of the divine Son. The antecedent is proved from St. Basil in book 5 against Eunomius chapter 11, saying: "The Word of God is

indeed the Son; but the Word of the Son is the Spirit." He proves it from Hebrews 1: "Upholding all things by the word of His power"; and because the Word of the Son is, through God, as the same Apostle says in Ephesians 6, "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God"; therefore, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent. That it is attributed properly and from the nature of the thing, I deny; figuratively and metaphorically, I concede. The metaphor consists in this: just as it is proper to Word to proceed from a Person and to be sent forth to express His sense and will, by which reason Christ proves Himself to be the Word of the eternal Father saying, "My doctrine is not mine, but His who sent me," the Father; so the Holy Spirit can be called the Word of the Son because He is sent forth by the Son to make known His sense and will to the faithful, according to John 16: "He will glorify me, because He will receive of mine and will announce it to you." Add that He can also be called the Word of the Son from the effect that He produces in the hearts of those evangelizing the truths proclaimed by Christ: "For," says Christ addressing the Apostles in Matthew 10, "you are not the ones speaking, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you." To St. Paul I say first that the divine Son upholds all things "by the word of His power," that is, by His most powerful command He preserves all things with the same ease by which He produces them, according to Psalm 148: "He spoke, and they were made," etc. Thus St. Chrysostom explains it in homily 2. Or that He contains and sustains all things by Himself, who is the omnipotent Word, as John 12 says: "The word which I have spoken, that will judge him," that is, I myself who am the Word of the Father, as St. Augustine interprets in book 1 of *De Trinitate* chapter 12. To the second I respond that by "the sword of the Spirit" the Holy Spirit as Word of the Son is not to be

understood, but the spiritual sword which is the divine doctrine itself, by which we must everywhere fight against all adversaries of salvation, both visible and invisible.

YOU WILL SAY 5: The divine Word is distinguished from the Son of God; therefore the reason of Word is not a property of the divine Son. The Samosatenes proved the antecedent from Acts 10: "God sent the word to the children of Israel, announcing peace through Jesus Christ," etc.

I deny the antecedent; and to its proof I say first that "word" there is not taken for a divine Person, but for the message which is spoken outside God and announced to men. Second, I say that by those words the divine Son can also be understood, whom God the Father sent into the world to preach the Gospel of peace in assumed humanity; for it is not new in Scripture that the same Person is repeated in the same sentence without the addition of His name or of a relative pronoun, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 1: "Awaiting the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ, who also will confirm you to the end without blame in the day of the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." Thus St. Athanasius answers in *Orations Against the Arians* 5 near the end.

YOU WILL SAY LAST: One and the same Person does not have two hypostatic properties, but one; but the reason of Word is distinguished from Filiation; therefore it is not a property of the divine Son.

I respond first by denying the major; for in the Father and the Son there is active spiration formally distinct from Paternity and Filiation, from which their real distinction from the Person of the Holy Spirit is also argued; therefore two formalities or relations or hypostatic properties do not contradict one and the same Person. I respond second that the reason of Word is not formally distinct from the reason of Son, nor are there two

relations, but one diversely conceived; as is clear both from St. Augustine cited above and from St. Athanasius, *Orations Against the Arians* 2, saying: "By that very thing by which He is the Word of His Father, He is Son; and by that by which He is Son, He is the Word," etc. Nazianzen agrees, *Orations* 36 near the end: "The Son," he says, "seems to me to be called so because He is the same in essence with the Father, and also because He is from Him. But Word, because He is related to the Father as speech is to mind," etc. Hence the reason of Word and of Son is one and the same, but only considered in different ways; therefore the minor must be denied.

QUESTION II
WHETHER AND HOW THE DIVINE WORD HAS THE REASON OF IMAGE

NOTE 1. An image is a likeness of something proceeding from it, such that two things necessarily concur for the reason of image: likeness and procession. Likeness, I say, either in species, that is, in specific nature, or at least in the sign of the species, that is, in something specially representative of the specific nature, as a painted image stands with respect to its prototype; for as St. Augustine says in *De Genesi ad litteram* chapter 16: "Every image is similar to that of which it is the image." Second, for the proper reason of image, procession is required of the image from that of which it is said to be the image: for as St. Augustine says, "an image exists when it is expressed from something." For lack of such procession, the Father is not the image of the Son, although perfectly similar to Him; nor is a painting judged to be the image of an object if the painter did not use that object as an exemplar, although the painting may otherwise be similar to the object; nor

among men, although two are very similar to each other, if one does not proceed from the other, he is not called the other's image. Therefore those two are necessary for image: likeness and procession.

NOTE 2. Just as a threefold likeness expressed from another can be found—namely, in an artificial thing, or in an intentional thing, or in a natural thing—so also a threefold image can be given: artificial, as a statue or a panel formed to express someone; intentional, as the impressed and expressed species from the object; and natural, as a son with respect to his father, whose specific likeness he bears. Hence it follows that an image is more perfect insofar as the likeness of what proceeds from another is greater; thus the artificial image is the most imperfect of all, because it bears likeness only in quality, namely in the figure of the thing which the image represents; the intentional image is more perfect, because it implies likeness not only in the sign of the species but also in the species itself, that is, in nature, under a mode of being not natural but intelligible or intentional; but the most excellent of all is the natural image, because it implies likeness in species, that is, in nature, under the mode of natural and entitative being.

NOTE 3. From St. Augustine in *Eighty-Three Questions* question 74: image, equality, and likeness are distinguished from one another. "For," he says, "where there is image there is always likeness, but not always equality; where there is equality there is always likeness, but not always image; where there is likeness there is not always image nor always equality." Thus in a mirror there is the image of a man, because it is expressed from him; there is also necessarily likeness, but not equality, because many things are lacking to the image that are in the thing from which it is expressed. Where there is equality there is always likeness but

not always image, as in two equal eggs, because there is equality and there is likeness, since whatever is in one is in the other; yet there is no image, because neither is expressed from the other. Where there is likeness there is not always image nor always equality: for every egg is similar to every egg insofar as it is an egg, but the egg of a partridge, although insofar as it is an egg it is similar to a hen's egg, is nevertheless not its image, because it is not expressed from it, nor equal, because it is smaller and is of another kind of animal. Therefore where in something representing another there is not only likeness but also perfect equality of the representing to the represented, then the reason of image exists in it most perfectly.

With these things presupposed, two things must be resolved: first, whether the true and perfect reason of image belongs to the Son; second, whether it belongs to Him alone. That both may be defined together:

SINGLE CONCLUSION. The reason of image perfectly and properly belongs in the divine only to the Son. The truth of this conclusion is clear from what has been said about the generation of the Son, and it is further gathered from various texts of Scripture in which the divine Son is called the image of the Father; thus Colossians 1: "Who is the image of the invisible God"; Hebrews 1: "Who, being the Splendor of glory and the Figure of His substance," or as St. Chrysostom translates it there in homily 3, "the Character of His substance," because, he says, as the Father subsists in Himself needing nothing, so also the Son.

This is also proved by the holy Fathers. St. Athanasius in the epistle *De decretis Nicaenae Synodi* says: "If you name Him image, by that very fact you will indicate that this is the Son; for what is like God except His own offspring?" Nazianzen agrees, *Orations* 4 *De Theologia*: "The Son is a brief, compendious, and

easy declaration of the Father's nature; for everything that is begotten defines its begetter by a kind of silent voice." Nyssen agrees in *De differentia essentiae et hypostaseos*: "The hypostasis of the Son is as it were the form and face by which the Father is known, and the hypostasis of the Father is known in the form of the Son, while that property remains in them which is considered for the distinction of the Persons."

This is further proved by theological reason: to the divine Son alone belong those two conditions required for the reason of image, namely likeness and procession from that whose likeness it bears; therefore the Son alone is image. The antecedent is clear from what we said to show that the procession of the Word is true generation, because it proceeds as like to the producing principle. This is confirmed by the Fathers, who from this twofold condition gather that the Son is the image of the Father; thus St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 3 of the *Thesaurus* chapter 1: "For this reason the Son is Word and Image of God, because He is truly and properly begotten from the Father Himself." And Athanasius, *Orations Against the Arians* 4: "Although He alone is the true image and genuine offspring of His Father, no obstacle arises from this to our being said to have been created to the image of God, and to our being called glory and image of God; since this does not occur from our own character, but because of the image of God and His true glory dwelling in us, which is reason, that is, the Word of God itself, which afterward for our sake was made flesh."

This is confirmed again, that the Son is the true image of the Father, from other names which differ from image only by their mode of signifying, yet in the thing signified express wholly the same as image. The first of these is the name Face, which Scripture sometimes uses to signify the divine Son; thus Psalm

138: "Where shall I go from Your Spirit, and where shall I flee from Your face?" For as the cited Nyssen says: "The hypostasis of the Son is as it were the form and face by which the Father is known." Hence the ancient Patriarchs, begging for the incarnation of the divine Word, said in Psalm 79: "Show us Your face, and we shall be saved." To this name also corresponds the name Countenance; hence Cyril, book 3 on John, chapter 29: "Thus," he says, "we also understand: 'The light of Your countenance, O Lord, has been signed upon us'; for he calls the Son the countenance of God the Father, that is, the Character of the Father."

The second name is Species; hence Christ Himself in John 5: "The Father bears witness concerning me; you have never heard His voice nor seen His Species; and you do not have His Word abiding in you, because you do not believe Him whom He has sent." Weighing this, Athanasius in the cited Oration 4 says: "He beautifully joined Word with form, so as to make it clear that He is the Word of God and the Image, Character, and Species of His Father." Hence in Daniel 3 it is said that "the Species of the fourth was like the Son of God"; from which the same Athanasius in a sermon *Contra omnes haereses* infers that the Arians are worse than Nebuchadnezzar, because they do not wish the Son to be similar to God nor consubstantial.

Third, He is called Seal and Character, as is gathered from John 6: "Him the Father, God, has sealed." Basil weighs these words in the one book *De Spiritu Sancto* chapter 6: "Christ, the Splendor of glory—Him the Father has sealed, and has expressed Himself whole in Him." Nazianzen agrees, teaching that the Son is called Character as the pure seal of the Father and not false. St. Ambrose gives the reason in *In prooemio* of book 2 *De Fide*: "He is called Image and Splendor and Character of the

Son of God, because these have revealed the incomprehensible and unsearchable majesty of the Father's divinity in the Son, and the expressed likeness." Other such appellations you may read in Ruiz, disputation 64, section 8.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Man is said to be made to the image and likeness of the divine Trinity, according to Genesis 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness"; hence Chrysostom in a sermon *De Trinitate*: "Scripture, signifying that there is one image of the Holy Trinity, says: 'And God made man; according to the image of God He made him.'" And Hilary, book 5 *De Trinitate*: "Man is formed to the image of Father and Son; the name does not differ, the nature does not differ; for there is one species of the image to which man was created." And Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*: "There is one divinity of the Holy Trinity and one image, to which man was made." Therefore the reason of image does not belong to the Word personally, but also to the divinity, indeed to the Trinity.

I respond that the name image is taken in two ways: either for the exemplar and prototype to whose likeness something is formed, or for the produced likeness made for imitation of another. In the former way the name image is taken both by Scripture and by the Fathers cited in the objection; for the divinity is indeed the exemplar to whose imitation man was made, but it is not image properly so called.

YOU WILL SAY 2: The Holy Spirit is also truly called image; therefore this reason does not belong only to the Son. The antecedent is proved from Romans 8: "Those whom He foreknew He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son." Hence Cyril, *Dialogus De Trinitate* book 7: "But that the Spirit is the true likeness of the Son, hear the blessed Paul writing: 'Those whom He foreknew, He predestined to be conformed to the

image of His Son.'" Hence Damascene, book 1 of *De Fide Orthodoxa* chapter 18: "The Son is the image of the Father, and of the Son the Holy Spirit, through whom Christ dwelling in man gives him the image according to what he is." Therefore, etc. I respond with our De Bassolis in book 1, distinction 27, question 3, article 3, that those Fathers use the name image improperly and extend it with such breadth that it includes any perfect likeness in nature of a Person proceeding with the principle from which it proceeds, even if it does not proceed from it as from an exemplar, and therefore does not proceed as similar from the formal force of the procession. They did this so that they might prove more evidently that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father no less than the Son; since the Holy Spirit is in fact no less similar and equal to the Father, nor can He lead into knowledge of the Father less than the Son Himself.

You will press: the Holy Spirit is infinitely more similar to the Father and the Son than creatures are to God; but spiritual creatures, namely men and angels, are truly perfect images of God; therefore much more the Holy Spirit is the perfect image of the Father and the Son.

I respond first by denying the minor: creatures are images of God only very imperfectly, because they do not have the same nature in species or number, nor any perfect sign of the divine nature; although they have some imperfect likeness to it, namely according to the spirituality of substance and the operation of intellect and will. I respond second that even if those creatures are imperfect images of God, nevertheless the reason of image belongs more properly to them than to the Holy Spirit, because they have that imperfect likeness to God formally from the force of their production, since they are formed by Him as artifacts by an artisan; and thus, as an artisan forms his work to

the likeness of the idea which he conceived in his mind, so God established creatures by looking to Himself as to their exemplar. But the Holy Spirit does not have likeness with the producing principle formally by the force of His procession, but only identically and by reason of infinity; therefore the reason of image does not belong to Him as properly as it does to creatures.

From these things gather that the divine Son is the image of the Father in two ways: first, naturally, insofar as He proceeds from Him really in an all-encompassing likeness of the divine nature. Second, intentionally, insofar as by the force of His production He proceeds as Word and knowledge, and thus proceeds as expressing the Father intentionally; and so He is His image not only insofar as He is of the same nature and substance with Him, but also insofar as He is produced knowledge of that same Father. This latter reason of image is most proper to the divine Son; for He alone proceeds as Word and as knowledge perfectly expressing His principle.

QUESTION III
WHETHER AND HOW THE REASON OF WISDOM BELONGS TO THE DIVINE SON

The third kind of names by which the Son of God is designated in Sacred Scripture is Wisdom. For this term is very often taken for the Person of the Word, as will be clear below. For this reason three things must be chiefly resolved here: first, whether indeed the name Wisdom belongs to the Word so that it can stand for His Person; second, in what way this appellation fits the divine Word, namely whether properly or by appropriation; third, whether the divine Father is wise by that Wisdom which is the Word. Therefore:

NOTE 1. This is the difference among essential, proper, and appropriated things in the divine: essential predicates are those, whether quidditative, or modificative, or attributive, common to the three divine Persons, such as the divine nature, immensity, goodness, etc. Proper things are those properties or relative formalities by which each Person is constituted and distinguished from another. Appropriated things are those essential and absolute predicates, truly common to the three Persons, yet by reason of a certain special account and affinity accommodated to one Person rather than another. Thus, to extinguish the heresy of those who would say that the divine Father is powerless because of old age, omnipotence is attributed to Him, though it belongs indivisibly to the three divine Persons. Likewise, because the divine Word proceeds through intellect, whose act is to know and to be wise, and because the Holy Spirit proceeds through will, which is as it were the sanctuary of love, goodness, and holiness, therefore knowledge, wisdom, etc. are appropriated to the Son, while holiness, goodness, and love are specially attributed to the Holy Spirit.

NOTE 2. It was fitting that certain essential attributes and certain operations ad extra should be appropriated especially to one Person rather than another, although these are truly common to the three divine Persons. The truth of this is gathered not only from Sacred Scripture, in which we see many such appropriations, but also from the holy Fathers who accommodated various appropriated perfections to one divine Person rather than another. "So that," says St. Leo, sermon 2 *De Pentecoste* chapter 2, "by the propriety of a word or work the truth of the Trinity may be insinuated to us, and the intellect may not divide what the ear distinguishes." "For," he adds, "the Trinity is never understood if it is always spoken inseparably." Reason

also favors this: it was fitting that more obscure and difficult things be manifested through things more easily perceived. But the attributes and operations of God ad extra are understood by us more clearly than the properties and distinctions of Persons; for by evident demonstration from known creatures we can rise to knowledge of the divine attributes, not likewise to knowledge of personal properties. Therefore it was fitting to accommodate to one divine Person some special attribute naturally known, by which the distinction of that Person from another might more easily become known. Hence Richard of St. Victor, in the little work *De tribus appropriatis* chapter 2, speaking of divine Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, says: "In these three the form and image of the supreme Trinity is expressed, so that the invisible things of God may be seen, being understood through the things that are made. Therefore, as those three are in the Trinity, so three are for the three, like to like, proper to proper," etc.

NOTE 3. Two things are required for perfect appropriation. First, there must be a certain cognition and affinity of the attribute with the property of the Person, as was just said: because the Son proceeds through intellection, Wisdom is appropriated to Him, so that, upon hearing this name, hearers may be moved to grasp something peculiar in the second Person that is not common to the others, namely the reason of Word, Image, etc. Second, by the appropriated perfection an imperfection must be removed which the unlearned could suspect in a divine Person; thus Alexander of Hales, *Summa* I, question 67, member 3, article 1, says that Power is attributed to the Father lest He be thought weaker because of age; Wisdom to the Son lest He be thought less capable because of youth; and Goodness to the Spirit lest He be heard as cruel. Hence it happens that St. Thomas calls appropriation "the way of likeness and

unlikeness"; Albert the Great, *Summa* I, question 48, "approach and withdrawal"; Henry, II, article 72, question 1, "correspondence according to likeness." But Alexander of Hales cited best gathers both conditions of appropriation from the end, namely: that the truth may be instructed and error forestalled. With these things presupposed, the three points proposed must now be proved; therefore:

CONCLUSION I
WISDOM IS TRULY ATTRIBUTED TO THE SON, AND SOMETIMES STANDS IN PLACE OF HIS NAME

This is proved from Sacred Scripture. First, because Wisdom is often called begotten; but no essential attribute, insofar as it is such, can be called begotten; therefore then the name Wisdom stands for the Person of the Word. The minor is clear: because the essence neither begets nor is begotten. The major is proved: for in Proverbs 8 that divine Wisdom says: "The abysses were not yet, and I was already conceived"; and again: "Before all the hills I was brought forth"; and in Ecclesiasticus 24: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, firstborn before every creature."

Hence St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 1 calls Christ the Lord "the power of God and the wisdom of God." Therefore St. Basil in book 4 against Eunomius rightly concludes that if Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, and these are uncreated and coeternal with God—for there was never a time when He was without wisdom or without power—then Christ is uncreated and coeternal with God.

This is confirmed from the holy Fathers, who prove in a like way that the Son of God is eternal and therefore coeval and

consubstantial with the Father. Thus St. Ambrose in *De Symbolo* chapter 11 refutes the Arians who say, "There was a time when He was not, and before He was born He was not," in this way: "Could there have been a time when the Father was without life, without wisdom, without power, without the Word, which is Christ?" St. Augustine agrees, *Oratio Contra haereses* chapter 6: "You see, therefore, that He was always, of whom you dare to say: He was not. Or if you say that God was at some time without Word or without reason, you will be an adversary not only of the Son but also of the Father."

Hence in book 7 of *De Trinitate* chapter 1 he says: "It is impious to say that God is not the Father of His Wisdom." Hence Theophylact on John 1: "It is impossible," he says, "for God to be without discourse and wisdom and power; therefore because the Word, Wisdom, and Power of the Father is the Son, we believe that He is always with God, that is, with the Father." Whoever that Eusebius is, the author of the first homily on the Creed, explains these things clearly: "Just as," he says, "the sun cannot be without splendor, nor fire without heat, nor immortality without eternity, nor eternity without immortality, nor power without strength; just as reason cannot be without wisdom, nor truth without justice, nor goodness without mercy; so the Father could never be without the Son. For all virtues are contained in the Son." From all this it is clear that Wisdom stands for the Son not only in Sacred Scripture but also among the holy Fathers.

CONCLUSION II
WISDOM IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE DIVINE SON NOT PROPERLY, BUT BY APPROPRIATION

This is the common position, and St. Augustine proves it in book 7 of *De Trinitate* chapter 2, where after saying: "Because in that simplicity to be wise is not other than to be; there wisdom is the same as essence," he concludes: "Therefore the Father and the Son together are one essence and one greatness and one truth and one wisdom; but the Father and the Son are not together one Word, because they are not together one Son." He gives the reason there: that the Son is called Image and Word not of Himself but of the Father, and relatively. Hence he infers that the Son is not Word by that by which He is Wisdom, because Wisdom is by that by which essence is. "Therefore," he says, "He is not Word by that by which He is Wisdom, because Word is not said of Himself but only relatively to Him whose Word it is, as Son is said to the Father; but Wisdom is by that by which essence is, and therefore because there is one essence, there is one wisdom."

From this it is plainly evident that Wisdom is an essential attribute common to the three Persons, not proper to the Son alone. Hence St. Augustine there infers that when the name Wisdom stands for the Person of the Son, it must not be said simply Wisdom, but begotten Wisdom. "Because," he says, "the Word is Wisdom, but not Word by that by which He is Wisdom; for Word is understood relatively, Wisdom essentially. Let us understand what is said when He is called Word as though it were said begotten Wisdom, so that He may be Son and Image." And when those two are said, namely begotten Wisdom in one of them, by the fact that it is begotten, Word and Image and Son are understood, and in all these names essence is not understood because they are said relatively.

From these things it is clear that the name Wisdom is not simply proper to the Son, but only with an addition, namely

when it is said begotten or generated Wisdom; for in this way it belongs to the Son not only by appropriation but also properly, and it expresses nothing other than what the name Word and Son expresses.

CONCLUSION III
THE DIVINE FATHER IS NOT WISE BY BEGOTTEN WISDOM

This is the common position, and the Subtle Doctor proves it in book 1, distinction 32, question 1, number 9: if the divine Father were wise by begotten Wisdom, either begotten Wisdom would be the form by which the Father would become formally wise, as by Paternity He is Father; or begotten Wisdom would be the principle of the wisdom that is in the Father, in the sense in which the Master of the Sentences concedes that the Son is wise by unbegotten Wisdom "principiatively," namely because the unbegotten Wisdom of the Father is the principle of the begotten Wisdom which is the Son; or finally the sense would be that the Son is a subauthoritative principle with respect to the act of being wise that is in the Father, as the Word is a subauthoritative principle with respect to the act of creating, for the Father is said to create through the Word.

But none of these can be said lawfully and truly. Not the first nor the second, otherwise the Father would receive Wisdom from the Son, which is absurd; for as St. Augustine says in book 15 of *De Trinitate* chapter 7: if the Son alone understands for Himself so that understanding may be for Himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit, we return to that absurdity that the Father is not wise of Himself but of the Son, nor that Wisdom begot Wisdom, but that the Father is said to be wise by that

Wisdom which He begot. And if in God to be is the same as to be wise, and His essence is His Wisdom, then it would follow not that the Son has being from the Father, which is true, but rather that the Father has being from the Son, which is most absurd and most false. Nor the third, because a subauthoritative principle has a true action with respect to that of which it is called such a principle; thus the Son truly influences creatures which the Father produces through Him and with Him; but begotten Wisdom has no influence with respect to the act of being wise in the Father. Hence St. Augustine concludes there: therefore God the Father is wise by that Wisdom which He Himself is; and the Son is the Wisdom of the Father from Wisdom, which is the Father, from whom the Son was begotten. Hence he rightly recalled in book 1 of *Retractationes* chapter 26 what he had taught in *Eighty-Three Questions* question 23, that God is said to be wise because He begot that Wisdom by which He is said to be wise. That opinion he retracted and there asserts that he handled it more accurately in the books *De Trinitate*.

YOU WILL SAY 1: The divine Father speaks by the Word, according to St. Augustine, book 7 of *De Trinitate* chapter 1; but from St. Anselm in *Monologion* chapter 63, to speak is nothing other than, as it were, to gaze by thinking; therefore the Father gazes by the Word, and thus is also wise by the Word.

The Doctor distinguishes the minor in number 10. If "to speak" is taken essentially insofar as it signifies the same as "to understand," as St. Anselm takes it, he concedes; if it is used notionally and insofar as it signifies the same as "to produce the Word," he denies the minor and likewise the consequence, for thus speaking is distinguished from essential intellection. Therefore the Father speaks by the Word only insofar as He is the principle of the Word, which by its nature is formally declarative

and expressive of all that can be declared and manifested; and so the Father is only the efficient cause, not the formal cause, of that representation and expression—no differently than if Peter were to make a mirror in which all species and images of things are received; the mirror would indeed be the formal cause of that representation, but Peter only the efficient cause. Hence although the Father in this way speaks by the Word, He still cannot be said to be wise by the Word, because to be wise is taken essentially, not notionally.

YOU WILL SAY 2: The Doctor admits there, question 1, number 7, that the divine Father is rightly said to love Himself by the Holy Spirit; therefore likewise it is not incongruous to say that He is wise by begotten Wisdom. The consequence is proved: the Father is said to love Himself by the Holy Spirit because He produces the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father by appropriation; but He also produces the Word, which is called the Wisdom of the Father by appropriation; therefore, etc.

I deny the consequence; and to its proof I say that this is the difference between loving and being wise in the divine: loving can be taken notionally insofar as it signifies the production of the Holy Spirit who is called produced love, so that to love is nothing other than to breathe forth produced love; but to be wise is not ordered to signify the production of Wisdom, but only the attaining and perceiving of the object, and thus it is taken only essentially for the whole intellection, not notionally for the productive utterance of the divine Word. Therefore there is no parity between them.

ARTICLE III
ON THE PERSON OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

That the third Person in the divine Trinity is named by the special name Holy Spirit is known of itself to all the faithful. "For," says St. Ambrose in *De Symbolo* chapter 1, "although the Father is Spirit and the Son is Spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy, nevertheless the third Person alone is called Holy Spirit."

St. Jerome in Galatians 4 gathers the propriety of this appellation from Psalm 50, where the royal Psalmist, naming the three divine Persons as Spirit, designates them by three proper titles; for, says that Doctor, he calls the Father the "principal Spirit," because the Son is from the Father and not from the Son; but the "upright Spirit" of truth and justice signifies Christ the Lord, because the Father gave all judgment to the Son, as David says, "O God, give Your judgment to the King"; but he calls the Holy Spirit by that name openly.

Yet the New Testament more clearly teaches that this appellation is proper to the third divine Person, since whenever express mention is made of the divine Persons, the third is called Holy Spirit; thus at the end of Matthew: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit"; 1 John 5: "There are three who give testimony in Heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." Hence St. Chrysostom, homily 3 *De Spiritu Sancto*, says: "He is called Spirit; for this is the first and proper appellation; and as having a clearer meaning it demonstrates the nature of the Holy Spirit."

Moreover, theologians wish this name Spirit to be derived rather from breathing or spirative breath than from spirituality and immortality; and this is fitting because of the singular analogy and likeness that His procession has with the emission of breath and vital spirit. For as, to omit other things, breath itself takes its origin from heart and mouth, so, says St.

Cyril in book 13 of the *Thesaurus* chapter 3, the Holy Spirit comes forth from the very substance of God, as also the spirit that comes forth from the human mouth. Job teaches this openly, chapter 33: "The Spirit of the Lord made me, and the breath of the Omnipotent gave me life."

Therefore Christ the Lord in John 20 breathed upon the disciples and said, "Receive the Holy Spirit"; which the same Cyril weighs in book 9, chapter 44: "For this reason Christ breathed corporeally, showing by this sign that, as from the human mouth the human spirit proceeds corporeally, so from the divine substance, in a manner fitting the Godhead, the Spirit which is from it is poured forth."

Yet this derivation and appropriation of the name Spirit, although proper, is not an all-encompassing but a very imperfect analogy with breath; for, as St. Basil observes in the one book *De Spiritu Sancto* chapter 16, "the Word is not a significative striking of air brought forth through the instruments of voice, nor is the Spirit the breath of the mouth flowing out from the respiratory parts; but the Spirit of the mouth of God is the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father."

Concerning this Spirit three things must now be resolved: first, whether He truly proceeds from the Father and the Son; second, whether, if hypothetically He did not proceed from the Son, He would be really distinguished from Him; third, what are His properties and peculiar endowments.

QUESTION I

WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT TRULY PROCEEDS FROM THE FATHER AND THE SON

That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father is held as certain by all who confess His divinity. For Eunomius, who asserted that He derives His origin from the Son alone, dreamed that He is not God but a creature of the Word, just as the Word itself is a creature of the Father, as St. Basil relates and refutes in book 2 against Eunomius, who says: "If someone is raised up from creatures to the comprehension of the substance, he understands the Son to be a creature of the Unbegotten, that is, the Father; and the Paraclete a creature of the Only-begotten." But the controversy between Greeks and Latins concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son remains famous; in order that this contention may be solved more evidently, His origin must first be uncovered. Therefore:

NOTE 1. It is not yet established who first asserted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, as the deviating Greeks contend. For that some think the first assertor of this error was Macedonius, the impugner of the divinity of the Holy Spirit, scarcely has the appearance of truth; nor does anything support this assertion from that letter of Justinian, bishop of Sicily, to Peter, bishop of Antioch, which is found in the fifth general council, where it reads: "Macedonius breathes the Holy Spirit from the Father alone." For certain very learned men think that, for the word "breathes," one should read "separates," and this fits well with the heresy and opinion of Macedonius, who, since he denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit, denied likewise His consubstantiality with the Father, and therefore tore Him away and separated Him from the Father.

Nevertheless, by the more common reckoning of ecclesiastical historians, the first assertor of this error is believed to be Theodoret while he was still a Nestorian. For writing for the Nestorians against the anathemas of Cyril of Alexandria by which

the errors of Nestorius were condemned, and attacking the ninth anathema in which Cyril said that the Holy Spirit is proper to the Son, Theodoret responds thus: that the Spirit is proper to the Son insofar as, proceeding from the Father, He is of the same nature, this we too confess; but if he says that the Spirit has His existence and essence as from the Son or through the Son, we say that this is blasphemous and impious. Cyril in his response deliberately omitted this futile and interposed erroneous opinion of Theodoret so that he might pursue the intended dispute, namely showing that the Holy Spirit is proper to the Son, that is, not adventitious or given to Him by accident—whose contrary Theodoret taught with the Nestorians. For this reason Theodoret was anathematized by the Council of Ephesus; but later, coming to his senses and renouncing his former opinion, he was received as Catholic with great applause and proclaimed so in the Council of Chalcedon. Therefore this error about the procession of the Spirit from the Father alone seems to have been erased and put to sleep at that time.

NOTE 2. This error was renewed around the year 766. For about this time our annals relate that the Council of Gentilly was celebrated near Paris, in which, besides the question of the veneration to be shown to sacred images, this too was debated: whether the Holy Spirit, just as He proceeds from the Father, so also proceeds from the Son, as Ado of Vienne relates in his chronicle. The cause of calling that synod was that when the emperor Constantine Copronymus, an iconoclast, had sent legates to Pepin, king of Gaul, to obtain his alliance, it happened that while the Gauls were accusing the Greeks for contempt of images, the Greeks in turn reproached the Gauls and the Latin Church because they had added the word "and the Son" to the Creed. Therefore, lest these seeds of impiety spread further, the

council established both: that sacred images are to be venerated, and that the Holy Spirit truly proceeds from the Father and the Son.

But those seeds of error could not be so uprooted that they did not quickly sprout again. For the same Ado reports that in the year 809 a synod was celebrated at Aachen by command of Charlemagne, in which the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son was treated. John, a certain monk at Jerusalem, first stirred up this question; and for the cause of defining it, Bernharicus, bishop of Worms, and Jesse, bishop of Amiens, and Adelhard, abbot of the monastery of Corbie, were sent to Rome to Pope Leo, etc., as the Frankish annals report for the year 809. John Pithou suspects that this John, the renewer of the error, was that most holy and most learned monk Damascene who was living at Jerusalem around the year 730. Nor is this without plausibility, since he seems to pronounce that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son in book 1 of *De Fide Orthodoxa* chapter 11, where, after saying many times that He proceeds from the Father, he adds near the end of the chapter: "We do not say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, but we name Him the Spirit of the Son." How easily Damascene can be excused will be clear below. It must nevertheless be noted in passing that in the synod of Aachen it seems that the issue was not so much the procession itself from the Son as the addition of those four syllables "and the Son" to the Creed, as is gathered from Pope Leo's conference with the legates of that synod, as we shall say below.

NOTE 3. This error at last burst forth into open heresy through Photius, who, after St. Ignatius the patriarch of Constantinople was expelled, was intruded into his seat in the year 858. For this reason he was condemned by Pope Nicholas I;

and then, raging against the Roman Church, he fabricated various calumnies against it and objected to it many heads of heresies, especially that the Latins assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. "This," says Hugo Etherianus in book 2 *Contra Graecos* chapter 15, "is he who after Theodoret, digging sand into a muddy pit, not sowing seeds but burying poisons, became the cause of Christians very weak in faith." From then on almost all the Greeks conspired into this erroneous opinion and held it as a public watchword by which they might tear the seamless tunic of Christ by wickedness, not only by schism but also by various heresies, departing from the Latin Church, the firmest pillar of Catholic truth. From then on it was often attempted to recall them to the faith and the unity of the Church. "But," says Cardinal Hosius in *De Communione sub utraque specie*, "as often as they returned to the bosom of the Church, so often were they led away again by various and strange doctrines; as though ten times and four they returned, so many times they abandoned it." Therefore this question must be discussed with the utmost exactness, so that it may become more clearly known how senseless and how foul the insanity of the Greeks is. Therefore:

CONCLUSION I
THE HOLY SPIRIT TRULY PROCEEDS FROM THE FATHER AND THE SON

This is a matter of faith determined in various councils and defended by the holy Fathers of both Churches, Eastern and Western, to be produced below. This is gathered and proved, first, from Sacred Scripture. First, from John 16:14, where Christ, promising the Apostles that He would send them the Paraclete,

the Spirit of truth, who would teach them all truth, says: "He will glorify me, because He will receive of mine and will announce it to you." St. Ignatius weighs this text in the epistle to the Ephesians, where he reports the Son to have said to the Father: "I have glorified You on earth; I have finished the work which You gave me to do." Concerning the Holy Spirit he says: "He will glorify me on earth, because He will receive of mine and will announce it to you." Therefore each of them glorifies Him from whom he receives what he does. From these words Ignatius infers that just as the Son glorified the Father because He receives from the Father by proceeding from Him, so the Holy Spirit glorifies the Son because He receives from Him by proceeding from Him. For the word "will receive" signifies nothing other than procession, since in the Gospel we never read that one divine Person gives to another and that the other receives, unless the latter proceeds from the former. For this reason we nowhere read that the Father receives anything from the Son or the Holy Spirit, nor that the Son receives from the Holy Spirit, because neither the Son proceeds from the Holy Spirit nor the Father from Him and from the Son. St. Epiphanius proves this clearly in the *Ancoratus*, where after saying at the beginning: "The Holy Spirit is in the midst of the Father and the Son, from the Father and the Son," he says near the middle: "If Christ is believed to be from the Father, God from God, and the Spirit is from Christ or from both, as Christ says, 'who proceeds from the Father,' and, 'He will receive of mine,'" etc.

This is confirmed from the following words, verse 15: "All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said: He will receive of mine." Therefore the Son has from the Father not only the essence but also the power of breathing forth, that is, the fecundity of producing the Holy Spirit. For all substantial perfections of the

Father are common to the Son, with this one exception: that the Son is not the Father. Moreover, Christ says that the Holy Spirit will receive from Him because He has all that the Father has; for the word "therefore" gives the cause why He said "He will receive of mine," namely because "all that the Father has…" Hence St. Augustine says: from Him from whom the Son has that He is God, from Him He has also that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him. And in book 3 *Contra Maximinum* chapter 14: He who begot such a Son, in begetting gave that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from Him. All these things Eugene IV explains clearly in the letters of union: because, he says, all that is the Father's the Father gave to His only-begotten Son by begetting Him, except being Father; this very thing, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the Son has eternally from Him from whom He also was eternally begotten. The same Damascene, whom the Greeks object to us for defending their error, subscribes; for in book 1 of *De Fide Orthodoxa* chapter 9 he says: "All that the Father has is the Son's, except that He is unbegotten." And chapter 11: "The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are altogether one, except that the Father is unbegotten, the Son is begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeds." But if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son and the Son did not breathe Him forth, the Father and the Son would be distinguished not only by generation but also by the power of breathing forth. Therefore, since Damascene affirms that the Father and the Son have all things in common besides Paternity and Filiation, he undoubtedly holds that they have the power of breathing forth in common and therefore that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both.

Second, it is proved from those texts of Sacred Scripture in which the divine Son promises the Apostles that He Himself will send them the Holy Spirit. Thus in the same chapter 16, verse

7: "If I do not go, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you." And earlier in chapter 15 He had said: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send you from the Father." But the mission of one Person by another cannot be understood unless He proceeds substantially from the one who sends Him, especially when the Persons are of the same nature and substance, as the Greeks themselves affirm concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Holy Spirit truly proceeds from the Son, since He is sent by Him. Hence Gregory the Great, homily 26 on the Gospels: "The mission of the Holy Spirit is the procession itself, because He proceeds from the Father and the Son." Athanasius agrees in the epistle to Serapion: the Son comes in the name of the Father; "but the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name," because the Spirit has such an order and nature to the Son as the Son has to the Father, etc.

The Greeks reply that the Son Himself is sent by the Holy Spirit, from whom nevertheless He does not proceed; therefore from the fact that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son it does not follow that He proceeds from the Son. They prove the antecedent from Isaiah 48: "And now the Lord has sent me, and His Spirit"; and Luke 4: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He anointed me, and sent me to evangelize the poor."

But I respond that Christ the Lord is indeed sent by the Holy Spirit insofar as He is, by reason of His assumed humanity, inferior to the Holy Spirit, and thus He can be sent by Him with an authoritative mission. The denomination of that mission can be attributed to the Word by the communication of idioms, yet Christ is not immediately and precisely sent by the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the uncreated Word; therefore nothing is proved from this against the present assertion.

Third, it is proved from all those texts in which the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of Christ and of the Son; thus Romans 8: "If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His." And Galatians 4: "God sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts." But He could in no way be called the Spirit of the Son unless He were referred to the Son; and He cannot be referred to Him unless He proceeds from Him. For if identity of nature and power, or some other cause, were sufficient for Him to be called the Spirit of the Son, by the same reason the Son could be called the Son of the Holy Spirit. This is confirmed: as the Son, quidditatively, bears respect to the Father begetting, so the Spirit bears respect to one breathing forth; hence just as the Word cannot be called the Son of a Person who is not Father, so the Holy Spirit could not be called the Spirit of a Person who is not the one breathing forth.

This is proved, second, from the definitions and doctrine of councils. First, this truth is defined in the epistle which Cyril, with the Alexandrian council, sent to Nestorius, and which was received and approved by the whole Council of Ephesus, the third general council; it is the tenth among Cyril's epistles, where it is said: "He is called the Spirit of truth, and Christ is truth, and He is poured forth from Him as also from God the Father," or as it was in the ancient compilation of councils: "He proceeds from Him as from the Father." In general, all the synodal epistles of Cyril were approved by the Council of Chalcedon, the fourth general council, in the fifth action, and by the sixth synod, the third of Constantinople, in the seventeenth action; and the seventh general council, the second of Nicaea, in action 7, referring and approving the Nicene Creed written in the first general council, adds: "who proceeds from the Father and the Son," although that council was composed for the most part of Greek Fathers.

Nor does it matter that in the Council of Florence, sessions 6 and 7, the more recent Greeks said that in their codices of that council the word "and the Son" is not read; for Andreas, theologian of the Latin Church, replied learnedly and excellently in that same session 7, testifying that he had a very ancient manuscript codex in which that word was contained. Moreover, an ancient historian was cited there as witness of that same addition. Nor likewise does it matter that Damascene, who flourished at the time of that seventh council, wrote: "We do not say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son," as was related in NOTE 3; for it is probable either that he died before the celebration of that council or that he wrote that book *De Fide Orthodoxa* earlier —an indication of which is that in his works he cites councils only up to the sixth.

This truth was also defined in many Latin councils. For Pope Agatho in epistle 2, which is also that of the Roman synod and is contained in the sixth general synod, says: "He proceeds from the Father and the Son," which place Julian the Cardinal complained had been corrupted by the Greeks in that disputation which he held against them in the Council of Florence. Nor is it surprising that this pontiff decreed thus with his Roman council; for many years earlier Leo the Great, in the epistle to Turibius, bishop of Astorga, chapter 1, says: "He proceeded from both." Moreover, under Pope Anastasius, in the year of Christ 400, the first Council of Toledo was celebrated, in which this truth is likewise defined in these words: "We believe the Spirit also to be the Paraclete, who is neither the Father Himself nor the Son, but proceeding from the Father and the Son." Likewise in the third Council of Toledo under Pelagius II in the year 589, where in the confession of faith set forth by 150 Fathers, canon 3, it is said: "Whoever does not believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the

Father and the Son, let him be anathema." The same is defined in the fourth Council of Toledo, chapter 1; and in the eighth around the times of Martin I; and in the eleventh under Pope Adeodatus; all of which councils were celebrated before the sixth general synod.

We read the same truth in the Council of Hatfield in the year 650, in Bede, book 4 of the *Historia Anglorum* chapter 17, where the Fathers openly profess that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. Finally, the councils of Gentilly in the year 766; Aachen around the year 809; Worms under the year 860; and around the year 1090 in the time of Urban II a council was celebrated at Bari with Greeks and Latins, as St. Anselm is the author, who was present and narrates the whole matter more fully, as an eyewitness, in the writer of the life of St. Anselm, book 1. Likewise the general councils defined this truth: Lateran under Innocent III, chapter 1, with Greeks also present and consenting, as is clear from chapter 4; Lyons under Gregory X, where with Greeks present and consenting this truth was defined, and the Nicene Creed was sung three times in Greek and Latin with that explanation "who proceeds from the Father and the Son"; finally the Council of Florence in the year 1438, after long and exact disputations between Greek and Latin Fathers on this matter, at last defined that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as is evident in the letters of union, which both Latin and Greek Fathers signed.

But because Greek minds are light and changeable, they did not remain long in faith and concord; rather they soon relapsed into their former schism and errors and drank again their own vomit, by which they are still defiled. Nor is it surprising, since in the very beginnings of the Church there arose a murmuring of the Greeks against the Hebrews, from whom

alone the Church then consisted, so that there might be a fatal presage that the Greeks, prone to division and contention, would, to the Church's grief, divide the seamless tunic of Christ by their schism.

This is proved, third, from the Greek Fathers. First, from the creed of St. Athanasius, in which we read: "The Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."

The Greeks reply, first, that this creed is not Athanasius's. But on the contrary, first, Gregory Nazianzen, in the oration in praise of St. Athanasius, testifies that he produced a perfect confession of faith which he offered to the emperor, and which the whole East and West venerates: "To the emperor," he says, "truly royal and magnificent, he offers a written confession against the new dogma," namely of the Arians; and shortly after: "Moved by the authority of this confession, as it seems to me, both the Westerners and whatever in the East is living," etc. Next, St. Augustine on Psalm 120 cites the preceding verse in the name of Athanasius: "Of this sun," he says, "Father Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, spoke so beautifully: He is from the Father alone," etc. In other places too he mentions the same creed, but without naming Athanasius, such as book 5 of *De Trinitate* chapter 8 and in the *Enchiridion* chapter 35, etc. From these it is clear that in the time of St. Augustine no one doubted that this creed had been produced by St. Athanasius. Finally, Genebrard, book 3 *De Trinitate*, and Nauclerus in *Chronologia*, affirm that there exists a very ancient codex in the monastery of St. Germain at Paris, in which it is asserted that Athanasius produced the said creed at Trier while he was hiding in a certain well because of the pressing persecutions of the Arians.

The Greeks reply, second, that the phrase "and the Son" was added by the Latins. But on the contrary, first, in the Greek Athanasian creed too this phrase is read. Next, in the fourth Council of Toledo, celebrated in the year 633 and therefore before the schism of the Greeks, the same Athanasian creed is recited with that phrase "and the Son." What reason would there then have been for making that addition, when no public dispute had yet arisen between the two Churches? Finally, and above all, Athanasius himself teaches this same truth in many places, especially in *Orations Against the Arians* 4: "For we do not introduce three principles or three fathers, as the Marcionites; nor do we adduce three suns as a comparison; but one sun and its splendor and one light from both." By these words he compares the Father to the sun, the Son to the splendor, and the Holy Spirit to the light arising not from the sun alone but also from the splendor. And in the epistle to Serapion *De Spiritu Sancto* he speaks thus: "The Apostle commands that a heretical man, after one or two corrections, be avoided; and even if you see some flying through the air with Elijah, and with Peter and Moses treading the sea dry-shod, unless they profess the Holy Spirit to be God essentially existing from God the Son, as we profess the Son to be God begotten essentially from God the Father, do not receive them."

Second, St. Basil in book 3 against Eunomius says: "Why is it necessary that if the Spirit is third in dignity and order, He must therefore also be third in nature? For the reason of piety teaches that He is second in dignity after the Son, since He has being from Him and depends wholly on that cause; but that He is third in nature we neither learned from the holy Scriptures nor can it be gathered from what has been said." Likewise Epiphanius, heresy 62: "From the same essence, from the same truth, from the

Father and the Son, with the Father and the Son always in substance, the Holy Spirit." And heresy 69: "So that Christ the Lord may show the Father as light and the Son as light and the Holy Spirit as light, and a fountain from a fountain—from the Father and the Only-begotten—the Holy Spirit; for rivers will flow from his belly." Cyril of Alexandria agrees not only in the ninth anathema but in many places, especially in *De recta fide ad Reginam*, where he concludes near the end: "From the Father the Son proceeds, equal and similar to Him in all things. From both the vivifying Spirit also proceeds." And in book 11 on John, chapter 27: "Proceeding," he says, "from the very substance of God the Father, and poured forth upon the saints through the consubstantial Word, from whom He is according to the emission unto being and subsisting." Which he declares more clearly in book 13 of the *Thesaurus* chapter 1: "It is altogether necessary to confess that the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Father and the Son"; and chapter 2: "We believe that from the Son naturally and essentially the Holy Spirit proceeds as from the Father." Nazianzen explains this very truth excellently in *Orations* 37, where he compares the divine Trinity to three human persons: the Father to Adam, because the Father from no Person takes origin, as Adam from no man; the Son to Eve, because Eve proceeded from Adam alone, as the Son from the Father alone; the Spirit to Seth, because he was born from Adam and Eve, as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

I omit the sentences of other Greek Fathers, which you may abundantly read in the Council of Florence and also in St. Thomas in the first little work *Contra Graecorum errores* chapter 32, in Hugo Etherianus, Petavius, and countless others, both more recent and more ancient, who have shown that the Greek Fathers support this truth.

This is proved, fourth, from the Latin Fathers. First, St. Martial in epistle 1 to the people of Bordeaux, chapter 10, says: "The Holy Spirit in the divine equality proceeded ineffably from Him who begot and from Him who was begotten; therefore the Spirit, the Lord of the Lord, is proceeding from the Father and the Word." Tertullian favors this in *Contra Praxeam* chapter 8: "The third is the Spirit from God and the Son, as third from the root is the fruit from the shoot, and third from the spring is the stream and the river, and third from the sun is the apex from the ray." Likewise Hilary, book 8 of *De Trinitate*, asserts that for the Spirit to receive from the Son is the same as to proceed from the Son, just as the Son receives and proceeds from the Father. Ambrose agrees, *De Symbolo* chapter 3: "The Holy Spirit," he says, "is truly Spirit, proceeding indeed from the Father and the Son, but He is not the Son, because He is not begotten; nor the Father, because He proceeds from both; neither begotten nor unbegotten, not made." But above all St. Augustine taught this truth best and most subtly in many places, especially in book 4 of *De Trinitate*: "Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son; for the same Spirit is not without cause called both the Spirit of the Father and of the Son." And in book 15, chapter 26, he often presses this truth: "It is taught that from both the splendor is such, because the Son Himself says, 'He proceeds from the Father'; and when He had risen from the dead and appeared to His disciples, He breathed and said, 'Receive the Holy Spirit,' so that He might show that He also proceeds from Himself." It would be superfluous to call other Latin Fathers as witnesses, for they are innumerable, and all, as one, conspire in the same dogma.

Therefore all the Greeks are greatly to be blamed because they do not believe so many and such faithful witnesses of divine

truth, whom nevertheless the Fathers of the fifth general synod cry out must be heard above all others, professing thus openly: "We follow in all things the most holy Fathers and Doctors of the Catholic Church—Saints: Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Cyril, Leo, Probus—and we receive all that they wrote concerning the right faith and the condemnation of heretics." These things were proved, to the lamentable loss of the Eastern Church, by which God Himself seems to have given His suffrage for the Latins: for from the time when the Greeks withdrew from communion because of these rivalries about the procession of the Holy Spirit, they always fell into worse. That nation, once conspicuous in doctrine even to envy, famous in holiness even to wonder, mistress of the nations by empire, today mourns under harsh Turkish captivity and, without king, without prince, without academies and schools, bears the barbarous yoke of the Saracens. And what is remarkable, Constantinople was taken and the Greek empire overthrown in the year 1452 on the 28th day of May, according to the more noted authors, on which day the feast of Pentecost sacred to the Holy Spirit fell, so that that saying of Christ in Matthew 12 may be verified: "Whoever speaks blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, neither in this age nor in the age to come."

This is proved by theological reason by the Subtle Doctor in book 1, distinction 11, question 1: one who has a perfect productive principle, before he is understood to have a product, can produce by that principle when the principle is so perfect that it does not depend on a passive and cannot be impeded by anything; but the Son has will, which is a productive principle of love adequate to it, and He has it as prior, before the product of the act of will is understood; therefore He can produce by it;

therefore He does produce by it. He proves the minor: generation and spiration have an order between themselves, such that in some way generation is prior to spiration, and in that prior the begotten is communicated every divine perfection that does not contradict it, and thus will; therefore then He has will as prior to the product by the act of will, because no production is yet understood to have been made by way of act of will.

This is confirmed from the fact that if doubt were to be raised about the influence of the Father and the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit, it would rather seem that one should hesitate about the Father than about the Son, since the Father in the production of His Son already has an action adequate to Himself if you look to natural reasoning: for His productive action of the Son is infinite and therefore adequate to the principle; therefore He seems unable to be occupied further by a new infinite action for a new production of another Person. But the Son has no productive action antecedent to the production of the Holy Spirit, nor can He have any other ad intra except spiration alone; therefore if natural reasoning is regarded, this spirative action would rather seem to be conceded to Him than to the Father, if it were to be attributed to only one divine Person.

The Greeks object, first, from Sacred Scripture, because whenever it mentions the procession of the Holy Spirit, it mentions the Father alone; thus John 15: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father." Therefore it judges that He proceeds from the Father alone.

I deny the consequence; for as St. Augustine notes in book 3 *Contra Maximinum*, by these words the Son is not excluded, but the Father is expressed as the principal author,

because He is the principle without principle, to whom He refers all that He has. For this reason John 7 says: "My doctrine is not mine, but His who sent me, the Father"; which Augustine weighs in tractate 29 on John: "Because," he says, "the Word cannot be of no one, but of someone; and He calls His doctrine Himself both His and not His, because the Word is the Father's. For what is so yours as you, and what is so not yours as you, if you are of someone?" Therefore the divine Son refers everything that He is back to the Father, and attributes to Him that fecundity productive of the Holy Spirit which He received from the Father. St. Augustine explains this excellently in book 15 of *De Trinitate* chapter 17: "Not without reason," he says, "in this Trinity it is not said from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds principally except God the Father." Therefore I added "principally," because it is found that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, but this too the Father gave to Him.

St. Anselm, in *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, answers that by asserting that the Father is productive of the Holy Spirit, the Son is not thereby excluded, because an affirmation of one is not a negation of the other. Indeed, he says, even if it were said openly, "No one produces the Holy Spirit except the Father," that expression would not thereby exclude the Son, since exclusive expressions added to one divine Person do not exclude the other Persons unless the predicate is opposed to them relatively. This is clear from Matthew 11: "No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son," by which nevertheless the Son is not excluded from knowledge of Himself nor the Holy Spirit from knowledge of both.

The Greeks object, second: in the Council of Ephesus the creed of the Nestorians was read before the Fathers, in which it was expressly contained that the Holy Spirit does not proceed

from the Son; and yet none of the Fathers objected; therefore they seem all to have consented to that proposition.

I respond, first, that an argument from negative authority, which nowhere has much force, here concludes nothing, since the silence of the judges was held to something other than that proposition; for the council did not then wish to dispute ex professo about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, because it had convened for another matter, namely about the one Person of Christ the Lord and about the divinity of Him whom the Virgin Mary bore. Still, the council sufficiently signified its opinion when it approved the doctrine of Cyril and condemned the contrary of the Nestorians and of Theodoret.

The Greeks object, third, from various authorities of the holy Fathers: first, of St. Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus* chapter 2, where he says: "The Father alone is the super-substantial fount of the Godhead." Second, of Nazianzen, *Orations* 24, where he says: "All that the Father has the Son also has, except cause," or as others translate, "except causality"; therefore the Son does not have from the Father that He is cause or principle of the Holy Spirit. Third, of Basil, epistle 43 to Gregory of Nyssa, where he says: "The Son has no communion with the Father according to proper notion"; but if the Son breathed forth the Spirit, He would have active spiration as a notion common with the Father; therefore, etc. Finally they bring Damascene, book 1 of *De Fide Orthodoxa* chapters 7 and 8, where he says: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and rests in the Son"; and a little later: "We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father; we do not say from the Son"; and again: "The Holy Spirit is indeed from the Father, but not from the Son"; therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

I deny the consequence. To St. Dionysius I say that he calls the Father the supersubstantial fountain because He alone is principle without principle; but the Son is as it were a river flowing from that fountain, and from that river, as from the fountain, the pool is derived, namely the Holy Spirit. In this sense Epiphanius, heresy 69, calls the Son "a fountain from a fountain." To Nazianzen I say that he speaks of causality by which the Father and the Son are mutually related, not by which they regard the Holy Spirit. To Basil I respond that he speaks there not of every notion of those two Persons, but of what is proper to each, namely Paternity and Filiation, according to which they have no communion at all; for Paternity and Innascibility belong to the Father alone, as Filiation is proper to the Son alone. Finally, to Damascene I say that although St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 3, replies that "many among the Greeks in this followed Theodoret the Nestorian, among whom was also Damascene," nevertheless Damascene can be interpreted benignly, as Bessarion explained in the oration *Pro unione* chapter 6, namely that Damascene did not absolutely deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but only disagreed with the Catholics in the manner of speaking, thinking it safer to say "through the Son" rather than "from the Son," since it seemed to him that the preposition "from" signifies a first cause not proceeding from another cause, whereas the preposition "through" signifies the contrary, which without doubt has a causal force.

APPENDIX
ON THE ADDITION OF THE CLAUSE FILIOQUE TO THE NICENE CREED

It is more certain than certain that the addition of the clause *Filioque* to the Nicene Creed was the very chasm that divided not only the two seas and even the two hemispheres of the earth, but also both the Eastern and the Western Church, and offered the Greeks an occasion for withdrawing themselves from union with and obedience to the Roman Church. Thus the Greek spokesman Mark of Ephesus, at the Council of Florence, after he had professed that the addition made to the Creed was neither true nor fitting, added: This, indeed, is acknowledged to have been the chief cause of our schism and dissension; and later: It is certain beyond doubt that the Roman Church had fabricated a doctrine proper to itself, and that for that reason it had been the cause of dissolving our friendship and the beginning of our hostilities. Hence Photius, who is thought to have begun the schism, in his Encyclical Letter to the patriarchal sees of the East, alleged this as the principal cause for his departure from the Roman Church: This, he says, is the sum and summit of evils: they did not hesitate to adulterate even the sacred Creed, which has irrefragable force and authority from all synodical and ecumenical decrees, with certain spurious and false disputations, newly teaching that the Holy Spirit proceeds not from the Father alone, but from the Son.

Now this tragedy arose because, in the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, the Fathers decreed that it is permitted to no one to hand on another faith than that of Nicaea, and those who dared the contrary seemed to be bound under an anathema. But in the Nicene Creed that clause *Filioque* is not found, nor anything equivalent; and therefore the Latins already seemed to have incurred the censure pronounced by the Council of Ephesus. Accordingly, two points especially must be established

in this Appendix: namely, that the addition was lawful, and the time must be investigated when it was first made.

The first point is affirmed by Fathers both Greek and Latin at the Council of Florence; for all subscribed, in the name of all, to the Letters of Union issued by Eugenius IV, in which, among other things, these words are read: We define that the explanation of those words *Filioque*, for the declaration of the truth and because of the necessity then pressing, was lawfully and reasonably added to the Creed. Hence there is no longer any place left for doubting this truth. Yet for fuller persuasion I press the matter as follows. The addition would be unlawful either because it asserts something false, or because it was made to the Nicene Creed contrary to the laws sanctioned by the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, or finally because it was promulgated without the consent of both the Eastern and Western Church. But none of these stands in the way.

Not indeed the first; for from what has been said it is clear that the Holy Spirit truly proceeds from the Father and the Son; therefore the clause that expresses this truth reeks of no falsity.

Nor the second; otherwise those Greeks would be especially to be blamed who so often altered their creeds after the Nicene Creed had been issued. For Mark of Ephesus himself, who most obstinately defended the Greek position at the Council of Florence, admits near the end of that council that between the first council, in which that divine Nicene Creed had been issued, and the second, not a little time had intervened, in which interval almost thirty other creeds were published by particular and private assemblies. Moreover, the Fathers of the Councils of Ephesus, Constantinople, and Chalcedon would have to be condemned and struck by their own thunderbolt; for if, as the

Greeks claim, it is not even permitted to add a word to the Nicene Creed, why did they themselves add several? For, as was objected to the Greeks at the Council of Florence, the clauses "of heaven and earth" are found in the Constantinopolitan Creed, which are not read in the Ephesian and Nicene; likewise "of one substance" is found in the Nicene, but is not found in the Ephesian and Constantinopolitan; likewise "from the Virgin Mary" is in the Constantinopolitan, but not in the Ephesian and Nicene. Besides, it is established that in the Nicene Creed nothing more was pronounced about the Holy Spirit than "and in the Holy Spirit"; later, however, the Fathers of the Council of Constantinople added the words "the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father," about which the Greeks do not complain. Therefore they complain without reason about the addition of the clause *Filioque*.

Finally, an equal has no authority over an equal, nor can anyone bind the hands of his successor. Therefore the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon could not forbid future councils, given an opportunity and under urgent necessity, to hand on a new explanation and addition to the Creed; for it is free to successors, as equals, to explain the faith in another way and in other words, provided they wish to add or subtract nothing contrary to right faith.

Nor, finally, the third. For, as the Latins demonstrated in the Council of Florence, that addition *Filioque* was approved by the Greeks before it was universally approved by the Roman Church, namely in the Seventh General Synod, which was almost entirely of Greek Fathers. Add also that just as the Greeks themselves, when opportunities were given, celebrated several councils with no Latin Father present, in which they determined certain matters of faith, proscribed heresies, and composed

creeds, so likewise Latin Fathers could add this *Filioque* clause to the Creed for the sake of explaining the faith. Moreover, the Roman Church is by no means bound to summon the others, especially since in antiquity many synods were celebrated with differing numbers of Fathers and were approved, while Latin Fathers were sometimes absent.

The second doubt, namely at what time this addition was made, has not yet been sufficiently explored. For some hold that the addition was made by the Roman Council under Damasus, which Stanislaus Socolovius deduces in chapter 1 of the annotation to the censure of the Eastern Church made by Jeremiah, Patriarch of Constantinople. There he says that when Damasus summoned the Fathers of the Eastern Church gathered at Constantinople to Rome so that they might celebrate a universal council there with the Latins, and since, because of various inconveniences, it was not possible for them to go there, they sent their faith to the Roman Council. Damasus approved it with the Roman Council, adding only that clause *Filioque* to the creed of faith issued in that council for a fuller explanation of the Nicene Creed, which the Constantinopolitan Fathers again confirmed. He proves this from the Council's letter to Damasus and from the Creed of Damasus found in Jerome, where the aforesaid clause is added.

But this opinion is not firmly established: first, because in the aforesaid letter of the Council of Constantinople there is not even a word about the addition of the clause *Filioque*; and second, because among the decrees of that Roman council, which are found in Book 9 of the *Historia Tripartita*, chapter 16, nothing is determined about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, but in Canon 16 only that man is condemned who denies that the Holy Spirit is from the Father. What is brought forward from the

Creed of Damasus helps little: first, because it is not established that this creed is truly Damasus's; moreover it is far different from the Nicene and Constantinopolitan. But the question here is not where this truth was first defined, but where the clause *Filioque* was first added to the Nicene Creed as it is sung in the Church.

One could suspect, not without foundation, that this addition was made by the Fathers of the First Council of Toledo celebrated in the year of Christ 400. For in the confession of faith which Idatius of Limoges indicates to have been issued in this synod, we read: We also confess that the Paraclete is the Spirit, who is neither the Father himself nor the Son, but proceeds from the Father and the Son. This is again firmly affirmed in the Third Synod of Toledo. Yet since that confession of faith is far different from the Nicene Creed sung in the Church, it is not permitted to conclude from this that at that time the clause *Filioque* was added to the Creed about which the Greeks complained.

Therefore I think it better to say that this addition was made by certain particular churches around the year of Christ 620, and from there was adopted by others with the approval of the Supreme Pontiff. I infer this first from the words of Andrew the Theologian, speaking in the name of the Latins at the Council of Florence, Session 7: When a great schism was imminent in Gaul and in Spain, and *Filioque* was already being celebrated everywhere, it was necessary for the Roman Pontiff, in a great assembly of many Westerners of eminent dignity and of the Fathers of the council, to add "and from the Son," and thus to make the Creed more illustrious. Next, in the Eighth Council of Toledo in the year 653, the same Nicene Creed is recited with this addition: We believe also in the Holy Spirit, the giver of life, proceeding from the Father and the Son, to be adored and glorified with the Father and the Son. Finally, an indication of

this truth is that in the Synod of Gentilly the question about the present controversy was debated between Greeks and Latins, and, what is decisive, in the Seventh General Synod, Act 7, the Creed is recited with this addition. Therefore it is permitted to believe that this addition had been made earlier.

You will say: The Master of the Sentences, Book 1, distinction 11, chapter 2, asserts that Leo III, who sat around the year 796, rebuffed the envoys of Charlemagne, who requested in his name and also in the name of the Council of Aachen the addition and the chanting of the clause *Filioque* in the Mass. Therefore it is a sign that this addition had not yet been approved by the Roman Church; for why would Leo hesitate to grant it if it had been approved and granted by his predecessors so many years before? Yet he refused. For, as Baronius relates in tome 9 under the year 809, he answered the envoys: If I had been asked before it was chanted in that way, I would surely have replied that it should not be introduced. And immediately confirming his counsel and his judgment he adds: Is it more salutary to believe, or more perilous not to believe, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as from the Father, than that the Son is Wisdom God from Wisdom God, Truth God from Truth God, begotten; and yet each is one wisdom and one truth, essentially God, although it is established that neither was added to that same Creed by the holy Fathers?

Moreover, the same Master of the Sentences affirms that the Pontiff, immediately after the departure of the aforesaid envoys, had the Constantinopolitan Creed engraved on two silver tablets, on one in Latin and on the other in Greek, in both cases without that addition *Filioque*. Therefore it follows that at that time this addition had not yet been lawfully made nor approved by the Roman Church.

I reply. Leo III did these things with good reason, because perhaps at that very time this addition was not yet read by the Roman Church in the sacrifice of the Mass, although in some particular churches the custom had long prevailed of reciting, during the solemnities of Mass, this clause *Filioque* added to the Constantinopolitan Creed. Yet for that reason he did not condemn the addition; rather he did not approve its being sung in the Mass without a prior ordinance of the Roman Church. Nor does it matter that he had the Creed engraved without the aforesaid clause. He did this so that the memory of the intact Constantinopolitan Creed might be preserved, which could be obliterated by the new explanation of the Creed, and so that it might be clear that nothing contrary to antiquity was being taught, but that the ancient faith was retained intact, with only further explanations appended.

QUESTION II
WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT WOULD BE REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE SON IF HE DID NOT PROCEED FROM HIM

Note 1. From the Doctor in Book 1, distinction 11, question 2, number 2, Godfrey in Quodlibet 7, question 4 judged this question useless and unworthy of solution, because it supposes an impossibility, namely that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. Such a supposition does not seem to be admissible by one responding, because from it he could be refuted and driven to concede contradictions, which would press the respondent most severely and lead him into error.

But all the other Scholastics valued this question so highly that they wove careful and subtle disputations in resolving

it, and their labor was not in vain. For just as similar questions are usefully treated in the schools, for example, whether if God were not immutable he would be eternal, and whether if man were not capable of laughter he would be distinct from a horse, the first indeed for investigating whether immutability is the formal reason of eternity, and the second for knowing the formal principle constituting man and distinguishing him from brute animals, although those suppositions are impossible, so likewise, although the supposition made by us is impossible, yet because it greatly conduces to perceiving the formal reason that distinguishes the Son from the Holy Spirit, it ought to be judged neither superfluous nor entailing a contradiction.

Add that St. Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Book 5, chapter 6, admits a similar impossible hypothesis, teaching that if the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent the Father from being called unbegotten. For it is certain that the Father's not begetting the Son is altogether impossible; nevertheless, from this impossible supposition St. Augustine rightly concludes that even if in the divinity the Person were not generating, he would still be unbegotten.

Note 2. From the same Doctor in the same place: inferential propositions are of two kinds. Some are inferred through a predicate that is primarily intrinsic; others through an extrinsic ground. Of the first kind are those in which, through an intrinsic ground and an essential consequence, one follows from another; as from "a man exists" it follows intrinsically "therefore he is rational," because "rational" is an intrinsic and essential predicate of man. Of the second kind are those which are inferred only as it were by an accidental consequence, though necessarily; thus from "a man exists" it follows only extrinsically, though necessarily, "therefore he is capable of laughter," because the

capacity for laughter is not of the primary intrinsic and essential reason of man, but is something extrinsic to his essential constitution.

In the former kind of hypothetical suppositions, it is certain that if the latter is removed, the former is removed through an intrinsic ground; for example, if Peter were not rational, it would follow by intrinsic consequence that he would not be a man. In the latter kind, however much the latter is removed, it does not follow through an intrinsic ground that the former is removed; for example, in this hypothesis, if man were not capable of laughter, it does not follow through an intrinsic ground that he would not be man, because, even with laughter removed, the intrinsic and essential principles constituting man remain, namely animal and rational.

Hence, to the point: the proposition "the Son is Spirator" is said to be of the latter kind with respect to the constitution of the Son, and consequently with respect to his distinction from anyone else, because, with active spiration removed, there still remains the adequate constitutive principle of the Son, namely essence and filiation.

Note 3. The Angelic Doctor gave occasion for this question in the First Part, question 36, article 2. For in order to prove against the Greeks that the Holy Spirit truly proceeds from the Son, he especially used this reason: that the Holy Spirit would not be really distinct from the Son if he did not truly proceed from him.

Examining this reason, the Doctor in the cited question shows it to be weak, since the Holy Spirit would be really distinct from the Son even if he did not truly proceed from him. For in the Son two relations must be distinguished, namely filiation and active spiration, formally, or at least modally, distinct from each

other. By the former the Son is constituted not only as Son, but as a divine Person altogether complete and perfect. The latter, however, results as it were from the former and presupposes it; therefore it presupposes also the Person of the Son as altogether complete and distinct from every other Person.

To make this clearer, let there be one conclusion: Even if, per impossibile, the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would nevertheless be really distinct from him. This is the Doctor's view and that of all his disciples, and it is gathered as follows.

First, indeed, from the holy Fathers, who teach that the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, not precisely because he proceeds from him, but because his emanation is of another reason than the emanation of the Son. Thus St. Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Book 5, chapter 14, bringing forward the reason why the Holy Spirit is not the Son, says: He goes forth not as begotten, but as given; and therefore he is not called the Son, because he is not begotten as the Only-Begotten.

Gregory of Nyssa, cited by Bessarion in his Oration for union from Book 1 on the Gospels, not yet published in Latin, also supports this, where among other things he says: The Spirit is joined to the Father both because each is uncreated, and because each has his substance from the first principle; he is distinguished by his property, namely that he is not produced from the Father as the Only-Begotten is, and that through him the Son is manifested. By these words he clearly assigns a reason for the distinction of the Father from the Holy Spirit not from spiration, but from the property constituting them. The same must be said of the Son. And thus their doctrine is not true who derive the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son from active and passive spiration alone.

St. Anselm explicitly agrees, in the treatise against the Greeks on the procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 2, where he says: Since the Son exists by being born from God, and the Spirit by proceeding, by this diversity of nativity and procession they are referred to each other as different and other from each other. Again in the same place: The Son, however, to pass over another cause for the moment, since it is not yet established that the Holy Spirit is from him and proceeds, is therefore not the Holy Spirit, nor is the Holy Spirit the Son, because the Son has being from the Father by being born, but the Holy Spirit not by being born, but by proceeding. He presses this reason in chapter 3: They are other than each other for this reason, namely that one is born and the other proceeds; therefore when the one is born the other cannot be born with him, who is other from him because he is not born in the same way but proceeds; and when the one proceeds, the other cannot proceed at the same time, who is other from him because he does not proceed in the same way but is born. Hence in chapter 4 he concludes: If the Son and the Holy Spirit were not two by some other reason, they would be different by this alone, namely that one exists by being born and the other by proceeding.

These statements most clearly and subtly confirm our position. Therefore Urban, the Pontiff who in the Council of Bari approved St. Anselm's doctrine with the assent and applause of the whole assembly of Fathers, does he not seem likewise from that time to have defined Bl. Scotus's doctrine?

But what is decisive is that the Angelic Doctor approves this very opinion in Quodlibet 4, article 3, where he teaches that a thing is distinguished by its form not only from its opposite but also from what is disparate, and he gives the example of sapphire, which he says is distinguished by its form not only from other

stones but from plants. Hence he concludes: Thus it must be said that the Son is distinguished by his filiation from the Father by the relative opposition of filiation to paternity; but from the Holy Spirit he is distinguished by filiation, since the Holy Spirit does not have filiation which the Son has. Therefore it follows that the Son is held to be distinguished from the Holy Spirit by filiation, not precisely by active spiration; and therefore, even if, per impossibile, active spiration were removed from the Son, he would still be really distinct from him by filiation.

The Doctor proves the conclusion first. By the same principle by which a thing is constituted, it is also distinguished from anything else; because, he says, by the same thing something is a being and one with the unity fitting to such an entity. But what is one in itself is also distinct from anything else. Therefore the constitutive principle of a thing is also its distinctive principle. Hence a man is distinguished by animality, by which he is constituted in the being of an animal, from whatever does not have animality; and by rationality, by which he is constituted in the being of a man, he is distinguished from whatever is not a man.

But the divine Son is constituted in personal being by filiation; therefore by filiation he is also distinguished from every Person in which that divine filiation is not. But in the hypothesis in which the Holy Spirit would not proceed from the Son, the Holy Spirit would not on that account include filiation in reality. Therefore in that case he would be no less really distinct from the Son.

The minor, in which alone there seems to be a difficulty, is proved as follows. The Holy Spirit, by his intrinsic reason, must be produced by will; but what is produced by will cannot be Son, since the divine Son must be produced as Son by an assimilative

faculty according to his formal reason, which is the intellect alone. What is produced by intellect cannot be produced by will, and conversely. Therefore the Holy Spirit, produced by will, cannot be produced by intellect; otherwise the same thing would be produced by a double total production, which implies a contradiction. Therefore in no case can he be Son, and consequently in every case he is necessarily really distinct from the Son.

This is confirmed. A personal distinction is from a personal form and property. But filiation alone is the personal property in the second Person. For the Son is not constituted in personal being by active spiration, because he has it in common with the Father. Therefore by filiation alone, not by active spiration, he is personally distinct from the Holy Spirit. Again, filiation by its very reason is really incommunicable to the Holy Spirit; otherwise it would not be a personal property. Therefore by its very reason it really distinguishes the Son from the Holy Spirit. Again, the Son is really distinguished from the Holy Spirit by that by which he is formally constituted in the being of Son; but he is not constituted in the being and reason of Son by active spiration, otherwise the Father would also have to be called Son, since the Father also has that active spiration. Therefore he is so constituted by filiation. Therefore by filiation he is distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

He proves it second. One and the same thing cannot receive being by two total and adequate productions. But passive generation and passive spiration, if they were from the Father alone, would be by two total and adequate productions. Therefore even in that case they would not be one and the same in reality, and consequently they would be really distinct. The major is clear, because otherwise neither production would be adequate if

it admitted the partnership of another in producing the effect. The minor is proved thus: production through intellect in the divinity and production through will are two adequate productions, since each faculty with the divine essence is able to produce an infinite terminus. But passive generation, or filiation, even in that case would be through intellect, and passive spiration through will. Therefore each would be through an adequate production, and consequently they cannot be one and the same.

This is confirmed. Filiation and passive spiration are by their intrinsic reason really distinct. Therefore although they proceeded from the Father alone, they would still be really distinct. The antecedent is proved: if they were not so distinct, they could, by their formal reason, coincide in the same Person. But this is false. For if they coincided in the same Person, it would follow that that Person would have being by two adequate productions, each of which would adequately produce him. For filiation is produced by intellect and passive spiration by will; but each faculty is infinitely productive, and therefore productive of an infinite terminus separately, because each is infinite separately and not only conjointly. But a faculty that is of itself productive of an infinite terminus is productive adequately and totally. Therefore, if filiation and passive spiration coincided in the same Person, it would follow that he is produced by two total and adequate productions; which implies a contradiction. Therefore it also implies that one and the same Person would be at once Son and Holy Spirit. Hence, although the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would not follow that he is really the same as the Son.

He proves it third. If, per impossibile, the Father did not spirate or produce the Holy Spirit, but the Son alone did, the Father would still be really distinct from the Son and the Holy

Spirit by paternity, which would not be in the Son nor in the Holy Spirit. Therefore likewise, if the Son did not spirate, he would still be distinct from the Holy Spirit by filiation, by which he is constituted in personal being and which is not found in the Father nor in the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear from the parity of reason.

This is confirmed. Passive spiration now, in fact, is not identical with paternity; therefore neither then, in the aforesaid hypothesis, would it be identical with filiation, or passive generation. The antecedent is clear, because paternity and passive spiration constitute two distinct Persons, namely the Father and the Holy Spirit. The consequence is proved: paternity is not identical now with passive spiration because they are disparate and personal relations. But in the proposed case, passive spiration and filiation would also be personal and disparate relations. Therefore the same reason that persuades that there is no identification of the former now persuades that there would be no identification of the latter then.

The major is proved. Paternity is not identical now with passive spiration either because it is relatively opposed to it, or because it is a relation disparate from it. Not the first, for paternity is relatively opposed only to filiation, since it is correlative only to filiation, not to passive spiration. For the first Person is related by paternity to his Son, not to the Holy Spirit. Therefore paternity is not really identical with passive spiration for no other reason than that it is a relation disparate from it.

Some Thomists reply that paternity is distinguished from passive spiration not because it is disparate from it, but because it is altogether identical with active spiration, which is correlatively opposed to passive spiration. But the falsity of this reply is plainly evident; for if that were sufficient, active spiration could not be in

the Son. But that consequence is false; therefore also that from which it follows.

Others reply that paternity is distinguished from passive spiration because it is in the Person who, by reason of active spiration, that is, by reason of the spirating Person, is distinguished from passive spiration, that is, from the spirated Person.

On the contrary. If this reply stood, it would follow that whatever is in the spirating Father would be really distinct from the Holy Spirit. But this is false, since the same essence which is in the Father is also in the Holy Spirit. Again, that active spiration is really distinct from passive spiration brings about only this: that the concrete "spirating" is really distinct from the concrete "spirated." But paternity is not formally something of this concrete; for the concrete "spirating" signifies only two things, namely the essence and the relation of active spiration. But paternity is neither of these; for paternity with the essence makes the generator to be Father and to be referred to the Son alone as generator and Father. Therefore paternity contributes nothing to the reason of "spirating." Finally, the spirative principle is the same in the Father and in the Son; but paternity is not the same in both. Therefore paternity is not something of this principle, and thus formally contributes nothing to the formal reason of "spirating."

Objection 1. The Thomists object from the authority of councils. First, from the First Council of Toledo in the confession of faith: We believe in the Holy Spirit, who is neither Father nor Son, because he proceeds from the Father and the Son. But in our case he would not proceed from the Son; therefore in that case he would not be distinct from the Son.

Second, from Toledo II: This alone indicates number, that they are toward each other, and in this number they lack what they are toward themselves. But they are toward each other only according to relations of origin. Therefore where those relations were not (as they would not be in our case), there would also not be a number and distinction of Persons.

Third, from the last session of the Council of Florence: For those who believe that the Holy Spirit by no means proceeds from the Son must understand that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and consequently that he is the Son. It is confirmed by the following words: Those who claim that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son and yet proceeds from the Father alone separate substance from hypostasis and imagine a partition of the divine substance. It is pressed from Session 18, where we read: According to all Doctors, both Greek and Latin, the difference of processions alone, which is more principally said, multiplies Persons in the divinity, to which alone are accommodated "who is from another" and "from whom another is," and so on. These words are put forward by the Latin theologian to show that since the Greeks admit that the Holy Spirit is really distinct from the Son, they must also admit that he proceeds from him. Therefore in the case in which he would not proceed, he would not be distinguished from him.

I reply to the first. The words of the council are not faithfully reported, since the causal particle "because" is not found there; rather it is said absolutely: He is neither Father himself nor Son, but proceeding from the Father and the Son, which we readily admit.

To the second I say: the council wills nothing other than that the divine Persons are truly many by reason of relations and not by reason of essence and absolutes, so that they are many

because they are relative, whether those relations are opposed or only disparate. Hence "toward each other" must not be understood determinately and formally of an opposed relation, but of relation as such, insofar as it abstracts from opposed and disparate. For the council there sets "being toward each other," that is, the relative mode of being, against "being toward oneself," that is, absolute. But that division and opposition would not be adequate if under the former member it included only opposed relations and not also disparate, since these cannot fall under the latter member, because they are not toward oneself. Therefore this authority does not harm us.

To the Council of Florence I say: the two first texts are reported in bad faith. For in the first the council does not say "consequently that he is the Son," but the contrary, namely "consequently that he is not the Son," as is clear in all copies thus far published. Nor is what some reply true, namely that if the negative particle is placed there the sentence will lack sense. For the sense is clear: that the Greeks, saying that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son but from the Father alone, must nevertheless admit that he is not the Son, lest they contradict the mystery of the Trinity. Hence "consequently" there does not have the force of an inference, as if from the fact that the Greeks admit that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone it would follow that the Spirit is not the Son. That would be a foolish inference. Rather the particle has the meaning of "further" or "moreover."

Likewise in the second text it is not read "distinguished from the Son," but rather: Those who claim that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Person of the Father alone, these beyond doubt in fact separate substance from hypostasis, and so on. These words do not oppose us.

To the later text I say: the council speaks of what is in fact the case, namely that now the more manifest reason for the distinction of one Person from another is that he proceeds and is related. Yet it must not be inferred that there would not be another reason for distinction if such a procession of one from another were not present.

Objection 2. From Boethius, Book 1 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 2: Essence contains unity, but relation multiplies the Trinity; therefore no Person is distinct from another except the one who is related to that one. Again from St. Anselm in *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, chapter 3: Unity does not lose its consequence where there is no opposition of relation; from which the common axiom: All things in the divinity are the same where there is no opposition of relation. Finally, St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*, Book 2, chapter 10: God is simple, because what he has, that he is, except that which each Person is said relatively to another, as the Father has the Son and is not the Son. Therefore if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be the Son, because then he would not be said relatively to him.

I reply to the first by denying the consequence. For it is one thing that a Person is distinguished only from that to which he is related, and another that no Person is distinguished unless he has a relation by which he is distinguished. In that case the Son would still have filiation, by which he would be constituted and distinguished from the other Persons. Add that by filiation in that case he would also be related to the Holy Spirit, not as producer or produced, but as really distinct from that from which he is distinguished.

To the second I say: St. Anselm admits also an opposition of relations among relations that are disparate. For in the same chapter, a little before the words cited in the objection, he says

that the opposition of relation is the opposition of nativity and procession, which, as is evident, is not relative opposition but disparity. Hence he did not say "relative opposition" but "opposition of relation," which includes both the relative and the disparate. Add that he himself openly supports our conclusion, as was said.

To the third the Doctor denies the consequence. For St. Augustine does not will that each Person would be the other to which he lacks correlation; but only that each has whatever the other has except that person's personal relation. But in our case the Holy Spirit would not have filiation, nor would the Son have passive spiration. Therefore they would not be one Person but two really distinct from each other.

Objection 3. If the relation of filiation were a sufficient reason for distinguishing the Son really from the Holy Spirit in the proposed case, it would do so either according to its quidditative and formal content or according to real and entitative being. Not the second, because as such it is the same as the divine essence. Therefore the first. But relation as relation formally regards only an opposite. Therefore it distinguishes only as correlation. But in the proposed case there would not be correlations, that is, opposed relations, in the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Son would not be distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

I distinguish the minor. It regards an opposite relatively: I deny. It regards a disparate: I grant. As to the subsumption: in that case there would not be opposed relations, that is, true correlations: I grant. There would not be opposed relations, that is, relations really distinct from each other: I deny; since passive spiration and filiation are disparate relations and really distinct from each other, as has been said. This disparity is sufficient for

that personal distinction. Therefore, just as paternity would distinguish the Father from the Holy Spirit in the case in which the Spirit would not proceed from the Father, although the Spirit would not have a correlation relatively opposed to paternity but only a disparity, so the Son would be distinguished from the Spirit because the Spirit has a relation really distinct from filiation, although that relation in the Spirit would not be the correlation of filiation, that is, paternity.

You will press: A relation distinguishes in the way it constitutes; but it constitutes only in order to a terminus; therefore it distinguishes only from the terminus. But the terminus of a relation is what has correlation. Therefore it distinguishes only from what has correlation. But in that case the Holy Spirit would not have the correlation of filiation and would not be its terminus. Therefore the Son, through filiation insofar as it is a relation, cannot be really distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

I reply first by distinguishing the major. It distinguishes as it constitutes, that is, if it constitutes essentially, it distinguishes essentially; if it constitutes accidentally, it likewise distinguishes: I grant. But if it constitutes relatively in order to one terminus alone, it distinguishes only from that terminus: I deny. For although paternity constitutes the Father formally in order to the Son, it nevertheless also distinguishes him from the Holy Spirit.

I reply second: even granting the major, I distinguish the minor. It constitutes in order to a terminus which it regards only as a proper correlative, as Father has the Son: I deny. It constitutes in order to a terminus which it regards as terminus in some way: I grant. Likewise I distinguish the subsumption. In that case the Holy Spirit would not have filiation as terminus whom it regards

as produced: I grant. That he would not be regarded as a Person really distinct from the Son: I deny.

Objection 4. If disparate relations, which would not be correlations, sufficed for distinguishing Persons, it would follow that paternity and active spiration ought to constitute two Persons. But this is false according to all. Therefore disparate relations do not suffice for personal distinction. It is confirmed: paternity and passive spiration ought to constitute two Persons no more than paternity and active spiration. But these do not constitute; therefore neither do those. And consequently, in the proposed case, the Son would not be really distinct from the Holy Spirit.

The Doctor denies the consequence of the objection, and he denies the antecedent of its confirmation. He says that the reason is not the same in the two combinations, namely of generation and active spiration compared with generation and passive spiration. For two active productions with respect to diverse termini do not conflict in the same suppositum; it can be understood that someone has multiple actions productive of multiple effects, as in fact happens not only in the eternal Father, who produces the Son and the Holy Spirit, but even in the sun with respect to many effects. But two total passive productions conflict in the same suppositum, because it would follow that at once and in the same respect one thing would be produced twice by total production, which implies a contradiction. From the fact that paternity and active spiration are in the same first Person, nothing else follows than that that Person has two total productions with respect to two diverse termini. But if filiation and passive spiration were in one and the same Person, it would follow that there are in him two passive productions and that he is produced twice, which implies a contradiction. Therefore from

the fact that one does not conflict it does not follow that the other does not conflict.

You will press: Two relations are not incompatible of themselves unless they are opposed to each other. But filiation and passive spiration are not opposed. Therefore of themselves they are not incompatible.

I distinguish the major. Unless they are opposed formally as two correlations: I deny. For two total passive productions of the same effect from the same or a different cause are not correlations, and yet they conflict in the same effect, that is, in the same thing. Unless they are opposed disparately, so that one requires the exclusion of the other: I grant. With the minor distinguished similarly, the consequence must be denied.

Objection 5. In the divinity no distinction is to be asserted unless faith asserts it or reason proves it. But in that supposition neither faith asserts nor reason proves that there would be a real distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son. Therefore it is not to be asserted.

I reply. First, the minor begs the question, for this is precisely what is asked, whether reason proves it or not. Next, the argument can be turned back thus: In the divinity no identity is to be asserted unless faith teaches it or reason compels it. But in the proposed case neither faith nor reason compels an identity of the Son with the Holy Spirit. Therefore neither is that to be asserted.

Finally they object: among the four divine relations disparate oppositions can be conceived: first between generating and spirating; second between being generated and being spirated; third between generating and being spirated; fourth between being generated and spirating. But none of these is a sufficient formal principle distinguishing Persons. Not the first or

second, for then it would follow that the Begotten and the Spirated are two Persons, and likewise the Generator and the Spirator are two other Persons, which is false. Nor the third or fourth. For those disparate oppositions would distinguish Persons either insofar as they are such or insofar as they are these. Not the first; for if disparate opposition of relations, insofar as it is disparate, were a formal principle distinguishing Persons, then every disparate relative opposition would distinguish, and thus generating and spirating, as well as being generated and being spirated, would constitute two Persons. Not the second, because no stronger reason appears why these should be distinctive of Persons rather than the others. Therefore, and so on.

I reply first that it can be said that they are distinctive of Persons precisely insofar as they are disparate, and it does not follow from that that all disparate relations must be distinctive of Persons, especially since not all relatively opposed relations are distinctive of Persons. For active and passive spiration are correlations and relatively opposed, and yet they do not distinguish personally; for active spiration in the Father is not personal, since he is conceived as already constituted in personal being through paternity and active generation, which in the order of origin precedes spiration.

Second, I say that not all disparate relations are distinctive of Persons, but only those which are personal, that is, by which divine Persons are constituted, such as paternity, passive spiration, and filiation as compared with passive spiration.

Corollaries. From these it follows first that although the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, nevertheless absolutely he could proceed from a single Person. For the Father and the Son separately have a sufficient productive principle of

the Holy Spirit, namely an infinite will fecundated by the infinite object, that is, by the divine essence. Therefore if in fact he did not proceed from two, nevertheless he could in reality proceed from one Person, equally perfect.

Gather second that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, both because, as St. Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, Book 5, chapter 14, as the Father and the Son are one God and one Creator with respect to creatures, so with respect to the Holy Spirit they are one principle, and because, just as the Father by generating communicates to the Son the same essence, so he also communicates the same spirative power. Therefore by reason of that one spirative power, they must be called one principle of the Holy Spirit. The consequence is evident: for just as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are called one God because they have one divinity, and one Creator because they have one creative power, so also the Father and the Son are called one Spirator, that is, one principle of the Holy Spirit, because they have one spirative power.

Gather third that the Father and the Son cannot indeed be called two Spirators, but they can be called two spirating Persons, as the Doctor teaches in Book 1, distinction 12, question 1. For the plural "two" joined to the noun "Spirator" would signify that the spirative power in the Father and the Son is distinct and doubled, since "Spirator" formally designates the power of spirating. But it is otherwise with the participle "spirating," which signifies the Person having that spirative power; thus, as there are two Persons producing the Holy Spirit, so they can be called two "spirating," that is, two Persons having spirative power. The reason for the difference is that for the plurality of concrete substantive nouns, it is not enough that there be a plurality of supposita; a plurality of forms is also

required. But for the plurality of adjectives and participles, a plurality of supposita suffices. Hence these propositions are true: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one Creator, one Cause, one Governor, and so on, because they have one and the same power of creating, causing, and governing. Likewise, because of the plurality of supposita, these are also true: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three creating, causing, and governing.

QUESTION III
WHICH ARE THE PROPER AND APPROPRIATED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

We have already said in the prelude to this disputation that the name Spirit, insofar as it signifies spirated Love, is proper to the third divine Person alone. There remains the difficulty about three principal terms which are attributed to him both by Scripture and by the Fathers, namely that he is called Holy, Gift of God, and Charity and Love: whether these names are proper to him or only appropriated must now be resolved.

NOTE 1. Holy is taken in three ways. First, as that which is pure and cleansed of all defilement; and in this way sanctification is called cleansing from sin by grace. Second, holy is that which is deputed and consecrated to divine worship; and in this way a temple is said to be sanctified, and likewise vessels that serve in the ministry of the temple; but much more is a rational creature called holy when it is applied to divine service. Third, holy is that which is firm, that is, confirmed in good.

It is certain that in these three ways holiness is effectively appropriated to the Holy Spirit; for by the infusion of sanctifying grace he cleanses the rational creature from all stain of flesh and spirit, and, cleansing it from the filth of earthly affections, raises it

to God, the center of all purity. From this elevation a second ray of holiness breaks forth, namely consecration and dedication and application to divine worship. For love is the principle of ordering to God, and by it we are most of all dedicated and consecrated to God. From this it comes about that the soul is strengthened and fortified in virtue, and attains a certain immovability in good, which is the mark of all holiness. But whether, besides this appropriation of effective holiness, the divine essential holiness also belongs to the Holy Spirit by a peculiar title must be determined here.

NOTE 2. From Aristotle in *Topica*, Book 4, chapter 4: a gift is said "of someone" and "to someone," and giving is said "of something" and "to someone." Giving is the genus of gift; for a gift is giving that is irredeemable, that is, liberal without any hope of repayment. From this definition it is gathered that three things are found in a gift. First, the thing itself that is given. Second, the relation of the given thing to the giver. Third, the respect both of the giver and of the given to the one to whom the giving is made. Yet it is not necessary that there be a real distinction between giver and gift; for when one gives himself to another, one and the same is both giver and gift.

It must further be observed that although the reason of gift in the divinity primarily and per se connotes a relation of reason to creatures, nevertheless secondarily it also connotes procession by way of freedom. Hence in that connotation two things are found, namely emanation and the mode of emanation, so that what is given in the divinity must first emanate from him who gives, and second emanate so as to be produced freely, that is, by will. In these two, the relation of reason of gift is chiefly founded, which is terminated to the creature to whom the gift is given only in time.

NOTE 3. Love or charity in the divinity is taken in three ways. First, essentially, insofar as it signifies an act of willing and loving, which is common to the three Persons. For as understanding and intellection are essential to God, so loving and love are something essential, absolute, and common. Second, it is sometimes taken notionally, insofar as it signifies the action productive of a terminus produced by will; and thus "to love" is the same as "to spirate," and its terminus is none other than the spirated Person himself, who is called the Holy Spirit. Third, it is taken in a mixed way for the bearing of the lover toward the loved things. This in turn can be taken in two ways, namely as principle and as form: insofar as the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit, who is the one "loving" (if it is permitted to speak so), that is, Love of all that is lovable, they are also said, as principle, to be love of all that is lovable; but insofar as the Holy Spirit, by love communicated to him by the power of his procession, regards whatever is lovable, he is judged to be formally loving of all that is lovable. For this reason he has a twofold respect: one real to his productive principle, the other of reason to things loved, that is, lovable. How the name of love belongs to him properly will be resolved below.

In the meantime let there be a first conclusion: Holiness is most of all appropriated to the third Person in the divinity. This is of faith, since this adorable Person is constantly called the Holy Spirit not only by the sacred Scriptures but also by the oracles of councils and holy Fathers. Therefore St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*, Book 10, chapter 24, calls him the holiness of the Father and the Son; and he explains that appellation in Book 11, chapter 24: Whether the Holy Spirit, because he is common to both, can rightly be called the goodness of both the Father and the Son, I do not dare to pronounce a rash judgment. Yet I would more

readily dare to call him the holiness of both, not as a quality of both, but as the very substance itself and the third Person in the Trinity. For what leads me to this more probably is that, although the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy, nevertheless he is properly called the Holy Spirit, as though he were the substantial holiness and consubstantial holiness of both.

St. Cyril anticipates him in *Dialogus De Trinitate*, Book 7: The Spirit is holy, he says, not by participation nor by an external relation to the Son, but by nature and truth. For just as it is foolish and senseless to call a man truly "man" and yet understand something other than him, so it is altogether foolish to name the Spirit "holy Spirit" and yet exclude holiness from him, so that by nature he is not holy, and to exclude him absurdly into another nature. For this name will not signify some mode of glory or excellence, as "principality," "throne," and "dominion" do, which are attributed to those creatures made by him; but it rather expresses a substantial quality, as the name "Father" does for the Father and "Son" for the Son.

By these words he plainly seems to say that holiness is not merely appropriated but in a way proper to the Holy Spirit, just as paternity is proper to the Father and filiation proper to the Son. Reason also suggests this if one attends to the mode of love by which that third divine Person proceeds. For every holiness or malice has its origin from love and will. Therefore it pertains in a special way to that third divine Person to sanctify men and angels. Hence St. Cyril of Alexandria in *Thesaurus*, Book 13, chapter 4: The Spirit is called holy because he is essentially holy; for he is a natural, living, and subsisting operation of God, which perfects creatures by sanctifying them through his participation. And a little later: We call the Holy Spirit the very power of

sanctifying, which naturally proceeds from the Father and sanctifies and perfects creatures.

How the sanctification of creatures is appropriated to him has already been sufficiently said.

Second conclusion: The name and reason of Gift is most of all appropriated to the Holy Spirit. St. Augustine proves this with many texts of Scripture in *De Trinitate*, Book 15, chapter 19, especially from the following. In John 4 Christ, speaking to the Samaritan woman, says: If you knew the gift of God. But Christ was speaking of the water of life, which in John 7 is said to be the Holy Spirit in these words: Rivers of living water will flow from his belly. Now he said this about the Spirit whom those believing in him were to receive. Likewise in Acts 8: May your money perish with you, because you thought that the gift of God could be purchased with money. St. Peter said this when Simon Magus, seeing that through the laying on of the Apostles' hands the Holy Spirit was given, offered him money.

St. Augustine also proves this from the very reason of the origin of the Holy Spirit, who, as he says in *De Trinitate*, Book 5, chapter 14, went forth not as born but as given, because he proceeds as love, which is the first root of gratuitous donation. For we give freely because we will good to the person receiving. Therefore love has the reason of the first gift, through which all gratuitous gifts are given. Since the Holy Spirit by the power of his procession formally proceeds as love produced by will, it follows that by reason of his personal property there belongs to him a certain peculiar reason of gift, because by the power of his origin he formally proceeds according to the first root of gratuitous liberality.

You will say 1: The Holy Spirit is from eternity; but from eternity he cannot have the reason of gift; therefore the reason of

gift does not belong to him by reason of his personal property. The major is clear. The minor is proved: a gift necessarily includes a twofold respect, one to the person from whom it is given, and another to the person to whom it is given. But from eternity there was no creature to whom the Holy Spirit could be given. Therefore he could not have the reason of gift.

Some reply that the Holy Spirit has the reason of Gift not only with respect to creatures but also with respect to the Father and the Son: he is as it were a gift that the Father gives to the Son and the Son to the Father, insofar as each bestows and returns his love to the other.

I reply: Gift is not said because it is actually given, but because it has the aptitude by which it can be given. Therefore from eternity a divine Person is called gift, although he is given only in time, as St. Augustine explains in *De Trinitate*, chapter 15: Because he proceeded as able to be given, he was already gift even before there was one to whom he might be given; for "gift" is understood one way, "given" another. A gift can exist before it is given; but what is given cannot be called "given" unless it has been given. And shortly thereafter: The Spirit is eternally gift, but temporally he is given.

You will say 2: The Holy Spirit is given not only by God but also by creatures, since in Acts 8 we read that the Holy Spirit was given through the laying on of the Apostles' hands. Therefore he is not only the gift of God.

St. Bonaventure answers in Book 1, distinction 14, article 2, question 2, that the Holy Spirit can be given in four ways: as from one preparing or ministering the sacraments; as from one announcing salutary teachings; as from one obtaining through prayer or through good works; or as from one producing. In the first and second ways he is conferred both by good and by evil

men; in the third way only by the good; in the fourth way he is given only by God, since he is produced by the Father and the Son alone and is given to creatures as the greatest of gifts and the inexhaustible origin of all goods that flow into us from God.

For, as St. Basil says in *De Spiritu Sancto*: Through the Holy Spirit are given restoration to paradise, return to the kingdom of heaven, restoration to the adoption of sons, confidence to call God Father, participation in grace, to be called Christ, son of light, to be partaker of eternal glory, and, to say it once, to be in the fullness of every blessing. And as St. John Chrysostom adds in Homily 2 on the Holy Spirit: He is the reformation of our image, the perfection of the spiritual mind, the sun of our mental eyes, the light of our inner man, the bond of our union with Christ, the exultation of souls, the joy of the heart, the rest of the mind, the communication of wisdom. By him prophets are enlightened, kings are anointed, priests are ordained, teachers are illumined, churches are sanctified, altars are founded, ointment is consecrated, waters are cleansed, demons are driven away, diseases are healed, sinners are reconciled to God.

Third conclusion: To the Holy Spirit most of all belongs the name and reason of divine Love. This is likewise gathered from sacred Scripture in those places in which he is called charity and love. Thus Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. St. Augustine explains this in *De Trinitate*, Book 15, chapter 18: The love that is from God and is God is properly the Holy Spirit, through whom the charity of God is poured forth into our hearts, by which the whole Trinity dwells in us. And in chapter 19 he calls the Holy Spirit the charity and love of both, namely of the Father and the Son: And if the charity by which the Father loves

the Son and the Son loves the Father ineffably shows the communion of both, what is more fitting than that he should properly be called charity who is the Spirit common to both?

Although he affirms that charity belongs properly to the Spirit, I do not deny that he used "properly" for "appropriately," for he adds: As he alone is not Spirit or holy in that Trinity, but the Father is Spirit and the Son is Spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy, as piety does not doubt, and yet this one is not without reason properly called the Holy Spirit; because since he is common to both, he is properly called that which both are commonly.

Nevertheless the Holy Spirit can be called Love not only appropriately but also properly, both by reason of procession, because he proceeds through will, whose proper act is to breathe forth love, and by adding some predicate, namely if he is called "produced love" or "spirated love." St. Peter Damian excellently explains the first in his first opusculum, chapter 2: And this is that supreme charity by which the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves his begetter; therefore there are no more than three, essentially undivided and distinct by threefold property: one loving him who is from him, one loving him from whom he is, and the love itself of which it is said that God is charity. St. Augustine presses the second in the places cited.

Yet the Holy Spirit must be regarded as the charity, love, or affection of the Father and the Son in such a way that he is not that essential charity by which the divine Persons love each other, for 1 John 4 says: God is charity. Hence some, as St. Augustine relates in *De Fide et Symbolo*, chapter 9, in order to deny that the Holy Spirit is a Person distinct from the Father and the Son, dared to believe that the Holy Spirit is the communion of the Father and the Son and, as it were, the deity itself.

Therefore the Holy Spirit is love appropriately, because he proceeds through will, whose act is to love, and properly, because he is the terminus spirated through love, that is, produced love, and effectively, because the charity of God is poured forth into our hearts through the Holy Spirit. St. Bernard explains this in Epistle 107: Christ dying is a twofold and most firm argument of love toward us; he deserves to be loved. The Spirit affects and causes love. The one makes that he be loved; the other that we love. The one greatly commends love in us; the other gives it. In the one we see what we should love; from the other we receive that by which we love. Therefore charity is from the one as occasion, from the other as affection.

Moreover it must be observed that since the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son, or the fruit and terminus of mutual love, he is called not only the unity and communion of both by St. Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Book 6, chapter 5, but by some he is called the kiss, embrace, and bond of both. Thus St. Bernard, Sermon 8 on the Song of Songs: If the Father is rightly taken as the one who kisses and the Son as the one kissed, it will not be out of place to understand the kiss as the Holy Spirit, as it were the peace of the Son that cannot be disturbed, the firm glue, the undivided love, the undivided unity. And Sermon 1 for the Octave of Easter: The Spirit is the indissoluble bond of the Trinity, by whom, as the Father and the Son are one, so also we are one in them. Likewise Lawrence Justinian in *De Obedientia* calls the Holy Spirit the indissoluble bond of charity, the sweetest kiss of peace, and the most blessed embrace of mutual love.

There are other appellations of this divine Spirit, some of which the Seraphic Doctor St. Bonaventure explains in the theological compendium, Book 1, chapter 9. He is called 1. A

living fountain, because by a sevenfold stream of gifts, which Isaiah 11 enumerates, he flows into us. 2. Fire, because he kindles affection in us. 3. Charity, not only because he is the love of the Father and the Son, but because he makes us lovers. 4. Spiritual anointing, because he makes all worldly tribulations sweet and clean, according to that sequence: in labor rest, in heat temperance, in tears consolation. 5. The finger of God's right hand, because as bodily things are shown by a finger, so by the Holy Spirit spiritual things are shown to the spiritual eye. 6. Paraclete, because he instills heavenly consolations into minds. 7. The best of teachers, because he illumines the intellect to the knowledge of God and of itself.

Divine Wisdom, chapter 7, attributes still more characteristics to him; for he is called the Spirit of intelligence, Right, because he directs what is crooked into what is straight and the rough into smooth ways; Good, by whom all evils are either removed or cooperate unto good; Principal, because he makes us princes, masters of disturbances, conquerors of vices; Sweet, by whom all bitter things become sweet when charity is poured forth in our hearts; Holy, by whom sins are remitted and sinners sanctified; Pure, than whom nothing is purer, who makes the pure and is pleased only by the pure; Simple, who flees the feigned and hates all deceit; Subtle, to enter in and to search and examine the deep judgments of God; Modest, the author of holy shame and modesty; Eloquent, who opens the mouths of the mute and makes the tongues of infants eloquent; Secure, concerning the future and the present; Certain, because he neither is deceived nor deceives; Mobile, breaking all unjust delays of impious idleness, impatient of negligence and slowness; Humane, loving the souls of all men.

APPENDIX
ON THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

It is established by faith, from many texts of Scripture, that certain divine Persons are sent by others to creatures. For in John 3 Christ says: God sent his Son into the world, not to judge the world, and so on. And in John 15: Him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world. And in John 16: I came forth from the Father and came into the world; for, as St. Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, Book 2, chapter 5, to go forth from the Father and to come into this world is to be sent. Likewise about the Holy Spirit the same Son says: When I have been taken up from you I will send him to you, John 16; and to the Galatians: God sent the Spirit of his Son. 1 Peter 1: with the Holy Spirit sent from heaven. And Psalm 103: Send forth your Spirit and they shall be created, and so on.

Add that the definition of mission, which will be given below, fits the divine Persons. It remains, therefore, to determine what that divine mission is and to which divine Persons it belongs and in what manner.

For these things to be clearer, it must be observed, from St. Bonaventure in Book 1, distinction 15, part 1, question 1, that mission is transferred from creatures to divine things according to a certain analogy. In created things mission chiefly expresses a threefold respect: first to the principle or sender; second to the terminus to which something is sent; third to the one sent, that is, him who is sent.

With respect to the principle or sender, the comparison of mission can be various: either as to one giving being to another, as a ray is sent from the sun, a root or flower from a tree;

or as to one giving power, as a dart is sent by one who throws; or as to one giving jurisdiction or authority, as a messenger is sent by a praetor and a legate by a pontiff. According to this threefold meaning, mission is truly in the divinity, for the Son is sent by the Father and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son as having being and power, and therefore authority, from the sender.

But according to other comparisons, in which the sender stands to the one sent as giving counsel, as counselors send a king to war, or as commanding, as a master sends a servant, mission plainly does not belong to the divine Persons; for to receive counsel is a sign of ignorance, and to be subjected to command is a diminution of power.

Likewise with respect to the terminus, mission can have a threefold respect. One is sent to something either as to a place in which it rests, as a stone is sent downward; or as to a possessor, as a gift is sent to someone; or as to an operation to be performed in something or with something. In this way the divine Person is sent so as to be with us, or to rest in us by internal indwelling, so as to be possessed by us, and so as to work good things with us; for the Holy Spirit is said, first, to dwell in our hearts; second, to be the gift of the Most High God; third, to work all things in us as he wills.

Moreover, for a more perfect understanding, three imperfections of created mission must be removed from divine mission. First, in created mission there is separation of the one sent from the sender. Second, there is subjection of the one sent to the sender and authority of the sender over the one sent. Third, there is change in the one sent, since he leaves one place and acquires another. But these imperfections are excluded from the divine Persons by the unity, immensity, and equality of their

essence; for unity excludes separation, equality excludes subjection, and immensity excludes local change.

With these things noted from the Seraphic Doctor, I say first: Not only created gifts, which are appropriated to the Son and the Holy Spirit, but the very Persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit are truly sent.

This is clear from sacred Scripture, and it suffices to weigh one or another text. John 14: But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things and suggest to you all things. But the office of the consoler, teacher, and suggester is exercised only by a subsisting Person. Therefore the one who is sent is truly the Person of the Holy Spirit.

Likewise chapter 15: When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness concerning me. Therefore the same one who proceeds from the Father and who bears witness concerning the Son with infallible authority is sent by the Son together with the Father. Therefore mission is not understood only of his gifts but also of the very Person.

Finally Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. By these words it is clear that the Spirit himself is given to us, distinguished from the created gift of charity as its author.

This is confirmed by the holy Fathers, especially St. Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Book 15, chapter 26, where, proving the divinity of the Holy Spirit from the fact that Christ commanded all nations to be baptized in the name of the Father, he concludes: He is therefore the one who was also given from heaven on the day of Pentecost. How then is he not God who gives the Holy Spirit, indeed how great a God is he who gives

God? By which words he plainly teaches that the Spirit in whose name we are baptized, and who is truly God, was given on the day of Pentecost. Likewise Sermon 43 on the words of the Lord: Great is the mercy of God, who gives a gift equal to himself, because the gift of God is the Holy Spirit, and the whole Trinity is one God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And he confirms it by the Apostle's words: The charity of Christ is poured forth, and so on.

It is also proved by reason. If only the gift were sent and not the very Person of the Holy Spirit, it would follow that he could not be called gift by reason of personal being. But this is false from what has been said, because the notional character of the Holy Spirit is to be gift and spirated love. Therefore just as it belongs to him to be love in himself and not only in effect, so also it belongs to him to be given. Again, if he were sent only by way of gifts, the mystery of the Incarnation could be evaded and it could be said that the mission of the Son occurred in certain gifts. For why should the one be so explained and not the other, since sacred Scripture expresses both equally by the name of mission?

I say second: Mission presupposes the procession of the Person sent from the sender.

This is likewise gathered from sacred Scripture. For in John 7 Christ says: I have not come of myself, but he who sent me is true, whom you do not know. I know him because I am from him and he sent me. Likewise chapter 16: I came forth from the Father and came into the world. Cyril of Alexandria weighs this text in Book 11 on John, chapter 9: To go forth from God is nothing other than to have been born and to have shone forth from the substance of the Father in that procession by which he is understood also in his proper subsistence, or he says "to go forth from the Father," that is, I became man and descended to your

nature. Hence St. Augustine, Tractate 102 on John: He went forth from the Father because he is from the Father, and he came into the world because he showed his body to the world.

From the fact that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son, as we said above, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is also gathered. Therefore procession is presupposed for mission. St. Anselm confirms this in the treatise *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*: It is too difficult, indeed impossible, to show how he does not proceed from both. For whence does the Son, together with the Father, give or send the Holy Spirit, and how is the Spirit of both, if he is not from both? For why does the Son give the Holy Spirit more than the Holy Spirit gives the Son? Or why is he rather the Spirit of the Son than the Son the spirit of the Holy Spirit, unless because the Son is not so from the Father and from the Holy Spirit as the Holy Spirit is from the Father and from the Son?

In the same way John the Theologian proceeded at the Council of Florence, Session 24, where expounding John 15, "whom I will send to you," he says: "I will send" signifies what else, I ask, than that he is sent from someone? But whoever sends something seems to send what is his, and what is sent is said to be from him, as when a provincial governor does something, he is seen not to have done it from himself but by the emperor's command. So also the Son, who in generation received the Holy Spirit from the consubstantial Father, having the same faculty and nature as the Father, is believed to send the same Spirit.

This is confirmed because St. Augustine asserts that mission includes not only the appearance of a divine Person through a visible creature. For if God the Father, he says in *De Trinitate*, Book 4, chapter 1, had willed to appear visibly through a subject creature, he would nevertheless most absurdly be said to

be sent by the Son whom he begot or by the Holy Spirit who proceeds from him, for no other reason than that, as he had said in chapter 20, the Father, when he is known from time by someone, is not said to be sent, for he does not have one from whom he is or from whom he proceeds.

Therefore mission requires procession of the Person sent from the Person sending. For in mission there must be preserved an authority in the sender and a certain sub-authority in the one sent, excluding all superiority and inferiority. But this authority and sub-authority are found only between a producing Person and a produced Person. Again, mission includes an "going forth" of the one sent from the sender; but among the divine Persons there is no going forth except according to procession. Therefore passive mission includes procession within.

You will say: The divine Son is sent by the Holy Spirit, as is clear from Isaiah 48: The Lord God sent me and his Spirit. Hence St. Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Book 2, chapter 5, attributes the mission of the Son to the Holy Spirit: God sent his Son, made of a woman; where he sufficiently shows that the Son is sent by this, that he was made of a woman. Therefore the Father could not have sent the Son without the Holy Spirit, because the Father is understood to have sent him when he made him from a woman, which he did not do without the Holy Spirit. Likewise St. Ambrose in *De Spiritu Sancto*, Book 2: Who is it who says, "The Lord sent me, and his Spirit," except he who came from the Father to save sinners, that is, Christ? Therefore both the Father sent the Son and the Holy Spirit. Likewise Ambrose there: Again he was given by the Father, as Isaiah says, "A child is born to us, and a Son is given to us." He was given, I dare to say, also by the Holy Spirit, because he was also sent by the Holy Spirit. For the Son of God says: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he

has anointed me; he has sent me to evangelize the poor." Likewise the Council of Toledo II in the confession of faith: The Son must be believed to be sent not only by the Father but also by the Holy Spirit, because through the prophet it is said: "And now the Lord God has sent me and his Spirit." But the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit. Therefore mission does not presuppose procession.

I reply: This mission must be understood of the Son according to his humanity, insofar as he was sent in the assumed nature, and that not by nature but by will and command to preach and to carry out the other works of our salvation. In this respect the humanity is said to be sent by the whole Trinity, and by God, even by the Word himself, as the following words of the Council of Toledo declare: He is also taken as sent by himself, by which the inseparable will and operation of the whole Trinity is acknowledged.

The Doctor confirms this in Book 1, distinction 15, number 4, from St. Ambrose in *De Spiritu Sancto*, Book 3, chapter 2, where expounding Isaiah 61, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me," Ambrose says well that the Holy Spirit sent me to preach, because he is sent and anointed as Son of Man. For according to divinity the Spirit is not upon Christ but in Christ. Therefore that authority of Isaiah, which says that Christ is sent by the Holy Spirit, is understood of Christ as man, not of the mission of the eternal Word to be incarnate.

Yet the Doctor admits that the opinion of the Master is not improbable, that mission does not necessarily require the procession of one Person from another, but that it is enough that the Person be manifested through some visible effect. Nor does it follow, because each divine Person can give himself, that he can also send himself; for more is required for mission than for

donation, since in the sender a certain authority is required, and in the one sent a certain sub-authority, which in the divinity are explained by producing and being produced.

I say third: Mission necessarily includes the manifestation of the Person sent through the production of some created gift, invisible or visible.

It is proved first from the words of Christ in John 4: My food is to do the will of him who sent me, that I may accomplish his work; and chapter 6: I came down not to do my will but the will of him who sent me, the Father. And this is the will of him who sent me, the Father, that I lose none of all that he has given me, and so on. Hence Wisdom in chapter 9 rightly prayed for the mission of divine Wisdom in these words: Send her from your holy heavens and from the throne of your majesty, that she may be with me and labor with me, that I may know what is acceptable before you at all times.

It is confirmed because the holy Fathers explain the mission of divine Persons only through the production of some effect in a creature. Hence the Doctor rightly gathers, in the cited question, that divine mission always connotes a real change in the creature. This change, although it is made by the whole Trinity, since the works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided, is nevertheless attributed in a special way to the Person sent because of a new personal, or moral, or mystical mode by which that Person begins to be in a creature anew, as the holy Fathers explain clearly.

Athanasius, Oration 5 against the Arians, expounding those words of Christ "He who sent me, the Father," says that he called the union with man "mission," so that the invisible nature of God might be made known to men through the visible. For God does not change place as we do. But because he presented

himself as present in the flesh, the holy men wished to use the term "mission." And St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book 2, chapter 5: The Father, invisible together with the Son who is invisible with him, is said to have sent the same Son by making him visible. And at the end of the chapter he adds: Now it is easy to understand also concerning the Holy Spirit why he too is said to be sent; for some created appearance was made in time in which the Holy Spirit might be shown visibly. This operation expressed visibly and set before the eyes of mortals was called the mission of the Holy Spirit. By these words the Fathers do not exclude the eternal procession of the Person sent from the sender, but connect it with the external operation.

Hence divine mission can rightly be described as: the procession of some divine Person from the sending Person to a creature in which he begins to be in a new mode. From this it is clear that the Father alone cannot be sent, even if he gives himself and comes with the other divine Persons to dwell in the soul through sanctifying grace, according to John 14: If anyone loves me, my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him. For, as St. Augustine says in the book against the Arians, chapter 4: The Father alone is read as not sent, because he alone does not have an author from whom he is begotten or from whom he proceeds.

It is likewise clear that the Son is properly sent into the world by the Father alone for the Incarnation, according to John 8: I went forth from God and came into the world. For just as he proceeds from the Father alone, so he is sent by him alone. But the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father together with the Son, as proceeding from both.

I say fourth: Mission on the part of the effect is twofold, namely visible and invisible.

The invisible is that by which the Son and the Holy Spirit are sent to dwell in a special mode in a rational creature through sanctifying grace, as the Doctors commonly affirm with the Seraphic Doctor in Book 1, distinction 15, part 2, article 1, question 1. For mission requires that the Person sent exist in the one to whom he is sent and be possessed by him. But those divine Persons are not perfectly possessed by the rational creature except through sanctifying grace, by which it is within the power of the one possessing and using it rightly to enjoy that divine Person sent as an object.

Whether this invisible mission is made not only to those first renewed by grace, that is, first justified, but also to those who grow in grace by an increase of justification, authors do not agree. Yet it seems more correct with the Seraphic Doctor in the same place, question 3, and more fitting to the concept of mission, to hold that a new mission is not made by an increase of grace, since then the Person sent does not begin to be in the just man in a new mode, except insofar as on the occasion of such increase or progress he works in the just man certain special gifts or effects, for example the gift of prophecy or something similar. In this way, when the double spirit of Elijah rested upon Elisha, the Holy Spirit is rightly said to have been sent to him.

Visible mission, as our Herinx observes in Disputation 3, question 4, number 46, is either substantial in being, that is, for subsisting, as is the Incarnation of the Word alone; or it is only for representing, that is, for appearing in a visible form, as the Holy Spirit was sent in the form of a dove, in tongues of fire, in a sound, in a bright cloud. These were not substantially assumed by the Holy Spirit, but only employed as signs by institution signifying not all the Persons, but especially the Holy Spirit, and representing inner sanctification. These symbols were formed

either immediately by God or, as St. Augustine thinks in *De Trinitate*, Book 3, chapters 4 and 10 and following, through the ministry of angels. Hence the dove was indeed a true body, but not a true living dove, according to the more probable opinion which St. Bonaventure teaches in Book 1, distinction 16, article 1, question 3, to the fourth; therefore it immediately ceased to be. Hence also in Matthew 3 and Luke 3 the Spirit is read to have descended "as a dove." Likewise, according to St. Bonaventure, the fire was indeed a true body, but not true fire, because it did not burn; therefore it is said to have appeared as divided tongues as of fire, Acts 2.

Many mystical reasons could be given why that divine Spirit appeared on the day of Pentecost under the forms of fire, dove, and wind, that is, a mighty breath. Fire he assumed, first, to testify to his divinity; for fire is a symbol of divinity, according to Deuteronomy: Our God is a consuming fire. Hence St. Gregory beautifully, Homily 30 on the Gospels: The Spirit co-eternal with the Father and the Son is shown in fire, because God is incorporeal, invisible, and ineffable fire. Moreover by the same figure of fire he testified that he is the notional love of the Father and the Son; for love signifies a kind of fire and is customarily figured under the form of fire, and poets always describe it with flames.

Second, he did so to express his divine fecundity toward creatures. For as fire seems barren in its own sphere and produces nothing, yet in the sublunary world it is the parent and cause of almost all productions, so also that divine Spirit in the bosom of deity produces nothing, yet, as Cornelius Musso says in Book 3 of Sacred History, he produces heaven, earth, the elements, and all living things, and he nourishes, preserves, vivifies, and renews what he has produced: he is the founder of nature, the author of

grace, the consummator of glory, the universal principle of all things. From him flow all the charisms of graces. He is the one who in baptism adopts into sons of God those reborn in Christ, as St. Leo says: The same Spirit filling the font who filled the Virgin. Looking to this wondrous fecundity, the bride prayed in the Song of Songs, chapter 1: Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth. St. Bernard explains this in Sermon 9: That holy kiss is of such efficacy and fecundity that as soon as the bride receives it she conceives, her breasts swelling and as it were becoming rich with milk. For by charity the holy soul not only conceives the Son of God, but is made a daughter of God.

Third, fire has three principal effects: it burns, it purges, it illumines. The Holy Spirit accomplishes all of these in us. By the fire of his love he inflames our hearts. Hence St. Augustine in the *Soliloquia*: O holy fire, how sweetly you burn, how desirably you consume. You burn, I say, not to destroy and consume as bodily fire does, but rather to increase and perfect. Hence Christ rightly said: I came to cast fire on the earth; what do I will except that it be kindled? St. Ambrose explains this splendidly in Sermon 18 on Psalm 118: The Lord sent fire upon the earth, not to inflame it again with Sodom's conflagration, nor to exclude it from the gift, use, or flowering of fecundity, but rather to prove his work and increase it than to diminish or condemn it. Therefore the Lord scattered a divine fire in the New Testament that might inflame the secret affections of minds with the ardor of divine knowledge, that might kindle the heat of faith and devotion, that might light the desire of virtue. Likewise he purges and illumines, according to Lamentations: From on high he sent fire into my bones and instructed me. Hence St. Gregory calls the school of the Holy Spirit most blessed: In it there is no delay in learning; for as soon as he touches the mind, he teaches, and to have touched is to have

taught. For, as he adds in Homily 30 on the Gospel, behold, he fills a boy who plays the lyre and makes him a psalmist; he fills a shepherd of cattle and makes him a prophet; he fills a fisherman and makes him a preacher; he fills a persecutor and appoints him a teacher of the nations; he fills a tax collector and makes him an evangelist. O what an artisan this Spirit is.

He likewise assumed the form of a dove, first, to testify to the purity and cleanness which the Holy Spirit especially produces and requires, and of which the dove is an excellent symbol. Hence Basil says beautifully that the most chaste dove leans wholly upon heavenly things, and never lifts even the smallest grain from the earth without immediately lifting its eyes to heaven; it does not fly around corpses and flesh but rests by flowing waters, where the image of heaven shines back; heavenly things are always set before its gaze; it always contemplates what is above.

Second, he assumed the figure of a dove to show himself the author and lover of meekness. Hence Paschasius, Book 2 on Matthew: The Holy Spirit appeared in the form of a dove so that through it he might show what those would be like who would come to his grace. For the dove has no gall, and from this he indicates that whoever longs to come to the grace of the Holy Spirit must not be in the bitterness of gall.

Third, by this form of the dove he proclaimed himself the maker of peace. For, as Tertullian says in *De Baptismo*, chapter 8, just as after the waters of the flood, by which iniquity was purged, a dove sent out from the ark and returning with an olive branch announced peace to the earth as a herald of heavenly wrath, which sign among the nations also is held out as peace, so after former sins the dove of the Holy Spirit flies down, bringing the peace of God, sent from heaven.

Finally, he testified to his descent into souls under the form of wind and a mighty breath. First, to signify his origin and to manifest his personal property, for he proceeds as love, and love signifies an impulse by which the will of the lover is driven into the beloved. Second, just as the origin of winds is hidden from us and known to him alone who brings forth winds from his treasuries, so Christ said in John 3: The Spirit breathes where he wills, and you hear his voice, but you do not know where he comes from or where he goes.

Third, wind or air is necessary for life; without breath and breathing there is no life. So also the Holy Spirit is altogether necessary for spiritual life. Hence St. Ambrose, expounding Genesis 2, "He formed man from the dust of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life," and also what Christ said when he breathed upon the disciples: Receive the Holy Spirit, speaks thus: God had breathed upon you so that by the gift of his breathing you might have the grace which guilt had taken away. You had been made a living soul, but because the sinner could not keep the seal, therefore Jesus came, and when he had said these things he breathed and said: Receive the Holy Spirit.

I would undertake to say more, unless the oracle of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 43, deterred me: We will say many things about God and we will not reach him, and the consummation of all words is he himself. Therefore I will make an end of speaking by crying out for the descent of the divine Spirit in these words of St. Augustine, Tractate 74 on John: Come, kindly Spirit, come, divine Love of the Deity, holy communion of the omnipotent Father and the most blessed offspring. Omnipotent Paraclete, consoler of those who mourn, enter with powerful strength into the innermost recesses of my heart, and as a pious dweller make bright whatever is dark with the lightning-flash of your divinity.

Come, strength of the weak, teacher of the lowly, destroyer of the proud. Come, Father of the poor; come, giver of gifts; come, light of hearts. Give the reward of virtue; give the end of salvation; give everlasting joy. Amen.

FIN

Scotus Academicus Dogmatica

In this third volume of *Scotus Academicus*, the Most Reverend Claudius Frassen, O.F.M. (1620–1711)—the Distinguished Doctor of the Sacred Faculty of Paris—presents a comprehensive and systematic exposition of the Trinitarian theology of Blessed John Duns Scotus, the Subtle Doctor." Drawing upon the great lights of the Franciscan intellectual tradition—Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and Bl. Duns Scotus himself—Frassen arranges their doctrines according to the rigorous pedagogical method of the University of Paris.

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